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The American Jewish Year Book 2014
The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities

This Report derives from Chapter 19 of the *American Jewish Year Book, 2014*.

The *American Jewish Year Book* is "The Annual Record of Jewish Civilization." This volume is a very important and prestigious annual publication because it has acted as a major resource for academic researchers, researchers at Jewish institutions and organizations, practitioners at Jewish institutions and organizations, the media, both Jewish and secular, educated leaders and lay persons, and libraries, particularly University and Jewish libraries, for up-to-date information about the American and Canadian Jewish communities. For decades, the *American Jewish Year Book* has been the premiere place for leading academics to publish long review chapters on topics of interest to the American Jewish community.

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World Jewish Population, 2014

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WORLD JEWISH POPULATION, 2014

At the beginning of 2014, the world's Jewish population was estimated at 14,212,800—an increase of 93,400 (0.66%) over the 2013 revised estimate of 14,119,400 (DellaPergola 2013b). The world's total population increased by 1.13% in 2013 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2013). World Jewry hence increased at about half the general population growth rate.

Figure 1 illustrates changes in the number of Jews worldwide, in Israel, and in the aggregate in the rest of the world—commonly referred to as the Diaspora—as well as changes in the world's total population between 1945 and 2014. The world's *core* Jewish population was estimated at 11 million in 1945. The *core* Jewish population concept addresses mutually exclusive sub-populations while acknowledging that persons who carry multiple cultural and religious identities are increasing in contemporary societies (see more under definitions below). While 13 years were needed to add one million Jews from 11 million to 12 million after the tragic human losses of World War II and the Shoah (DellaPergola, Rebhun, and Tolts 2000), 40 more years were needed to add another million from 12 million to 13 million. Since the 1970s, world Jewry stagnated at *zero population growth* for nearly 20 years, with some recovery during the first decade of the 21st century. More recently world Jewish population recovered some momentum mostly reflecting enhanced demographic increase in Israel. It took about 13 years to add another million from 13 million to 14 million.

World Jewish population size resulted from the combination of two very different demographic trends in Israel and in the Diaspora. Israel's Jewish population increased linearly from an initial one-half million in 1945 to over 6.1 million in 2014. The Diaspora, from an initial 10.5 million in 1945, was quite stable until the early 1970s, when it started decreasing to the current 8.1 million. The world's total population increased more than threefold from 2.315 billion in 1945 to 7.243 billion in 2014. Thus, the relative share of Jews among the world's total population steadily diminished from 4.75 per 1,000 in 1945 to 1.96 per 1,000 currently.

Two countries, Israel and the US, accounted for 83% of the 2014 total, another 16 countries, each with 19,000 Jews or more, accounted for another 15%, and another 77 countries, each with Jewish populations below 18,000, accounted for the remaining 2%. **Figure 2** shows the largest *core* Jewish populations in 2014.

Israel's Jewish population (*not* including about 348,000 persons not recorded as Jews in the Population Register and belonging to families initially admitted to the country within the framework of the *Law of Return*) surpassed six million in 2014 (42.9% of world Jewry). This represented a population increase of 103,600 (1.73%) in 2013. In 2013, the Jewish population of the Diaspora decreased by 10,200 (-0.13%). Following the 2013 Pew Research Center study (Pew Research Center 2013), the *core* Jewish population in the US was upwardly re-assessed at 5,700,000 (40.1% of world Jewry) and was estimated to have slightly increased over the past 10 years after probably reaching its peak after 1980 followed by several subsequent years of moderate decline (DellaPergola 2013a). Jews in the rest of the world were assessed at 2,409,600 (17% of world Jewry).



Figure 1 World total population and Jewish population, core definition, 1945-2014



Figure 2 Largest core Jewish populations, 2014

After critically reviewing all available evidence on Jewish demographic trends, it is plausible to claim that Israel now hosts the largest Jewish community worldwide, although there are some dissenting opinions (Saxe and Tighe 2013; Sheskin and Dashefsky 2014 in Chapter 5 of this volume). Demography has produced a transition of singular importance for Jewish history and experience—the return of the Jews to a geographical distribution significantly rooted in their ancestral homeland. This has occurred through daily, minor, slow and diverse changes affecting human birth and death, geographical mobility, and the willingness of millions of persons to identify with a Jewish collective concept—no matter how specified in its details. At the same time, Israel's Jewish population faces a significant demographic challenge with its gradually diminishing majority status vis-à-vis the Palestinian Arab population that lives in the same territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.

Israel's current Jewish population growth—although slower than during the 1990s—reflects a continuing substantial natural increase generated by a combination of relatively high fertility (3.0 children per Jewish woman on average in 2012) and a young age composition (27% under age 15 and only 12% age 65 and over as of 2012). These two drivers of demographic growth—above-replacement fertility and a balanced age composition—do not simultaneously exist among any other Jewish population worldwide, namely the US. Other than a few cases of growth due to international migration (for example, Canada, the US in the recent past, Australia, and until recently, Germany), the number of Jews in Diaspora countries tended to diminish at varying rates. The causes for these decreases are low Jewish birth rates, an increasingly elderly age composition, and a dubious balance between persons who join Judaism (*accessions*) and those who partly or completely drop their Jewish identity (*secessions*).

All this holds true regarding the *core* Jewish population, which does *not* include non-Jewish members of Jewish households, Jews who also hold another religious identification, persons of Jewish ancestry who profess another monotheistic religion, other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry, other non-Jews with family connections to Jews, and other non-Jews who may be interested in Jewish matters. Starting from the core Jewish population estimate of 14,212,800 in 2014, if we add persons who state they are partly Jewish and non-Jews who have Jewish parents, an *extended* global aggregate population estimate of 17,236,850 is obtained. By adding non-Jewish members of Jewish households, the *enlarged* estimate grows to 20,109,400. Finally, under the comprehensive three-generation and lateral provisions of Israel's *Law of Return*, the total Jewish and non-Jewish eligible population can be roughly estimated at 22,921,500. The US holds a significantly larger *enlarged* Jewish population aggregate than Israel—roughly 10 million compared to 6,451,100, respectively. (See the **Appendix** and further discussion of definitions below.)

Fundamentals of Jewish Population Change

Jewish population size and composition reflect the continuous interplay of various factors that operate from both outside and inside the Jewish community.

Regarding **external factors**, since the end of the 1980s, major geopolitical and socioeconomic changes in the world significantly affected Jewish population trends. Leading factors included 1) the disintegration of the Soviet Union; 2) Germany's reunification; 3) the EU's gradual expansion to 28 states, but also its more recent economic stagnation and rising xenophobia and anti-Semitism; 4) South Africa's transition away from the apartheid regime; 5) political and economic instability but also democratization and growth in several Central and South American countries; and 6) steady economic growth in Israel along with a highly tense and volatile situation in the Middle East. Large-scale emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and also from Ethiopia, and rapid population growth in Israel were the most visible effects, accompanied by other significant Jewish population transfers, such as the movement of Jews from Central and South America to the US, particularly South Florida and Southern California. Shifts in group allegiances, reflecting broader trends in religious and national identities, as well as intermarriage patterns also played a role in shaping Jewish population size and composition. A major development was the rapid growth of the external – partly, weakly or not at all connected – belts of the Jewish identification configuration.

Reflecting these global trends, 83% of world Jews currently live in two countries, Israel and the US, and 96% are concentrated in the ten largest countries. In 2014, the G8 countries—the world's eight leading economies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian Federation, UK, and US)—comprised about 89% of the total Diaspora Jewish population. Thus, the aggregate of just a few major Jewish population centers virtually determines the assessment of world Jewry's total size and trends. The continuing realignment of world Jewish geography toward the major centers of economic development and political power provides a robust yardstick for further explanation and prediction of Jewish demography (DellaPergola, Rebhun, and Tolts 2005; DellaPergola 2014a).

Regarding **internal factors**, the defining prerogative of demography is that populations do not surge from a vacuum but rather reflect an uninterrupted chain of events that relay the same population from an earlier to a later point in time. Of the three major determinants of population change, two are shared by all populations: (a) the balance of vital events (births and deaths); and (b) the balance of international migration (immigration and emigration). Both factors affect increases or decreases in the physical presence of persons in a given place. The third determinant consists of identification changes or *passages* (accessions and secessions), and applies only to populations—often referred to as sub-populations—that are defined by some cultural, symbolic, or other specific characteristic, as is the case for Jews. Identification changes do not affect people's physical presence but rather their willingness or ability to identify with a particular religious, ethnic, or otherwise culturally-defined group. One cannot undervalue the quantitative impact of passages that occur in either direction regarding individual perceptions and emotional attachments to group identities. Some of these

passages are sanctioned through a normative ceremony under a given religious denomination, and some are not. Some involve severing ties with a previously held identity; some do not and involve a growing pool of carriers of multiple identities no matter how contradictory those nominal identities can be to each other.

The 2014 Jewish population data were updated from 2013 and previous years in accordance with the known or estimated quantity of vital events, migrations, and Jewish identification shifts. In the updating procedure, when data on intervening changes were available, empirically ascertained or reasonably assumed, effects of change were applied accordingly and consistently added to or subtracted from previous estimates. If the evidence was that intervening changes balanced one another, Jewish population size was not changed. This procedure has proven highly effective. Most often, when improved Jewish population estimates reflecting a new Census or socio-demographic survey became available, our annually updated estimates proved to be on target. Otherwise, previous estimates were adjusted to new better evidence.

The research findings reported here tend to confirm the estimates reported in previous years and, perhaps more importantly, a coherent interpretation of the trends prevailing in world Jewish demography (Bachi 1976; Schmelz 1981, 1984; DellaPergola 1995, 1999, 2001, 2011a). Concisely stated, a strongly positive balance of Jewish vital events (births and deaths) is seen in Israel versus a negative balance in nearly all other countries. A positive migration balance is seen in Israel, the US, Canada, Australia, and in a few other Western countries, while a negative migration balance prevails in Central and South America, South Africa, Eastern Europe, Muslim countries, and several countries in Western Europe. Israel sees a positive balance of accessions to Judaism over secessions, while an often negative, or, in any event, rather uncertain, balance of formal and especially informal passages prevails elsewhere.

While allowing for improvements and corrections, the 2014 population estimates highlight the increasing complexity of socio-demographic and identification factors underlying Jewish population patterns. This complexity is magnified at a time of pervasive internal and international migration and increasing transnationalism, sometimes implying bi-local residences and, thus, double counting of people on the move or who permanently share their time between different places. In this study special attention is paid to avoiding double counts of internationally mobile and multi-local persons. Even more intriguing can be the position of persons who hold more than one cultural identity and may periodically shift from one to another. Available data sources only imperfectly allow documenting these complexities, hence Jewish population estimates are far from perfect. Some errors can be corrected at a later stage. Consequently, analysts should resign themselves to the paradox of the *permanently provisional* nature of Jewish population estimates.

Definitions

Jewish population definitions obviously critically impact on the numbers. A major problem with Jewish population estimates produced by individual scholars or Jewish organizations is the lack of uniformity in definitional

criteria—when the issue of defining the Jewish population is addressed at all. The problem is magnified when one tries to address the Jewish population globally, trying to provide a coherent and uniform definitional framework to Jews who live in very different institutional, cultural and socioeconomic environments. For analytical purposes it would not be acceptable to use one definitional standard for one country, and another for another country, although in the practical conduct of Jewish community affairs, such differences do exist across countries. The need for international consistency guides this chapter.

The study of a Jewish population (or of any other sub-population) requires solving three main problems:

1) *defining* the target group on the basis of conceptual or normative criteria aimed at providing the best possible description of that group—which in the case of Jewry is no minor task in itself;
2) *identifying* the group thus defined based on tools that operationally allow for distinguishing and selecting the target group from the rest of the population—primarily by systematic canvassing of populations and personally ascertaining personal identifications. Identification is also often performed through membership lists, surnames, areas of residence, or other random or non-random procedures; and
3) *covering* the target group through appropriate field work—through face-to-face interviews, by telephone, by Internet, or otherwise. Most often in the actual experience of social research, and contrary to ideal procedures, the definitional task is performed at the stage of identification, and the identification task is performed at the stage of actual fieldwork.

It thus clearly appears that the quantitative study of Jewish populations relies mostly on *operational*, not *normative*, definitional criteria. Its conceptual aspects, far from pure theory, heavily depend on practical and logistical feasibility. The ultimate empirical step—obtaining relevant data from relevant persons—crucially reflects the readiness of people to cooperate in the data collection effort. In recent years, as cooperation rates have significantly decreased in social surveys, the amount, content, and validity of information gathered have been affected detrimentally. These declining cooperation rates reflect the identification outlook of the persons who are part of the target population—that outlook which is itself an integral part of the investigation. No method exists to break this vicious cycle. Therefore, research findings reflect, with varying degrees of sophistication, only that which is possible to uncover. Anything that cannot be uncovered directly can sometimes be estimated through various imperfect techniques. Beyond that, we enter the virtual world of myths, hopes, fears, and corporate interests. No methodology exists to demonstrate the actual nature of some of these claims—at least not within the limits of a non-fiction work such as this.

Keeping this in mind, four major definitional concepts should be considered to provide serious comparative foundations to the study of Jewish demography (**Figure 3**). It should be noted that the graph has purely illustrative purposes and does not pretend to portray accurately the actual quantitative extent of each of the several areas portrayed there.



Figure 3 Configuring contemporary Jewish populations
(Areas represented are not proportional to actual populations)

In most Diaspora countries, the concept of ***core Jewish population*** (initially suggested by Kosmin et al. 1991) includes all persons who, when asked in a socio-demographic survey, identify themselves as Jews; *or* who are identified as Jews by a respondent in the same household, *and* do not have another monotheistic religion. Such a definition of a person as a Jew, reflecting *subjective* perceptions, broadly overlaps but does not necessarily coincide with *Halakhah* (Jewish law) or other normatively binding definitions. Inclusion does *not* depend on any measure of that person's Jewish commitment or behavior in terms of religiosity, beliefs, knowledge, communal affiliation, or otherwise. The *core* Jewish population includes people who identify as Jews by religion, as well as others who are not interested in religion but see themselves as Jews by ethnicity or by other cultural criteria. Some others do not even recognize themselves as Jews when first asked, but if they descend from Jewish parents and do not hold another religious identity they should be included. All these people are considered to be part of the *core* Jewish population which also includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they are Jewish even without conversion and do not hold another identity. Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another monotheistic religion are excluded, as are persons who state being partly-Jewish along with another identity, and those of Jewish origin who in censuses or socio-demographic surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish religious group without having formally converted out. The *core* population concept offers an intentionally comprehensive and pragmatic, mutually exclusive approach compatible with the analytic options offered by many available demographic data sources.

In the Diaspora, such data often derive from population censuses or socio-demographic surveys where interviewees have the option to decide how to answer relevant questions on religious or ethnic identities. In Israel, personal status is subject to the rulings of the Ministry of the Interior, which relies on criteria established by rabbinic authorities and by the Israeli Supreme Court (Corinaldi 2001). In Israel, therefore, the *core* Jewish population does not simply express subjective identification but reflects definite legal rules. This entails matrilineal Jewish origin, or conversion to Judaism, *and* not holding another religion. Documentation to prove a person's Jewish status may include non-Jewish sources.

A major research issue of growing impact is whether *core* Jewish identification can or should be mutually exclusive with other religious and/or ethnic identities. In a much debated study—the 2000-01 US National Jewish Population Survey-NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler Berkowitz et al. 2003)—the solution chosen was to allow for Jews with multiple religious identities to be included in the *core* Jewish population definition under condition that the other identity was not a monotheistic religion. This resulted in a rather multi-layered and not mutually exclusive definition of the US Jewish population. A further category of *Persons of Jewish Background* (PJBs) was introduced by NJPS 2000-01. Some PJBs were included in the Jewish population count and others were not, based on a more thorough evaluation of each individual ancestry and childhood. (See further comprehensive discussions of the demography of US Jews in Heilman 2005, 2013).

The 2013 Pew Research Center survey of Jewish Americans (Pew Research Center 2013), by introducing the so far not empirically tested

concept of *partly Jewish,* helped clarifying the demographic picture but also made the debate about definitions more complicated and ambivalent. One intriguing issue concerns the status of the *partly Jewish* as a standard component of the Jewish collective, as some analysts would have it. Following a similar logic, persons with multiple ethnic identities, including a Jewish one, have been included in total Jewish population counts for Canada. As against this, other researchers would suggest that the *partly Jewish* stand conceptually closer to the other Pew survey categories of *Non-Jews with Jewish background*, or *Non-Jews* feeling some *Jewish affinity*. Recent research experiences, at any rate, indicate that people may often shift their identities over time across the different layers of the *core* Jewish definition, and between different *core* and *non-core* statuses. It is not uncommon to see those shifts across the boundary between being Jewish and being something else and vice versa, as graphically illustrated in **Figure 3**.

The adoption of increasingly extended definitional criteria by individual researchers tends to stretch Jewish population definitions with an expansive effect on Jewish population size beyond usual practices in the past and beyond the limits of the typical *core* definition. These procedures may respond to local needs and sensitivities but tend to limit the actual comparability of the same Jewish population over time and of different Jewish populations at one given time. As noted, a more coherently comparative approach is followed here.

The concept of an ***enlarged Jewish population*** (initially suggested by DellaPergola 1975) includes the sum of: (a) the *core* Jewish population; (b) persons reporting they are *partly Jewish*; (c) all others of Jewish parentage who—by *core* Jewish population criteria—are *not* currently Jewish (non-Jews with Jewish background); and (d) all respective non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.). Non-Jews with Jewish background, as far as they can be ascertained, include: (a) persons who have adopted another religion, or otherwise opted out, although they may claim to be *also* Jewish by ethnicity or in some other way—with the caveat just mentioned for recent US and Canadian data; and (b) other persons with Jewish parentage who disclaim being Jewish. It logically follows that most Pew survey *partly Jewish* and *PJBs* who are not part of the US *core* Jewish population, as well as many Canadians declaring Jewish as one of *multiple ethnicities* naturally should be included under the *enlarged* definition.

The ***Law of Return,*** Israel's distinctive legal framework for the acceptance and absorption of new immigrants, awards Jewish new immigrants immediate citizenship and other civil rights. The Law of Entrance and Law of Citizenship apply to all other foreign arrivals, some of whom may ask for Israeli citizenship. According to the current, amended version of the *Law of Return* (Gavison 2009) a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism (regardless of denomination—Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, or Reform), who does not have another religious identity. By ruling of Israel's Supreme Court, conversion from Judaism, as in the case of some ethnic Jews who currently identify with another religion, entails loss of eligibility for *Law of Return* purposes. Thus, all the Falash Mura—a group of Ethiopian non-Jews of Jewish ancestry—must undergo conversion to be eligible for the *Law of Return*. The law as such does not affect a person's Jewish status—which, as noted, is adjudicated by Israel's Ministry of Interior

relying on Israel's rabbinic authorities—but only for the specific immigration and citizenship benefits granted under the *Law of Return*. Commas 1 and 4A(a) of this law extend its provisions to all current Jews, their children, and grandchildren, as well as to their respective Jewish or non-Jewish spouses. As a result of its three-generation and lateral extension, the *Law of Return* applies to a large population—the so called *aliyah* eligible—whose scope is significantly wider than the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations defined above (Corinaldi 1998). It is actually quite difficult to estimate the total size of the *Law of Return* population. Rough estimates of these higher figures are tentatively suggested below.

Some major Jewish organizations in Israel and the US—such as the Jewish Agency for Israel, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and the major Jewish Federations in the US—sponsor data collection and tend to influence research targets, rendering them increasingly complex and flexible. Organizations enact their mission toward their respective constituencies based on perceived interests rather than scientific criteria. The understandable interest of organizations to function and secure budgetary resources may prompt them to expand their reach to Jewish populations increasingly closer to the *enlarged* and *Law of Return* definitions than to the *core* definition.

Some past socio-demographic surveys, by investigating people who were born or were raised or are currently Jewish, may have reached people whose ancestors *ever* were Jewish, regardless of present identification. It is indeed customary in socio-demographic surveys to consider the religio-ethnic identification of parents. Some censuses, however, *do* ask about more distant ancestry. For both conceptual and practical reasons, the *enlarged* definition usually does not include other non-Jewish relatives who lack a Jewish background and live in exclusively non-Jewish households. Historians may wish to engage in the study of the number of Jews who ever lived or of how many persons today are the descendants of those Jews—for example, *Conversos* who lived in the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages. The early Jewish backgrounds of some population groups have been uncovered in recent studies of population genetics (Hammer et al. 2000; Behar et al. 2004; Behar et al. 2010). These long-term issues and analyses are beyond the purpose of the present study.

The estimates presented below of Jewish population distribution worldwide and in each continent, individual country, and major metropolitan area consistently aim at the concept of *core* Jewish population (**Tables 1-6** and the **Appendix**). The *core* definition is indeed the necessary starting point for any admittedly relevant elaboration about the *enlarged* definition, or even broader definitions such as the *Law of Return* definition which will be estimated in the **Appendix**.

Data Sources

Data on population size, characteristics, and trends are a primary tool in the evaluation of Jewish community needs and prospects at the local level, nationally, and internationally. The estimates for major regions and individual countries reported below reflect a prolonged and continuing effort to study scientifically the demography of contemporary world Jewry. Data collection

and comparative research have benefited from the collaboration of scholars and institutions in many countries, including replies to direct inquiries regarding current estimates. It should be emphasized, however, that the elaboration of worldwide estimates for the Jewish populations of the various countries is beset with difficulties and uncertainties (Ritterband, Kosmin, and Scheckner 1988; DellaPergola 2002; DellaPergola 2014c). The problem of data consistency is particularly acute, given the very different legal systems and organizational provisions under which Jewish communities operate in different countries. In spite of our keen efforts to create a unified analytic framework for Jewish population studies, users of Jewish population estimates should be aware of these difficulties and of the inherent limitations of our estimates.

The more recent data presented here on Israel, the US, and the rest of world Jewry reflect updated information on Jewish population that became available following the major rounds of national censuses and socio-demographic surveys in countries with large but also smaller Jewish populations since 2000. This new evidence generally confirmed our previous estimates, but sometimes suggested upward or downward revisions.

Over the past decades, the data available for a critical assessment of the worldwide Jewish demographic picture have expanded significantly. Some of this ongoing research is part of coordinated efforts aimed at strengthening Jewish population research. For example, initiated by the late Roberto Bachi of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, an International Scientific Advisory Committee was established under the chairmanship of Sidney Goldstein from Brown University. An Initiative on Jewish Demography, sponsored by the Jewish Agency, facilitated data collection and analysis from 2003-2005, while between 2003 and 2009, the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute (JPPPI) provided a framework for Jewish population policy analysis and suggestions (DellaPergola and Cohen 1992; DellaPergola 2003a, 2003b, 2011a); The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute 2005, 2007, 2008). While the quantity and quality of documentation on Jewish population size and characteristics are still far from satisfactory, over the past twenty years important new data and estimates were released for several countries through official population censuses and Jewish-sponsored socio-demographic surveys.

Since 2000, one or more national censuses have yielded results on Jewish populations in European countries like Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK, and Ukraine; countries in Asia like Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; countries in Africa like South Africa; countries in the Americas like Canada, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; and countries in Oceania like Australia and New Zealand. Population Censuses in the US do not provide information on religion, but have furnished relevant data on countries of birth, spoken languages, and ancestry. Permanent national population registers, including information on Jews as one of several documented religious, ethnic, or national groups, exist in several European countries (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Switzerland) and in Israel.

In addition, independent socio-demographic studies provided valuable information on Jewish demography and socioeconomic stratification, as well

as on Jewish identification. Several socio-demographic surveys were conducted over the past several years in South Africa (1991 and 1998); Mexico (1991, 2000, and 2006); Lithuania (1993); Chile and the UK (1995, 2001, and 2011); Venezuela (1998–99); Guatemala, Hungary, and the Netherlands (1999); Moldova and Sweden (2000); France and Turkey (2002); Argentina (2003, 2004, and 2005); Australia (2008), New Zealand (2008), and Israel (1990, 1999, and 2011, besides the annual National Social Survey). In the US, important new insights were provided by several large surveys: the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS 2000–01, following NJPS 1971 and NJPS 1990), the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS 2001 and 2008), the Heritage, Ancestry, and Religious Identity Survey (HARI 2001-02), and the more recent Pew survey (2013). Smaller Jewish samples can be obtained from the General Social Survey (GSS) and similar national studies, and have been compiled and analyzed at the Steinhardt Social Research Institute at Brandeis University—SSRI (Saxe et al. 2013). Two other national studies including fairly large Jewish samples were the American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS 2008) and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2008). Moreover, numerous Jewish population studies were separately conducted in major cities in the US (notably in Chicago in 2001 and 2010, New York City in 2002 and 2011, Washington, DC in 2003, Miami in 2004, Palm Beach County (FL) in 2005, Boston in 2005—the fifth decennial study in that metropolitan area, and Philadelphia in 2009), as well as in other countries. (For a synopsis of the main findings, see Sheskin 2001, 2013).

Additional evidence on Jewish population trends comes from the systematic monitoring of membership registers, vital statistics, migration and conversion records available from Jewish communities and other Jewish organizations in many countries or cities, notably in Buenos Aires, Germany, Italy, São Paulo, and the UK. Detailed data on Jewish immigration routinely collected in Israel help to assess Jewish population changes in other countries. Jewish population projections undertaken by the author in the light of the latest data also helped in the current assessment. It is quite evident that the cross-matching of more than one type of source about the same Jewish population, although not frequently feasible, can provide either mutual reinforcement of, or important critical insights into, the available data.

Presentation and Quality of Data

Jewish population estimates in this study refer to January 1, 2014. Efforts to provide the most recent possible picture entail a short span of time for evaluation of available information, hence a somewhat greater margin of inaccuracy. Indeed, where appropriate, we revised our previous estimates in light of newly acquired information (**Tables 1-2**). Corrections were also applied retroactively to the 2013 totals for major geographical regions so as to ensure a better base for comparisons with the 2014 estimates. Corrections of the 2014 estimates, if needed, will be presented in the future.

We provide separate estimates for each country with approximately 100 or more resident *core* Jews. Estimates of Jews in smaller communities have been added to some of the continental totals. For each country, we provide in the **Appendix** an estimate of mid-year 2013 total (including both Jews and non-Jews) country population (Population Reference Bureau 2013), the estimated January 1, 2014 *core* Jewish population, the number of Jews

per 1,000 total population, and a rating of the accuracy of the Jewish population estimate. The last three columns provide rough estimates of the population with *Jewish parentage*, the *enlarged* Jewish population, and the *Law of Return* Jewish population. These figures were derived from available information and assessments on the generational depth and recent extent of cultural assimilation and intermarriage in the different countries. The quality of such broader estimates of the aggregate of Jews and non-Jews who often share daily life is much lower than that of the respective *core* Jewish populations, and the figures must be taken as indicative only.

Wide variation exists in the quality of the Jewish population estimates for different countries. For many Diaspora countries, it might be best to indicate a range for the number of Jews (minimum, maximum) rather than a definite estimate. It would be confusing, however, for the reader to be confronted with a long list of ranges; this would also complicate the regional and world totals. The estimates reported for most of the Diaspora communities should be understood as being the central value of the plausible range for the respective *core* Jewish populations. The relative magnitude of this range varies inversely with the accuracy of the estimate. One issue of growing significance is related to persons who hold multiple residences in different countries. Based on available evidence, we make efforts to avoid double counts. Wherever possible we strive to assign people to their country of permanent residence, ignoring the effect of part-year residents.

The three main elements that affect the accuracy of each estimate are: (a) the nature and quality of the base data, (b) how recent the base data are, and (c) the updating method. A simple code combines these elements to provide a general evaluation of the reliability of data reported in the detailed tables below. The code in the **Appendix** indicates different quality levels of the reported estimates:

(A) Base estimate derived from a national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period.
(B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period.
(C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or unsatisfactory or partial coverage of a country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends.
(D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure.

The year in which the country's base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the initial basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries, whose Jewish population estimate for 2014 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information.

As noted, one additional tool for updating Jewish population estimates is provided by several sets of demographic projections developed by the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics at the Institute of Contemporary

Jewry of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (DellaPergola, Rebhun and Tolts 2000; and author's updating). Such projections, based on available data on Jewish population composition by age and sex, extrapolate the most recently observed or expected Jewish population trends over the first decade of the 21st century. Even where reliable information on the dynamics of Jewish population change is not available, the powerful connection that generally exists between age composition, birth rates, death rates, and migration helps provide plausible scenarios for the developments bound to occur in the short term. Where better data were lacking, we used indications from these projections to refine the 2014 estimates against previous years. It should be acknowledged that projections are clearly shaped by a comparatively limited set of assumptions and need to be constantly updated in light of actual demographic developments.

World Jewish Population Size and Distribution

The size of world Jewry at the beginning of 2014 was assessed at 14,212,800. World Jewry constituted 1.96 per 1,000 of the world's total population of 7.243 billion by mid-year 2014 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2013). One in about 510 people in the world is a Jew (**Table 1**).

According to the revised estimates, between January 1, 2013 and January 1, 2013, the Jewish population increased by an estimated 93,400 persons, or about 0.66%. This compares with a total world population growth rate of 1.13% (basically nil in more developed countries, 1.5-2.0% in less developed countries). World Jewry continued to increase slowly exclusively due to the population increase in Israel (1.73%) overcoming the decrease in the Diaspora (-0.13%).

Table 1 offers an overall picture of the Jewish population at the beginning of 2014 as compared to 2013. For 2013, the originally published estimates from the 2013 *American Jewish Year* Book are presented as are the revised estimates that reflect retroactive corrections made in certain country estimates, given improved information. These corrections resulted in a net increase of 264,600 persons in the 2013 world Jewry estimate, comprising a reduction of -14,700 in the previous estimate for Israel, and an increase of 279,300 in the Jewish Diaspora total. Most of the correction concerns an increase of 275,000 in the US following publication of the 2013 Pew survey. Other corrections, reflecting newly available data, concern Canada (+3,000), Switzerland (+1,800), Ireland (+400), Latvia (-500), and Lithuania (-400). Moreover, Croatia (1,700 Jews) was moved from the regional sub-total of the Balkans to that of the European Union following that country's EU admission. Further explanations are provided below.

The number of Jews in Israel increased from the revised 5,999,600 in 2013 to 6,103,200 at the beginning of 2014, an annual increase of 103,600, or 1.73%. In contrast, the estimated Jewish population in the Diaspora *decreased* from the revised 8,119,800 to 8,109,600—an annual decrease of 10,200, or -0.13%. These changes reflect continuing Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and other countries to Israel, and the internal decrease typical of the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. In 2013, out of a total growth of 103,600 core Jews in Israel, 91,600 reflected the balance of births

Table 1 Estimated core Jewish population, by continents and major geographic regions, 2013 and 2014[a]

Region	2013			2014		Percentage change 2013-2014	Jews per 1,000 total population in 2014[a]
	Original Number	Revised[b]					
		Number	Percent[c]	Number	Percent[c]		
World total	**13,854,800**	**14,119,400**	**100.0**	**14,212,800**	**100.0**	**0.66**	**1.99**
Diaspora	7,840,500	8,119,800	57.5	8,109,600	57.1	-0.13	1.14
Israel[d]	6,014,300	5,999,600	42.5	6,103,200	42.9	1.73	750.29
America total	**6,189,900**	**6,467,900**	**45.8**	**6,468,800**	**45.5**	**0.01**	**6.75**
North[e]	5,805,000	6,083,000	43.1	6,085,300	42.8	0.04	17.31
Central, Caribbean	56,900	56,900	0.4	56,900	0.4	0.00	0.28
South	328,000	328,000	2.3	326,600	2.3	-0.43	0.81
Europe total	**1,416,400**	**1,417,700**	**10.0**	**1,407,200**	**9.9**	**-0.74**	**1.72**
European Union[f]	1,105,700	1,106,900	7.8	1,103,300	7.8	-0.33	2.18
FSU[g]	270,300	270,300	1.9	263,700	1.9	-2.44	1.30
Other West	19,300	21,100	0.1	20,900	0.1	-0.95	1.52
Balkans[g]	21,100	19,400	0.1	19,300	0.1	-0.52	0.20
Asia total	**6,053,700**	**6,039,000**	**42.8**	**6,142,000**	**43.2**	**1.71**	**1.45**
Israel[d]	6,014,300	5,999,600	42.5	6,103,200	42.9	1.73	750.29
FSU[g]	19,600	19,600	0.1	19,100	0.1	-2.55	0.23
Other	19,800	19,800	0.1	19,700	0.1	-0.51	0.00
Africa total	**74,700**	**74,700**	**0.5**	**74,700**	**0.5**	**0.00**	**0.07**
Northern[h]	3,500	3,500	0.0	3,500	0.0	0.00	0.01
Sub-Saharan[i]	71,200	71,200	0.5	71,200	0.5	0.00	0.09
Oceania[j]	**120,100**	**120,100**	**0.9**	**120,100**	**0.8**	**0.00**	**3.16**

a Jewish population: January 1. Total population: mid-year estimates, 2013. Source: Population Reference Bureau 2013.
b Based on updated or corrected information.
c Minor discrepancies due to rounding.
d Includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.
e US and Canada.
f Including the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).
g Asian regions of Russian Federation and Turkey included in Europe. Excluding the Baltic countries.
h Including Ethiopia.
i Including South Africa and Zimbabwe.
j Including Australia and New Zealand.

and deaths, and 12,000 derived from net conversions to Judaism and from the estimated Israel-Diaspora net migration balance (immigration minus emigration) (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Fisher 2013). This estimate includes tourists who changed their status to immigrants, returning Israelis, and Israeli citizens born abroad who entered Israel for the first time. Therefore, internal demographic change produced over 80% of the recorded Jewish population growth in Israel as well as most of the Diaspora's estimated decrease.

By comparing the Israel-Diaspora net migration balance with the total estimated decrease in the Diaspora's *core* Jewish population, one obtains that the former was very close to the latter. This would imply a zero balance in the combination of Jewish births and deaths, as well as of accessions to and secessions from Judaism across the Diaspora. This is quite certainly underestimating the actually negative balance between these demographic factors in most countries, resulting in higher than real population estimates for the aggregate of Diaspora Jewry. Adjustments could be needed in the future.

Recently, however, more frequent instances of conversion, accession, or "return" to Judaism can be observed in connection with the absorption in Israel of immigrants from Eastern Europe, Ethiopia, some Latin American countries like Peru, and India. To some extent this phenomenon occurs in the Diaspora as well. The return or first-time accession to Judaism of such previously non-belonging or unidentified persons tends to contribute both to slowing the decrease in the relevant Diaspora Jewish populations and to some of the increase in the Jewish population in Israel.

Along with our assessment of world Jewish population and its geographical distribution there are other such evaluations. One worth mentioning is the 2010 estimate by the Pew Research Center (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2012). Unlike our review of hundreds of local and international sources, the Pew study often relies on percentages of Jews from larger general studies. As those fractions are usually extremely small, the resulting Jewish population estimates may be affected by quite large sampling errors. However, the overall picture is worth seeing as part of Pew's broader comparative assessment of world religions. It suggests estimates basically compatible with ours in view of the intervening four-year time lag:

Estimate (thousands)	North America	Middle East, North Africa	Europe	Latin America, Carib-bean	Asia, Pacific	Sub-Saharan Africa	Total
Ours 2014	6,085	6,117	1,407	384	149	71	14,213
Pew 2010	6,040	5,630	1,410	470	200	100	13,850

As noted, in our present study we corrected previously published Jewish population estimates in light of new information. The last correction in the US called for retrospective revision of the whole annual series of data since 2000. **Table 2** provides a synopsis of world Jewish population estimates for 1945–2014, as first published each year in the *American Jewish Year Book (AJYB)* and as now corrected retroactively, also adjusting all revisions that had been suggested in previous years.

Table 2 World core Jewish population estimates: original and revised, 1945-2014

	World Jewish population			World total population		
Year	**Original estimate[a]**	**Revised estimate[b]**	**Annual percentage change[c]**	**Total (millions)[d]**	**Annual percentage change**	**Jews per 1,000 total population**
1945, May 1	11,000,000	11,000,000		2,315		4.75
1950, Jan. 1	11,303,400	11,297,000	0.57	2,526	1.76	4.47
1960, Jan. 1	12,792,800	12,079,000	0.67	3,026	1.82	3.99
1970, Jan. 1	13,950,900	12,585,000	0.41	3,691	2.01	3.41
1980, Jan. 1	14,527,100	12,819,000	0.18	4,449	1.81	2.88
1990, Jan. 1	12,810,300	12,868,000	0.04	5,321	1.74	2.42
2000, Jan. 1	13,191,500	13,150,000	0.22	6,127	1.42	2.15
2005, Jan. 1	13,034,100	13,460,000	0.47	6,514	1.23	2.07
2010, Jan. 1	13,428,300	13,854,000	0.58	6,916	1.20	2.00
2011, Jan. 1	13,657,800	13,925,000	0.51	6,998	1.19	1.99
2012, Jan. 1	13,746,100	14,011,000	0.62	7,080	1.17	1.98
2013, Jan. 1	13,854,800	14,119,400	0.77	7,162	1.16	1.97
2014, Jan. 1	14,212,800		0.66	7,243	1.13	1.96

a As published in *American Jewish Year Book*, various years. Some estimates reported here as of January 1 were originally published as of December 31 of previous year.
b Based on updated or corrected information. Original estimates for 1990 and after, and all revised estimates: The A. Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
c Based on revised estimates, besides latest year.
d Mid-year estimates. Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2013.

These revised estimates depart, sometimes significantly, from the estimates published by other authors until 1980 and since 1981 by ourselves. Thanks to the development over the years of an improved database, these new revisions are not necessarily the same revised estimates that appeared annually in the *AJYB* based on the information that was available on each date. It is likely that further retroactive revisions may become necessary reflecting ongoing and future research.

The time series in **Table 2** clearly portrays the decreasing rate of Jewish population growth globally from World War II until 2005. Based on a post-Shoah world Jewish population estimate of 11,000,000, a growth of 1,079,000 occurred between 1945 and 1960, followed by increases of 506,000 in the 1960s, 234,000 in the 1970s, 49,000 in the 1980s, and 182,000 in the 1990s. While 13 years were necessary to add one million to world Jewry's postwar size, 47 years were needed to add another million. Since 2000, the slow rhythm of Jewish population growth has somewhat recovered, with an increase of 704,000 through 2010, reflecting the robust demographic trends in Israel and Israel's increasing share of the world total. Between 2010 and 2014, world Jewry increased by 359,000, but Israel's Jewish population grew by 401,000 while the total Diaspora Jewish population decreased by 40,000. **Table 2** also catches the slower Jewish population growth rate compared to global population growth, and the declining Jewish share of world population. In 2014, the share of Jews among world population (1.93 per 1,000) was 40% of the 1945 estimate (4.75 per 1,000).

Besides updating and revising *core* Jewish population estimates, we made an entirely new attempt to evaluate the possible extent of various expanded Jewish population definitions in each country of the world: the total of those who have Jewish parents regardless of their current identity; the enlarged Jewish population inclusive of non-Jewish household members; and the population eligible for the Law of Return (**Table 3** and the **Appendix**). The main gist of these alternative population boundary definitions is to promote and facilitate inter-country comparability. In the light of the preceding discussion of definitions, it appears that Jewish investigators or community leaders in different countries sometimes follow local criteria that may differ from the definitional criteria acceptable and used in other countries. This may help explain why Jewish population size in the US is evaluated quite differently in the present study and in another chapter of this same volume (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2014). In other words, criteria that may be understood or even preferred in one country may not be acceptable in another country. But in a global study like ours, maximum comparability can be ensured only if the same criteria are followed consistently across the board, and the choice unavoidably must fall on the minimum common denominator. By showing the consequences different definitions may have for Jewish population evaluation, we believe readers will have an additional tool to better appreciate the ongoing population trends in their countries.

The results are quite tentative but provide interesting indications about the total size and geographical distribution of the populations more or less closely attached to the core Jewish population. The global total of persons who have a Jewish parent, regardless of their own identification, stands at 17,236,850, or 3,024,050 more than the 14,212,800 core Jews. The total number of household members with at least one core Jew is estimated at

20,109,400, or an additional increment of 2,872,550. Finally, the total eligible for the Law of Return is roughly estimated at 22,921,500, or an additional increment of 2,812,100. All in all, the difference between the Law of Return potential aggregate and the core Jewish population can be evaluated at 8,708,700 self-described partly Jewish or non-Jewish holders of a non-Jewish religion and/or a non-Jewish ethnicity. Of these roughly estimated 8.7 million somewhat Jewish-connected non-Jews, 76.0% live in North America, 8.7% in the EU, 6.3% in the FSU, 4.0% in Israel, 3.6% in Latin America, and 1.4% in other countries.

Table 3 Jewish population by major regions, core definition and expanded definitions (rough estimates), 1/1/2014

Region	Core Jewish population[a]	Population with Jewish parents[b]	Enlarged Jewish population[c]	Law of Return population[d]	Difference (Law of Return - Core Jewish population)	Percentage distribution of difference
World total	**14,212,800**	**17,236,850**	**20,109,400**	**22,921,500**	**8,708,700**	**100.0**
North America	6,085,300	8,450,000	10,550,000	12,700,000	6,614,700	76.0
Latin America	383,500	513,600	625,100	698,600	315,100	3.6
European Union[e]	1,103,300	1,312,300	1,592,600	1,862,300	759,000	8.7
FSU in Europe[e]	263,700	410,700	542,500	814,000	550,300	6.3
Rest of Europe	40,200	46,700	53,000	59,600	19,400	0.2
Israel[f]	6,103,200	6,245,000	6,451,100	6,451,100	347,900	4.0
FSU in Asia	19,100	26,850	37,900	52,300	33,200	0.4
Rest of Asia	19,700	22,600	25,600	28,600	8,900	0.1
Africa	74,700	80,950	87,400	94,750	20,050	0.2
Oceania	120,100	128,150	144,200	160,250	40,150	0.5

a Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews; or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews; *and* do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity.
b Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent.
c Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.).
d Sum of Jews, children of Jews, and grandchildren of Jews, and their respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identity.
e The Baltic countries are included in the European Union, not in the FSU.
f Includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.

Major Regions and Countries

Over 45% of the world's Jews reside in the Americas, with about 43% in North America (**Table 1**). Over 43% live in Asia, mostly in Israel. Asia is defined as including the Asian republics of the FSU, but not the Asian parts of the Russian Federation and Turkey. Europe, including the Asian territories of the Russian Federation and Turkey, accounts for about 10% of the total. Fewer than 2% of the world's Jews live in Africa and Oceania.

Very significant changes occurred in world Jewish population distribution by major regions between 1948 and 2014. **Figure 4** illustrates these changes by focusing on a threefold division between the US, Israel, and the rest of the world. In particular the rapid growth of Israel's Jewish population is evident, from 650,000 and 5.7% of the total in 1948, to over 6.1 million and 42.9% in 2014. In contrast, the US changed from over 4.5 million and 39.5% of the total in 1948, to 5.7 million and 40.1% in 2014, while the total Jewish population in other countries decreased from over 6.3 million and 54.9% of the total in 1948, to 2.4 million and 17.0% in 2014. The most significant declines occurred in the FSU, in other Eastern European countries, in Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East, in Africa south of the Sahara, and in Latin America. Substantial stability prevailed in North America and in Western Europe as a total. Significant increases occurred in Oceania where the Jewish population represents less than 1% of world Jewry. All in all, comparing 1970 with 1948, and 2013 with 1970, the geographical map of world Jewish population dispersion tended to become much more concentrated over time.

Among the major geographical regions shown in **Table 1**, the number of Jews increased between 2013 and 2014 in Israel (and, consequently, in Asia as a whole), in Oceania, and minimally in North America thanks to continuing immigration to Canada. Jewish population size decreased to variable extents in Central and South America, Western Europe, the Balkans, the FSU (both in Europe and Asia), the rest of Asia, and in Africa. These regional changes reflect the trends apparent in the Jewish population in the major countries in each region. We now turn to a review of the largest Jewish populations in individual countries.

Reflecting global Jewish population stagnation along with an increasing concentration in a few countries, 98.3% of world Jewry in 2014 lived in the largest 18 communities, and excluding Israel from the count, 97.1% of Diaspora Jewry lived in the 17 largest communities of the Diaspora, including 70.3% who lived in the US (**Table 4**). Besides the two major Jewish populations (Israel and the US), each comprising over five million persons, another seven countries each had more than 100,000 Jews. Of these, three were in Western Europe (France, the UK, and Germany); one in Eastern Europe (the Russian Federation); one in North America (Canada); one in South America (Argentina); and one in Oceania (Australia). The dominance of Western countries in global Jewish population distribution is a relatively recent phenomenon and reflects the West's relatively more hospitable socioeconomic and political circumstances *vis-à-vis* the Jewish presence.



Figure 4 Core Jewish population in the United States, Israel, and other countries, thousands, 1948, 1970, and 2014

Table 4 Countries with largest core Jewish populations, 1/1/2014

Rank	Country	Jewish population	Percent of total Jewish population			
			In the world		In the diaspora	
			%	Cumulative %	%	Cumulative %
1	Israel[a]	6,103,200	42.9	42.9	[b]	[b]
2	US	5,700,000	40.1	83.0	70.3	70.3
3	France	475,000	3.3	86.4	5.9	76.1
4	Canada	385,300	2.7	89.1	4.8	80.9
5	United Kingdom	290,000	2.0	91.1	3.6	84.5
6	Russian Federation	186,000	1.3	92.4	2.3	86.8
7	Argentina	181,300	1.3	93.7	2.2	89.0
8	Germany	118,000	0.8	94.6	1.5	90.5
9	Australia	112,500	0.8	95.3	1.4	91.8
10	Brazil	95,000	0.7	96.0	1.2	93.0
11	South Africa	70,000	0.5	96.5	0.9	93.9
12	Ukraine	63,000	0.4	96.9	0.8	94.7
13	Hungary	47,900	0.3	97.3	0.6	95.2
14	Mexico	40,000	0.3	97.6	0.5	95.7
15	Belgium	30,000	0.2	97.8	0.4	96.1
16	Netherlands	29,900	0.2	98.0	0.4	96.5
17	Italy	28,000	0.2	98.2	0.3	96.8
18	Switzerland	19,000	0.1	98.3	0.2	97.1

a Includes Jewish residents in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.
b Not applicable.

The growth, or at least the slower decrease, of Jewish population in the more developed Western countries is accompanied by a higher share of Jews in a country's total population. Indeed, the share of Jews in a country's total population tends to be related to the country's level of development (**Table 5**). Regarding *core* Jewish populations in 2014, the share of Jews out of the total population was 750.3 per 1,000 in Israel (including Jews in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, but excluding Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza). Israel obviously is a special case in Jewish identity perceptions, but it also has become quite a developed country. Elsewhere, Jews represented 18 per 1,000 of total population in the US; 3.9 per 1,000 on average in the other seven countries with over 100,000 Jews; 0.8 per 1,000 on average in the other nine countries with 19,000 or more Jews; and virtually nil in the remaining countries which comprise the overwhelming majority of world population.

To illustrate the increasing convergence between the Jewish presence and the level of socioeconomic development of a country better, **Table 5** reports the Human Development Index (HDI) for each country (United Nations Development Programme 2013). The HDI—a composite measure of a society's education, health, and income—provides a general sense of the context in which Jewish communities operate, although it does not necessarily reflect the actual characteristics of the members of those Jewish communities. The latest available HDI country ranks reported in the table are for 2012. Of the 18 countries listed, five are included among the top ten HDIs among 189 countries ranked (Australia, the US, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland). Another five countries are ranked 11th to 25th (Canada, Israel, Belgium, France, and Italy), three are better than 50th (UK, Hungary, and Argentina), four are better than 100th (Russian Federation, Mexico, Ukraine, and Brazil), and one (South Africa) occupies a lower rank (121st) pointing to lesser development in the host society. One should be aware that Jewish communities may display social and economic data significantly better than the average population of their respective countries, but nonetheless the general societal context does affect the quality of life of each individual, Jews included.

The increasing overlap of a Jewish presence with higher levels of socioeconomic development in a country, and at the same time the diminution or gradual disappearance of a Jewish presence in less developed areas is a conspicuous feature of the 20th and early 21st centuries. The emerging geographical configuration carries advantages concerning the material and legal conditions of Jewish life, but it also may generate a lack of recognition of, or estrangement toward, Jews on the part of societies in less developed countries that constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's total population and the overwhelming majority of voting countries in international bodies like the United Nations.

Major Cities

Changes in the geographic distribution of Jews have affected their distribution not only among countries, but also significantly within countries, and have resulted in a preference for major metropolitan areas. Most metropolitan areas

Table 5 Largest core Jewish populations per 1,000 total population and Human Development Indices, 1/1/2014

Rank	Country	Jewish population	Total population	Jews per 1,000 total population	HDI rank[a] 2012
1	Israel[b]	6,103,200	8,134,500	750.3	16
2	US	5,700,000	316,200,000	18.0	3
3	France	475,000	63,940,000	7.4	20
4	Canada	385,300	35,300,000	10.9	11
5	United Kingdom	290,000	64,300,000	4.5	26
6	Russian Federation	186,000	143,500,000	1.3	55
7	Argentina	181,300	41,300,000	4.4	45
8	Germany	118,000	80,600,000	1.5	5
9	Australia	112,500	23,100,000	4.9	2
	Total ranks 3-9	*1,748,100*	*452,040,000*	*3.9*	*23.4*[c]
10	Brazil	95,000	195,500,000	0.5	85
11	South Africa	70,000	53,000,000	1.3	121
12	Ukraine	63,000	45,500,000	1.4	78
13	Hungary	47,900	9,900,000	4.8	37
14	Mexico	40,000	117,600,000	0.3	61
15	Belgium	30,000	11,200,000	2.7	17
16	Netherlands	29,900	16,800,000	1.8	4
17	Italy	28,000	59,800,000	0.5	25
18	Switzerland	19,000	8,100,000	2.3	9
	Total ranks 10-18	*422,800*	*517,400,000*	*0.8*	*48.6*[c]
	Rest of world	238,700	5,843,745,500	0.0	ca. 100

a HDI = The Human Development Index, a synthetic measure of health, education and income (in terms of US dollar purchase power parity) among the country's total population. See: United Nations Development Programme 2013.
b Total Jewish population of Israel includes the Jewish residents of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights**.** Total population includes all residents of Israel, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, but only the Jewish residents (and non-Jewish members of Jewish households) of the West Bank.
c Average HDI rank for group of countries.

include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city, definitions varying by country. (For definitions of Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) in the US see: United States Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget 2008). It is not easy to create a truly standardized picture of Jews in major cities, as some of the available figures refer to different years and only roughly compare with each other regarding Jewish population definitions and evaluation methods. For example, in the case of a recent Jewish population study in the New York area (Cohen, Ukeles, and Miller 2012), we subtracted about 100,000 individuals of the 1,538,000 that had been included in the Jewish population count because they were neither born Jewish nor had converted to Judaism and therefore could not be considered part of a core Jewish population definition. This correction affected our estimate for the larger New York metropolitan area. On similar ground, we introduced a correction in the Jewish population estimate for the San Francisco Bay area (Phillips 2005).

The unequivocal fact of an overwhelmingly urban concentration of Jewish populations globally is shown by the fact that in 2014 more than half (52.9%) of world Jewry lived in only five metropolitan areas (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2013; see Chapter 5 in this volume, Sheskin and Dashefsky 2014). These five areas—including the main cities and vast urbanized territories around them—were Tel Aviv, New York, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Los Angeles (**Table 6**). Over two-thirds (68.2%) of world Jewry lived in the five previous areas plus the South Florida, Be'er Sheva, San Francisco, Washington/Baltimore, Chicago, and Boston areas. The 17 largest metropolitan concentrations of Jewish population, each with 100,000 Jews or more, encompassed 76.8% of all Jews worldwide.

The Jewish population in the Tel Aviv urban conurbation, extending from Netanya to Ashdod and approaching 3.2 million Jews by the *core* definition, now exceeds by far that in the New York Combined Metropolitan Statistical Area, extending from southern New York State to parts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, with 2.1 million Jews. Of the 17 largest metropolitan areas of Jewish residence, nine were located in the US, four in Israel, and one each in France, the UK, Canada, and Argentina. Nearly all the major areas of settlement of contemporary Jewish populations share distinct features, such as being a national or regional capital, enjoying a higher standard of living, with a highly developed infrastructure for higher education, and widespread transnational connections.

Unlike our estimates of Jewish populations in individual countries, the data reported here on urban Jewish populations do not fully adjust for possible double counting due to multiple residences. The differences in the US may be quite significant, in the range of tens of thousands, involving both major and minor metropolitan areas. Estimates of part-year residents for the two main receiving areas of South Florida and Southern California are reported in the footnotes to **Table 6.** The respective estimates of part-year residents were excluded from the estimates in the table. Part-year residency is related to both climate differences and economic and employment factors. Such multiple residences now also increasingly occur internationally. A person from New York or Paris may also own or rent an apartment in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, or vice versa (Pupko 2013).

Table 6 Seventeen metropolitan areas (CMSAs) with largest core Jewish populations, 1/1/2014

Rank	Metropolitan area[a]	Country	Jewish population	Percent of world Jewish population	
				%	Cumulative %
1	Tel Aviv[b]	Israel	3,173,000	22.3	22.3
2	New York[c]	US	2,100,000	14.8	37.1
3	Jerusalem[d]	Israel	872,000	6.1	43.2
4	Haifa[e]	Israel	690,000	4.9	48.1
5	Los Angeles[f]	US	689,000	4.8	52.9
6	South Florida[g]	US	489,000	3.4	56.4
7	Be'er Sheva[h]	Israel	414,000	2.9	59.3
8	San Francisco[i]	US	346,000	2.4	61.7
9	Washington/Baltimore[j]	US	333,000	2.3	64.1
10	Chicago[k]	US	295,000	2.1	66.1
11	Boston[l]	US	291,000	2.0	68.2
12	Paris[m]	France	282,000	2.0	70.2
13	Philadelphia[n]	US	280,000	2.0	72.1
14	London[o]	United Kingdom	195,000	1.4	73.5
15	Toronto[p]	Canada	186,000	1.3	74.8
16	Buenos Aires[q]	Argentina	160,000	1.1	76.0
17	Atlanta[r]	US	119,000	0.8	76.8

a Most metropolitan areas include extended inhabited territory and several municipal authorities around the central city. Definitions vary by country. Some of the US metropolitan areas are defined differently than in the Sheskin and Dashefsky chapter in this volume. Some of the US estimates may include non-core Jews.
b Includes Tel Aviv District, Central District, and Ashdod Subdistrict. Principal cities: Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, Bene Beraq, Petach Tikwa, Bat Yam, Holon, Rishon LeZiyon, Rehovot, Netanya, and Ashdod, all with Jewish populations over 100,000.
c Our adjustment of original data based on core Jewish population definition. About 100,000 individuals pertaining to the enlarged Jewish population were subtracted from the original population estimates by Cohen et al. (2012). New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA Metropolitan Statistical Area. Principal cities: New York, NY; White Plains, NY; Newark, NJ; Edison, NJ; Union, NJ; Wayne, NJ; and New Brunswick, NJ.
d Includes Jerusalem District and parts of Judea and Samaria District.
e Includes Haifa District and parts of Northern District.
f Includes Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana area, San Bernardino and Ventura areas.
g Includes Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. Not including 69,275 part-year residents.
h Includes Be'er Sheva Subdistrict and other parts of Southern District.
i Our adjustment of original data based on core Jewish population definition. About 40,000 individuals pertaining to the enlarged Jewish population were subtracted from the original population estimates by Phillips (2005). Includes the San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont area, Napa, San Benito, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, and Sonoma.
j Includes the District of Columbia, northern Virginia, Montgomery County, Prince George's County, and the Baltimore-Towson area.
k Includes Chicago-Joliet-Naperville area (IL-IN-WI), Kankakee area (IL), La Porte area (IN).
l Includes Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, Bristol, Worcester area (MA), Hillsborough, Merrimack, Belknap area (NH), and Rhode Island.
m Departments 75, 77, 78, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95.
n Includes Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington area (PA-NJ-DE-MD), Berks area (PA), and Cumberland area (NJ).
o Greater London and contiguous postcode areas.
p Census Metropolitan Area.
q Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area A.M.B.A.
r Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Determinants and Consequences of Jewish Population Change

International Migration

Over the past decades, shifts in Jewish population size in the major regions of the world were primarily determined by large-scale international migration. Unfortunately, international migration of Jews is only imperfectly documented. Currently, only Israel annually records Jewish immigrants by country of origin (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). Israeli data, compared over several successive years, may provide under certain conditions a sense of the intensity of parallel migration movements of Jews to other countries, although there also are differences in the timing, volume, direction, and characteristics of migrants (DellaPergola 2009a; Amit, Borowski, and DellaPergola 2010). Some countries do have records of annual numbers of migrants from Israel, though not distinguishing between Jews and non-Jews (US Department of Homeland Security 2013). Jewish organizations, like the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) (2013) in the US or Zentralwohlfhartsstelle in Germany, record Jewish immigrants on an annual basis, but the global picture of Jewish migration remains incomplete.

Jewish international migration reached one of its highest peaks ever when the former Soviet Union (FSU) opened its doors at the end of 1989. Of the estimated total 1.66 million FSU migrants between 1989 and 2012 by main countries of destination, including non-Jewish household members, over one million migrated to Israel, over 300,000 to the US, and over 225,000 to Germany. Israel's share of the total increased from 18% in 1989 to 83% in the peak years 1990-1991. It then decreased to 41% in 2002-2004 and increased again to 71% in 2010-2012. The decrease for the US as a destination for FSU migrants in the first decade of the 21st century is noticeable, as is the parallel decrease in the attractiveness of Germany since the second half of the same decade. These significant increases and decreases reflect the changing incidence of push factors in the FSU during times of rapid geopolitical and economic change, and real or expected disruptions in the environment affecting Jewish life, namely the relationship between society at large and the Jews. They also reflect the different and significantly variable legal provisions related to migration and socioeconomic opportunities in the main countries of destination.

Beginning with 1948, Israel was the main recipient of Jewish international migration. It gathered 69% of all Jewish migration between 1948-1968, and 59% between 1969-2012 (DellaPergola 2014b). Clearly migration, or rather a net migration balance to Israel, decreases the Diaspora Jewish population and increases Israel's Jewish population. **Table 7** shows the number of immigrants to Israel by country of origin in 2012 and 2013. The data reflect the *Law of Return*, not the *core* Jewish population, definition.

Table 7 New immigrants to Israel[a], by last country of residence, 2012-2013

Country	2012	2013	Country	2012	2013	Country	2012	2013
Total[b]	**16,557**	**16,882**	Germany	100	79	**Asia total[b]**	**1,069**	**956**
			Greece	10	7	*FSU in Asia*	**962**	**753**
America total[b]	**3,308**	**3,334**	Hungary	110	148	Armenia	25	22
North America	**2,525**	**2,413**	Ireland	5	2	Azerbaijan	154	124
Canada	235	228	Italy	137	133	Georgia	231	141
United States	2,290	2,185	Luxembourg	2	-	Kazakhstan	145	146
Central America	**167**	**161**	Netherlands	36	55	Kyrgyzstan	48	28
Costa Rica	28	7	Poland	16	25	Tajikistan	9	2
Cuba	64	72	Portugal	5	5	Turkmenistan	38	24
Dominican Rep.	1	-	Romania	51	41	Uzbekistan	312	266
El Salvador	-	2	Slovakia	1	1	*Other Asia*	**107**	**203**
Guatemala	7	2	Slovenia	1	-	Afghanistan	-	1
Honduras	1	-	Spain	76	70	Bahrain	-	1
Mexico	61	77	Sweden	15	29	China	8	10
Panama	5	1	United Kingdom	569	403	Hong Kong	2	4
South America	**616**	**760**				India	27	44
Argentina	222	255	*FSU in Europe*	**6,272**	**6,529**	Iran	37	82
Bolivia	4	11	Belarus	377	323	Japan	1	-
Brazil	162	169	Estonia	10	3	Lebanon	1	-
Chile	42	52	Latvia	57	36	Pakistan	-	1
Colombia	44	62	Lithuania	19	32	Singapore	6	4
Ecuador	3	-	Moldova	209	178	Thailand	-	4
Paraguay	2	1	Russian Fed.	3,545	4,028	Yemen	25	52
Peru	37	101	Ukraine	2,048	1,917	**Africa total[b]**	**2,642**	**1,562**
Uruguay	67	62	FSU unspecified	7	12	*North Africa*	**2,517**	**1,400**
Venezuela	33	47				Algeria	-	1
			Other W. Europe	**87**	**81**	Eritrea	-	1
Europe total[b]	**9,425**	**10,881**	Andorra	1	5	Ethiopia	2,432	1,355
European Union[c]	**2,994**	**4,189**	Monaco	2	-	Morocco	45	37
Austria	18	25	Norway	3	1	Tunisia	40	6
Belgium	140	222	Switzerland	81	75	*Sub-Saharan Africa*	**125**	**162**
Bulgaria	17	15	*Balkans*	**72**	**82**	Central Africa	-	1
Croatia	1	4	Albania	-	1	South Africa	125	161
Czech Republic	13	4	Bosnia-Herzeg.	1	-	**Oceania total**	**104**	**149**
Denmark	14	13	Macedonia	-	4	Australia	96	145
Finland	4	5	Serbia	9	13	New Caledonia	4	-
France	1,653	2,903	Turkey	62	64	New Zealand	4	4

a New immigrants and tourists changing their status to immigrant, not including immigrant citizens.
b Including country unknown.
c Not including the Baltic countries.
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

In recent years, Jewish international migration has tended to decrease due to the growing concentration of Jews in more developed countries and the drying up of the previous reservoirs of Jewish emigration. Historically, a clearly negative relationship prevailed between the quality of life in a country and the propensity of Jews to emigrate. This logically helps to predict the continuation of rather low levels of migration in the foreseeable future, provided current geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions continue to prevail across the global system. In 2013, 16,882 new immigrants arrived in Israel, compared to 16,557 in 2012, 16,892 in 2011, 16,633 in 2010, 14,567 in 2009, and 13,699 in 2008. Overall immigration levels remained quite moderate compared with other periods in Israel's migration history, but the data hint at some reversal of the past trend. The main countries of origin continued to be Russia (4,028 in 2013), France (increasing to 2,903), the US (2,185), Ukraine (1,917), and Ethiopia (decreasing to 1,355). In 2013, immigrants slightly diminished from North America, the FSU Asian republics, and Africa, with tiny increases from Latin America, the EU, and the FSU European republics. To these figures one should add several thousand of immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad and entering the country for the first time) and of returning Israelis, at a time when the Israeli economy was performing relatively better than in many Western countries thus making Israel a reasonable or even attractive option for international migration.

On the other hand, Israel—in part because of the smallness of its market and the limits this imposes upon employment opportunities—is a source of Jewish emigration, mostly to the US and other Western countries (Rebhun and Lev Ari 2010). In recent years, some Israelis, mostly former immigrants, have also migrated to the FSU (Cohen 2009; Tolts 2009). Estimates of total emigration from Israel, including Jews and non-Jews, range from less than 5,000 to 15,000 annually, despite much higher numbers sometimes mentioned in public discourse. In 2011, 4,389 Israelis obtained legal permanent resident status in the US, versus 5,172 in 2010 and an annual average of 5,408 in 2000-2009, pointing to a declining trend. There were 3,466 naturalizations of Israelis in 2013 as against a decennial average of 2,910 (US Department of Homeland Security 2013). In Canada, the decade 2001-2011 yielded over 21,000 Jewish immigrants, or an annual average above 2000, mainly from the FSU, Israel, and other European countries (Statistics Canada 2013a, 2013b). The level of emigration from Israel is consistent with expectations for a country at Israel's level of economic development (DellaPergola 2011c). These findings clearly point to the primacy of socioeconomic determinants, in contrast with the widespread assumption that the volume and timing of Israeli immigration and emigration are primarily motivated by ideological and security factors.

Marriages, Births, and Deaths

Another major determinant of demographic change at the global level is family formation and childbearing. The birth rate, in turn, bears crucial consequence for a population's age composition. When international migration stands at moderate levels, as in recent years, the most important determinant of long-term population change becomes the birth rate, which reflects both the average number of children currently born per women age 15-49 (the *fertility rate*) and the size of potential parental cohorts. In contemporary societies, the

latter is, in turn, affected by the number of births in previous years, by international migration, and to some extent by the mortality level. The mutual influence of childbearing and age composition is worthy of special attention and indeed plays an important role in the case of world Jewry. In addition, the question of the Jewish identity of the children of intermarriage now plays a significant role in the overall pattern of Jewish demographic change (Reinharz and DellaPergola 2009).

Low birth rates and relatively high intermarriage rates have prevailed among some European Jewish communities since the late nineteenth century. After World War II, the US and several Western European countries experienced a prolonged rise in fertility, which did not occur in Eastern Europe. These trends were matched by the respective Jewish communities in each country, though at lower levels. Where the baby boom occurred, it generated large age cohorts born between 1945 and 1965, who in turn reached the age of procreation between the 1970s and the 1990s. An “echo effect” of more births might have been expected, but fertility rates, general and Jewish, decreased sharply since the 1970s and such "echo" was actually quite weaker than could be expected. Jews usually anticipated by several years these developments, resulting in lower birth rates across the board. Significant internal differentiation persisted according to religiosity and other social characteristics among Jewish populations, with Orthodox Jews generally maintaining higher fertility rates than other Jewish groups.

Several Jewish communities in different countries have collected data on the balance between Jewish births and deaths over the past two decades. The number of Jewish births was usually exceeded by the number of Jewish deaths according to direct vital registrations in the Russian Federation, the UK, Germany, and according to indirect estimates, in the US. This gap was strikingly high in the Russian Federation and in other European republics of the FSU (Tolts 2004). In the Russian Federation in 2000, there were only 600 recorded Jewish births compared to over 8,200 recorded Jewish deaths—a net loss of 7,600. Such a striking deficit reflects extreme population aging (see below), in part the consequence of the intensive emigration of younger Jewish adults and nuclear families with the consequence that large numbers of elderly remained behind in the FSU.

In Western Europe, the negative gap was somewhat smaller, yet consistent. In the UK in 1991, the 3,200 Jewish births were exceeded by 4,500 Jewish deaths—a net loss of 1,300. The most recent UK data available from Jewish community sources indicate a reversal of this trend in 2005, showing an increase in the number of births and a decrease in the number of deaths (Graham and Vulkan 2008). However, the decrease to fewer than 3,000 Jewish deaths in recent years seems to indicate a significantly reduced Jewish community, or a significant under-reporting of Jewish burials, or both. In Germany, the Jewish community experienced a threefold population increase due to a significant inflow of FSU immigrants since 1989. However, while in 1990 there were 100 Jewish births and 400 Jewish deaths—a net loss of 300, in 2013, 250 Jewish births were recorded compared to 1,244 Jewish deaths—a net loss of nearly 1,000 (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle).

In the US, Jewish vital statistics are not directly available. However Jewish population projections based on the available age composition and cautious assumptions about the age-specific frequency of motherhood and

deaths suggests that the core Jewish population generates annually about 55-57,000 births and 60-62,000 deaths. The likely deficit of about 5,000 is being compensated for by a positive Jewish immigration balance.

Israel is the only exception to these recessive demographic trends. Steady immigration produced a doubling of Israel's Jewish population between 1970 and 2004, which was reinforced by a significant Jewish natural increase. In 1990, 73,900 Jewish births and 25,800 Jewish deaths produced a natural increase of 48,100. In 2004, for the first time, more than 100,000 Jewish babies were born in Israel. In 2013, 127,100 Jewish births and 35,500 Jewish deaths produced a net increase of 91,600. Demand for children continues to be strong among both the religious and secular populations, rooted partly in Jewish communal identity and partly in a broader sense of economic optimism and life satisfaction, and resulting in significantly larger families in Israel than among Jews in other countries (DellaPergola 2009c).

Low Jewish birth rates and population aging in the Diaspora are further impacted by high and continually increasing rates of intermarriage (DellaPergola 2009b). Overall, the rate of intermarriage has been increasing among Jews, but significant differences persist by country. In recent years, in the Russian Federation, about 70% of recently married Jewish women and 80% of recently married Jewish men chose non-Jewish spouses. In the US, the 2013 Pew survey found an out-marriage rate of 58% among the most recent marriage cohorts, but the broad population definition adopted, actually closer to an *enlarged* Jewish population, determined an inflated out-marriage estimate. In several medium-size European Jewish communities, the intermarriage rate was over 50%; in France and the UK, it was over 40%; in Canada and Australia, over 30%; and in South Africa and Venezuela, over 15%. Of the major Jewish communities, probably only Mexico had an intermarriage rate lower than 15%. The incidence of intermarriage is significantly dependent on the ethno-religious composition of parents: most of the total increase in intermarriage occurs among Jewish adults who are themselves the children of intermarried parents (Phillips 2013).

In Israel, the rate of intermarriage is assessed at less than 5%, low but not negligible, reflecting the growing size of the non-Jewish population who immigrated under the *Law of Return*, particularly from the FSU. Many of these intermarriages are performed in Cyprus (Dvorin 2006). The absence of civil marriage in Israel raises the intriguing question of the inability of the Israeli legal system to face the family formation needs of an increasing number of citizens whose religion is not Jewish. On average, based on the 2010 Jewish population distribution and recent intermarriage rates in different countries, about 29% of all recently married Jews worldwide, and 48% of all recently married Jews in the Diaspora, started a new family with a non-Jewish partner. Scattered data on cohabitation among young Jewish adults suggest much higher rates of intermarried couples.

A further factor in Jewish population change is the Jewish identity of the children of intermarriages. The percentage of the children of intermarriage being raised as Jews during the early 1990s was about 20% in both the US (Phillips 1997) and the Russian Federation (Goskomstat 1994). In 2001, this percentage had increased in the US to more than one-third (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003), and was estimated at 36% (20% Jewish by religion and 16% Jewish not by religion) by the 2013 Pew study, still far from the 50% that

would be required so as not to erode the younger Jewish population cohorts, hence the total number of Jews. The non-identification with Judaism of many children of intermarriages combined with low Jewish fertility levels is producing an even lower *effective Jewish birth rate*.

In addition, affiliation of intermarried Jewish adults with the Jewish community or exposure to any Jewish services including children's education is much lower than among the in-married. This often is associated with a propensity to have fewer children, hence low overall Jewish intergenerational reproduction. Compared to other countries, Israel only marginally features this whole chain of lifecycle factors related to marriage, childbearing and childrearing potentially weakening Jewish identification and demography.

Conversions

Given the increasing number of Jewish households (defined as a household containing one or more self-identified Jews) some of whose members are not Jewish, the number of persons converting to Judaism is highly relevant to Jewish population change.

In Israel, data on converts through the Israel Conversion (*Giyur*) Courts from 1999 to 2012 cover passages to Judaism certified through both the civilian and military-Israel Defense Forces conversion systems (Bass 2011). Overall, from 1999 to 2012, 71,984 persons converted to Judaism through Israeli rabbinical channels. Most civilian conversions were of new Ethiopian immigrants who, in recent years, almost exclusively included over 3,000 Falash Mura annually. Within the military conversion system, the demand for conversion prevailed among young adults mostly born in the FSU or in Israel to non-Jewish immigrant mothers. About 500-800 young military were converted annually from 2005 to 2012. Only a small number of converts were civilians from countries other than Ethiopia who immigrated to Israel under the *Law of Return*. Only in 2005, and again in 2007 and 2008, did Conversion Courts certify somewhat higher numbers of converts. The 2009 estimate was much lower due to reduced immigration from Ethiopia and ongoing controversies within the Israeli Rabbinate about the general validity of conversion procedures. Some members of the Israeli Rabbinate have indeed requested that thousands of conversions performed in the Israel Defense Forces conversion system be annulled. The matter was eventually settled, but controversy about conversion in Israel remains high.

Were it not for the opposition to conversion within such branches of the Israeli Rabbinate, the actual number of *gerim* (Jewish neophytes) might have been higher, but nonetheless constituted a visible component of Israel's Jewish population growth. However, the total number of "others," i.e., *Law of Return* immigrants and their children not registered as Jews, increased from 171,600 in 1999 to 347,900 in 2014. The more recent increase reflected in nearly equal numbers the arrival of new immigrants and births in Israel. Most of these "others" lack religious status, with a minority of less than 10% Christians and a few Moslems. Only in 2008 and 2011 was the number of converts to Judaism greater than the yearly "others" increase.

Data on conversions to and from Judaism in Diaspora countries exist, but have not been compiled systematically. The consistent evidence from socio-demographic surveys, reflecting the net effect of accessions and secessions, is that many more people were born Jewish than the number of

people who consider themselves currently Jewish. The main evidence for this loss derives from US Jewish population surveys. One recent source, the 2007 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (Pew 2008), compared the percentages of those raised Jewish with those currently Jewish in the total US population. At least in terms of Jews by religion, the lifetime balance was unequivocally negative—about 0.2% of the US total population. Assuming the same effects among children as among adults, this would amount to a net lifetime loss of about 600,000 individuals, or approximately 10% of a total Jewish population estimated by different authors at between 5 and 7 million (see below). It is true that some of these passages occur from/to the unknown/unreported/ agnostic/atheist group, rather than from/to another specific religious group. But such data disprove the assumption of a significant ongoing transfer allegedly fueling an increase in the US Jewish population from the outside and peripheral toward the inside and central areas of the Jewish identification typology outlined in **Figure 3**.

Another, admittedly small, example illustrative of the more general trend derives from the 2001 Census of Scotland (United Kingdom, Scotland General Register Office 2002), the data from which are available separately and in greater detail than the data from other parts of the UK. In 2001, 8,233 persons in Scotland declared that either they were raised Jewish or their current religion was Jewish. Of these, 5,661 (69%) were both raised Jewish and Judaism was their current religion; 1,785 (22%) were raised Jewish but were not currently Jewish; and 787 (9%) were not raised Jewish but were currently Jewish. Thus, the total number with Jewish upbringing was 7,446, and the number currently Jewish was 6,448, a difference of 998—a net loss of 13% (Graham 2008). In 2011 the number of Jews in Scotland had further diminished to 6,262 (Graham 2013a).

Age Composition

Age composition plays a crucial role in population change (Schmelz 1984; DellaPergola and Schmelz 1989). **Figure 5**, covering selected populations between 1975 and 2013, exemplifies the extreme variations that can emerge in age composition following the transition from higher to lower birth rates and death rates. Jewish populations can be classified into five demographic types, gradually moving from traditional, to transitional, moderately aging, advanced aging, and terminal.

Traditional Jewish populations, frequent in the past and characterized by very high percentages of children, have disappeared. Jews in Ethiopia, here portrayed at the time of their mass immigration to Israel in 1991, were the last surviving example.

The **transitiona**l type occurs as fertility is controlled and mortality declines following economic development and health improvement. Such populations feature relatively high percentages of children, increasing shares of adults, and median ages around age 30 or under. Israel in 2012 provided the only persisting example of a Jewish population where percentages regularly decrease when moving from younger to older age groups.

In **moderately aging** communities, the center of gravity moves to age 45-64, but children under age 15 are still more numerous than adults age 65 and over. This type, whose median age is about age 35 and less than age 40, was still evident during the 1970s and through the 1990s in the US, and still

later in some communities in Central and South America like Mexico, or even France which in 2002 still was in the moderately aging type with 19% age 65 and over, and possibly a similar percentage of children under age 15 (Cohen 2002).

More recently, Jewish communities in the US (Pew Research Center 2013)–namely in New York (Cohen, Ukeles, and Miller 2012)–and Canada, major Jewish communities in Western and Central European countries, Central and South American communities like Argentina and Brazil, as well as Australia and Turkey, joined the **advanced aging** type. In these populations, persons age 65 and over outnumber children under age 15, and median ages mostly range between age 40 and 45 but also tend to approach age 50.

The **terminal** age composition pattern is typical of the Russian Federation, the other FSU republics, Germany, and several other Eastern European countries. It comprises percentages of elders that are double or more the percentage of children, with a median age of 50 or higher, eventually tending toward age 60 and over.



Figure 5 Jewish populations in selected countries, by main age groups, 1975-2013, arranged by descending percentage at age 0-14

In the US, the ongoing aging process was confirmed by the 2013 Pew survey that can be compared with NJPS 1990, NJPS 2000-01 corrected for under-reporting of young and middle-age adults, and with projections of the same corrected figures to 2011 and later years (DellaPergola 2013a). In these projections, death rates were based on Israeli Jews' detailed schedules—Israel being a country with high life expectancies of more than 84 years for women and over 80 years for men in 2010, significantly better than among the total US total population (81 and 76 years respectively) (Population Reference Bureau 2013). Birth rates were calculated according to varying assumptions about the effective Jewish fertility rate—i.e., estimated average children born, discounted for the non-inclusion of some children of intermarriages. The decline in the younger US Jewish cohorts under age 15 is evident (16% in 2013 versus 19% in 1990), as against an increase followed by temporary decline in the population age 65 and over (17% in 2013 likewise in 1990). The whole gamut of Jewish community resources and needs is being significantly reshaped by these demographic changes that portray Jewish population aging.

Demographic Implications

The corollary of older age composition among Jews in many countries is that the annual number of deaths must outnumber the annual number of births. Such a skewed age composition also reflects the past non-incorporation within the Jewish collective of many children of intermarriages, which is bound to lead to a continuing Jewish population decrease in future years as in fact has been the case in the overall Diaspora over the past decades.

Jews in Israel are the notable exception. Their vital rates not only *do* generate Jewish population growth, but the rate of natural increase is high in comparison with other developed societies, and in fact very similar to that of the world's total population (Population Reference Bureau 2013). Contemporary Jewish demography is polarized between an Israeli component that features consistent increase and a Diaspora component which is bound to decrease—though some internal variation exists.

Jewish Population by Country

The Americas

The Jewish population in the Americas is predominantly concentrated in the US (5,700,000, or 88% of the total Americas), followed by Canada (385,300, 6%), South America (326,600, 5%), and Central America and the Caribbean (56,900, 1%) (**Appendix**).

The United States

The release in 2013 of a new major survey, *A Portrait of Jewish Americans* (Pew Research Center 2013), provided new population estimates accompanied by a rich array of other demographic, social, and identificational data. Pew found that *Jewish religion* without other religious identities applied

to 4.2 million adults and 900,000 children, for a total of 5.1 million Americans. Another 600,000 persons—500,000 adults and 100,000 children—reported *no religion and Jewish* without another identity, raising the total to a 5.7 million mutually exclusive Jewish population. This 5.7 million corresponded with the old *core* Jewish population concept which relied on self-assessment (enhanced by some outside decisions by analysts) and mutual exclusiveness between populations so defined. Another million—600,000 adults and 400,000 children—reported *no religion and partly Jewish*, raising the total to 6.7 million. This 6.7 million was designated in the Pew report as the *net* Jewish population estimate. Moreover, another 2.4 million non-Jewish adults with 1.5 million children, for a total of 3.9 million, reported a *Jewish background*, raising the total to 10.6 million. A further 1.2 million non-Jewish adults reported some *Jewish affinity*, raising the total to 11.8 million, not including the children of the latter group. In tabular format, the same data appear as follows (see also Chapter 1 above):

Population (millions)	Jews by religion	No-religion, Jewish[a]	No-religion, partly Jewish[a]	Non Jews, Jewish back-ground	Non-Jews, Jewish affinity	Total reported
Total	**5.1**	**0.6**	**1.0**	**3.9**	**1.2**	**11.8**
Adults	4.2	0.5	0.6	2.4	1.2	8.9
Children	0.9	0.1	0.4	1.5	NA.	2.9

Source: Pew Research Center 2013.

Jewish population size in the US constitutes a most important component of any global Jewish population estimate and needs careful assessment in the absence of official census documentation and in the presence of abundant alternative sources of diverse quality (Goldstein 1981, 1989, 1992). In recent years, the topic has been at the center of a lively debate in the social scientific study of Jewry, which has been enhanced by the new study. Competing narratives and empirical approaches have generated diverging estimates, with a significant high-low gap of about 1.5 million, and opposite interpretations of current and expected trends varying among rapid growth, stability, and slow decline. Two volumes comprising the gamut of methodological and analytical positions appeared on the matter (Heilman 2005, 2013). Regarding an assessment of the current number of Jews in the US, we present here reasoning and empirical evidence grounded in demographic research already discussed elsewhere in greater detail (DellaPergola 2005, 2010a, 2012, 2013a) and updated in the light of the new Pew evidence.

A general prerequisite for population estimates is that they should be consistent with similar estimates from earlier dates, reflecting intervening changes over the period of time considered. The same applies to Jewish population estimates with the already noted caveat that comparisons are only possible if population definitions are kept consistent over time. In the US, several major sources of data allow for a detailed reconstruction of Jewish population trends since the end of World War II to date. The total US Jewish population was realistically assessed at 4.4 million in 1945 (Rosenwaike 1980), quite an improvement over pre-existing estimates that had relied on the US Census of Religious Bodies (Schwartz, Scheckner, and Kotler-

Berkowitz 2002). Between then and 1990, when the estimate was around 5.5 million, all of the main sources provided consistent indications on the general direction and speed of change. Relatively rapid growth until the late 1970s was followed by stagnation or incipient decline during the subsequent 20 years.

Several major surveys were undertaken between 1957 and 1990, and the question was whether these various data sets could be logically related to each other through a set of assumptions inferred from the same surveys' findings regarding international migration, age composition, marriage, fertility, survivorship at different ages, and conversions. A series of forward-backward Jewish population projections indeed did provide highly consistent results (DellaPergola 2005). In light of the then ongoing and expected demographic trends, the finding of over 5 million Jews in the 1957 Current Population Survey (CPS) (US Census Bureau 1958, 1968; Glick 1960; Goldstein 1969) did quite accurately predict the 5,420,000 Jews found by NJPS 1971 (Massarik 1974; for a somewhat higher estimate see Lazerwitz 1978), which, in turn, did predict the 5,515,000 found by NJPS 1990 (Kosmin et al. 1991). If there had been an NJPS 1980, it would probably have shown a peak of around 5.6-5.7 million, reflecting continuing Jewish population growth due to the first echo effect of the relatively large baby-boom cohorts. Yet, the Jewish population was aging through the combined effect of postponed marriage, low fertility, more frequent intermarriage, and the non-attribution of Jewish identification to a large percentage of the children of intermarriages. The unavoidable consequence was the stoppage of growth and incipient decline in Jewish population. The findings of both NJPS 1971 and NJPS 1990 (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1983, 1988) predicted Jewish population reduction after 1990, which was found by two nearly simultaneous and competing studies in 2001. Indeed, both NJPS 2000-01 (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003) and the American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS) (Mayer et al. 2001) assessed American Jewry at 5.2-5.3 million and produced fundamentally similar Jewish population profiles (Perlmann 2007). Other Jewish population projections suggested somewhat higher scenarios, but likewise produced an expectation of eventual decline after temporary growth (DellaPergola, Rebhun, and Tolts 1999, 2000).

In some popular perceptions, NJPS 2000-01 was a study that failed because of a variety of inappropriate procedures during and after fieldwork. However, when NJPS 2000-01 was submitted to independent professional scrutiny, it was concluded that the study—while handicapped by methodological shortcomings such as low response rates, inconsistent survey coverage of relevant population subgroups, and loss of documentation—stood within the range of professionally acceptable research standards and biases and was therefore usable (Schulman 2003). Indeed, leaving aside the question of population estimates, some of the critics did use NJPS 2000-01 (Kadushin, Phillips, and Saxe 2005). By decision of The Jewish Federations of North America—the main sponsor of the 1971, 1990, and 2000-01 National Jewish Population Surveys—no national survey was undertaken in 2010, thus depriving the public of the opportunity to further compare developments based on substantially similar Jewish databases. Fortunately, the Pew Research Center undertook a new major national study in 2013, thus providing renewed empirical evidence for the ongoing debate about US Jewish population trends.

The above mentioned survey-to-survey projections, aimed at determining consistency between different Jewish databases developed over more than forty years, were significantly on target within reasonable margins of error, not only for the total Jewish population, but also for each birth cohort. This means that the people surveyed in a certain year were found alive and older at a later year—allowing for margins of statistical error and for the changes intervening within each sex and five-year age group, such as incoming and outgoing international migration, births to women of relevant ages, deaths, and accessions to and secessions from Jewish identity. Significantly, when stable characteristics of a given cohort, such as the number of children born to older women, could be compared at two or even three points in time such as NJPS 1971, NJPS 1990, and NJPS 2000-01, they appeared to be the same, confirming that basically the same population has been surveyed (DellaPergola 2013a). Moreover, on most accounts, when an NJPS-based estimate could be checked against a similar estimate from another source, the comparison usually held—with the possible exception of Jewish Community Center (JCC) membership. Examples of such good matches included the estimated numbers of children enrolled in Jewish day school compared with actual school enrollment (Schick 2005) and the estimated number of documented immigrants compared with actual institutional data (HIAS).

The NJPS 1990 finally adjusted core Jewish population was 5,515,000. NJPS 2000-01 yielded an initial estimate of 5,035,468. After imputation of people not actually covered in the survey, such as persons in homes for the elderly or in prisons, a final estimate of 5,200,000 was suggested (Kotler-Berkowitz et al. 2003). There remained, however, an important point of contention regarding a supposed undercount in NJPS 2000-01 of many Jewish adults age 35-44 and age 45-54 (Saxe et al. 2006, 2007; Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). These adults were born, respectively, between 1957-1966 and 1947-1956. A reduction in the reported number of Jews born in those specific years had already been noted when comparing NJPS 2000-01 with NJPS 1990, and perhaps more interestingly, also when comparing NJPS 1990 with NJPS 1971 (DellaPergola 2005). As noted, NJPS 1990 data could be projected ten years forward and compared with the actual NJPS 2000-01 findings. Our detailed age-specific projection produced results nearly identical to the actual NJPS 2000-01 regarding two age cohorts, born in 1970-1990 and born in 1950 or earlier. Moreover, the projected estimate of the age group 0-9 in 2000—the births expected to have occurred under observed age-specific fertility rates during the inter-survey period—was 514,095, a figure nearly identical to the 515,146 core Jewish children of the same ages actually found in NJPS 2000-01. Unlike this extraordinary consistency between expected and actual 2000-01 data, the situation was different for the 1950-1970 birth cohort, age 20-39 in 1990 and age 30-49 in 2000. Here, NJPS 2000-01 found 1,338,527 individuals versus an expected figure of 1,624,543—a large difference of -286,016 or -17.6 percent, pointing to a real shortcoming of NJPS 2000-01. Our independent projection based on NJPS 1990 and on the evaluation of current migration, fertility, mortality, accession, and secession frequencies, provided a higher estimate of 5,367,244 for 2000-01 (DellaPergola 2013a).

Whether the significant under-coverage of this particular generation of

Jewish adults born during and after the baby boom years was due to insufficient efforts or skills during the fieldwork, or on the elusive nature of their Jewish identification, cannot be determined easily. Either explanation stands to reason. But unquestionably, a correction was necessary. Thus, we added a total of 331,776 core Jews to the original NJPS 2000-01 estimate, not inclusive of Jewish persons in institutions. The correction affected not only total Jewish population size, but also age composition, with visible effects on the subsequent demographic dynamics of US Jewry. In fact, the addition of 286,000 adults at ages typical for family growth, plus about 50,000 older adults, could generate some Jewish population increase over 2000-2010. Projecting the corrected NJPS 2000-01 to 2010 indeed resulted in a total of 5,425,000 Jews—about 60,000 higher than the corrected 2000-01 figure. It is also true that the children of baby boomers began their families relatively late in life; therefore, the echo effect of the baby-boomers was rather weak. Allowing for survey sampling variability, it could thus be established that at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century Jewish population in the US would be within a range of 5.2 to 5.7 million.

Looking more closely at recent Jewish population patterns in the US, during the 1990s there was an influx of at least 200,000 new Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU), Israel, Central and South America, South Africa, Iran, and Western Europe, which was expected to have boosted the total US Jewish population. But, since the late 1960s, Jewish fertility consistently stood well below replacement level (2.1 children per woman), hence population continued to age producing rising death rates, while intermarriage rates continued to increase (beyond possible differences of opinion regarding the magnitude of these rates), and propensities to identify with Judaism among children of intermarriages continued to remain low and far less than half of all such children and younger adults (Barack Fishman 2004; Dashefsky with Heller 2008). The population decrease was more likely the product of actual demographic trends than due to insufficient data.

The current age composition of US Jewry and other evidence about age-specific birth and death frequencies generated an estimate of about 55-57,000 annual Jewish births (by the *core* definition) in the US versus about 60-62,000 Jewish deaths. The number of Jewish immigrants to the US diminished, especially from the FSU, but Jewish immigration continued from other countries, mainly in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. The total of Israelis, including non-Jews, admitted as legal immigrants in the US was 5,172 in 2010, 4,389 in 2011, and 4,640 in 2012 (US Department of Homeland Security 2013). Probably as part of these, there were 3,466 naturalizations of Israelis in 2013 as against a decennial average of 2,910 (US Department of Homeland Security 2013). On the other hand, in 2012, 2,290 new immigrants moved from the US to Israel, and 2,185 did so in 2013 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). At the same time, Israel recorded increasing numbers of returning Israelis and of immigrant citizens from the US, reflecting the 2008-2009 economic recession and the slow subsequent US recovery at a time when Israel's economy was comparatively stable. Also taking into account unrecorded migration to the US, an annual net migration into the US of 5,000 Jews or slightly more could be estimated. In other words net immigration basically balanced the losses due to the higher number of Jewish deaths than Jewish births (stressing the *core* definition).

Regarding the balance of affiliations and disaffiliations with Judaism, the notion that more Jews are now "coming out of the closet" is disproven by empirical evidence (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008). Examining shifts in lifetime religious preference in American society—comparatively more frequent than in other countries—an American Jewish Committee survey found that Jews, Catholics, and older established Protestant denominations tended to lose, while Evangelical denominations, Eastern cults, and especially the "religiously undefined" tended to gain (Smith 2009). All in all, American Jewry neither was gaining nor losing large numbers due to conversions from and to other religions. However, the overall number of secessions from Judaism was double the number of accessions. US Jewry continued its aging trajectory with low fertility rates well below generational replacement and a low percentage of children of intermarriage being raised as Jews. Several other independent sources have more or less confirmed the general trends outlined here, like the three American Religious Identification Surveys (ARIS) (Kosmin and Lachman 1993; Kosmin, Mayer, and Keysar 2001; Kosmin and Keysar 2009) and the 2007 Pew U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2008). The 2013 Pew Research Center study confirmed the trend toward ever rising frequencies of intermarriage, assessed at 58% of the latest marriage cohorts on the basis of an extended Jewish population definition, and low percentages of children of intermarriage solely socialized in a Jewish environment.

As against this basic profile, the past ten years have yielded widely different population estimates and perceptions of the direction of change. For example, the 2001-02 Survey of Heritage and Religious Identification (HARI) (Tobin and Groeneman 2003) used a broader definition of Jewish identity than NJPS and AJIS in the same year. AJIS used the same definition as NJPS 1990, but NJPS 2000-01 itself used a broader definition. Special national Jewish population surveys, like the various NJPSs or the 2013 Pew survey, which include a sizeable sample of Jews, may claim to constitute a satisfactory basis for nationwide Jewish population estimates. National Jewish surveys, with their detailed information on individual identification characteristics, offer good opportunities to assess the grey zones around the more clearly defined Jewish core. In Jewish-sponsored surveys, which generally achieve lower response rates, significantly fewer respondents than in general surveys readily admit their Jewishness when defined in terms of religion. On the other hand, quite a few respondents, who in the first place may not seem to belong to the core Jewish population, can be recovered and incorporated through detailed questions about the religion of parents and grandparents, Jewish educational training as a child, etc. General social surveys, based on population classification by religion, do not offer the same maneuvering opportunity—hence resolution of the undeclared parts of the Jewish core becomes largely conjectural. A sure mistake would be to attribute in general surveys the same rate of non-response/unknown/agnostic as found in Jewish surveys.

Two alternative methods have been pursued to estimate the US Jewish population: 1) the compilation of a vast array of local Jewish population estimates (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2014), and 2) the meta-analysis of a vast pool of national surveys, each including a small subsample of Jews (Saxe and Tighe 2013). Neither method was designed from the beginning to determine

countrywide population estimates. On the other hand, both methods provide excellent grounds for serious comparative analytic work and for in-depth multivariate analysis (Hartman and Sheskin 2012).

Based on their compilation of local estimates, Sheskin and Dashefsky (2014) estimate the US Jewish population at 6.77 million. Without detracting from the importance of local Jewish community studies—still the most important tool for Jewish community planning—the methodology of summing the local studies to obtain a national estimate is problematic, as the authors themselves recognize (Sheskin and Dashefsky 2007, 2010; Sheskin 2008, 2009). One should acknowledge the many and diverse databases, the lack of synchronization, and the very uneven quality of the various sources, including variation across the different survey firms. When it comes to national Jewish population estimates, which local studies were not designed to supply in the first place, local Jewish community summations are at risk of amassing significant errors and biases, including double counts of geographically mobile individuals (Rebhun and Goldstein 2006; Groeneman and Smith 2009).

The Brandeis Steinhardt Social Research Institute (SSRI) meta-analysis of a large set of general social surveys is one of the more innovative and ambitious projects ever undertaken in the social scientific study of American Jews (Saxe et al. 2006; Tighe et al. 2005; Tighe et al. 2009a, 2009b). The SSRI suggestions that US Jewry might number 6.8 million persons, or perhaps as many as 7.5 million, or that 70,000 Jewish babies are born annually, or that American Jewry grew by 13.5% during the past ten years, as against a US total white, non-Hispanic population growth of 1.2% (US Census Bureau 2012), become plausible only if shifting from the *core* concept of individually-identified Jews to an *enlarged* concept of the total population in Jewish households (Tighe et al. 2009a, 2011). When using general surveys inclusive of a Jewish subsample, many quite crucial Jewish/non-Jewish demographic differentials are often neglected or lost. Examples include: using data for a sample of US adults to project data for total Jews, thus disregarding the lower share of children among Jews; or ignoring multi-religious household composition when projecting from the number of households to population size, thus factoring non-Jews into Jewish population estimates; or using data on religious composition to estimate the non-religiously declared segment of Jewish population.

Following these facts and assumptions, our core Jewish population estimate was set at 5,700,000 for 2014, hence within and at the upper limit of the statistical variation that was expected by the systematic monitoring of the Jewish population over the past decades *based on constant definitions* (DellaPergola 2013a). This is an upward revision of 275,000 over our previous estimate of 5,425,000, which in turn was an upward revision of the original 5.2 million estimated by NJPS 2000-01. Our revised estimate has been applied retroactively to our world population estimates (**Table 2**) and reflects a well-documented pattern by which US Jewish population size, under consistent definitions, did experience some minor growth since 2001, and will probably not change dramatically for several more years. The suggestions of significantly higher *core* Jewish population estimates at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century do not look tenable, as the implicit assumption of these higher estimates is that (a) there were one million more Jews in the US in the 1960s and 1970s than is commonly accepted; and/or

(b) the US Jewish population has increased during the past decade at a pace greater than that of the US total white, non-Hispanic population, or similar to the unusually high rate of increase of the Jewish population in Israel; and/or (c) Jewish population definitions can be freely updated and reshaped following patterns prevailing in American society but not consistent with a common standard for the US and other countries. The similar estimates reached using very different methods by Sheskin and Dashefsky, by SSRI, and by a casual reading of the 2013 Pew survey, which ignore the difference between *Jewish* and *partly Jewish*, are quite coincidental and in no way reflect a shared research logic or mutual agreement between the respective research teams.

If, however, different definitions of Jewish population are considered, the picture is quite different. It is beyond dispute that the US has a far larger *enlarged* and *Law of Return* population. Once 1 million partly Jewish persons are added to the 5.7 million core Jews assessed here, a combined total of 6.7 million obtains (the Pew concept of *net Jewish population*). While, as noted above, we do not count the partly Jewish in the US in our totals of core Jewish population, so that these totals are comparable with other countries (where they are not included either), we should recognize that different American Jewish organizations do include this group within their population totals and service constituencies.

By adding another about 1.3 million non-Jews with at least one Jewish parent, an *extended* total of 8 million with direct Jewish ancestry is reached. Adding another estimated 2 million other members of Jewish households, themselves not Jewish or with more distant Jewish ancestry, the total *enlarged Jewish* population reaches 10 million. By the rules of the *Law of Return*—which along with Jews also entitles their non-Jewish children, non-Jewish grandchildren, and their respective spouses to Israeli citizenship—the number eligible in the US might be as many as 12 million or more.

Canada

Canada is significantly different from the US concerning both the documentary situation of available databases and substantive population trends. In 2011, a new National Household Survey (previously known as a population census) was undertaken, allowing for comparisons with the Censuses of 2006 which included a question on ethnic ancestry and of 2001 which also provided data on religion (Statistics Canada 2003a, 2003b; Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014, Chapter 6 in this volume). Data on Jewish ethnicity, released every five years, can be compared with data on religion, released every ten years. Both types of information can be used to estimate Canada's *core* Jewish population. Data on religion and ancestry are collected through open-ended questions, with examples and instructions provided. Since 1981, Canadians can declare either a single or a multiple ethnic ancestry (up to four categories, one for each grandparent). Consequently, people can be ethnically Jewish only, or Jewish and something else, being the descendants of intermarriages or expressing multiple ethnic identities. Ethnic Jews, as defined by the Canadian Census, can include persons who hold a non-Jewish religion, but these persons are *not* included in the *core* concept used herein. On the other hand, persons without religion may declare a Jewish ethnicity in the Canadian Census and are included in the *core*. The

Jewish Federations of Canada-UIA defines this as the *Jewish Standard Definition* (Shahar 2004).

In 2011, 329,500 Canadians declared they were Jewish by religion. The Jewish population was greatly concentrated in the major urban areas: about half the total lived in Toronto, another fourth lived in Montreal, and the total of the five main urban areas (including Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Winnipeg, and Ottawa) reached 87% (Weinfeld, Schnoor, and Koffman 2012). The national total by religion remained nearly unchanged compared to 2001, when it reached 329,995. Previously there had been a significant increase from 296,425 in 1981 and 318,070 in 1991. Following Jewish ethnicity throughout the past decades provides further clues on Jewish population and identification in Canada. An initial estimate of 293,175 ethnic Jews in 1981 increased to a peak of nearly 370,000 in 1991, and has since decreased to 349,000 in 2001, 315,000 in 2006, and 309,650 in 2011—a decrease of 1.7% in five years and 16.3% in twenty years. In other words, the ethnic mode of Jewish identification was stronger than the religious mode until 2001, but now seems to be losing traction among Canadian Jewry. By combining religion and ethnicity, the core Jewish population was evaluated at 312,060 in 1981, 356,315 in 1991, 370,520 in 2001, and 380,000 in 2011. Compared to the core figure, religion tended to lose some ground, constituting 95% of the broader concept in 1981 and 86% in 2011. The main Jewish population growth therefore involved the total of persons with a Jewish religion but another ethnicity, and persons with a Jewish ethnicity, but no religion. **Table 8** provides a synopsis of the number of Jews by various definitions since 1981.

More striking changes affected the distribution of Canadians and of the Jews among them between single and multiple ethnicities. Among Canada's total population in 2011, 57.9% of the total population provided a single ethnicity answer and 42.1% reported multiple ethnicities. 5.8 million (31%) of the 19 million who provided a single ethnicity declared themselves to be Canadian, and 4.7 million (34%) of the 13.8 million who provided a multiple response did so. All in all, 10.6 million of a total population of 32.9 million reported a Canadian ethnicity—which in other epochs was thought to be a nonexistent construct. The growth of a new Canadian ethnic identity from the merger of pre-existing ethnicities is parallel to the development of a new American ethnic identity in the US (Lieberson and Waters 1988). Most likely, the rapid growth of *Canadian* as a primary or additional ethnic category affects identification perceptions among Jews. In 1981, 90% of total ethnic Jews declared a single ethnicity, but this share had decreased to 66% in 1991, 53% in 2001, 43% in 2006, and 37% in 2011. The proportion of Jews (63%) with a multiple ethnicity is today much higher than among the total population (42%). Some minor inconsistencies in the ratio between the number of Jews by religion and by ethnicity depend on changes in classification definitions and modes of data processing at Statistics Canada. The sharp decrease from 1991 to 2011 in Jewish ethnic identification clearly points to a powerful process of acculturation that operates at two levels. One is an increase in intermarriage, which generates growing multiple ancestries among descendants of Jews. The share of children of intermarriage reported to be Jewish is also increasing, with significant gender differences in this respect: the likelihood of a child of intermarriage being raised Jewish is four times higher if the mother is Jewish than if the father is (Goldman 2009).

Table 8 Jewish population in Canada by different definitions, 1981-2011

Year	Core Jewish population[a]	Jewish religion	Jewish ethnicity			Religion as % of core	Ethnicity as % of religion	Ethnicity % single
			Total	Single	Multiple			
1981	312,060	296,425	293,175	264,025	29,150	95	99	90
1986	334,000	307,000	343,505	245,855	97,650	92	112	72
1991	356,315	318,070	369,305	245,580	123,725	89	116	66
1996	363,000	324,000	351,705	195,810	155,900	89	109	56
2001	370,520	329,995	348,605	186,475	162,130	89	106	53
2006	375,000	329,750	315,120	134,045	181,070	88	96	43
2011	385,300	329,500	309,650	115,640	194,010	86	94	37

a Author's estimates.

Source: Statistics Canada 2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2013a, 2013b.

As noted, the number of Canada's Jews according to religion remained stable around 330,000 between 2001 and 2011. It should be stressed, though, that between 2001 and 2011 21,445 Jews immigrated into Canada and were still in Canada in 2011. Consequently, the Jewish population by religion would have decreased by a similar amount (a potential decrease of 6.5%) were it not for immigration. This essentially points to some emigration, to a negative balance between Jewish births and Jewish deaths, and to passages of Jews from self-definition by religion to no religion. Emigration from Canada is moderate, with 463 persons migrating to Israel in 2012-2013, and an unknown number of others moving to the US and to other countries.

Assuming continuing immigration to Canada, but also some internal attrition, we estimate the Jewish population at 385,300 in 2014, the world's fourth largest Jewish community. Accounting for further ongoing growth, this is an upward revision of 3,000 over our previous estimate. It is slightly lower that would obtain by extrapolating to 2014 the 2011 *Jewish standard definition* of 385,345, or even the newly suggested *Revised Jewish definition* of 391,665 which also accounts for: a) no religious affiliation and Israeli by ethnicity; b) no religious affiliation and having knowledge of Hebrew or Yiddish as a "non-official" language; c) no religious affiliation and born in Israel; and d) no religious affiliation and living in Israel in 2006 (Weinfeld and Schnoor 2014, Shahar 2014). The reason for our more conservative estimate is that both latter estimates are not strictly comparable with the concept of *core* Jewish population as they include the fast increasing number of persons for whom Jewish is only one among multiple ethnic identities, some of whom may not readily identify as Jewish if asked, possibly preferring *partly Jewish*, and some of whom would not be included in the *core* Jewish population in Israel (see below). As argued above, some of these would better be included among the *enlarged* Jewish population. Taking into account all ethnic Jews who profess a non-Jewish religion, and/or multiple ethnicities, and all other non-Jewish household members, an *enlarged* Jewish population of 550,000 would probably obtain, along with a *Law of Return* population of possibly 700,000.

Central and South America

Since the 1960s, the Jewish population has been generally decreasing in Central and South America, reflecting recurring economic and security concerns (Schmelz and DellaPergola 1985; DellaPergola 1987, 2008a, 2011b). However, outside the mainstream of the established Jewish community, increased interest in Judaism appeared among real or putative descendants of *Conversos* whose ancestors left Judaism and converted to Christianity under the pressure of the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal. Some of these *Converso* communities have been trying to create a permanent framework for their Jewish identity, in part manifested through formal conversion to Judaism and migration to Israel. In the long run, such a phenomenon might lead to some expansion of the Jewish population, especially in smaller communities in the peripheral areas of Brazil, Peru, Colombia, and other countries.

Mexico

In **Mexico**, the third largest Jewish community in Central and South America, the 2010 Census reported a Jewish population of 59,161 plus another 8,315 *Neo israelitas* (New Jews), for a grand total of 67,476 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2012). Of these, 62,913—55,138 Jews and 7,775 New Jews, respectively, were age 5 and over. The 2000 Census reported 45,260 Jews age 5 and over (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informatica 2002). Projecting the number of Jews 5 and over to an estimate inclusive of children age 0-4, the total Jewish population in 2000 would be about 49,000. At face value, this would indicate an increase of over 10,000 (+21%) if only counting Jews, and nearly 18,500 (+38%) if also including New Jews. The increase would be only 485 (+2.6%) in the Federal District, 5,728 (+40.7%) in the State of Mexico, and 10,518 (+82.2%) in Mexico's other federal states. Such findings are most implausible. A Jewish population survey undertaken in 2000 provided a national estimate of 39,870 Jews, of whom 37,350 lived in Mexico City (Comité Central Israelita de México 2000), confirming the results of a previous 1991 survey (DellaPergola and Lerner 1995). Another survey in 2006 confirmed the previous results (Comité Central Israelita de México 2006).

The 2010 Census intriguing findings, at a time when migration if anything is slightly reducing Mexican Jewish population size, remind us of erratic estimates in past Censuses which reported 17,574 Jews in 1950, 100,750 in 1960, 49,181 in 1970, 61,790 in 1980, and 57,918 (age 5 and over) in 1990. In other words these figures cannot be accepted at face value. An in-depth analysis of the 1970 Census (DellaPergola and Schmelz 1978) indeed unveiled a significant presence among those defined as Jews of persons adherent to other religious denominations, mostly located in distant rural states or peripheral urban areas, with very low levels of educational attainment, exclusive knowledge of local indigenous idioms, and *descalzos* (shoeless). The further inclusion of a category of *Neo israelitas* in 2010 does not seem to adjudicate the attribution to Judaism of a population most likely composed of followers of Evangelical sects or Jehovah's Witnesses.

Mexican Jewry still displays higher birth rates and a relatively young age profile compared to other Jewish populations in Central and South America, but some aging occurred during the past decade and emigration intermittently affected the community. In 2014, allowing for some emigration to the US and Israel (972 persons moved to Israel between 2001 and 2013, of which 138 did so during the past two years) and some new arrivals we maintained our previous Jewish population estimate at 40,000, the world's fourteenth largest Jewish community.

Argentina

Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Central and South America. Nearly 6,000 Jews emigrated from Argentina to Israel in 2002—the highest number ever in a single year from that country—due to dire economic conditions in Argentina and to special incentives offered by Israel. In 2003, the Argentinean economic situation eased somewhat and Israel restricted its incentives, resulting in much lower levels of emigration. About 1,500 persons left Argentina for Israel in 2003, decreasing steadily to 337 in 2010, 220 in 2011, 222 in 2012, and 255 in 2013 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics).

Based on the experience of previous years, approximately 20% of these migrants were non-Jewish household members. Partial evidence from different sources indicated that less than half of total Jewish emigration from Argentina went to Israel, with most others going to South Florida where the Greater Miami Jewish Federation ran a program to assist Argentinian Jews. Permanence in Israel of the new immigrants was high, at least during the first three years after immigration, with only about 10% emigrating (Adler 2004).

A 2004 Jewish population survey in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (AMBA) (Jmelnizky and Erdei 2005) found an enlarged Jewish population of 244,000. Of these, 64,000 were Christians and about another 20,000 reported some Jewish ancestry, but did not consider themselves Jewish. Overall, 161,000 people in the AMBA considered themselves as totally or partly Jewish—consistent with our own previous estimate of 165,000. This estimate for the major urban concentration provided support to our national *core* estimates also inclusive of provincial communities. The 244,000 estimate is a good estimate of the AMBA *enlarged* Jewish population (including non-Jewish members of Jewish households) as part of the over 300,000 who were identified as in some way of Jewish origin or attached to a person of Jewish origin. Another survey, limited to the City of Buenos Aires, suggested significant aging of the *core* Jewish population, reflecting the emigration of younger households in recent years (Rubel 2005). The current situation implies an annual loss of about 500-1,000 persons through a negative balance of Jewish births and deaths and emigration. Argentina's Jewish population was assessed at 181,300 in 2014, the world's seventh largest Jewish community.

Brazil

In **Brazil**, the second largest Central and South American Jewish community, the 2010 Census provided new findings on Jews (**Table 9**) (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica IBGE 2010). The reported national total was 107,329, of whom 105,432 lived in urban localities and 1,987 in rural localities. The census classified Brazil's population by color, and among Jews, 94,575 were white, 10,429 brown, 1,690 black, 492 yellow, and 143 indigenous. By region, 79,910 lived in the Southeast, 12,963 in the South, 4,266 in the Northeast, 2,367 in the North, and 1,394 in the Central West. These data need to be critically evaluated against the evidence of previous censuses that supplied somewhat contradictory evidence. The historical series was: 55,563 in 1940, 69,955 in 1950, 96,199 in 1960, 91,795 in 1980, 86,416 in 1991, and 86,828 in 2000 (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica 2000; Decol 2009). The 1960 figure included about 10,000 "rurals", which was not plausible, while the 1991 and 2000 results were plausible and stable, if somewhat underestimating the actual Jewish population. Considering the possible omission of persons who did not answer the 2000 Census question on religion, we had assessed Brazil's core Jewish population at 97,000 in 2003 and at 95,200 in 2013, allowing for moderate emigration (2,750 went to Israel between 2001 and 2013, including 331 in 2012-2013). Previous Census data were consistent with systematic documentation efforts undertaken by the Jewish Federation of São Paulo that showed 47,286 Jews (Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo FISESP 2002) and an assumption that about one-half of Brazil's Jews live in that city.

According to the Census, the Jewish population in São Paolo decreased from 41,308 in 1980 to 37,500 in 2000 (Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estatistica IBGE 2000; Decol 1999, 2009), which certainly was an undercount. The new census finds 51,050 Jews in São Paulo state—36% more than in 2000. While such upward adjustment is reasonable, its size is not. There also is a 2.5% upward change in Rio de Janeiro (24,451 in 2010) and a downward change of -8.7% in the rest of the Southeastern and Southern states (overall 17,372 in 2010). What is not credible is a decennial increase of over 8,000 people (+125%) in the Northeastern, Northern, and Central-Western states. These suddenly inflated numbers in the least developed and more peripheral regions of Brazil, but to some extent also in São Paulo, point to inclusion in the Jewish population of many thousands of persons who in all probability belong to Evangelical sects and Jehovah Witnesses, besides possible cases of *Converso* Jewish ancestry. Caution is also needed in evaluating the plausibility of the about 13,000 non-whites recorded in the census, notwithstanding the well-established existence of some small veteran communities, descendants of Jewish immigrants who have long assimilated with the local non-Jewish population.

This is the background and rationale for our assessment of Brazil's Jewish population at 95,000 in 2014—the world's tenth largest Jewish community. Brazil's *enlarged* Jewish population (including non-Jewish members of Jewish households) was assessed at 132,191 in 1980 and 117,296 in 1991 and reached 119,430 in the 2000 census (Decol 2009). We reassessed it at 150,000 in 2014.

Table 9 Jewish population in Brazil, 1940-2010

Region	1940	1950	1960[a]	1980	1991	2000	2010	2000-2010 Difference	2000-2010 % change
Total[b]	**55,563**	**69,955**	**96,199**	**91,795**	**86,416**	**86,828**	**107,329**	**20,501**	**23.6**
Sudeste - Southeast	43,476	55,402	70,147	75,493	70,960	70,386	79,910	9,524	13.5
Sul - South	7,768	9,545	11,341	10,982	10,614	10,011	12,963	2,952	29.5
Nordeste - Northeast	2,180	3,071	2,628	2,600	1,693	3,060	7,326	4,266	139.4
Norte - North	1,562	1,791	1,390	1,394	2,308	2,059	4,426	2,367	115.0
Centro-Oeste - Central-West	80	148	532	1,326	841	1,312	2,706	1,394	106.3
Thereof:									
São Paulo	17,219	22,808	NA	41,308	38,843	37,500	51,050	13,550	36.1
Rio de Janeiro	19,743	25,222	NA	27,699	24,754	23,862	24,451	589	2.5
Rest of Southeast, South	14,282	16,917	NA	17,468	17,977	19,033	17,372	-1,661	-8.7
Rest of Brazil	3,822	5,010	4,550	5,320	4,842	6,429	14,458	8,029	124.9

a National total includes rural population. Regional figures are for urban population only.
b Minor discrepancies due to rounding.
Source: Instituto Brasilero de Geografia e Estadistica IBGE 2012, Decol 2009. Unadjusted census data, see text.

Other countries

Chile has the fourth largest Jewish community in Central and South America. This relatively stable core Jewish population was assessed at 18,500 in 2014 on the basis of the 2002 Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 2003) and an earlier Jewish population survey (Berger et al. 1995); 94 people moved to Israel in 2012-2013. **Uruguay** has experienced continuing emigration (Berenstein and Porzecanski 2001; Porzecanski 2006), including 129 migrants to Israel in 2012-2013. The Jewish population estimate for Uruguay was assessed at 17,200 in 2014. **Venezuela** experienced significant Jewish emigration in recent years (DellaPergola, Benzaquen, and Beker de Weinraub 2000). In 2000, about 20% of the former students of Jewish schools in Uruguay, and over one-third of the adult children of Caracas Jews, lived in a different country. In Venezuela, where the Jewish community has been under pressure due to disruptive security, political and economic circumstances, the estimate was reduced to 8,000 Jews, reflecting 80 migrants to Israel in 2012-2013, and higher numbers to other destinations, particularly South Florida. **Colombia** and **Peru**, with respectively 106 and 138 migrants to Israel in 2012-2013, several of whom recently converted to Judaism, had diminishing Jewish populations below 3,000.

In Central America**, Panama** with an estimated Jewish population of 10,000 continued to constitute an attractive location for Jewish migration from other Central and South American countries. It is symptomatic of the country's stability that in 2012-2013 only 6 migrants from Panama went to Israel. **Costa Rica** was stable with 2,500 Jews, and 35 migrants to Israel.

Europe

The Jewish population in Europe, estimated at 1,416,400 in 2013, is increasingly concentrated in the western part of the continent and within the European Union (EU) (see **Appendix**). The EU, comprising 28 countries, had an estimated total of 1,103,300 Jews in 2014 (78% of the continent's total). The former Soviet republics in Europe outside the EU comprised 263,700 Jews (19%). All other European countries combined comprised 40,200 Jews (3%).

The momentous European political transformations since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union brought about significant changes in the structure of Jewish community organizations, with an expanded presence of Israeli and American bodies in Eastern European countries. The latter have played an important role in strengthening or even creating anew the possibilities of Eastern European Jewish life in the fields of religion, education, culture, social service, and support to the needy—in the context of very large scale emigration to Israel and to Western countries. The revitalization of Jewish community life may have some impact on demographic trends, primarily through the revival of submerged Jewish identities and the opportunity of greater social interaction with other Jews, possibly leading to more Jewish marriages and children. But economic recession and rising perceptions of anti-Semitism across the continent have brought about growing Jewish dissatisfaction and emigration (Staetsky et al. 2013; European Union FRA 2013). In spite of the ongoing unifying project and process, Europe is much more politically fragmented than the US, making it more difficult to create a homogeneous database. Nevertheless several

studies have attempted to create and expand such analytic frames of reference (Graham 2004; Kovacs and Barna 2010; DellaPergola 1993, 2010b; Staetsky et al. 2013).

The European Union (EU)

In June 2013, the EU expanded with Croatia joining as the 28th member. The EU's growing format symbolized an important historical landmark: the virtual boundary between Western and Eastern Europe was erased. Iceland, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey are the next candidates for EU membership. Disagreements about the possible inclusion of Turkey with its large Moslem population reflect the persisting dilemma in the definition of Europe's own cultural and geopolitical boundaries.

France

The largest Jewish community in Europe is **France**, where a 2002 national survey suggested 500,000 core Jews, plus an additional 75,000 non-Jewish members of Jewish households (Cohen with Ifergan 2003). Jewish population is decreasing, primarily due to emigration, mainly to Israel, but also to Canada, the US, and other countries. Migration to Israel, after surpassing 2,000 annually for several years, stood at 1,653 in 2012 and increased to 2,903 in 2013. In 2014, the early data indicated further substantial increase. The total for 2001-2013 was 25,185. Jewish emigration was directed as well toward other western countries and reflected the continuing sense of uneasiness in the face of anti-Semitism, in part stemming from Islamic fundamentalism as exemplified by the murder of four Jewish school children and an adult teacher in Toulouse in 2012.

A survey of Jewish tourists to Israel from France in 2004 unveiled a remarkable estimate of 125,000 visitors, or more than 30% of all French Jews age 15 and over (Cohen 2005). Much higher percentages have ever been to Israel. Of the 125,000, 23% (about 29,000) affirmed their intention to move to Israel in the near future. The US was a distant second candidate for possible emigration. Migration intentions are not a proxy for actual migration decisions, but in the past such intentions proved quite reliable in the case of French Jews (Cohen 2007). The diminishing feeling of security among French Jewry and the actual movement of thousands of persons is undisputable. A more recent survey of French Jewish adults age 18 to 40 about their expected country of residence five years ahead uncovered the following: in France, 33%; in Israel, 26%; in another country, 14%; uncertain, 27% (Cohen 2013). Our 2014 estimate for French Jewry, the third largest in the world, was therefore decreased to 475,000.

United Kingdom

In the **United Kingdom**, publication of the 2011 Census was completed with the regional totals for Scotland and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2012; United Kingdom National Records of Scotland NRS 2011; Graham, 2013a) (**Table 10**). It pointed to a slight Jewish population increase, from 266,740 in 2001 to 269,282 in 2011 (+1%) (United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2002). After the 2001 national population Census included a voluntary question on religion for the first time since the nineteenth century (Kosmin and Waterman 2002), general

agreement existed that it had somewhat underestimated the Jewish population, especially in areas inhabited by the more religious sectors of UK Jewry. In 2011, the response rate significantly increased in those areas, especially when it was realized that government investment tends to be based on reported population figures (Graham and Vulkan 2012). In 2001, about 15% of the UK total population reported no religion and another 8% did not answer the question, for a total of 23%. In 2011, this total rose to 32% (25% and 7% respectively). In view of the organized Jewish community's efforts to encourage participation in the Census, Jewish population estimates should not be expanded accounting for the increase in agnostics and atheists to an extent similar to that of the total population. There is strong evidence that persons not reporting a religious affiliation, as well as many others reporting weird labels like "Jedi Knight", "Wicca" or "Heavy metal" did not live in residential areas associated with a strong Jewish presence. Nevertheless the need for some upward Jewish population adjustment was agreed (Graham, Schmool, and Waterman 2007; Graham and Waterman 2005; Voas 2007; Graham and Waterman 2007).

Detailed tabulations obtained by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research and the Board of Deputies of British Jews from the Office for National Statistics from the 2001 Census allowed for an in-depth profile of the socio-demographics of British Jewry, along with better evaluation of the quality of Jewish population estimates. The Jewish population was dispersed over the whole national territory, including all counties but one—the Isles of Scilly. The presence of Jews in areas lacking Jewish infrastructure suggested a lower degree of affiliation with the organized community than previously assumed. Analyses for detailed geographical precincts allowed for estimates of non-response in areas with higher and lower Jewish shares of the total population. A significant correlation was found between the known Jewish religiosity, in terms of the local presence of very Orthodox Jews in a ward, and non-response to the religion question. On the other hand, post-Census surveys of Jews in London and Leeds did not reveal high percentages declaring they had not answered "Jewish" to the question on religion (Miller, Schmool, and Lerman 1996; Graham and Vulkan 2007).

Table 10 illustrates significant geographical shifts among UK Jews between 2001 and 2011. The most significant relative increase occurred in the North East, including the Yeshiva center of Gateshead upon Tyne. Increases also occurred in the North West (Manchester) and East Midlands (Nottingham) areas. On the other hand significant losses appeared in the Yorkshire and Humber (Leeds) and West Midlands (Birmingham) areas, as well as throughout the South East (Surrey), the South West (Bournemouth), Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. Regarding London, the main portion of the metropolitan area was quite stable (148,602 in 2011 versus 149,789 in 2001) with an increase of over 3,000 in Inner London partly compensating for a decrease of 5,000 in Outer London, while the areas just beyond London's northwestern suburbs (Hertfordshire) continued to expand steadily. As noted, some of these changes may reflect the higher propensity of Haredi Jews to participate in the 2011 Census.

Table 10 Jewish population in the United Kingdom, 2001-2011

Area and main Jewish community in city or county	Jewish population		Percentage change	Total population	Jews per 1,000 total population
	2001	2011	2001-2011	2011	2011
Total	**266,740**	**269,568**	**1.0**	**63,182,175**	**4.3**
England	***257,671***	***261,282***	***1.4***	***53,012,456***	***4.9***
North East (Gateshead)	3,151	4,503	42.9	2,596,886	1.7
North We st (Manchester)	27,974	30,417	8.7	7,052,177	4.3
Yorkshire and the Humber (Leeds)	11,554	9,929	-14.1	5,283,733	1.9
East Midlands (Nottingham)	4,075	4,254	4.4	4,533,222	0.9
West Midlands (Birmingham)	4,977	4,621	-7.2	5,601,847	0.8
East (Hertfordshire)	30,367	34,830	14.7	5,846,965	6.0
London	149,789	148,602	-0.8	8,173,941	18.2
South East (Surrey)	19,037	17,761	-6.7	8,634,750	2.1
South West (Bournemouth)	6,747	6,365	-5.7	5,288,935	1.2
Wales	***2,256***	***2,064***	***-8.5***	***3,063,456***	***0.7***
Northern Ireland	***365***	***335***	***-8.2***	***1,810,863***	***0.2***
Scotland	***6,448***	***5,887***	***-8.7***	***5,295,400***	***1.1***

Source: United Kingdom Office for National Statistics 2012; Graham, Boyd, Vulkan 2012; Graham 2013a.

British Jewry is aging, with 16% of persons under age 15, compared to 22% age 65 and over in 2001. Vital statistics routinely collected by the Board of Deputies of British Jews Community Research Unit on the annual number of Jewish births were quite consistent with the Census returns (The Board of Deputies of British Jews, Community Research Unit 2005). Comparing the uncorrected Census returns for the age 0-9 group and the recorded number of Jewish births over the past ten years preceding the Census, the discrepancy was only 2.5%. This confirms some undercount, but not on a scale that would significantly impact Jewish population Census estimates. The same vital statistics indicated a continuing excess of Jewish burials over Jewish births until 2004, but since 2005 the trends apparently reversed. The steadily decreasing number of Jewish deaths is an obvious symptom of a shrinking population which loses several hundred people annually through a negative vital balance. The number of recorded Jewish deaths may also be decreasing due to a growing use by Jews of non-Jewish burial societies.

Another indicator of the same trend was decreasing synagogue membership in the UK (Hart and Kafka 2006; Graham and Vulkan 2010; Vulkan and Graham 2008), by 17.8% between 1990 and 2000, and by 4.5% (about 1% annually) between 2001 and 2005. This trend, however, seems to have abated, as in 2010 synagogue membership was 82,963 households, compared to 83,567 households in 2005. At the same time, the denominational balance has shifted toward the strictly, often called right-wing, Orthodox (whose membership doubled between 1990 and 2010) and Masorti (tending to American Conservative, with an 85% membership increase), as against a reduction in the Central (mainstream) Orthodox (a 30% membership decrease). This may plausibly explain the apparent increase in the birth rate. But the decreasing number of recorded burials is most likely explained by an increasing number of families who do not choose Jewish burial societies.

Updating UK Jewish population estimates must account for the negative balance of births and deaths during most of the intercensal period after correcting for under-reporting, as well as some continuing emigration (569 persons immigrated to Israel in 2012 and 403 in 2013, for a total of 6,118 between 2001 and 2013). We estimated the UK's total Jewish population at 290,000 in 2014, the world's 5th largest Jewish community.

Germany

In **Germany**, Jewish immigration, mainly from the FSU, brought to the country over 200,000 Jews and non-Jewish household members between 1989 and 2005. This caused a significant boost in the Jewish population of Germany that had previously relied on a few Shoah survivors and several thousand immigrants mostly from Eastern Europe and Israel. This major immigration stream subsequently diminished to a few hundred annually. The German government, under pressure because of growing unemployment and a struggling welfare system, limited Jewish immigration from the FSU in 2005. On January 1, 2005, the previous special quota immigration law (*Kontingentsflüchtlingsgesetz*) was replaced by new more restrictive rules (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*), and Jews lost their privileged quota status. The new law elevated integration into German society and good economic prospects above other considerations and required Jews aspiring to immigrate to

Germany to first prove that a community would accept them as members. Prior knowledge of the German language was required. Potential Jewish immigrants now also had to prove that they would not be dependent on welfare and were willing to enter the German labor market (Cohen and Kogan 2005; Dietz, Lebok, and Polian 2002; Erlanger 2006).

In 2013, based on German Jewish community sources, 467 Jewish FSU immigrants were recorded as new members of German Jewish communities, as compared to 481 in 2012, 636 in 2011, 667 in 2010, 704 in 2009, 862 in 2008, 1,296 in 2007, 1,971 in 2006, 3,124 in 2005, 4,757 in 2004, 6,224 in 2003, and 6,597 in 2002 (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland). Between 2002 and 2004, the *enlarged* total of Jews and non-Jewish family members who came to Germany from the FSU was larger than the number of FSU migrants to Israel, but Israel regained primacy as of 2005. Admission criteria to the central Jewish community follow Jewish rabbinical rules. The total number of *core* Jews registered with the central Jewish community, after increasing consistently since 1989 to a peak of 107,794 at the end of 2006, diminished to 107,330 in 2007, 106,435 in 2008, 104,241 in 2009, 104,024 in 2010, 102,797 in 2011, 102,135 in 2012, and 101,338 in 2013. Of the current total, only 5,000-6,000 were part of the original community of 28,081 members at the end of 1990. The remainder was mostly recent immigrants and their children. **Table 11** compares the numbers and geographical composition of Jews in Germany at three points in time: 1989 on the eve of the great migration influx, at the peak of growth at the beginning of 2007, and at the beginning of 2014.

Total growth between 1989-2007 was 253.9%, or more than three and one-half times. However during the past seven years, a contraction of 6% is seen. Most of the growth was in the Länders (states) of the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (West Germany) which passed from 29,957 in 1989 to 99,558 in 2007, and diminished by 6% to 93,609 in 2014. In the Länders of the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) (East Germany) the number of Jews was assessed at a tiny 1,100 in 1989, increased to 8,236 in 2007, and was reduced equally by 6% to 7,729 in 2014. Because of the German national policy to decentralize the geographical absorption of immigrants, no specific area became really dominant in Jewish population. The main regional concentrations were in the industrial area of Northern Rhine-Westphalia (Düsseldorf, Dortmund, and Cologne), Bavaria (Munich), Hesse (Frankfurt), and Berlin. But during the past seven years regional trends of growth and decline were widely different. Five Länders lost more than 10%: Lower Saxony, Saar, Bremen, Hamburg, and Saxony-Anhalt. Modest increases occurred in Brandenburg, Thuringia, Saxony, and Rhineland-Palatinate. The registered Jewish population of Belin, in spite of wide reports of huge increase, diminished from 11,022 to 10,157. The number of officially recorded Israelis in Berlin was 3,065, very far from high figures often mentioned in popular discourse (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2012).

The age composition not only of the 5,000-6,000 long-time Jewish residents of Germany, but also of the many more newcomers, is very skewed and very aged. To characterize the prevailing demographic trend, in 2013, 250 Jewish births and 1,244 Jewish deaths were recorded by the German Jewish community, a loss of about 1,000 Jews. While 479 Jews joined a German Jewish community in 2013, 1,002 Jews withdrew membership.

Another 444 immigrated from countries other than the FSU republics, versus 150 who emigrated from Germany (Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland). According to Israeli sources, 100 persons arrived from Germany in 2012 and 79 in 2013. All in all, because of these and other population movements, the total Jewish community inclusive of orthodox and liberal congregations diminished by 797 persons in 2013. Abundantly allowing for delays in joining the organized community on the part of new immigrants and a preference on the part of some Jews, including temporary migrants, not to affiliate with its official institutions, we assessed Germany's *core* Jewish population at 118,000 in 2014, the world's eighth largest Jewish community. The *enlarged* Jewish population, inclusive of the non-Jewish relatives of immigrants, is closer to 250,000. German Jewry surely enjoys new opportunities for religious, social, and cultural life, but also significantly depends on welfare and elderly services (Schoeps, Jasper, and Vogt 1999).

Hungary

In **Hungary**, Jewish population trends reflect the unavoidably negative balance of Jewish births and deaths in a country whose total population's vital balance has been negative for several years. A Jewish survey in 1999 reported a conspicuously larger *enlarged* Jewish population than usually assessed (Kovács 2004). The report reconstructed Jewish population changes between the end of World War II and 1995 (based on Stark 1995) but the latter study significantly underestimated emigration from Hungary to countries other than Israel, as well as to Israel outside the major migration periods. A demographic extrapolation based on the usually accepted number of post-Holocaust *core* Jewish survivors (Swiss Fund for Needy Victims of the Holocaust/Shoa 2002) and accounting for the known or estimated numbers of births, deaths, and emigrants to Israel and other countries since 1945 closely matches our assessment. In the 2001 Hungarian Census, only 13,000 reported themselves Jewish by religion. In 2012-2013, 258 persons emigrated to Israel. Our *core* estimate was 47,900 Jews, the world's thirteenth largest Jewish community. The *enlarged* Jewish population in Hungary is assessed at about 95,000 in 2014.

Belgium

In **Belgium**, quite stable numbers reflected the presence of a traditional Orthodox community in Antwerp and the growth of a large European administrative center in Brussels that has attracted Jews from other countries. However, 140 Jews migrated to Israel in 2012 and 222 in 2013, reflecting growing concerns about Islamization and anti-Semitism. The murder at the Brussels Jewish Museum in 2014 was in a sense predictable. Local Jewish population estimates are quite obsolete and unsubstantiated in comparison with most other EU countries, but the order of magnitude reported here is supported by indirect evidence such as the number of votes collected by Jewish candidates in the 2003 legislative elections (Cohn 2003). The Jewish population was estimated at 30,000 in 2014, the world's fifteenth largest Jewish community.

Table 11 Jewish population in Germany, 1989-2014

State and main Jewish community	Jewish population			Percentage change	
	1989	2007[a]	2014[a]	1989-2006	2006-2014
Total	**31,057**	**107,794**	**101,338**	**247.1**	**-6.0**
Baden-Wurttemberg (Stuttgart)	1,936	8,157	8,221	321.3	0.8
Bavaria (Munich)	5,484	18,825	18,357	243.3	-2.5
Berlin	8,500	11,022	10,157	29.7	-7.8
Bremen	132	1,140	962	763.6	-15.6
Hamburg	1,344	3,086	2,481	129.6	-19.6
Hesse (Frankfurt a.M.)	6,440	12,429	11,614	93.0	-6.6
Lower Saxony (Hannover)	501	9,197	8,193	1,735.7	-10.9
North Rhine-Westphalia (Dusseldorf)	4,782	29,652	27,408	520.1	-7.6
Rhineland-Palatinate (Mainz)	352	3,237	3,277	819.6	1.2
Saar	236	1,134	966	380.5	-14.8
Schleswig-Holstein (Lubeck)	250	1,679	1,973	571.6	17.5
Total former West Germany + Berlin (FRG)	*29,957*	*99,558*	*93,609*	*232.3*	*-6.0*
Brandenburg (Potsdam)	450	1,374	1,458	205.3	6.1
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Schwerin)	100	1,750	1,450	1,650.0	-17.1
Saxony (Leipzig)	350	2,576	2,609	636.0	1.3
Saxony-Anhalt (Halle)	50	1,805	1,443	3,510.0	-20.1
Thuringia (Erfurt)	150	731	769	387.3	5.2
Total former East Germany (GDR)	*1,100*	*8,236*	*7,729*	*648.7*	*-6.2*

a January 1.
Source: Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland 2014.

Other Countries

The next two largest Jewish communities in the EU, and globally, are in the Netherlands and Italy. In the **Netherlands**, a 1999 survey estimated a Halakhic Jewish population of 30,072 (the basis for our estimate of 29,900 assuming that the intervening changes tended to balance), of which perhaps as many as one-third were immigrants from Israel, and an *enlarged* Jewish population of 43,305 (van Solinge and de Vries 2001; Kooyman and Almagor 1996). In **Italy**, total Jewish community membership—which historically comprised the overwhelming majority of the country's Jewish population—decreased from 26,706 in 1995 to 25,143 in 2001 and 24,462 at the end of 2009 (Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane 2002, 2010; Lattes 2005). A new study unveiled the evolving patterns of Jewish identification and community participation (Campelli 2013). Our estimate of 28,000 allocates for non-members and considers enhanced migration to Israel of 270 in 2012-2013.

Next in Jewish population size among EU countries are **Sweden**, estimated at 15,000 (Dencik 2003) and **Spain**, estimated at 12,000 (Cytto 2007). Much higher figures occasionally mentioned for Spain lack documentary basis, unless one wishes to venture into speculations about the number of descendants from the time of Inquisition (Adams et al. 2008). No other Jewish community in the EU reaches 10,000 by the *core* definition. In some EU countries national censuses offered a rough baseline for Jewish population estimates. In **Austria**, the 2001 Census reported 8,140 Jews, of which 6,988 lived in Vienna (Statistik Austria 2003). The Jewish community of Vienna had a membership of 7,097 in 2010 (Cohen Weiss 2010). We estimated the *core* community at 9,000. In **Romania**, the 2002 Census reported a Jewish population of 6,179, but we assessed the community at 9,400, after accounting for 92 migrants to Israel in 2012-2013. In **Poland**, where the 2002 Census reported a Jewish population of 1,100, we estimated 3,200. In **Slovakia** 631 Jews were reported in the 2011 census, with our assessment at 2,600 in 2014. For the **Czech Republic**, 3,900 Jews were assessed following a 2011 census. In **Bulgaria** the 2011 census gave 706 Jews and our assessment was 2,000. In **Croatia** versus 495 Jews in the 2002 census, we assessed 1,700 in 2014; and in **Slovenia** versus 28 in 2002, 100 in 2014. *Enlarged* Jewish populations are significantly higher in Eastern Europe, reflecting the high levels of intermarriage among the dramatically reduced communities following the Shoah and massive emigration. In **Ireland**, an upward correction of 400 was applied to 1,600 in light of the 2011 census results (Ireland Census Statistical Office).

The Former Soviet Union

The FSU is one of the areas where Jewish population has changed the most during the past 25 years (Tolts 2008, 2014; Konstantinov 2007). More recently Jewish population decrease continued, reflecting continuing emigration, an overwhelming excess of Jewish deaths over Jewish births, high rates of intermarriage, and low rates of Jewish identification among the children of intermarriages. The ongoing process of demographic decrease was alleviated to some extent by the revival of Jewish educational, cultural and religious activities supported by American and Israeli Jewish organizations (Gitelman

2003). Nevertheless, total migration to Israel from the FSU steadily continued with 7,234 in 2012 and 7,282 in 2013. Our 2014 assessment of the total *core* Jewish population for the 15 FSU republics was 293,200 core Jews, of whom 274,100 lived in Europe (including the three Baltic republics already accounted for in the EU) and 19,100 in Asia. Almost as many non-Jewish household members created an *enlarged* Jewish population nearly twice as large as the *core* (Tolts 2006, 2007, 2011). A similar number of further eligible persons would probably lead to a *Law of Return* population approaching 900,000.

Russian Federation

In the **Russian Federation,** Jewish population continued its downward course in the context of the country's general population stagnation or decrease (Tolts 2008, 2014). The 2002 Census reported 233,600 Jews, compared to our *core* Jewish population estimate of 252,000 for the beginning of 2003, extrapolated from a February 1994 Russian Microcensus estimate of 409,000 Jews (Goskomstat 1994; Tolts 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). After the compulsory item on ethnicity *(natsyonalnost)* on identification documents was canceled, and the Census ethnicity question became optional, the 2010 Russia Census provided a core Jewish population estimated at 157,763, plus another 41,000 undeclared people who most likely belonged to the core Jewish population, for a total of 200,600 in 2010 (Tolts 2011). Comparing the totals and main geographical distributions of Jews in the Russian Federation in 2002 and 2010 (adjusted data for under enumeration), the Jewish population diminished by 54,500 (21.4%) reflecting emigration, aging and a negative balance of births and deaths. About half of Russian Jewry was concentrated in the two main cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the basic configuration was not much altered through migration or vital events during the intercensal period.

Jewish population size was more stable in Russia than in other FSU republics. This partly reflected Jewish migration among the various republics as well as lower emigration from Moscow and other important urban areas in the Russian Federation (Tolts 2003). The number of births to couples with two Jewish parents decreased from 1,562 in 1988 to 169 in 2000. Births to couples with at least one Jewish parent were estimated at 5,858 in 1988 and 1,057 in 2000. Recorded Jewish deaths were 13,826 in 1988 and 8,218 in 2000. The negative balance of vital events was -7,978 in 1988 and -7,161 in 2000 (Tolts 2009). The striking imbalance of Jewish births and deaths, and continuing emigration (3,545 to Israel in 2012 and 4,028 in 2013, including non-Jewish household members) implies continuing population decrease and an extremely elderly age composition. We evaluated the Russian Federation's Jewish population at 186,000 in 2014, the world's sixth largest Jewish community.

Ukraine

In **Ukraine,** the December 2001 Census yielded an estimate of 104,300 Jews, not significantly different from our 100,000 estimate for January 1, 2002. Reflecting the dramatic pace of emigration since 1989, the Census fully confirmed our previous assessment of ongoing demographic trends. Given that our baseline for the latter estimate was the 487,300 Jews counted in the

January 1989 Census, the fit between the expected and actual was remarkable (Ukrainian Ministry of Statistics 2002; Tolts 2002). A new Census was planned in 2010 but was postponed. Adding continuing emigration (2,048 to Israel in 2012 and 1,917 in 2013), we assess the 2014 *core* Jewish population at 63,000, the world's eleventh largest Jewish community.

The instability and deep internal cleavage and conflict in Ukraine's politics that reached its peak in 2014 call for a more detailed inspection of Jewish geographical distribution and for an assessment of the ethno-political environment in which Ukrainian Jews live. Over 80% of Ukrainian Jews in 2001 were Russian speakers. Looking at 1989-2001, **Table 12** presents the changing Jewish population distribution by regions as well as the changing proportion of ethnic Russians in the same regions. It clearly appears that the Jewish population diminished more sharply in the Western regions where the share of Russians was relatively lower. Patterns of decline of ethnic Russians were similar. The northwestern regions where Jewish and total population decline was highest were also those most affected by the 1986 nuclear plant disaster at Chernobyl. Large quantities of radioactivity were released and continued to produce seriously damaging health effects in subsequent years, prompting emigration. The share of Jews in Western (and pro-Western) regions out of Ukraine's total Jewish population diminished from 10% in 1989 to 6.6% in 2001. This points to an overwhelming predominance of a Russian (and pro-Russian) environment in the daily life of Ukrainian Jews. **Figure 6** stresses the powerful correlation between ethnic, linguistic, and political regional contexts and Jewish population trends in Ukraine—before the more acute crisis of 2013-2014—confirming the strong proximity and dependency of Jews on a Russian-dominated environment.

Table 12 Jewish population in Ukraine, by administrative regions, 1989-2001 and 2014

Administrative Region	Jewish population[a]			Percentage change		Percent of Russians among total population		
	1989	2001	2014	1989-2001	2001-2014	1989	2001	% change[b]
Total	**486,326**	**103,591**	**63,000**	**-78.7**	**-39.2**	**22**	**17**	**-22**
Volyn'	740	213		-71.2		4	2	-45
Zakarpattia	2,639	565		-78.6		4	3	-38
Ivano-Frankivs'k	1,998	361		-81.9		4	2	-55
L'viv	14,240	2,212		-84.5		7	4	-50
Rivne	1,592	455		-71.4		5	3	-43
Ternopil'	693	167		-75.9		2	1	-48
Khmel'nyts'kyi	10,323	1,410		-86.3		6	4	-38
Chernivtsi	16,469	1,443		-91.2		7	4	-39
Total Western	*48,694*	*6,826*		*-86.0*				
Vinnytsia	26,200	3,066		-88.3		6	4	-36
Dnipropetrovs'k	50,096	13,799		-72.5		24	18	-27
Donets'k	28,135	8,825		-68.6		44	38	-12
Zhytomyr	21,749	2,670		-87.7		8	5	-37
Zaporizhzhia	14,361	4,353		-69.7		32	25	-23
Kiev City	100,584	17,962		-82.1		21	13	-37
Kiev region	7,001	1,270		-81.9		9	6	-31
Kirovograd	4,554	1,066		-76.6		12	8	-36
Crimea	17,731	5,531		-68.8		67	60	-10
Luhans'k	8,230	2,651		-67.8		45	39	-13
Mykolaiv	11,910	3,263		-72.6		19	14	-27
Odesa	69,105	13,386		-80.6		27	21	-24
Poltava	6,668	1,843		-72.4		10	7	-29
Sumy	2,328	762		-67.3		13	9	-29
Kharkiv	48,921	11,576		-76.3		33	26	-23
Kherson	7,370	1,732		-76.5		20	14	-30
Cherkasy	6,505	1,479		-77.3		8	5	-33
Chernihiv	6,184	1,531		-75.2		7	5	-26
Total Southeastern	*437,632*	*96,765*		*-77.9*				

a Not including those recorded as Central Asian [Bukharan], Georgian, Mountain Jews, and Krymchaks.
b Calculated from unrounded percentages.
Source: Tolts 2003; 2011.



Figure 6 Jewish population changes in Ukraine, 1989-2001, by administrative regions

Other countries

Of the other European republics of the FSU, the largest Jewish population is in **Belarus**. The Belarus Census of October 2009 found 12,926 Jews, with 2.4% of the population not reporting an ethnicity/nationality (Belstat 2009). Our estimate, also considering 700 migrants to Israel in 2012-2013, was adjusted to 11,000 in 2013. In the three Baltic republics of **Latvia, Lithuania**, and **Estonia**, following EU membership in 2004, the Jewish population has been fairly stable. After reductive adjustments of -600 for Latvia and -500 for Lithuania, reflecting revisions of the respective national population registers, and accounting for 157 migrants to Israel in 2012-2013, we assessed a combined revised estimate of 10,400 for the three Baltic countries in 2014 (Goldstein and Goldstein 1997).

A survey in **Moldova** found an *enlarged* Jewish population of 9,240 in 2000 (Korazim and Katz 2003). The Moldova Census of October 2004 reported 3,628 Jews, although it did not cover the Russian controlled Moldovan territory east of the Dniester River. According to unofficial results of a separate Census of November 2004, about 1,200 Jews lived east of the Dniester River. Considering 387 migrants to Israel in 2012-2013, we assess the *core* Jewish population of Moldova at 3,700 in 2014.

Other Countries

As a result of Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joining the EU, only 40,500 Jews lived in Europe outside of the EU and the FSU in 2014. Of these, 19,300 lived in Western Europe, primarily in **Switzerland**, where in light of new Census data, our estimate was increased by 1,800 to 19,000 in 2014 (Bundesamt für Statistik 2005, 2012)—the world's eighteenth largest Jewish community. In 2012-2013, 156 migrants went to Israel. Another 19,400 Jews lived in the Balkans, primarily in **Turkey** and mostly in Istanbul's European neighborhoods. A 2002 survey in Istanbul suggested widespread aging in a community that has experienced significant emigration (126 to Israel in 2012-2013). In Istanbul, 10% of the Jewish population was under age 15, compared to 18% age 65 and over (Filiba 2003; Tuval 2004). In **Serbia** the 2011 census indicated 611 Jews and our assessment for 2014 was 1,400.

Asia

The Jewish population in Asia is mostly affected by trends in Israel (see the **Appendix**). Israel accounts for more than 99% of the total Jewish population in Asia. The former republics of the FSU in Asia and the aggregate of the other countries in Asia each account for less than one-half of one percent of the continental total.

Israel

Israeli population data are regularly collected by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Israel also has a permanent Population Register maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Israel Population and Migration Authority). Annual data derive from CBS periodic censuses and detailed accountancy of intervening events (births, deaths, immigrants, emigrants, and converts). The most recent Census was in December 2008 and, as usual, resulted in a correction of the current population estimates extrapolated from the previous

1995 Census. Thus, the original Jewish estimate of 5,569,200 for the end of 2008/beginning of 2009 was raised to 5,608,900—a 39,700 person increase. Two main reasons made this update necessary. The first was the normal discrepancy that may occur between repeated population counts. The second was possible delays in the reclassification of persons following conversion to (or from) Judaism. Data refer to the permanent population, excluding residents who have been out of the country for a consecutive year or more, and also excluding tourists and other temporary residents. These can be included after they are granted permanent residency—which does not necessarily involve naturalization and citizenship.

After World War II, **Israel**'s (then still Palestine) Jewish population was just over one-half million (Bachi 1977). Jews increased more than tenfold over the next 60 years due to mass immigration and a fairly high and uniquely stable natural increase, along with parallel and even higher growth of Israel's Arab population. At the beginning of 2014, Israel's *core* Jewish population reached 6,103,200, as against 5,999,600 in 2013. The latter was a revision of the previously released total of 6,014,300. Such downward adjustment of 14,700 largely reflected a transfer from the Jewish to the "other" population of non-Jewish members of Jewish households and other persons pertaining to the Law of Return eligible but not recorded as Jewish in the population register. The revised core population combined with the revised figure of 347,900 "others," formed an *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,451,100 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). For the past several years, the main component of Jewish population growth in Israel has been the natural increase resulting from an excess of births over deaths. In 2004, for the first time, more than 100,000 Jews were born in Israel. In 2013, 127,101 Jewish births—the highest ever—and 35,509 Jewish deaths produced a net natural increase of 91,592 Jewish persons—again, the highest ever. Israel's current Jewish fertility rate slightly rose to 3.0 children per woman, higher than in any other developed country and twice or more the effective Jewish fertility rate in most Diaspora Jewish communities. This reflected not only the large family size of the Jewish population's more religious component, but more significantly a diffused desire for children among the moderately traditional and secular, especially remarkable among the upwardly mobile (DellaPergola 2009c, 2009d).

At the time of this writing, the final data on the components of population growth for 2013 were not yet released. In 2012, 16,900 new immigrants, plus about 5,300 immigrant citizens (Israeli citizens born abroad who entered the country for the first time) and Israelis returning to the country after a prolonged stay abroad arrived in the country, for a total of 22,200 immigrants, of whom 14,700 were Jewish. Current emigration (estimated from these data at 2,400) reduced this to a net migration balance of 19,800, of whom 9,800 were Jewish. The net emigration of Jews was 4,900, indicating that among non-Jews the propensity to emigrate was relatively lower. All in all, these data about Israel's international migration balance point to a relatively low level of immigration in comparison to other historical periods, but also to a relatively low level of emigration. The latter observation stands in sharp contrast with the highly spirited debate about an alleged increase of emigration from Israel (Lustick 2011; DellaPergola 2011c).

The number of converts to Judaism remained only a tiny percentage of

the non-Jewish members of Jewish households in Israel, especially among recent immigrants. However, evidence from Israel's Rabbinical Conversion Courts indicates some increase in the number of converts. Overall, between 1999 and 2012, nearly 72,000 persons were converted to Judaism by Rabbinical Conversion Courts, some of whom were not permanent Israeli residents. Most converts were new immigrants from the Ethiopian Falash Mura community. The highest year was 2007 with 8,608 converts. Since 2010, the annual number of converts was around or slightly above 5,000. Overall, 6,408 of the converts came through the Rabbinate of the Israeli Defense Forces and 65,576 were civilian converts (Fisher 2013; Waxman 2013).

To clarify the intricacies of demographic data in Israel and the territories of the Palestinian Authority, **Table 13** reports numbers of Jews, Others (i.e., non-Jewish persons who are members of Jewish households and Israeli citizens by the provisions of the Law of Return), Arabs, and foreign workers and refugees. Each group's total is shown for different territorial divisions: the State of Israel within the pre-1967 borders, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. The percentage of Jews (by the *enlarged* definition) in each division is also shown.

Of the 6,103,200 *core* Jews in 2014, 5,532,600 lived within Israel's pre-1967 borders; 210,000 lived in neighborhoods of East Jerusalem incorporated after 1967; 20,500 on the Golan Heights; and 340,100 lived in the West Bank. Of the 347,900 non-Jewish household members included in the *enlarged* Jewish population, 332,000 lived within the pre-1967 borders, 7,000 in East Jerusalem, 1,000 in the Golan Heights, and 7,900 in the West Bank. *Core* Jews represented 75.0% of Israel's total legal population of 8,134,500 (6,451,100 Jews and others + 1,683,400 Arabs and others), including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, *and* the Israeli population in the West Bank, but not the Arab population in the West Bank and Gaza, nor foreign workers and refugees. Israel's *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,451,100 represented 79.3% of the State of Israel's total population of 8,134,500. Israel's Arab population, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, was 1,683,400, or 20.7% of the total population thus territorially defined. As shown in **Table 13**, the *enlarged* Jewish population represented 78.2% of the total within pre-1967 borders, 41.3% in East Jerusalem, 46.2% in the Golan Heights, and 12.9% in the West Bank. Gaza has a Jewish population of zero.

Table 13 Core and enlarged Jewish population, Arab population, foreign workers and refugees in Israel and Palestinian Territory by territorial divisions, 1/1/2014[a]

Area	Core Jewish population	Others	Core Jewish and others[b]	Arab population and others	Foreign workers and refugees[c]	Total	Percent of Jews and others[h]
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Grand total	**6,103,200**	**347,900**	**6,451,100**	**5,698,500**	**280,000**	**12,429,600**	**51.9**
State of Israel[d]	***6,103,200***	***347,900***	***6,451,100***	***1,683,400***	***280,000***	***8,414,500***	***76.7***
Thereof:							
Pre-1967 borders	5,532,600	332,000	5,864,600	1,350,400	280,000	**7,495,000**	**78.2**
East Jerusalem	210,000	7,000	217,000	308,000	-	**525,000**	**41.3**
Golan Heights	20,500	1,000	21,500	25,000	-	**46,500**	**46.2**
West Bank	340,100	7,900	348,000	[e]	-	**348,000**	**12.9**[f]
Palestinian Territory				***4,015,100***	-	***4,015,100***	-
West Bank	[g]	[g]	[g]	2,341,500	-	**2,341,500**	-
Gaza	0	0	0	1,673,600	-	**1,673,600**	**0.0**

a Rounded figures.
b Enlarged Jewish population.
c All foreign workers and refugees were allocated to Israel within pre-1967 borders.
d As defined by Israel's legal system.
e Included under State of Israel.
f Percent of Jews and others out of total population in the West Bank under Israeli or Palestinian Authority jurisdiction.
g Included under State of Israel.
h Column 3 divided by column 6.
Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Israel Population and Migration Authority; PCBS Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics; and author's estimates.

Table 14 Percent of core and enlarged Jewish population in Israel and Palestinian Territory, according to different territorial definitions, 1/1/2014

	Percentage of Jews[a] by definition	
Area	**Core**	**Enlarged**
Grand total of Israel and Palestinian Territory	**49.1**	**51.9**
Minus foreign workers and refugees	50.2	53.1
Minus Gaza	58.3	61.6
Minus Golan Heights	58.4	61.7
Minus West Bank	75.3	79.5
Minus East Jerusalem	78.2	82.7

a Total Jewish population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In each row, the Arab population and others of mentioned area is deducted.
Source: Table 13.

These estimates reflect our own assessment of the total Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. To clarify the issues, it should be noted that until the 1994 Oslo agreements, statistical operations in the West Bank and Gaza were the responsibility of Israel's CBS. In 1967, immediately after the June war, Israel conducted a population Census in the West Bank and Gaza. The count showed a population of 598,637 in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and 356,261 in Gaza, for a combined total of 954,898, plus 65,857 in East Jerusalem (Bachi 1977). East Jerusalem's Arab population was incorporated within Jerusalem's expanded municipal territory when Israel annexed East Jerusalem in November 1967. After 1994 Israel transferred the chore of statistical documentation to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). In 1997, the PCBS conducted a Census in the West Bank and Gaza under the guidance of Norwegian experts and reported 1,600,100 persons in the West Bank and 1,001,569 in Gaza, for a combined total of 2,601,669 (not including Israeli settlers). Another 294,014 persons were recorded, but they were not included in data processing because they were abroad at the time of the Census. In addition, the population of East Jerusalem was assessed at 210,000 (PCBS 1998). Thus, the annual rate of population growth over the 30 years (1967-1997) for the West Bank and Gaza combined was 3.4% and was 3.9% for East Jerusalem. Such high growth rates are fully consonant and if anything slightly lower than annual growth rates among Moslem citizens of Israel, assessed at 3.7% during the same period. Palestinian population growth during the 1967-1997 intercensal period was therefore very high, but plausible.

The PCBS subsequently released population projections based on fertility and migration assumptions, reaching an estimate of 4,081,000 for the end of 2007, inclusive of East Jerusalem. Besides first deducting East Jerusalem because it was already included in the Israeli data, we judged the PCBS projected estimate to be too high since it assumed a continuing immigration of Palestinians to the West Bank that did not materialize and was instead replaced by some out-migration (particularly of Christians). The same estimates were debated by a group of American and Israeli writers who maintained that current population estimates from Palestinian sources were inflated by one and one-half million (Zimmerman et al. 2005a; Zimmerman et al. 2005b; for a rebuttal, see DellaPergola 2007b, 2011a).

In November 2007, the PCBS undertook a new Census which enumerated 3,542,000 persons in the West Bank and Gaza (plus 225,000 in East Jerusalem, clearly an undercount because of the PCBS's limited access to the city). The new Census total, not unexpectedly, was more than 300,000 lower than the PCBS's own projected estimate. Our own independent assessment, after subtracting East Jerusalem (as noted, already included in the Israeli total), accounting for a negative net migration balance of Palestinians, and some further corrections, was about 3,500,000 toward the end of 2007, and 4,015,100 on January 1, 2014. Of these, 2,341,500 were in the West Bank and 1,673,600 in Gaza.

By our estimates, the 1997-2007 intercensal yearly average population increase among Palestinians in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and Gaza combined would be 2.91%. This exactly equals the 2.91% yearly growth rate for Arabs in Israel over the same period (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics). In subsequent years, the growth rate of Israel's total Arab

population was slowly declining and in 2013 was 2.11% (2.21% among Moslems only), as against 1.73% for the Jewish population with immigration and 1.52% without immigration. The Palestinian population's growth rate in the West Bank and Gaza combined was probably decreasing as well. Our assumption here is that the annual rate of growth is the same as among Moslems in Israel, whose demographic characteristics are quite similar to those in the Palestinian Territory—though probably both fertility and mortality are slightly higher in the Palestinian Territory than in Israel and significantly higher than among the Jewish population. Our adjusted Palestinian population estimates for the beginning of 2014 are lower than some other independent evaluations (Population Reference Bureau 2013; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2013) since we assume that the original PCBS Census figures had been overestimated by counting some persons, students, and others who actually resided abroad for more than one year.

The Arab population of East Jerusalem, which we have included in Israel's population count, was assessed at 308,000 at the beginning of 2014, and constituted 37% of Jerusalem's total population of 832,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics; Choshen et al. 2010, 2012; DellaPergola 2008b). By adding the 1,683,400 Arab population of Israel, including East Jerusalem, and the 4,015,500 Palestinian estimate for the West Bank and Gaza, a total of 5,698,500 Arabs obtains for the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. If only adding East Jerusalem's Arabs (308,000) to the 4,015,100 who live in the West Bank and Gaza, a total of 4,323,100 would obtain.

Table 14 reports the percentage of Jews, according to the *core* and *enlarged* definitions, of the total population of the whole territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Relative to this grand total, we demonstrate the potential effect of gradually and cumulatively subtracting from the initial maximum possible extent the Arab population of designated areas as well as the foreign workers and refugees. The result is a gradually growing Jewish share of a total population which diminishes according to the different territorial and Arab population configurations considered. This allows a better evaluation of the possible Jewish population share of the total population that exists under alternative territorial assumptions.

A total combined Jewish and Arab population of 12,429,600, including foreign workers and refugees, lived in Israel and Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza) in 2014. The c*ore* Jewish population represented 49.1% of this total between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, of which the State of Israel is part and parcel. Thus, by a rigorous rabbinic definition of who is a Jew, Jewish majority not only is constantly decreasing but possibly does not subsist any longer among the broader aggregate of people currently found over the whole territory between the Sea and the River (DellaPergola 2003a, 2003b, 2007a, 2011a; Sofer and Bistrow 2004). If the 347,900 non-Jewish members of Jewish households are added to the *core* Jewish population, the *enlarged* Jewish population of 6,451,100 represented 51.9% of the total population living legally or illegally in Israel and the Palestinian Territory—a tiny majority.

If we subtract from the grand total, the 220,000 non-Jewish foreign workers—legal or undocumented—who are not permanent residents, and

60,000 refugees, for a total estimate of 280,000, the *core* and *enlarged* Jewish populations represented, respectively, 50.2% and 53.1% of the total population resident in Israel and the Palestinian Territory, estimated at 12,149,600 in 2014. After subtracting the population of Gaza, the total percent of Jews rose to 58.3% core and 61.6% enlarged; after subtracting the Druze population of the Golan Heights the percentages became, 58.4% and 61.7% respectively; 75.3% and 79.5%, if subtracting the Arab population of the West Bank; and 78.2% and 82.7% if also subtracting the Arab population of East Jerusalem. The Jewish population majority in Israel is conditional upon the definitions of who is a Jew, and the territorial boundaries chosen for assessment.

Other Countries

In the rest of Asia, the Jewish population consisted mainly of the rapidly decreasing communities in the eight Asian FSU republics, the largest of which was **Azerbaijan** (8,700 Jews in 2014), followed by **Uzbekistan** (3,800), **Kazakhstan** (3,100), and **Georgia** (2,800) (Tolts 2013). Continuing emigration was the main factor of change, the total moving to Israel being 1,715 in 2012-2013. In the 2009 Kazakhstan Census, 5,281 people appeared with "Judaism" as their religion, most of them Kazakh (1,929) and Russian (1,452) ethnics. The more reliable total number of ethnic Jews was 3,578.

The largest Jewish population in a single country in Asia besides Israel was Iran. Our estimate of 10,000 Jews in **Iran** in 2014 reflects an effort to monitor intensive emigration to Israel, the US, and Europe since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Large scale emigration, selectively inclusive of younger adults, typically engendered significant aging among the extant remaining communities. The Jewish population in **India** was estimated at 5,000. Another reservoir for possible Jewish population increase is the local tribe known as *Benei Menashe* who claims ancient Jewish origins (Parfitt 2002).

Small Jewish populations, partly formed by temporary sojourners, exist in various South Asian and East Asian countries, namely in **China**. Rapid economic development and increasing relations with Israel render these countries receptive to a small but clearly increasing Jewish presence. We assess the number in China including Hong Kong and Macao, at 2,500, mostly recent arrivals. **Japan** has a more veteran Jewish presence estimated at 1,000.

Africa

The Jewish population in Africa was mostly concentrated in **South Africa** (94% of the continental total, see **Appendix**). According to the 2001 Census, the white Jewish population was 61,675 (Saks 2003). Factoring in the national white non-response rate of 14% led to a revised estimate of 72,000. Allowing for a certain proportion of actual Jews among the self-reported Jews among South Africa's nonwhites (11,979 blacks, 1,287 coloreds, and 615 Indians, many of whom practice other religions), we assessed the total Jewish population at 75,000 in 2001. After the major wave of departures just before the 1994 internal transferal of power, South African Jewry has been relatively stable (Kosmin et al. 1999; Bruk 2006). Following a continuation of moderate emigration to Israel (276 in 2012-2013) and other countries, we estimated South Africa's Jewish population at 70,000 in 2014, the world's twelfth largest

Jewish community.

Our revised estimates for Northern Africa acknowledge the practical end of the Jewish presence in most countries and the ongoing reduction in the small Jewish communities remaining in **Morocco** and **Tunisia**, now assessed with a combined population of 3,300 (and a combined total of over 1,100 migrants to Israel in 2001-2013).

Virtually the entire Jewish population is estimated to have emigrated from **Ethiopia**. The question that remains open concerns the Falash Mura—a community of Jewish ancestry long ago baptized to Christianity. Upon migration to Israel, all Falash Mura undergo conversion to Judaism. Their quest for family reunification, and the personal chains involved with extended family patterns create a never-ending potential stream of often unskilled non-Jewish immigrants and is the subject of continuing public discussion. The last contingent of the enlarged community eligible for the Law of Return, which we very tentatively assessed at 2,500, is still waiting in Ethiopia hoping to migrate to Israel. The government of Israel decided to stop further migration from Ethiopia but subsequently reopened the doors and it is hard to predict whether this will really be the last word in the saga of Ethiopian Jewry. Since 3,589 Falash Mura went to Israel in 2007, the flow decreased to 1,582 in 2008 and only 239 in 2009. It increased again to 1,655 in 2010, 2,666 in 2011, and 2,432 in 2012, declining to 1,355 in 2013. In 2014 we allocated a nominal value of 100 to the remaining core Jewish presence in Ethiopia—as distinguished from Falash Mura.

Oceania

Immigration continued to produce some increase in Jewish population in Oceania. **Australia**'s 2011 Census reported a Jewish population of 97,336, versus 88,831 in 2006 and 83,993 in 2001 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2002, 2007, 2012; Eckstein 2003; Graham 2012, 2013b). In view of general non-response to the question about religion, but also in view of indications of a lower non-response in more densely Jewish residential areas, adjusted figures suggest totals of 100,800 in 2001 and 112,000 in 2011, a ten year increase of 11.2% (Graham 2013b). Accounting for such factors as continuing immigration from South Africa, the FSU, and Israel, moderate but rising rates of intermarriage, and the community's rather old age composition (Eckstein 2009; Markus, Jacobs, and Aronov 2009; Markus et al. 2011), we adopted a *core* Jewish population estimate of 112,500 in 2014. Australia has the world's ninth largest Jewish population. The Jewish population is highly concentrated in the two major metropolitan areas of Melbourne and Sydney, which in 2011 comprised 85% of the total.

The 2006 Census of **New Zealand** suggested a Jewish population increase to 6,858, mostly following immigration from South Africa, the US, and the UK (Statistics New Zealand 2007; Morris 2011). The 2011 population Census was canceled after a severe earthquake damaged the city of Christchurch. We assessed the total at 7,500 in 2014.

Dispersion and Concentration

In 2013, 95 countries had at least 100 Jews (**Table 15**). Two countries had Jewish populations of over 5 million each (Israel and the US), another seven had more than 100,000 Jews, three had 50,000 to 99,999, five had 25,000 to 49,999, nine had 10,000 to 24,999, eight had 5,000 to 9,999, 23 had 1,000 to 4,999, and 38 had less than 1,000. The 69 country communities each with less than 10,000 Jews together accounted for less than 1% of world Jewry.

In only five Diaspora countries did Jews constitute at least 5 per 1,000 (0.5%) of the total population. In descending order by the relative share (not size) of their Jewish population, they were Gibraltar (19.4 Jews per 1,000 inhabitants), the US (18.0), Canada (10.9), France (7.4), and Uruguay (5.1). The case of Israel is evidently different, with a *core* Jewish population that represents 75.3% of the total population, and an *enlarged* Jewish population that represents 79.3% of the total population (**Table 14**). In both Israel and the Diaspora, the percentage of Jews out of the total population is decreasing.

By combining the two criteria of Jewish population size and percentage of Jews, we obtain the following taxonomy of the 26 countries with Jewish populations over 10,000 (excluding Israel). Three countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1,000 total population: the US, Canada, and France. Five more countries have over 100,000 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Australia, the UK, the Russian Federation, Argentina, and Germany. One country has 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 5 Jews per 1,000 total population: Uruguay. Ten more countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and at least 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Ukraine, South Africa, Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Chile, Switzerland, Sweden, Belarus, and Panama. Six countries have 10,000 to 99,999 Jews and less than 1 Jew per 1,000 total population: Brazil, Mexico, Italy, Turkey, Spain, and Iran.

Table 15 World core Jewish population distribution, by number and proportion (per 1,000 total population), 1/1/2014

Number of core Jews in country	Jews per 1,000 total population					
	Total	Less than 1.0	1.0-4.9	5.0-9.9	10.0-19.9	20.0+
Number of countries						
Total	**95**	**66**	**23**	**2**	**3**	**1**
100-999	38	34	3	-	1	-
1,000-4,999	23	22	1	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	8	4	4	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	9	3	5	1	-	-
25,000-49,999	5	2	3	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	3	1	2	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	7	-	5	1	1	-
1,000,000 or more	2	-	-	-	1	1
Jewish population distribution (number of core Jews)						
Total[a]	**14,212,800**	**297,100**	**1,233,900**	**492,200**	**6,085,900**	**6,103,200**
100-999	11,700	9,700	1,400	-	600	-
1,000-4,999	56,000	54,100	1,900	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	59,600	31,100	28,500	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	129,900	39,200	73,500	17,200	-	-
25,000-49,999	175,800	68,000	107,800	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	228,000	95,000	133,000	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	1,748,100	-	887,800	475,000	385,300	-
1,000,000 or more	11,803,200	-	-	-	5,700,000	6,103,200
Jewish population distribution (percent of world core Jewish population)						
Total[a]	**100.0**	**2.1**	**8.7**	**3.5**	**42.8**	**42.9**
100-999	0.1	0.1	0.0	-	0.0	-
1,000-4,999	0.4	0.4	0.0	-	-	-
5,000-9,999	0.4	0.2	0.2	-	-	-
10,000-24,999	0.9	0.3	0.5	0.1	-	-
25,000-49,999	1.2	0.5	0.8	-	-	-
50,000-99,999	1.6	0.7	0.9	-	-	-
100,000-999,999	12.3	-	6.2	3.3	2.7	-
1,000,000 or more	83.0	-	-	-	40.1	42.9

a Grand total includes countries with fewer than 100 core Jews, for a total of 500 core Jews. Minor discrepancies due to rounding. Israel includes Jewish residents and their non-Jewish family members in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.

Outlook

Jewish population trends constitute a sensitive indicator of broader political, socioeconomic and cultural trends globally and within each country. Accurate population data, as far as they can be assessed, also constitute a necessary tool in the planning of Jewish community life.

Beyond the many and arguable problems related to Jewish population definitions, and beyond imperfect data availability and accuracy, it is important to recognize that powerful and consistent trends constantly shape and reshape the demographic profile of world Jewry. Current data should be read in historical and comparative context, so as to detect the major underlying drivers of Jewish population change within the broader context of global society. The recent momentum of Jewish population change in the US and in most other countries of the world—at best tending to zero growth—contrasts with that of Israel—characterized by the continuation of significant natural increase. While the transition of Israel to the status of largest Jewish population in the world is grounded on solid empirical foundations, the US constitutes a very large and stable Jewish population—culturally and socioeconomically a powerful, creative, and influential center of Jewish life.

The US constitutes a powerful source of new modes of Jewish population attachment—whether exclusive or shared with alternative identifications, whether through direct genealogical linkage or by voluntary association with others who are Jewish. These definition and identification patterns operate along with, and to some extent compete with, the more conservative and mutually exclusive Jewish family and identification patterns that prevail in Israel. Both modes, however, generate widespread echoes across all other Jewish communities worldwide, including powerful mutual influences among the two major ones. The aggregate demographic weight of other Jewish communities globally—aside from their continuing cultural relevance—is gradually decreasing. The cultural and institutional projection and influence of the two major centers, Israel and the US, has become increasingly significant in other geographical areas of Jewish presence. The Jewish world has become demographically more bi-polar, but also more individualistic and transnational reflecting pervasive trends in contemporary world society.

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consult past AJYB volumes for further details on how the respective annual estimates were obtained. Since 2010, our world Jewish population estimates have appeared in the framework of the North American Jewish Data Bank (now the Berman Jewish Data Bank), and since 2012 within the new *American Jewish Year Book.*

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Appendix. Jewish population by country, core definition and expanded definitions, 1/1/2014

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b]	Jews per total 1,000 popula-tion	Accuracy rating[c]		Population with Jewish parents[d]	Enlarged Jewish population[e]	Law of Return population[f]
World	**7,137,520,000**	**14,212,800**	**1.99**			**17,236,850**	**20,109,400**	**22,921,500**
America total	**957,830,000**	**6,468,800**	**6.75**			**8,963,600**	**11,175,100**	**13,398,600**
Canada	35,300,000	385,300	10.92	B 2011	X	450,000	550,000	700,000
United States	316,200,000	5,700,000	18.03	B 2013	X	8,000,000	10,000,000	12,000,000
Total North America[g]	**351,630,000**	**6,085,300**	**17.31**			**8,450,000**	**10,550,000**	**12,700,000**
Bahamas	300,000	300	1.00	D 1995		350	400	500
Costa Rica	4,700,000	2,500	0.53	C 1993		2,750	3,000	3,200
Cuba	11,300,000	500	0.04	C 2000		1,000	1,500	2,000
Dominican Republic	10,300,000	100	0.01	D 2000		150	200	300
El Salvador	6,300,000	100	0.02	C 1993		150	200	300
Guatemala	15,400,000	900	0.06	B 1999		1,200	1,500	1,800
Jamaica	2,700,000	200	0.07	C 2010		300	400	500
Mexico	117,600,000	40,000	0.34	B 2010		45,000	50,000	65,000
Netherlands Antilles	304,000	200	0.66	C 1998		300	400	600
Panama	3,900,000	10,000	2.56	C 2012		10,500	11,000	12,000
Puerto Rico	3,600,000	1,500	0.42	C 2000		2,000	2,500	3,000
Virgin Islands	110,000	500	4.55	C 2006		600	700	800
Other	28,486,000	100	0.00	D		200	300	500
Total Central Amer., Caribbean	**205,000,000**	**56,900**	**0.28**			**64,500**	**72,100**	**90,500**
Argentina	41,300,000	181,300	4.39	B 2003		270,000	330,000	350,000
Bolivia	11,000,000	500	0.05	C 1999		700	900	1,000
Brazil	195,500,000	95,000	0.49	B 2010		120,000	150,000	175,000
Chile	17,600,000	18,500	1.05	B 2002		21,000	26,000	30,000
Colombia	48,000,000	2,500	0.05	C 1996		2,800	3,200	3,600
Ecuador	15,800,000	600	0.04	B 2011		800	1,000	1,200
Paraguay	6,800,000	900	0.13	B 1997		1,200	1,500	1,800
Peru	30,500,000	1,900	0.06	C 1993		2,300	3,000	3,500
Suriname	600,000	200	0.33	D 2000		300	400	500
Uruguay	3,400,000	17,200	5.06	B 2006		20,000	25,000	27,500
Venezuela	29,700,000	8,000	0.27	C 2012		10,000	12,000	14,000
Total South America[g]	**401,200,000**	**326,600**	**0.81**			**449,100**	**553,000**	**608,100**
Europe total	**816,890,000**	**1,407,200**	**1.72**			**1,769,700**	**2,188,100**	**2,735,900**
Austria	8,500,000	9,000	1.06	B 2011		14,000	17,000	20,000
Belgium	11,200,000	30,000	2.68	C 2002		35,000	40,000	45,000
Bulgaria	7,300,000	2,000	0.27	C 2011		4,000	6,000	7,500
Croatia	4,300,000	1,700	0.40	C 2001		2,400	3,000	3,500
Cyprus	1,100,000	100	0.09	D 2012		150	200	250
Czech Republic	10,500,000	3,900	0.37	C 2011		5,000	6,500	8,000
Denmark	5,600,000	6,400	1.14	C 2001		7,500	8,500	9,500
Estonia	1,300,000	1,900	1.46	B 2013		2,600	3,400	4,500
Finland	5,400,000	1,300	0.24	B 2010		1,500	1,800	2,500
France[h]	63,940,000	475,000	7.43	B 2012		530,000	600,000	700,000
Germany	80,600,000	118,000	1.46	B 2013		150,000	250,000	275,000
Greece	11,100,000	4,500	0.41	B 2000		5,500	6,000	7,000
Hungary	9,900,000	47,900	4.84	C 2001		75,000	95,000	150,000
Ireland	4,700,000	1,600	0.34	B 2011	X	2,000	2,400	2,800
Italy	59,800,000	28,000	0.47	B 2011		33,000	40,000	45,000
Latvia	2,000,000	5,600	2.80	B 2013	X	8,000	12,000	16,000
Lithuania	3,000,000	2,900	0.97	B 2013	X	4,700	6,500	10,000

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b]	Jews per total 1,000 popula-tion	Accuracy rating[c]		Population with Jewish parents[d]	Enlarged Jewish population[e]	Law of Return population[f]
Luxembourg	500,000	600	1.20	B 2000		750	900	1,000
Malta	400,000	100	0.25	D 2012		150	200	250
Netherlands	16,800,000	29,900	1.78	B 2000		43,000	50,000	57,000
Poland	38,500,000	3,200	0.08	C 2001		5,000	7,500	10,000
Portugal	10,500,000	600	0.06	C 2001		800	1,000	1,200
Romania	21,300,000	9,400	0.44	B 2001		13,500	17,000	20,000
Slovakia	5,400,000	2,600	0.48	C 2001		3,600	4,500	6,000
Slovenia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C 2003		150	200	300
Spain	46,600,000	12,000	0.26	D 2007		15,000	18,000	20,000
Sweden	9,600,000	15,000	1.56	C 2007		20,000	25,000	30,000
United Kingdom[i]	64,300,000	290,000	4.51	B 2011		330,000	370,000	410,000
Total European Union 28	**506,240,000**	**1,103,300**	**2.18**			**1,312,300**	**1,592,600**	**1,862,300**
Belarus	9,500,000	11,000	1.16	B 2009		18,000	25,000	33,000
Moldova	4,100,000	3,700	0.90	B 2004		5,700	7,500	11,000
Russian Federation[j]	143,500,000	186,000	1.30	C 2010		290,000	380,000	570,000
Ukraine	45,500,000	63,000	1.38	C 2001		97,000	130,000	200,000
Total FSU Republics	**202,600,000**	**263,700**	**1.30**			**410,700**	**542,500**	**814,000**
[Total FSU in Europe][k]	**208,900,000**	**274,100**	**1.31**			**426,000**	**564,400**	**844,500**
Gibraltar	30,000	600	20.00	B 2001		700	800	900
Norway	5,100,000	1,300	0.25	B 2010		1,500	2,000	2,500
Switzerland	8,100,000	19,000	2.35	B 2012	X	22,000	25,000	28,000
Total other West Europe[g]	**13,750,000**	**20,900**	**1.52**			**24,200**	**27,800**	**31,400**
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,800,000	500	0.13	C 2001		800	1,000	1,200
Macedonia	2,100,000	100	0.05	C 1996		150	200	250
Serbia	7,100,000	1,400	0.20	C 2001		2,100	2,800	3,500
Turkey[j]	76,100,000	17,200	0.23	B 2002		19,300	21,000	23,000
Other	5,200,000	100	0.02	D		150	200	250
Total Balkans	**94,300,000**	**19,300**	**0.20**			**22,500**	**25,200**	**28,200**
Asia total	**4,224,800,000**	**6,142,000**	**1.45**			**6,294,450**	**6,514,600**	**6,532,000**
Israel[l]	7,786,500	5,763,100	740.14	A 2014	X	5,900,000	6,103,100	6,103,100
West Bank[m]	2,689,500	340,100	126.45	A 2014	X	345,000	348,000	348,000
Gaza	1,673,600	0	0.00	A 2014	X	0	0	0
Total Israel and Palestine[n]	**12,149,600**	**6,103,200**	**502.34**			**6,245,000**	**6,451,100**	**6,451,100**
[Total Israel][o]	**8,134,500**	**6,103,200**	**750.29**			**6,245,000**	**6,451,100**	**6,451,100**
Azerbaijan	9,400,000	8,700	0.93	B 2009		10,500	16,000	22,000
Georgia	4,500,000	2,800	0.62	C 2002		4,500	6,000	8,700
Kazakhstan	17,000,000	3,100	0.18	B 2009		4,800	6,500	9,600
Kyrgyzstan	5,700,000	500	0.09	B 2009		750	1,000	1,500
Turkmenistan	5,200,000	200	0.04	D 1989		300	400	500
Uzbekistan	30,200,000	3,800	0.13	D 1989		6,000	8,000	10,000
Total former USSR in Asia[g]	**83,100,000**	**19,100**	**0.23**			**26,850**	**37,900**	**52,300**
China[p]	1,365,200,000	2,500	0.00	D 2010		2,700	3,000	3,300
India	1,276,500,000	5,000	0.00	B 1996		6,000	7,000	8,000
Iran	76,500,000	10,000	0.13	D 1986		11,000	12,000	13,000
Japan	127,300,000	1,000	0.01	D 1993		1,200	1,400	1,600
Korea, South	50,200,000	100	0.00	C 1998		150	200	250
Philippines	96,200,000	100	0.00	D 2000		150	200	250
Singapore	5,400,000	300	0.06	C 1990		400	500	600
Syria	21,900,000	100	0.00	C 1995		150	200	250
Taiwan	23,400,000	100	0.00	D 2000		150	200	250
Thailand	66,200,000	200	0.00	D 1998		250	300	350
Yemen	25,200,000	200	0.01	C 1995		250	300	350

Country	Total population[a]	Core Jewish population[b]	Jews per total 1,000 popula-tion	Accuracy rating[c]	Population with Jewish parents[d]	Enlarged Jewish population[e]	Law of Return population[f]
Other	995,550,400	100	0.00	D	200	300	400
Total other Asia	**4,129,550,400**	**19,700**	**0.00**		**22,600**	**25,600**	**28,600**
Africa total	**1,100,000,000**	**74,700**	**0.07**		**80,950**	**87,400**	**94,750**
Egypt	84,700,000	100	0.00	C 2008	150	200	250
Ethiopia	89,200,000	100	0.00	C 2008	500	1,000	2,500
Morocco	33,300,000	2,400	0.07	C 2006	2,500	2,700	2,900
Tunisia	10,900,000	900	0.08	C 2008	1,000	1,100	1,200
Total Northern Africa[g]	**297,700,000**	**3,500**	**0.01**		**4,150**	**5,000**	**6,850**
Botswana	1,900,000	100	0.05	C 1993	150	200	250
Congo D.R.	71,100,000	100	0.00	C 1993	150	200	250
Kenya	44,200,000	300	0.01	C 1990	500	700	800
Namibia	2,400,000	100	0.04	C 1993	150	200	250
Nigeria	173,600,000	100	0.00	D 2000	150	200	250
South Africa	53,000,000	70,000	1.32	B 2011	75,000	80,000	85,000
Zimbabwe	13,000,000	400	0.03	B 2001	500	600	700
Other	443,100,000	100	0.00	D	200	300	400
Total Sub-Saharan Africa[q]	**802,300,000**	**71,200**	**0.09**		**76,800**	**82,400**	**87,900**
Oceania total	**38,000,000**	**120,100**	**3.16**		**128,150**	**144,200**	**160,250**
Australia	23,100,000	112,500	4.87	B 2011	120,000	135,000	150,000
New Zealand	4,500,000	7,500	1.67	B 2006	8,000	9,000	10,000
Other	10,400,000	100	0.01	D	150	200	250

a Source, with minor adjustments: Population Reference Bureau 2013. Mid-year 2013 estimates.
b Includes all persons who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews, or, if the respondent is a different person in the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews; *and* do not have another religion. Also includes persons with a Jewish parent who claim no current religious or ethnic identity.
c A) Base estimate derived from national census or reliable Jewish population survey; updated on the basis of full or partial information on Jewish population movements in the respective country during the intervening period. B) Base estimate derived from less accurate but recent national Jewish population data; updated on the basis of partial information on Jewish population movements during the intervening period. C) Base estimate derived from less recent sources and/or less reliable or partial coverage of country's Jewish population; updated on the basis of demographic information illustrative of regional demographic trends. D) Base estimate essentially speculative; no reliable updating procedure. In categories A, B, and C, the year in which the country's base estimate or important partial updates were obtained is also stated. This is not the current estimate's date but the basis for its attainment. An X is appended to the accuracy rating for several countries, whose Jewish population estimate for 2013 was not only updated but also revised in light of improved information.
d Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; and (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent.
e Sum of (a) core Jewish population; (b) persons reported as partly Jewish; (c) all others not currently Jewish with a Jewish parent; and (d) all other non-Jewish household members (spouses, children, etc.).
f Sum of Jews, children of Jews, and grandchildren of Jews, and their respective spouses, regardless of Jewish identity.
g Including countries not listed because fewer than 100 core Jews live in each of those countries and in all of those countries combined.
h Including Monaco.
i Including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
j Including Asian regions.
k Including the Baltic countries which are already included above in the EU.
l Including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, not including the West Bank.
m Author's revised estimates of total Palestinian population on 1/1/2014: West Bank (without East Jerusalem): 2,341,500; Gaza: 1,673,600; Total: 4,015,100. The West Bank also includes 340,100 Jews and 7,900 non-Jewish members of Jewish households, for a total of 348,000 Jews and others. The reported West Bank total of 2,689,500 includes Palestinian, Jewish and other residents.
n Not including foreign workers and refugees.
o As defined by Israel's legal system, not including foreign workers and refugees.
p Including Hong Kong and Macao.
q Excluding Sudan and Ethiopia included in Northern Africa.

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