

## Jewish <br> Distinctiveness In America

A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT

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# Jewish Distinctiveness In America 

A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT

Tom W. Smith

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## FOREWORD

Jewish conventional wisdom claims that "Jews are just like everybody else, only more so." The kernel of truth-and misunderstand-ing-in that bit of folklore is revealed in this multidimensional statistical portrait of American Jewry, based on the General Social Surveys (GSS) conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago between 1972 and 2002. Among the myriad of ethnic groups and religious denominations that make up the American mosaic, American Jews are the most distinctive. Yet on 84 percent of the items, Jews and non-Jews take the same side of the issue, and over the decades, the gap between Jews and other Americans has narrowed, largely by non-Jews moving toward the positions held by Jews.

Dr. Tom Smith, an eminent social scientist and the director of the GSS, has mined thirty years of surveys to profile American Jews statistically, for dozens of demographic categories and on 153 nondemographic questions-everything from family size and per capita income to viewing X-rated movies and spanking one's children. By comparing Jews to other ethnic/racial and religious groups within America, Smith shows their relative position and which groups are closest to Jews. By comparing Jews and non-Jews over time, he shows how changes have taken place.

Out of this treasure trove of data, Dr. Smith discerns six megapatterns that describe Jewish distinctiveness in the United States:

- Jews attach great importance to seeking knowledge and highly value education and science. Their pursuit of education leads them to higher occupational status, better vocabulary scores, and more vociferous newspaper reading. It also influences many attitudes and values, which, in America, tend to become more liberal with higher education.
- Jews value individual freedom and choice. On many issues where Jews differ most markedly from non-Jews-on support for abortion rights, civil liberties, sexual freedom, and allowing euthana-sia-Jews favor moral autonomy over governmental regulation or societal conformity.
- Jews identify themselves as liberal more than do others, and this is reflected in their political affiliation and voting patterns, their egalitarian views on gender roles, and their support for policies promoting integration and racial equality.
- Jews display an urban orientation, reflecting their high concentration in large metropolitan areas. This translates into support for greater spending for the cities and for mass transportation, and an aversion to owning guns and hunting.
- Jews are skeptical about the military, and favor cuts in defense spending.
- Jews take a nonpunitive approach to child-raising, disapproving of corporal punishment and valuing children who "think for themselves."

Why should we care about all of this-other than for "bragging rights" or a parlor game? We care because the numbers reveal an underlying strength of the American Jewish community: Despite our declining share of the overall American population, a high intermarriage rate, and a growing geographical dispersion, Jews have been able to retain a distinctive profile which bespeaks a unique core Jewish identity. Furthermore, Jews have embraced certain broad values, such as belief in the importance of education and in expressive individualism, that seem to have resonance for other Americans as well.

Dr. Smith theorizes that Jews occupy a special place in the American amalgam in that they are both an ethnic group and a religion, and these two aspects reinforce each other. "Jews, as a religious group, are expected to maintain and pass on their Jewish identity. As an ethnic group, their religion is not only an attribute of individuals and families, but a trait of the collective Jewish community."

We at the American Jewish Committee value the research that informs our efforts to strengthen the quality of American Jewish life. Dr. Smith has given us as detailed a picture as we are likely to get of what American Jews think and believe, and from this we can take heart about our future viability and vitality.

David A. Harris<br>Executive Director<br>The American Jewish Committee<br>April 2005

## INTRODUCTION

America is a diverse society. Its citizens come from all of the world's peoples, practicing all of the world's faiths, to form, in Seymour Martin Lipset's phrase, the "first new nation." This nation joins together Native Americans with immigrants from all the continents and countries into a new American nationality. While the metaphor of a melting pot has often been used to describe this process, it is really more aptly characterized as an amalgamation or commingling, as the new is formed from the parts of the old. On top of this broad ethnic/racial diversity comes even greater religious variation. Hundreds of ethnic groups are subdivided into thousands of denominations. Nor are these religions expected to disappear or blend together as the old nationalities did. Quite the contrary-freedom of religion is a central guarantee of America, and faiths are expected to continue to flourish.

Moreover, not only is the ethnic/racial and religious mixture extensive and complex, but it is also dynamic. The flow of immigrants continues, and the mix of origins changes as once-small groups grow larger. These new immigrants not only bring new religions with them, but the domestic religious marketplace is continually adding new denominations from schisms, mergers, and the genesis of entirely new faiths.

Understanding America means understanding both its pluralistic nature and the groups that form its ethnic-religious mosaic. In turn, to understand each ethnic, racial, and religious group, one must compare and contrast each to other groups and society as a whole. To obtain a clear picture of the whole, one needs to look at the parts, and to see the position and importance of each part, one needs to have it reflected against the other parts.

One important part of America's ethnic-religious mix is the Jewish people. Three hundred and fifty years ago Jewish refugees from the Portuguese Inquisition in Recife, Brazil, arrived in the future United States. Since then, Jews have been an integral part of the American nation and have made enormous contributions to the arts and sciences, the economy, the government, and all other spheres of life. The public readily acknowledges the important role of Jews, as indicated by a 2000 survey asking about twelve ethnic/racial groups, which ranked Jews second only to settlers from England in making positive contributions to America (Smith, 2001).

To extend our understanding of the position of Jews in contemporary society, this report examines American Jews through comparative perspectives. First, by comparing Jews to other ethnic/racial and religious groups, one can establish the relative position of Jews in America on both the ethnic/racial and religious dimensions and also determine which groups Jews are closer to and more distant from. Second, comparing Jews and non-Jews over time enables us to examine recent sociopolitical change both for Jews alone and with respect to other Americans. Finally, by comparing different types of Jews (e.g., by denomination and by level of observance), one can investigate the degree of internal solidarity and see how different subgroups of Jews are related to non-Jews. Collectively, these comparisons provide notable insights into the nature, role, and position of Jews in contemporary American society. ${ }^{1}$

## DATA, ORGANIZATION, AND METHODS

Almost all the data utilized in this report come from the General Social Surveys (GSSs) conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, between 1972 and 2002. The GSSs are full-probability, in-person samples of adults living in households in the United States. For more details, see Appendix 1 (page 285).

For the exact wording of items, see Davis, Smith, and Marsden, 2003, or go to www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss.

The first section of the report compares Jews to other ethnic/ racial and religious groups. In the first series of comparisons, Jews are examined as one of fifteen ethnic/racial groups: Jews, Germans, the British, Blacks, the Irish, Hispanics, Italians, Native Americans, Scandinavians, the French, Eastern Europeans, Asians, the Polish, Other Whites, and Others. ${ }^{2}$ Details on the definitions of these groups are given in Appendix 2 (page 286). In the second comparison, Jews are compared as one of seven religious groups: Jews, Fundamentalist Protestants, Moderate Protestants, Liberal Protestants, Catholics, those with no religious preference (None), and those in Other Religions. Details on this religious typology are given in Appendix 3 (page 288). Two separate comparisons are carried out because Jews are and should be examined as both an ethnic/racial group and a religious group.

The second section examines trends over time for Jews and non-Jews. The GSSs are grouped into three time periods: the 1970s (1972-80), the 1980s (1981-90), and the recent period (1991-2002). Appendix 1 (page 285) shows the distribution of groups by period. These three time periods were chosen to allow the aggregation of enough Jewish cases so that changes in demographics and attitudes could be analyzed over time.

The third section looks at differences among Jews. Three different analyses of intra-Jewish variation are carried out. The first compares those who currently identify as Jewish to those raised as Jewish and now without any religious preference, and to those raised as Jewish and now following some other religion. The second examines different denominational streams within Judaism (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Other). The third approach divides Jews by their level of attending religious services into high, moderate, and low levels. The Jewish subgroup analyses are carried out for the combined years 1988-2002. This represents all years in which informa-
tion on Jewish denominational streams were collected. See Appendix 4 (page 289) for more details on these three classifications of Jews.

The data analyzed are divided into demographics (current and for family of origin) and nondemographics (mostly attitudes). The nondemographics cover 153 measures grouped into eighteen topical categories: Religion (nine items), Abortion Rights (seven), Suicide and Euthanasia (five), Sexual Morality (seven), Gender Roles/Equality (eight), Child Values (five), Misanthropy (three), Socializing (four), Politics and Voting (seven), Confidence in Institutions (thirteen), Government Spending Priorities/Taxes (twenty-one), SocialWelfare Policies (four), Intergroup Relations (fourteen), Civil Liberties (fifteen), Crime and Firearms (twelve), Psychological Wellbeing and Health (six), Finances and Jobs (seven), and Miscellaneous (six). Analysis examines patterns overall, within the eighteen topical categories, and those that emerge across topics.

## JEWS IN AMERICA'S ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MOSAIC

## Demographic Profile

America is made up of many different ethnic/racial and religious groups with unique histories and distinctive backgrounds and attributes. In many cases the various ethnic/racial and religious groups differ from one another on various basic demographic variables, including age, family characteristics, socioeconomic status, laborforce participation, and current and former residence.

Jews are very distinctive on family demographics (Tables 1-2, 45). ${ }^{3}$ First, they are older than other Americans: The average age for adult Jews is 47.7 compared with 44.3 for non-Jews (United Jewish Communities, 2003). Among ethnic/racial groups only the British are older (49.6), and among religious groups only Liberal Protestants have a higher average age (50.8). This comes about because Jews have
a high life expectancy and relatively low birthrates in recent decades.
Second, Jews exceed all other ethnic/racial and religious groups in being married ( 65 percent of Jews vs. 57 percent of non-Jews). ${ }^{4}$ This in large part results from their relatively low level of divorce. With 21 percent ever having been divorced, Jews are lower than all other groups except Asians (11 percent) and Catholics (20 percent).

Third, despite having more stable marriages, Jews have smaller families than other groups do (Keister, 2003; Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; United Jewish Communities, 2003; Waite, 2002). They have fewer brothers and sisters than any other ethnic/racial or religious group ( 2.4 vs. an average of 3.8 ); they are tied with Italians for the lowest number of children ever born ( 1.6 compared to an average of 1.9), but do have more children than those with no religion (1.2) and Other Religions (1.4). They have the smallest current household size of any ethnic/racial or religious group ( 2.5 vs . an average of 2.9 ).

Jews also differ notably from others in their residential pattern (Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; United Jewish Communities, 2003). More than any other group, Jews live in and near the largest cities. They are more likely than any other ethnic or religious group to live in one of the twelve largest central cities and are also the ethnic/racial and religious group most likely to reside in a suburb of the twelve largest cities. Similarly, Jews are more than twice as concentrated in the Northeast than non-Jews are ( 43 percent vs. 20 percent). Only Italians are more likely to reside in the Northeast than Jews are (51 percent vs. 43 percent), and Jews lead all religious groups in being Northeasterners.

Jews exceed other groups in socioeconomic status (SES) (Alba, Lutz, and Vesselinov, 2001; Keister, 2003; Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; Lehrer, 1999; United Jewish Communities, 2003; Wilder, 1996; Wilder and Walters, 1998). First, Jews surpass all ethnic/racial and religious groups in education. Mean years of schooling is 15.7 for Jews vs. 13.1 for non-Jews, and 61 percent of Jews have at least a four-year college degree as compared with 22 percent of non-Jews. ${ }^{5}$

Similarly, spouses of married Jews have much higher education than the spouses of non-Jews (Kalmijn, 1991). This educational edge leads to Jews topping all other groups in a measure of verbal ability (Lynn, 2004). On average Jews correctly identified 7.2 of 10 words compared to 6.0 words correct for non-Jews.

Second, Jews hold more prestigious jobs than any other ethnic/racial or religious group. Their occupational prestige averaged 51.9 compared to 43.2 for non-Jews. Third, the high education and occupational standing of Jews lead to their exceeding all other ethnic/racial and religious groups in household income (Kosmin and Lachman, 1993). In 1986 constant dollars Jews have an average income of $\$ 58,900$ compared to $\$ 34,600$ for non-Jews. When income per household member is calculated, Jewish per capita income (in 1986 constant dollars) is $\$ 27,500$ vs. $\$ 14,100$ for nonJews. Thus, Jewish household income is greater than that of nonJews by 70 percent, and Jewish per capita income is 95 percent higher. Furthermore, other research indicates that the net wealth of Jews is several times greater than that of those in other major religions (Keister, 2003).

Fourth, these large objective advantages, in turn, create major differences in class identification and self-assessment. Jews are more likely than any other ethnic/racial or religious group to say they are both middle class and upper class. Sixty-seven percent consider themselves to be middle class and 19 percent to be upper class. The respective figures for non-Jews are 46 percent and 3 percent. Likewise, Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group most likely to rate their financial situation as above average ( 51 percent for Jews vs. 22 percent for non-Jews). Finally, among the socioeconomic status (SES) measures, home ownership is the only indicator on which Jews do not distinguish themselves from other groups (Keister, 2003; Kosmin and Lachman, 1993). While home ownership among Jews is somewhat higher than among non-Jews ( 72 percent vs. 66 percent), the edge is not statistically significant, and the British, Ital-
ians, and Liberal Protestants have higher home-ownership levels than Jews do.

Jews are less distinctive in their labor force status and work history (Kosmin and Lachman, 1993). They do not differ notably from non-Jews in overall employment levels ( 71 percent for Jews and 68 percent for non-Jews) or proportion retired ( 14 percent for Jews and 12 percent for non-Jews). However, reflecting their greater education and higher occupational standing, Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group with the lowest level of unemployment during the previous ten years ( 21 percent for Jews and 32 percent for non-Jews). Also, their concentration in professional, managerial, and proprietary positions holds down their membership in labor unions, so that 17-18 percent of both Jews and non-Jews come from union households.

The decided demographic differences between Jews and nonJews are not recent developments, but have prevailed across generations (Tables 4-5). First, in terms of family structure, Jews not only are more likely to live in intact marriages, but are more likely to have been raised in a family with both a mother and father present than any other ethnic/racial or religious group. Eighty-two percent of Jews vs. 71 percent of non-Jews grew up in an intact family. Similarly, just as current Jewish families tend to have fewer children than others have, so too were Jews raised in smaller families. They have fewer brothers and sisters than any other ethnic/racial or religious group ( 2.4 for Jews and 3.8 for non-Jews).

Second, residentially, Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group most likely to have been raised in a large city ( 41 percent of Jews compared with 14 percent of non-Jews). Even the group with the second highest level of urban origins, Blacks, had only 28 percent from large cities. Likewise, Jews were the religious group most often raised in the Northeast and were behind only Italians in being from the Northeast.

Third, Jews grew up in families with high SES. Jewish mothers
and fathers had greater education than parents of any other ethnic/racial or religious group. Over two-fifths ( 41 percent) of Jewish fathers had a college education as did 29 percent of Jewish mothers, compared to respectively 17 percent and 11 percent of non-Jewish fathers and mothers. Likewise, the occupational prestige of both Jewish fathers and mothers was higher than that of any other ethnic/racial or religious group. These educational and occupational advantages gave Jews a great financial advantage. More than any other ethnic/racial or religious group, Jews said the homes they grew up in were financially above average. Fifty-two percent of Jews said that their family's financial standing was above average compared to 18 percent of non-Jews.

Fourth, Jews have enjoyed more social mobility than non-Jews have (Alba, Lutz, and Vesselinov, 2001; Chiswick, 1993; Keister, 2003). Compared to the average years of schooling for their parents, Jews have gained 2.5 years, while non-Jews only bettered their parents by 1.9 years of schooling. Likewise, in terms of occupational prestige, Jews score 2.7 points higher than their parents' standing, while non-Jews are up only by 1.3 points.

The success that Jews have achieved comes in part because many positive traits reinforce one another. For example, because of assortative mating, Jews have tended both to have well-educated fathers and mothers and to marry well-educated spouses. This helps to cement and transmit the benefits of education in particular and to promote high socioeconomic status (SES) in general. Similarly, their tendency to have more stable marriages reduces the social and economic disjunctions that divorce often causes within and across generations. Likewise, their relatively lower fertility levels mean that family resources can be concentrated on fewer children. Thus, socioeconomic, marital, and fertility characteristics work together to promote stability and success.

## Religion

Religion is, of course, the attribute that definitively differentiates Jews from other Americans. But how do Jews and others differ on specific religious behaviors and beliefs, besides their different religious affiliations? As Tables 7-8 show, there are important differences within the religious dimension. First, Jews are less active in several overt expressions of their faith than are others. Of all ethnic/racial groups, Jews are the least likely to attend religious services. Just 7 percent of Jews report going to synagogue each week while 27 percent of non-Jews attend services weekly. At the other end, 31 percent of Blacks and 35 percent of Asians indicate weekly attendance. Among religious groups, only those with no religious preference attend worship services less frequently ( 1.5 percent weekly). In contrast 22-26 percent of Liberal to Moderate Protestants attend weekly, as do 31 percent of Catholics and 36 percent of Fundamentalist Protestants. Likewise, Jews are the ethnic/racial group least likely to pray daily ( 26 percent for Jews and 56 percent for non-Jews). At the high end are Blacks with 76 percent praying daily. Again, by religion only those with no religious preference pray less frequently (19 percent daily).

Second, while less engaged in these religious behaviors, Jews do not differ from others on self-ratings of religious strength (37-38 percent of both Jews and non-Jews saying they have a strong religious attachment), and Jews fall in the middle among ethnic/racial and religious groups on religious strength.

Third, Jews fall at or near the bottom on several measures of traditional religious beliefs (Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002). Among all ethnic groups, they are the least likely to be sure that God exists, to believe that there is an afterlife, and to say that the Bible is the exact word of God. Among religious groups, Jews are the least likely to believe in an afterlife, and only those without any religious preference are less likely to hold to these beliefs about God and the

Bible. Thus, certainty about God is held by 27 percent of Jews and 65 percent of non-Jews, belief in an afterlife by 43 percent of Jews and 74 percent of non-Jews, and Bible inerrancy is accepted by 11 percent of Jews and 33 percent of non-Jews. Blacks, at 81 percent, have the highest certitude about God, while Native Americans, at 80 percent, are tops in believing in an afterlife. The distance of Jews from other religious groups is underscored by the fact that their beliefs are much closer to those without any religious preference than to those of any of the other faith groups.

Fourth, on two existential measures about good and evil Jews show a disparate pattern (Cohen and Rankin, 2004). Jews are the ethnic group least likely to believe that the world is mostly good ( 25 percent of Jews vs. 30 percent of non-Jews) and below all religious groups except for those with no religion (21 percent saying the world is good). But on whether human nature is basically good, Jews are more likely to be optimistic ( 47 percent of Jews vs. 36 percent of non-Jews), and Jews are second to only Others among ethnic/racial groups and first among religious groups in thinking that people are basically good.

Finally, Jews strongly support the separation of church and state (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001). They differ dramatically from others in supporting the ban on school prayer. The Supreme Court ruling against school prayer is backed by 84 percent of Jews and only 38 percent of non-Jews. The court ban on school prayers is not supported by the majority of any other ethnic/racial group, and among religious groups even those without any religion are much less likely to favor the ban than are Jews ( 64 percent to 84 percent).

## Abortion Rights

Jews are strongly supportive of abortion rights (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Miller, 1996). On all seven measures on allowing legal abortions, Jews are the most supportive of all
ethnic/racial and religious groups, with majorities of from 77 percent to 96 percent approving (Tables 10-11). Scandinavians and those with no religion usually finish second to Jews in their support for abortion rights. Even for those reasons for which there is consensus for legal abortions (i.e., in cases of the mother's health being seriously endangered, a serious birth defect, or pregnancy from rape) support among Jews is 10-18 percentage points higher than among non-Jews. For the less supported reasons (not married, too poor, does not want more children, and for any reason) Jewish approval is about 40 percentage points above that of other groups.

## Suicide and Euthanasia

Jews are more in favor of a right to commit suicide and receive euthanasia than is any other ethnic/racial or religious group (Tables 13-14). About 85 percent of Jews would allow suicide or euthanasia when a person has an incurable disease, compared to 58-67 percent of non-Jews. Blacks have the lowest support at $41-48$ percent. Support for suicide in the case of bankruptcy, dishonoring one's family, or being "tired of living" is backed by 22-33 percent of Jews and 815 percent of non-Jews.

## Sexual Morality

Jews generally have a more tolerant attitude toward sexual behavior than do others (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 1997; Waite, 2002), as Tables 16-17 show. They are more approving of premarital sex, extramarital sex, homosexual sex, teenage sex, birth control for teens, and sexually explicit material than any other ethnic/racial group and more accepting than any religious group on all items, except that those without any religion are more approving of teenage sex than Jews are. Few Jews (4 percent) think that premarital sex is always wrong, 18 percent consider homosexual sex always wrong, and 52 percent believe that both extramarital and teenage sex are always wrong. But if teenagers are sexually active, 76 percent of

Jews agree that birth control should be available, even if the parents do not approve, compared to 57 percent of non-Jews. Regarding sexually explicit/pornographic material, only 17 percent of Jews as compared with 38 percent of non-Jews believe that it should be illegal for everyone (all adults and children). On premarital sex, homosexual sex, and pornography, Italians are second behind Jews in not viewing these as always wrong. But Jews and non-Jews are equally likely to have seen an X-rated movie in the last year ( 22 percent and 24 percent), and Jews fall among the middle of ethnic/racial and religious groups in having viewed X-rated movies. Thus, Jews are decidedly distinctive and permissive in their attitudes toward sexual matters, but merely typical and undistinctive in their consumption of sexually explicit movies.

## Gender Roles and Gender Equality

Jews are more in favor of modern gender roles for women and gender equality than non-Jews are (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Waite, 2002), as revealed in Tables 19-20. In the political realm 94 percent of Jews would vote for a woman for president, 92 percent disagree that women should take care of the home and let men run the country, and 83 percent disagree that "most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women." (Non-Jews, by contrast, are respectively at 90 percent, 82 percent, and 73 percent.) Jews also have more favorable views on employment for women than non-Jews have. For example, 90 percent of Jews approve of a wife working even if her husband can support the family, 88 percent reject the idea that a wife should put her husband's career ahead of her own, 78 percent agree that children are not hurt if their mother works, 74 percent disagree that a family is better off if the man works and the woman stays home, and 61 percent reject the idea that preschoolers suffer if the mother works outside the home. (Non-Jews are respectively at 80 percent, 76 percent, 65 percent, 61 percent, and 54 percent for each of these gender role items.)

Among ethnic/racial groups Jews take the most modern, proequality position on six out of the eight issues and finish second to the French on voting for a woman for president and second to Blacks on preschoolers not suffering if their mothers work. Asians or Others hold the most traditional position on all these gender-related measures.

Among religious groups, Jews hold the top position on women being suited for politics, on who should run the country, on wives working even when husbands can support families, and on not putting a husband's career first. Jews are second to those with no religion on the rest of the gender items. Fundamentalist Protestants hold the most traditional views on gender.

## Child Values

Jews have distinctive views on children and child rearing (Ellison, Xu , and Grayson, 2002; Waite, 2002). When asked to rank five values that children should have, Jews led non-Jews in selecting to "think for himself or herself" as the most important value, with 71 percent of Jews and 50 percent of non-Jews placing it first (Tables 22-23). As a result, almost all other values were less likely to be ranked first by Jews than by non-Jews: to work hard (Jews 13 percent; non-Jews 17 percent), obedience (Jews 6 percent; non-Jews 19 percent), helping others (Jews 9 percent; non-Jews 14 percent), and being wellliked/popular (Jews 1 percent; non-Jews 1 percent). Thus, overall, Jews ranked desirable values for children as 1) thinking for oneself, 2) working hard, 3) helping others, 4) obedience, and 5) popularity, while non-Jews placed the values as 1) thinking for oneself, 2) obedience, 3) working hard, 4) helping others, and 5) popularity.

Of all ethnic/racial groups, Jews were top in selecting thinking for oneself (by 10 percentage points over even the second highest group), lowest on obedience and helping others, and next to the lowest, above the Scandinavians, on working hard. Since almost no one chooses popularity as the most important value, there is no variation
across ethnic/racial groups in selecting it as the top value. But if one looks at selecting popularity as not the least important (fifth value), one sees that Jews are the group most likely to mention popularity. Forty-three percent of Jews compared to the average of 24 percent place popularity above last place. The child values held by Asians are most distant from those of Jews (e.g., lowest on thinking for oneself and highest on helping others and working hard).

Among religious groups, Jews are first in thinking for oneself and popularity (when looking at not being one's last choice) and lowest in selecting obedience, working hard, and helping others. Fundamentalist Protestants differ the most from Jews, ranking last on thinking for oneself and popularity and first on obedience.

## Misanthropy

Jews have more positive views of people in general than non-Jews do (Tables 25-26). More Jews believe that most people are fair ( 58 percent), helpful ( 50 percent), and trustworthy ( 47 percent) than nonJews do (respectively 53 percent, 47 percent, and 35 percent). This optimism also shows up on the item on human nature discussed above, in which Jews were more likely to indicate that humans were basically good.

Compared by ethnicity and religion, Jews do not stand out from most other groups on fairness and helpfulness, but on judging people to be trustworthy they are the second highest, below only Scandinavians, among ethnic/racial groups and first among all religious groups.

## Socializing

Jews and non-Jews show distinctive patterns in socializing (Tables 28-29). Jews are less likely to spend several evenings a week visiting with a relative ( 26 percent vs. 36 percent) and less likely to visit a neighbor ( 17 percent vs. 21 percent). At least part of the lower level of Jewish socializing with relatives may result from Jews having fewer
relatives. While the total number of relatives is not known, in the 1980 s and early 1990s, Jews were less likely than non-Jews to have a living parent ( 64 percent to 73 percent) and less likely to have a living sibling ( 85 percent for Jews vs. 92 percent for non-Jews). The former difference results from Jews being older than non-Jews, and the latter from the combination of age and lower fertility. Jews and non-Jews do not differ on visiting other friends several times a week (23-24 percent for both groups). Jews are more likely to go at least occasionally to a bar ( 55 percent at least once a year vs. 50 percent for non-Jews).

Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group least likely to frequently visit either relatives or neighbors, but are in the middle of groups regarding visiting friends and going to bars. Those in Other Religions have the highest socializing rate except for going to bars.

## Politics and Voting

Jews are more likely to vote than are non-Jews (Tables 31-32). In presidential elections over the last thirty-six years Jewish turnout has exceeded non-Jewish voting by 10 to 20 percentage points (74-86 percent of Jews vs. 62-66 percent of non-Jews). In 1992 Jewish turnout topped that of any other ethnic/racial or religious group, and in 1996 Jews ranked third below the Scandinavians and the British and second on religion behind Liberal Protestants.

In terms of political orientation, Jews tend to be liberals and Democrats compared to non-Jews (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Forman, 2001; Goren, 1999; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; Sonenshein and Valentino, 2000; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003), as indicated in Tables 31-32. With the exception of the Jimmy Carter/Ronald Reagan/John Anderson race in 1980, Jews have heavily favored the Democratic candidate in all presidential races since 1968. In 1992-96, 71-77 percent of Jews voted for Bill Clinton compared to about half of non-Jews. On party identification, 52 percent of Jews are Democrats, while only 33 percent of
non-Jews are. Likewise, on political ideology, 48 percent of Jews selfrate themselves as liberals vs. 26 percent of non-Jews.

In terms of presidential voting, Jews are more likely to vote Democratic than any other White ethnic group. Blacks always are the most Democratic presidential voters, and sometimes other ethnic/racial minorities such as Hispanics and Asians exceed the Jewish Democratic vote. By religion Jews are the most Democratic of presidential voters. Likewise, Jews are lower than only Blacks in identifying as Democrats and are the most Democratic of religious groups. On political ideology Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group most likely to say they are liberal (by 15 percentage points over sec-ond-ranked Blacks and by a more modest four percentage points over those without any religion). Germans, followed by the British, are the least Democratic groups.

## Confidence in Institutions

Jews and non-Jews differ in their evaluations of some institutions, but agree about many others (Tables 34-36). As Table 34 shows, rankings are fairly similar, but some divergences are apparent. The most notable difference in the ranking of institutions is that Jews place organized religion in ninth place, while non-Jews put it in sixth position. Other differences include that the military is rated lower by Jews (fourth place) than by non-Jews (second place), science is in the top spot for Jews and in third place for non-Jews, and Congress scores better than labor unions for Jews while the opposite is true for non-Jews.

In the economic realm Jews and non-Jews do not vary significantly in their confidence in major companies ( 26 percent of Jews and 24 percent of non-Jews have a "great deal of confidence") or in financial institutions ( 19 percent and 22 percent). Jews are significantly less confident in labor unions than non-Jews are ( 5 percent vs. 11 percent). On political groups Jews have more confidence in the
executive branch than non-Jews do ( 21 percent vs. 14.5 percent). ${ }^{6}$ By an even greater margin Jews have more confidence in the Supreme Court than non-Jews do ( 40 percent vs. 32 percent). Jews and non-Jews differ little on the Congress ( 11 percent vs. 10 percent). On media institutions Jews and non-Jews differ little in terms of either television ( 9 percent and 11 percent) or the press ( 10 percent and 11 percent).

Among the remaining institutions Jews and non-Jews differ little on education ( 23 percent vs. 26 percent) and medicine ( 41 percent vs. 44 percent). Jews have notably lower confidence than non-Jews do in the military ( 30 percent vs. 42 percent) and in organized religion ( 12 percent vs. 25 percent). Skepticism on religion probably results from Jews viewing organized religion as referring to the large Christian denominations. Jews have more confidence in the scientific community than non-Jews do ( 50 percent vs. 39 percent). Overall, Jews and non-Jews do not systematically differ in their confidence in institutions. No statistically meaningful differences occur for more than half of the institutions, and when differences do emerge, Jews have greater confidence in three (executive branch, Supreme Court, and science) and lower confidence in three (labor, religion, and the military).

By ethnicity, Jews have the lowest confidence of any group in labor unions, religion, and the military and next to the bottom, above only Poles, on medicine. Jews surpass all ethnic/racial groups on confidence in the Supreme Court and are second highest on the executive branch (after Others) and the scientific community (behind Asians). Asians have the highest confidence across all institutions. Likewise, compared by religion, Jews have the lowest confidence on financial institutions, organized labor, television, medicine, and the military, and the highest confidence in the executive branch, the Supreme Court, and science. No religion stands out as especially high or low on confidence overall.

## Government Spending Priorities and Taxes

In general, the spending priorities of Jews and non-Jews are similar (Tables 38-40). Among Jews the top spending priority is education, with 82 percent favoring more funding. This is followed by supporting more spending in three other domestic areas: health ( 75 percent), the environment ( 71 percent), and solving the problems of big cities ( 62 percent). Then comes support for more spending on lowering the crime rate (fifth at 58 percent) and for law enforcement (eighth at 53 percent). Next is spending on the drug problem, with support for more spending to deal with drug addiction sixth, at 56 percent, and for drug rehabilitation ninth, at 50 percent. ${ }^{7}$ In the middle of the crime and drugs priorities comes wanting to spend more on assistance to the poor (seventh place at 54 percent). In tenth place is support for added spending on mass transportation ( 46 percent). Next comes spending for Social Security (eleventh at 42 percent). Spending for Blacks is in twelfth position at 40 percent when described as for "improving the condition of Blacks" and in sixteenth position at 31 percent when phrased as "assistance for Blacks." At thirteenth position at 39 percent is spending for highways and bridges. Spending for assistance to big cities is fourteenth at 35 percent. In fifteenth position is spending for parks and recreation at 34 percent. The domestic program with the lowest support is welfare in seventeenth place with 26 percent favoring more spending. At the bottom of the spending priorities are space exploration (eighteenth at 15 percent), the military (nineteenth at 11 percent), and foreign aid (twentieth at 8 percent).

Non-Jews have a fairly similar ranking of spending priorities. Both Jews and non-Jews list education and health as the two top areas and have welfare, the military, space, and foreign aid at the bottom. The biggest difference is that Jews place solving the problems of big cities fourth, while non-Jews place solving the problems of large cities eleventh. This probably reflects the heavy concentration of

Jews in large metropolitan areas discussed above. In all other cases, Jews and non-Jews differ in ranking by two positions or less.

In most, but not all, areas Jews favor more governmental spending than non-Jews do. Jews back more spending for most social welfare and domestic concerns (being significantly more pro-spending for the environment, health, education, large cities, welfare, parks, and mass transportation and marginally more so for Blacks and highways). Jews are also significantly more supportive of spending for space and foreign aid. Non-Jews support more spending on crime, drugs, and the military (significantly more for the military and one crime measure and marginally so for the second crime measure and both drug items). Non-Jews also favor more spending than Jews do on Social Security ( 53 percent to 42 percent) and assistance to the poor ( 61 percent to 54 percent). These last two areas deviate from the general pattern of spending priorities.

Among all ethnic/racial groups Jews are first in wanting more spending on space, the environment, education, and mass transportation and second behind only Blacks for more spending on health, solving the problems of big cities, improving the condition of Blacks, welfare, and assistance to big cities. Jews are not least for spending in any area, but are next to the lowest on crime (above Scandinavians) and the military (above Asians). Blacks are first for more spending in most areas and especially in domestic spending. Asians and Scandinavians tend to be least for government spending.

By religion, Jews are the most pro-spending group on health, solving the problems of big cities, education, improving the conditions of Blacks, foreign aid, welfare, mass transportation, assistance to Blacks, and assistance to big cities. Jews are the group least in favor of more spending on the military, Social Security, and drug rehabilitation. No religious group stands out overall on spending priorities, but Catholics are notable in always tending toward the middle ground.

Jews take a general pro-spending slant despite being concerned about high federal income taxes. Seventy percent of Jews and 64 percent of non-Jews think their income taxes are too high. Among ethnic/racial groups only Poles and Blacks object more to their income taxes, and among religious groups Jews are first in saying their income taxes are too high.

## Social Welfare Policies

Jews and non-Jews differ little on extending social welfare policies (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Hunt, 2002) as shown by Tables 42-43. Jews are more in favor of the government assisting people in obtaining health care than non-Jews are ( 57 percent to 49 percent) and doing more about problems in general ( 28 percent to 25 percent), but the differences are not statistically significant. Jews and non-Jews do not differ on the government doing more to improve living standards ( 25 percent vs. 27 percent). Jews are slightly less in favor of the government reducing income differences than non-Jews are (38 percent vs. 44 percent).

While differences among ethnic/racial and religious groups are not great, Jewish views are somewhat distinctive nevertheless. On health care Jews are second among ethnic/racial groups, below only Blacks, in supporting more government health care and top among the religious groups. On doing more in general, Jews surpass other White ethnic groups, but are lower than Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics. Their support is top among religious groups. On reducing income differences Jews are least supportive among religious groups and third from the bottom, above the Scandinavians and British, by ethnicity. Blacks top three of the four lists as most pro-social welfare, and the British and Scandinavians are typically the least in favor.

## Intergroup Relations

On almost all measures Jews are more for racial equality, integration, and intergroup tolerance than non-Jews are (Cohen and Liebman,

1997; Glaser, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Smith, 1990) as shown in Tables 45-46. First, Jews tend to endorse liberal explanations and reject illiberal reasons for the socioeconomic disparities between Blacks and Whites. Sixty-three percent of Jews vs. 46 percent of non-Jews believe that lack of education causes the lower income and other disadvantages of Blacks, and 41 percent of Jews vs. 37 percent of non-Jews believe racial discrimination explains the differences. In contrast, lack of motivation is seen as the explanation by 48 percent of non-Jews, but by only 32 percent of Jews. Less inborn ability is mentioned as a reason by 11 percent of non-Jews and 7 percent of Jews. Second, integration is uniformly favored more by Jews than by non-Jews. For example, 97 percent of Jews and 85 percent of non-Jews oppose laws forbidding BlackWhite marriage, 88 percent of Jews vs. 84 percent of non-Jews disagree with the idea that Whites have a right to exclude Blacks from their neighborhoods, and 70 percent of Jews vs. 64 percent of nonJews favor an open housing law outlawing housing discrimination. Third, Jews are more likely to live in a racially integrated neighborhood than non-Jews are ( 76 percent vs. 61 percent). Fourth, Jews support minorities in other ways. For example, 78 percent disagree with the idea that Blacks should not push for their rights compared to 56 percent of non-Jews; 40 percent want the government to spend more on improving the conditions of Blacks vs. 33 percent of nonJews (see Table 38.H), and 96 percent of Jews vs. 88 percent of nonJews would be willing to vote for a Black for president if their party nominated such a candidate. Finally, Jews and non-Jews are indistinguishable in their positions on affirmative action and school busing. Neither group favors preferences to help racial minorities, 19 percent of Jews and 17 percent of non-Jews believe that government should give special assistance to Blacks, and 15 percent of Jews and 16 percent of non-Jews back hiring preferences for Blacks. However, Jews are more likely than non-Jews to disagree with the idea that Blacks should overcome prejudice without special favors as some
other groups have ( 22 percent vs. 14 percent). School busing to integrate schools is supported by 32 percent of Jews and 33 percent of non-Jews.

A comparison across all ethnic/racial groups shows that Jews take the most pro-racial equality/integration positions on BlackWhite differences due to inborn ability, lack of education and motivation, opposition to antimiscegenation laws, and Blacks pushing for rights; they are second only to Blacks in opposition to Whites segregating neighborhoods, in living in an integrated neighborhood, and in disagreeing that Blacks should overcome prejudice without special favors. On all other issues except school busing Jews take a more prointergroup relations position than any other White ethnic group. No ethnic/racial group stands out as being least supportive of racial equality and integration.

Among religious groups Jews hold the most pro-racial equality/ integration stance on Black-White differences and lack of education, inborn ability, and motivation, opposition to antimiscegenation laws, Blacks pushing for rights, living in an integrated neighborhood, voting for a Black for president, and disagreeing that Blacks should overcome prejudice without special favors. Jews score lower than those with no religion and sometimes those with Other Religions on special government help for Blacks, differences due to discrimination, Whites segregating neighborhoods, open housing laws, and school busing. With one exception, Jews take more pro-intergroup relations positions than do Catholics or any of the Protestant groups on all measures. Fundamentalist Protestants followed by Liberal Protestants tend to be the least supportive of measures aimed to bolster racial equality and integration.

## Civil Liberties

Jews support civil liberties for various socially and/or politically suspect groups, including those against all churches, racists, Communists, militarists, and homosexuals (Cohen and Liebman, 1997;

Miller, 1996) as evidenced in Tables 48-49. Specifically, in all but one instance, Jewish majorities believe that members of these groups should be allowed to a) give a public speech, b) teach in a college, and c) have a book in the public library. Support for public speech ranges from 69 percent for a racist to 93 percent for a homosexual (averaging 88 percent). Approval of college teaching starts at 48 percent for a racist and goes up to 94 percent for a homosexual (averaging 67 percent). On having a book in the public library, support goes from 76 percent for a racist to 88 percent for either an anti-religionist or a homosexual (averaging 83 percent). Across the suspect groups, Jews support civil liberties the most for homosexuals (averaging 92 percent) followed by Communists ( 80 percent), anti-religionists ( 78 percent), militarists ( 72 percent), and racists ( 64 percent). In all but two cases, non-Jews are significantly less in favoring of granting rights to these groups. Jews are marginally, but not significantly, more for allowing a racist to teach in a college and to make a public speech.

Among ethnic/racial groups Jews are the most pro-civil liberties on twelve of the fifteen measures. They fall behind only Scandinavians on letting a racist make a public speech, are lower than Scandinavians, Others, and Eastern Europeans on letting an anti-religionist teach in college, and are in the middle on allowing a racist college teacher. At the opposite end Blacks are least supportive on eleven out of fifteen indicators. Among religious groups Jews are the most for civil liberties on six measures and second behind those with no religion on the other nine. Fundamentalist Protestants show the least support for all measures.

## Crime and Firearms

Jews and non-Jews differ moderately in their views on crime and firearms (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001) according to Tables 51-52. Despite the fact that Jews are more likely than non-Jews to be afraid to walk alone at night near their home (respectively 52 percent vs. 40 percent), Jews are less likely to take a
punitive position toward criminals or to own guns. Sixty-four percent of Jews compared to 70 percent of non-Jews support the death penalty for murder, and 71 percent of Jews vs. 77 percent of nonJews believe courts are not harsh enough with sentences. Only 13 percent of Jewish households contain firearms (vs. 41 percent for non-Jews) and just 10 percent of Jews personally own a gun (vs. 26 percent for non-Jews). Their low level of firearm ownership, in turn, explains their higher level of support for requiring a permit from the police before a firearm is purchased ( 92 percent of Jews vs. 80 percent of non-Jews).

Jews and non-Jews differ little in their approval of when police should be allowed to strike people. For Jews approval is at 94 percent when the person is hitting the police officer, 77 percent when a suspect is trying to escape, 69 percent under an unspecified "ever" situation, 6 percent when a murder suspect is involved, and 6 percent in response to verbal abuse. For non-Jews the respective approval levels are 91 percent, 70 percent, 68 percent, 6 percent, and 7 percent. Jews and non-Jews also do not differ on the use of wiretaps (supported by 25 percent of Jews and 22 percent of non-Jews).

Of all ethnic/racial and religious groups Jews have the highest level of fear and the greatest support for gun control. Jews are lowest of all religious groups in ownership of firearms, second lowest to Asians in having a gun in their household, and below all but Asians and Hispanics in personally owning a firearm. Fundamentalist Protestants have the most pro-gun profile. On measures of punitiveness, Jews are less supportive than all other ethnic/racial groups except for Blacks and Hispanics on capital punishment, and less for tougher courts except for Asians and Others. Among religious groups only those in Other Religions and those with no religion (on the question of courts) are less in favor of the punitive approach. For police use of force, Jews differ little from most ethnic/racial groups. They are the religious group most supportive of the police striking in self-defense and to stop an escape, but the absolute differences are
modest. On wiretapping Jews vary little from other ethnic/racial and religious groups.

## Psychological Well-Being and Health

By mostly modest differentials Jews give more positive assessments of their well-being and health than do non-Jews (Tables 54-55). In terms of overall happiness 35 percent of Jews vs. 32.5 percent of non-Jews are very happy (not statistically significant). On marital happiness the edge is a bit larger, with 67 percent of Jews and 62 percent of non-Jews very happy-but still not statistically significant. Likewise, 50 percent of employed Jews are very satisfied with their job vs. 46 percent of non-Jews (not statistically significant). Jews are significantly more likely than non-Jews to be financially satisfied ( 39 percent to 20 percent), to find life exciting rather than routine or dull ( 56 percent to 47 percent), and to rate their health as excellent ( 43 percent to 32 percent).

Among ethnic/racial groups Jews lead all groups in financial satisfaction (as they did also in objective financial measures) and health. They finished second highest on marital happiness (to the British), job satisfaction (to the Irish), and excitement (to the Other group). Blacks and Hispanics tended to register the least positive scores overall.

Likewise, among religious groups, Jews were highest on marital happiness, financial satisfaction, job satisfaction, and health. They were behind Liberal Protestants on overall happiness and Other Religions on excitement. Those with no religion ranked lowest on three measures and next to lowest on two items.

## Financial and Job Changes and Expectations

Despite their strong socioeconomic status position, Jews differ little from non-Jews on changes and values related to finances and jobs (Tables 57-58). Two-thirds of both groups report being better off than their parents, and 41 percent say that their financial situation
improved in recent years. Looking to the future, 48 percent of Jews and 55 percent of non-Jews expect their children to be better off than they are (not statistically significant). Among the employed, both Jews and non-Jews think that they are "not at all likely" to lose their jobs in the next twelve months (respectively 73 percent and 64 percent), but only 27 percent of Jews and 28 percent of non-Jews feel it would be "very easy" to find as good a job if they did become unemployed.

On work-related values, 73 percent of Jews and 68 percent of non-Jews would continue to work, even if they were able to live comfortably without being employed (not statistically significant); and Jews are less likely than non-Jews to believe that people mostly get ahead in life from hard work rather than from luck or help from others (respectively 58 percent vs. 68 percent and statistically significant).

Jews are not distinctive from other ethnic/racial groups on most of the financial and job measures. Jews are the group least likely to think their children will have a higher standard of living than they do, while racial minorities are the most optimistic in this regard (47.5 percent of Jews vs. 67-73 percent of Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Others). Probably the high current SES of many Jews creates a perceived ceiling effect for their offspring. On the other hand, Jews are next to the top, behind only the Poles, in seeing their jobs as secure. Jews are next to the bottom, ahead of only the Poles, in thinking that one gets ahead in life mostly from hard work.

Similarly, Jews are the religious group least likely to believe that their children will be better off than they are, with the lowest faith in hard work, and the most assurance about keeping one's job.

## Miscellaneous

Less than a majority of Jews ( 49 percent) agree that "it is sometimes necessary to discipline a child with a good, hard spanking," but almost three-quarters of non-Jews ( 74 percent) support corporal punishment (Tables 60-61). Jews are less supportive of spanking than any
other ethnic/racial or religious groups, 15-16 percentage points lower than the second least supportive group. Blacks and Fundamentalist Protestants are the most in favor of spanking (both 84 percent).

Easier divorce laws are backed by 29 percent of Jews and 25 percent of non-Jews. Jews are more supportive of easier divorces than any other White ethnic group, but the differences are modest. Only those with no religion are more in favor of easier divorce among religious groups.

Of all ethnic/racial and religious groups Jews are least likely to think a world war will occur in the next ten years. This is expected by 23 percent of Jews and 44 percent of non-Jews. It is possible that Jewish orientation toward Israel makes them aware that wars and conflict frequently occur, but that does not mean that a "world war" is likely. Blacks and Fundamentalist Protestants see a world war as most likely (respectively 56 percent and 52 percent).

More than two-fifths of Jews ( 41 percent) support the legalization of marijuana compared to a quarter of non-Jews. Jews are the ethnic/racial group most for legalization (by 11 percentage points over second-place Native Americans) and second behind those with no religion among religious groups ( 48 percent to 41 percent).

Jews have the highest level of newspaper readership of any ethnic/racial or religious group ( 57 percent daily vs. 44 percent for nonJews). Conversely, TV watching is low among Jews compared to non-Jews (respectively 2.5 hours vs. 2.9 hours per day). Only Asians watch less TV among ethnic/racial groups, and Jews and those in Other Religions are tied for lowest among religious groups. NonWhite minorities and Hispanics are lowest on newspaper readership and highest on TV viewing (with the exception of the low TV viewing of Asians).

## Overall Differences among Ethnic and Religious Groups

Jews are the most distinctive of all ethnic/racial and religious groups. As Table 63 indicates, the position of Jews on the 153 nondemo-
graphic items differs from the national norms by an average of 11.4 percentage points, highest of all fifteen ethnic/racial groups. The average difference from the national norms was only 5.1 points. Jews are followed by non-White groups (Blacks, Others, Asians) and Hispanics and then other White ethnic groups. Large long-term immigrant groups, such as Germans, the Irish, and Other Whites (which include many earlier settlers with no known ethnic identity) are nearest the overall average. Similarly, Jews are the religious group most distant from the overall average by 11.4 points compared to 8.8 points for Nones, 5.2 points for Fundamentalist Protestants, 4.5 points for Other Religionists, 3.7 points for Liberal Protestants, 2.0 points for Catholics, and 1.7 points for Moderate Protestants.

Another way of seeing the distinctiveness of Jews is by looking at how many times they are at the extremes on each items-that is, at the top or bottom among the fifteen ethnic/racial groups and seven religious groups. Jews are at the poles in 73 of the 153 ethnic/racial breakdowns ( 47.7 percent) and in 91 of the 153 religious comparisons ( 59.5 percent). Given that the probabilities of being at the extremes by chance are .133 for ethnicity and .286 for religion, this means that Jews are overrepresented at the extremes by $3.6: 1$ on ethnicity and 2.1:1 on religion. No other group approaches these levels. Blacks are second among ethnic/racial groups in being in the extreme positions 56 times and Nones are next on religion with 58 extreme rankings.

As Table 64 shows, among ethnic/racial groups, Jews are closest to (i.e., have the smallest average distance from) Eastern Europeans ( 9.8 percentage points) and Italians ( 9.8 points)—two other immigrant groups that arrived about the same time as most Jewish immigrants did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and are also concentrated in large metropolitan areas. The other White ethnic groups fall next, with average differences of 10.3 to 12.8 points. The most distant from Jews are non-White and Hispanic ethnic groups: Others (13.5 points), Hispanics (13.9 points), Asians (14.4 points),

Native Americans (14.5 points), and Blacks (17.0 points).
Among religious groups, Jews are closest to Nones (7.1 points), followed by Other Religionists ( 10.0 points), Liberal Protestants (10.2 points), Catholics (11.0 points), Moderate Protestants (11.5 points), and finally, Fundamentalist Protestants ( 16.1 points). Thus Jews are closest to secular and religiously liberal groups and furthest from the religiously conservative. Not only do Jews and Nones often hold down the extreme poles (respectively 91 and 58 times), but Jews are second only to Nones in 28 cases and Nones are second to Jews in 41 cases.

## Summary of Jewish/Non-Jewish Differences by Topics

Jews and non-Jews differ in many ways in their attitudes and actions. Of the 153 nondemographic comparisons there are statistically significant differences 70 percent of the time. Table 65 shows on what topics the views and behaviors of Jews are most distinctive. The first column shows the average difference between Jews and everyone else for each topic. Jews and non-Jews disagree the most (by an average of 29 percentage points) on abortion rights. This is followed by a cluster of other large Jewish/non-Jewish differences on religion (22 points), sexual morality (21 points), partisanship and voting (19 points), and suicide and euthanasia ( 18 points). Next, just slightly greater than the overall difference of 11 points are the miscellaneous items (13 points), civil liberties (13 points), and child values (12 points). Falling below the average overall difference are gender roles and gender equality ( 10 points), intergroup relations ( 8 points), crime and firearms ( 8 points), psychological well-being and health (7 points), spending and taxes ( 7 points), misanthropy ( 7 points), confidence in institutions ( 5 points), socializing ( 5 points), finances and jobs ( 4.5 points), and social welfare policy ( 4 points).

The second column looks at the percentage of cases that Jews are one of the most extreme groups among both ethnic/racial and religious groups. This measure emphasizes relative differences among
the fifteen ethnic/racial and seven religious groups and not the absolute differences as in the first column. Of course, the two rankings are correlated with one another, but the relationship is far from perfect. On abortion rights and suicide and euthanasia, Jews occupy the most extreme positions on all items for both ethnicity and religion (i.e., scores of 100 percent). Next ranks child values, with a score of 90 percent. ${ }^{8}$ Scoring in the extremes more than 50 percent of the time are sexual morality ( 71 percent), gender roles and gender equality ( 69 percent), partisanship and voting ( 64 percent), civil liberties ( 60 percent), miscellaneous ( 58 percent), and religion ( 56 percent). Right at or near half are intergroup relations ( 50 percent), socializing ( 50 percent), psychological well-being and health ( 50 percent), and confidence in institutions ( 46 percent). Around a third are social welfare policies ( 38 percent), finances and jobs ( 36 percent), spending/taxes ( 33 percent), and crime and firearms ( 29 percent). Showing the least extremity is misanthropy ( 17 percent).

## Across-Topic Patterns

While attitudes and values have been grouped together into eighteen areas and examining each individually provides great insight into the place of Jews in American society, it is also necessary to look for patterns that prevail across the topics.

One metapattern involves the role and importance of seeking knowledge and the promotion of education and science in pursuit of that quest. First, education, of course, has had a profound, direct effect on the lives and circumstances of Jews. Jews have been both raised in better-educated homes and have themselves acquired more education than any other group. This, in turn, in large part explains their greater occupational standing, higher income, superior vocabulary scores, and more frequent newspaper reading.

Second, education also has a strong effect on many attitudes and values. Prior research has established that in America education has larger, broader, and longer-lasting impact than any other demo-
graphic variable. In particular, education often has a liberalizing influence that can trump the often conservative impact of more income (Davis, 1979 and 1981; Hyman and Wright, 1979).

But beyond the direct effects of education, the strong interest of Jews in learning and education also helps to shape many attitudes. Education not only has instrumental value to most Jews, but also has intrinsic value-with learning being a positive goal in and of itself. The importance given education and learning shows up in various ways. First, Jews lead all other groups in wanting more spending for education and space exploration. ${ }^{9}$ Second, Jews have notably more confidence in science than non-Jews do. But, in a contrary result, Jews have marginally less confidence in education than nonJews do (respectively 23 percent to 26 percent). Perhaps it is their high interest in quality education and concern about what is being delivered that makes their confidence relatively low. Third, Jews are much more likely to rank thinking for oneself as the top value for a child ( 71 percent for Jews vs. 50 percent for non-Jews). Fourth, while Jews are more supportive of integration and racial equality than most other groups are, their ranking is lowest on supporting school busing and marginally lower than non-Jews (respectively 32 percent vs. 33 percent). Their relatively low support for school busing may reflect concerns over the quality of schooling.

Fifth, Jewish support for civil liberties is notably higher than any other group, but support for college teachers from suspect groups drops off more among Jews than among non-Jews (among Jews support for teachers across the five suspect groups is 66.5 percent compared for an average of 82.9 percent for speeches and books or 16.4 points difference; for non-Jews the average for teachers is 56.2 percent and the average for speeches and books is 68.1 percent or 11.7 points difference). Thus, while Jews are absolutely more supportive of civil liberties than non-Jews are (by 10.3 points, e.g., 66.5 percent compared to 56.2 percent), relatively they are less so (by 4.7 points: 11.7 percent vs. 16.4 percent).

Finally, on religion, Jews are much less likely to say that the Bible is the exact word of God than non-Jews are ( 11 percent to 33 percent). While this undoubtedly mainly reflects different religious tenets, it may also indicate a stronger critical, knowledge-based perspective among Jews. In brief, high regard for gaining knowledge, science, and education influences attitudes in a wide range of ways.

A second major metapattern is Jewish support for expressive individualism and moral autonomy. On the issues showing the largest differences between Jews and non-Jews (sexual morality, abortion rights, suicide/euthanasia, civil liberties, and some of the items in the religion and miscellaneous groups), Jews consistently are more supportive of letting individuals decide on what course to follow rather than having options restricted by government or social conformity. In part, Jews are more supportive of legalizing abortions and marijuana, more inclined to find actions by suspect groups tolerable, more accepting of behaviors such as suicide and sexual activity, and more tolerant on other issues because they want to leave choices open to each individual.

A third general pattern is liberal leanings on other topics. First, Jews show liberal leanings on political and voting variables, being solidly Democratic in party identification and presidential voting and self-identifying as liberal. Second, Jews are more supportive of group and minority rights. They favor modern, egalitarian positions on gender and support integration and racial equality. Finally, to a lesser degree, Jews take liberal positions on government spending and policies. They are more likely to favor increased spending and expanded programs on the domestic social agenda and less spending for conservative items such as the military and controlling crime and drugs.

A minor, but clear fourth pattern is an urban orientation among Jews. Jews are heavily concentrated in large metropolitan areas, and they strongly reflect that perspective. They are more supportive of increased spending for cities and mass transportation, and
the margin here is larger than on any other spending areas. They are the group most fearful of walking alone at night and among the least likely to own a gun or to hunt.

A fifth pattern is that Jews are less supportive of the military. They have low confidence in the military and favor cuts in military spending. This may, in part, reflect their relatively low level of expectation of a world war occurring.

A sixth pattern is a nonpunitive or nonauthoritarian attitude toward raising children. Jews rate obedience low as a child value and are less in favor of the use of corporal punishment.

A final general pattern relates to two of the previously discussed metapatterns. The liberal edge of Jews on expressive individualism and group equality is much greater than their leaning toward social welfare liberalism.

Thus, looking across the eighteen topics reveals several important metatrends. Jewish attitudes are shaped by 1) their high level of and interest in education and learning, 2) the values of individual freedom and choice, 3) other liberal values, such as support for group and minority rights and social justice, 4) an urban orientation, 5) nonpunitive child rearing, and 6) skepticism about the military.

## TRENDS, 1972-2002

The current attributes and attitudes of groups are not writ in stone, but have changed (and will change) over time. This section reviews Jewish trends for the last thirty years and compares Jewish changes against those of non-Jews.

## Demographic Profile

The background characteristics of Jews and non-Jews have been changing in many important ways over the last thirty years. First, more people have experienced divorces and fewer adults are married
than before (Tables 3 and 6). While only 8 percent of Jews had been divorced in the 1970 s, 21 percent are during the recent period (+13 percentage points). Likewise, divorce rose from 16 percent to 26 percent (+ 10 points) for non-Jews. Partly as a result, 65 percent of Jews are now married vs. 75 percent in the 1970 s ( -10 points). For nonJews the decline was from 71 percent to 57 percent ( -14 points).

Second, there were declines in family size. This occurred for number of siblings, current household size, and number of children ever born. In each case, the non-Jewish decline was greater than the Jewish decrease. This means that Jewish and non-Jewish families are now more similar in size than they used to be.

Third, Jews in particular have become less concentrated in large cities and in the Northeast. While the share of Jews living in the largest twelve metropolitan areas changed little (from 55 percent to 54 percent), those living in the central cities dropped by 11 points and suburban residents increased by 10 points. Similarly, the proportion raised in a big city declined from 53 percent to 41 percent. Non-Jews showed much more modest switches in the same direction. Likewise, the proportion of Jews living in the Northeast dropped from 59 percent to 43 percent ( -16 points), while non-Jews had a very modest decline from 22 percent to 20 percent ( -2 points). Similarly, the proportion of Jews raised in the Northeast fell from 58 percent to 51 percent ( -7 points), while non-Jews showed virtually no change in being raised in the Northeast ( 21 percent to 20 percent, just -1 point).

Fourth, socioeconomically Jews substantially improved their position over the last thirty years, both objectively and subjectively. Objectively, they had notable gains in education, occupational prestige, and real household income. For example, having a four-year college degree rose from 39 percent in the 1970 s to 61 percent in the most recent period; average occupational prestige climbed from a score of 46 to 52; and per capita income in 1986 dollars grew from $\$ 18,800$ to $\$ 27,500$. Jews also showed major gains in parental edu-
cation. In each case Jews outpaced non-Jews in their gains. Subjectively, identification as upper class grew from 10 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in the most recent period, self-ranking as being financially above average increased from 41 percent to 51 percent, and evaluations of having been raised in a family with above-average finances went up from 24 percent to 52 percent. Again, the Jewish gains surpassed those of non-Jews on all items. Only for vocabulary score and home ownership did neither Jews nor non-Jews show any meaningful improvements.

Finally, in terms of labor force participation, retirement and employment have both increased for Jews and non-Jews, and keeping house declined. For Jews retirement more than doubled, by about 7 percent to 14 percent, and for non-Jews it grew from 9 percent to 12 percent. Employment rose from 60 percent to 71 percent for Jews and from 57 percent to 68 percent for non-Jews.

## Religion

Jews have shown little change in most of their religious beliefs and behaviors (Table 9). The major exception is that belief in an afterlife increased notably from 18 percent in the 1970 s to 43 percent recently ( +25 percentage points). This shift moved Jews much closer to the predominately Christian position of non-Jews ( 74 percent believing in life after death). ${ }^{10}$ The one other notable change in belief represents divergence between the two groups. Support for the Supreme Court ruling against school prayers rose among Jews from 67 percent in the 1970 s to 84 percent now ( +17 points), while among non-Jews there was a modest rise from 33 percent to 38 percent ( +5 points).

## Abortion Rights

Jewish support for abortion rights has been high throughout the last thirty years and has changed little (Table 12). With non-Jewish attitudes also largely stable, there has been little variation in the large intergroup differences.

## Suicide and Euthanasia

For both Jews and non-Jews there has been modest growth in support for suicide and euthanasia (Table 15). For Jews the most notable changes were that approval of suicide when one had an incurable disease rose from 73 percent in the 1970 s to 84 percent ( +11 percentage points) at present, and support for allowing euthanasia increased from 73 percent to 86 percent ( +13 points). Among non-Jews acceptance also climbed for these two measures (respectively by 19 and 9 points). Thus, the Jewish/non-Jewish gap widened somewhat in the former case, but narrower in the later. Little change occurred for either Jews or non-Jews on the other suicide measures.

## Sexual Morality

Both Jews and non-Jews have become less disapproving of various sexual behaviors except for extramarital sex (Table 18). The one notable change is that starting in the 1990s the share thinking that homosexual relations were always wrong fell among Jews from 33 percent to 18 percent ( -15 percentage points) and from 74 percent to 60 percent ( -14 points) among non-Jews. Smaller tolerant shifts occurred for both Jews and non-Jews on premarital sex, teenage sex, contraceptives for teenagers, and the legalization of pornography. In contrast, opposition to extramarital sex rose by 4 points for Jews and 8 points for non-Jews.

In terms of watching X-rated movies, Jews and non-Jews moved in opposite directions. Viewing fell among Jews from 34 percent to 22 percent ( -12 points) and climbed by 5 points among non-Jews. As a result, Jews and non-Jews no longer differ in their level of viewing X-rated movies ( 22 percent of Jews and 24 percent of non-Jews).

## Gender Roles and Gender Equality

Jews and non-Jews have both grown more supportive of modern gender roles and gender equality (Table 21). In part because Jewish
support was high from early on, the gains have been notably greater among non-Jews. For example, in the 1970s 69 percent of Jews disagreed that women were not emotionally suited for politics, and this rose to 83 percent at present ( +14 percentage points), while for nonJews it started at 50 percent and ended at 73 percent ( +23 points). Likewise, disagreement with the idea that it is better for a family if the man works and the woman stays home increased from 60 percent to 74 percent ( +14 points) among Jews and from 33 percent to 61 percent ( +28 points) for non-Jews. Thus, non-Jews have been closing the gender rights gap with Jews.

## Child Values

The child-values measures only go back to the 1980s, and during this abbreviated period there were no meaningful changes in the absolute or relative endorsement of items (Table 24).

## Misanthropy

Jewish trust in people did not change during the last thirty years, but since non-Jews became less trusting, a notable gap of 12 percentage points opened up (Table 27). Both groups thought people were more helpful in the 1980s than before or after, but there was little meaningful change across all years. Both groups did see people as less fair, with Jews falling from 68 percent to 58 percent ( -10 points) and non-Jews decreasing from 61 percent to 53 percent ( -8 points). Taking the three items together, there was no change in misanthropy for Jews, but small-to-moderate increases on each item for non-Jews.

## Socializing

Over the last thirty years the level of socializing with relatives and visiting bars did not change significantly and meaningfully for Jews or non-Jews (Table 30). But social relations within neighborhoods did decline, and the drop among Jews (from 35 percent visiting several times a week in the 1970s to 17 percent recently, a decrease of

18 percentage points) was larger than that among non-Jews (from 28 percent to 21 percent, a decline of 7 points). Jewish visits with friends outside one's neighborhood also fell (from 31 percent to 24 percent, or -7 points), while there was no meaningful change among non-Jews (from 21 percent to 23 percent, or +2 points). As a result of these differential shifts, the greater Jewish socializing with neighbors and friends that happened in the 1970s no longer occurs.

## Politics and Voting

Jews have consistently been Democratic in their party identification and voting and liberal in their political ideology over the last thirty years (Fisher, 1976, 1981; Forman, 2001; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Goren, 1999; Medding, 1981; Sonenshein and Valentino, 2000) as indicated by Table 33. With one exception, the 1980 election, when many Jews voted for John Anderson (Greenberg and Wald, 2001), strong majorities of Jews have voted for the Democratic presidential candidate. Typically, the Democratic vote of Jews has exceeded that of non-Jews by 20-30 percentage points. Democratic Party identification did slide from 58 percent in the 1970 s to 52 percent recently ( -6 percentage points), but among non-Jews the decline was even greater from 42 percent to 33 percent ( -9 points), so the Jewish edge in Democratic identification actually grew from 16 points to 19 points. On political ideology neither Jews nor non-Jews changed positions meaningfully over the last thirty years.

## Confidence in Institutions

Overall for Jews and non-Jews there has been a decline in confidence in most institutions over the last thirty years (Table 37). Jews show declines in confidence in nine of thirteen institutions (not all significantly) and non-Jews had decreases on ten. On economic institutions confidence dropped for financial institutions and labor unions, but held up for major companies. The percentage with a great deal of confidence in financial institutions fell from 28 percent to 19 per-
cent ( -9 percentage points) among Jews and from 35 percent to 22 percent (-13 points) among non-Jews. For labor unions it fell 4 points among Jews and 3 points among non-Jews.

On the media, confidence decreased for both the press and television, and the decline was somewhat greater among Jews than non-Jews. Jewish confidence in television went from 20 percent in the 1970 s to 9 percent recently ( -11 points), while among non-Jews it slipped from 18 percent to 11 percent ( -7 points). For the press Jewish confidence fell from 28 percent to 10 percent ( -18 points), while for non-Jews it went from 24 percent to 11 percent ( -13 points).

Also showing a decline was confidence in religion (from 20 percent to 12 percent or -8 points for Jews, and from 34 percent to 25 percent or -9 points for non-Jews).

On education Jews show no meaningful change in the proportion with a great deal of confidence (from 21 percent to 23 percent or +2 points) while the level went from 37 percent to 26 percent (11 points) for non-Jews. However, since the percentage of respondents with hardly any confidence rose 6 points for Jews (and 6 points for non-Jews), there was a net loss of confidence in education, even among Jews.

In the areas of medicine and science, Jews showed no decline in confidence. Non-Jews were unchanged in their evaluation of science, but their confidence in medicine did fall by 9 points. As a result, the higher confidence in medicine by non-Jews in the 1970s ( +9 points) virtually disappeared ( +3 points).

Politics showed the most complex pattern. For the executive branch, Jewish confidence rose from 11 percent to 21 percent (+10 points), while for non-Jews, it went from 17 percent to 14 percent ( -3 points). ${ }^{11}$ For the Congress, the proportion with a great deal of confidence showed no change for Jews and a modest decline for nonJews ( -5 points). But looking at the "hardly any confidence" category makes clear that there was a notable decline for both groups, with
the proportion lacking confidence rising from 16 percent to 35 percent ( +19 points) for Jews and from 23 percent to 34 percent ( +11 points) for non-Jews. On the Supreme Court, there has been no meaningful change for either group.

The military showed the largest gains in confidence from 17 percent to 30 percent for Jews ( +13 points) and from 35 percent to 42 percent for non-Jews ( +7 points).

## Government Spending Priorities and Taxes

Among Jews and non-Jews there have been few changes in governmental spending priorities that have been statistically significant and meaningful (Table 41). The most important was the rise in support among Jews for more educational spending from 65 percent in the 1970s to 82 percent recently ( +17 percentage points). Similarly, among non-Jews those favoring expanded educational spending went from 50 percent to 72 percent ( +22 points). Also, showing gains among Jews was more spending for welfare (from 18 percent to 26 percent or +8 points). Among non-Jews there was no change in support for welfare spending.

Jewish support for spending declined for some of the crime and drugs measures. Among Jews backing of more spending to reduce the crime rate fell from 73 percent in the 1970 s to 58 percent recently ( -15 points), while among non-Jews there was only a drop from 66 percent to 65 percent ( -1 point). Jews favoring more spending on dealing with drug addiction dropped from 61 percent to 56 percent ( -5 points), but non-Jews showed no change.

On space and the military, the changes were more complex. Jews show no meaningful rise in wanting increased spending on space, but there was a decline in wanting to spend less from 48 percent in the 1970s to 31 percent from the 1980s through the recent period. Non-Jews showed a similar trend. On the military Jews showed little change in wanting more spending ( 13 percent in the 1970s and 11 percent in the recent period), but there was a signifi-
cant rise and then fall in saying that too much was being spent (from 46 percent to 51 percent to 37 percent). Non-Jews showed similar shifts with too much spending rising from 26 percent to 37 percent and then falling to 29 percent, but those for less spending grew modestly larger in the recent period than in the 1970s, counter to the Jewish pattern.

Finally, for Social Security there was from the 1980s to the recent period a rise in uncertainty. Jewish support for more spending and less spending both fell modestly (respectively by -3 points and -4 points) and those saying they did not know rose from 2 percent to 9 percent ( +7 points). For non-Jews there were no meaningful changes.

## Social Welfare Policies

Support for reducing income differences and for more government assistance with health care changed little for both Jews and non-Jews (Table 44). For non-Jews there was a decline, mostly from the 1970s to the 1980s, in backing for government to improve the living standards of the poor and in doing more in general. For Jews there were too few observations in the 1970s to tell if a similar trend existed.

## Intergroup Relations

With one major exception, Jews and non-Jews both moved toward greater approval of racial equality and integration (Table 47). For example, opposition to antimiscegenation laws grew among Jews from 85 percent to 98 percent ( +13 percentage points) and among non-Jews from 65 percent to 85 percent ( +20 points); willingness to vote for a Black for president climbed from 85 percent to 96 percent ( +11 points) among Jews and from 76 percent to 86 percent ( +10 points) among non-Jews; and disagreement that Blacks should not push for their rights grew among Jews from 48 percent to 78 percent ( +30 points) and among non-Jews from 27 percent to 55 percent ( +28 points). ${ }^{12}$ Growth in backing tolerance and equal treatment
was greater on some items for Jews and on others for non-Jews, but overall there was little change in the difference.

The one exception to the pattern of rising support for measures aimed to strengthen intergroup equality occurred on affirmative action. Approval of the government giving special help to Blacks fell from 25 percent to 17 percent ( -8 points) among non-Jews and by an even greater margin from 41 percent to 19 percent ( -22 points) among Jews. As a result, at present Jews and non-Jews differ little on this issue.

## Civil Liberties

On almost all measures, support for civil liberties increased for the last thirty years (Table 50). For Jews the gains were mostly small, averaging just +4.2 percentage points. For non-Jews they were larger, averaging 10.4 points. As a result, the Jewish lead in supporting civil liberties narrowed for all but one item (allowing a Communist to teach in a college). For both Jews and non-Jews the gains were greatest vis-à-vis homosexuals. For Jews the increases were smallest regarding anti-religionists and racists, and for non-Jews they were the least concerning racists.

## Crime and Firearms

For both Jews and non-Jews punitive attitudes increased in the 1980s and then declined in the recent period (Table 53). For example, among Jews support for capital punishment rose from 64 percent to 72 percent and then fell back to 64 percent; for tougher courts it went from 75 percent to 86 percent and down to 71 percent; and for approval of the police ever striking someone it moved from 76 percent to 78 percent and then to 69 percent. A similar pattern occurred for non-Jews.

On firearms Jewish household ownership remained low and stable throughout the period ( 14 percent, 13 percent, 13 percent) and support for requiring a police permit to purchase a gun was high
and stable ( 95 percent, 94 percent, 92 percent). Among non-Jews household gun ownership fell from 51 percent to 41 percent and support for requiring a police permit to purchase a gun climbed from 71 percent to 80 percent. As a result, the gap between Jews and non-Jews narrowed on both.

## Psychological Well-Being and Health

Neither Jews nor non-Jews showed much change in their evaluation of their mental or physical well-being (Table 56). While none of the trends among Jews were statistically significant, their gains in financial and job satisfaction, health, and life assessment compared to static or declining levels among non-Jews may indicate a modest relative improvement in the status of Jews compared to non-Jews.

## Financial and Job Changes and Expectations

Job and financial expectations for Jews have not meaningfully changed, but their commitment to hard work has strengthened (Table 59). In the 1970s 41 percent of Jews believed people got ahead mainly from hard work and that rose to 58 percent recently ( +17 percentage points). Among non-Jews it climbed from 63 percent to 68 percent ( +5 points), so Jews have been converging with non-Jews. On wanting to keep working even if able to live comfortably, Jews moved from 66 percent to 73 percent ( +7 points), while non-Jews went from 70 percent to 68 percent ( -2 points).

## Miscellaneous

Few of the trends among Jews were statistically significant, but Jews and non-Jews both showed less support for spanking children (-9 percentage points from the 1980s to the present period for Jews and -6 points for non-Jews) and a decline in support for easier divorce laws ( -11 points for Jews and -3 points for non-Jews)(Waite, 2002) as seen in Table 62. Those favoring the legalization of marijuana decreased in the 1980s (down 5 points for Jews and 6 points for non-

Jews) and then rose in the recent period ( +3 points for Jews and +7 for non-Jews). Expectations of a world war in the next ten years climbed from the 1980s to the recent period ( +7 points for Jews and +6 points for non-Jews). Hours of TV watching changed little for Jews or non-Jews. Newspaper readership significantly dropped for both groups, with daily reading falling from 74 percent in the 1970 s for Jews to 57 percent ( -17 points) in the recent period and by an even greater margin from 64 percent to 44 percent ( -20 points) for non-Jews.

## Summary of Trends

Looking at the trends from the 1970s to the present, there was a moderate decline in the gap between Jews and non-Jews. For the 117 nondemographic items with data points covering the entire time period, the average difference declined from 14 percentage points to 11.5 points, a decrease of almost 19 percent. As Table 66 shows, there was convergence between Jews and non-Jews within the topics of religion, intergroup relations, finances and jobs, gender roles, socializing, confidence in institutions, spending/taxes/social welfare policy, crime and firearms, civil liberties, suicide, and miscellaneous. Divergence occurred slightly for abortion rights and sexual morality, and to a greater degree for politics, psychological well-being, and misanthropy. However, the gaps between Jews and non-Jews on psychological wellbeing and misanthropy have never been very notable. Thus, in general, a few of the large Jewish/non-Jewish differences maintained themselves (e.g., abortion rights and sexual morality), but most mod-erate-to-large gaps narrowed somewhat in recent decades.

The relative and absolute trends of Jews and non-Jews are quite varied, and there are individual items that follow almost all possible patterns. However, the most common pattern, affecting most trends for intergroup relations, gender roles, civil liberties, suicide, and confidence in institutions in general and such specific items in other topics as spending on health and education and the ownership and
regulation of firearms was for differences to close, with general movement toward the side favored by Jews (e.g., more support for gender equality and civil liberties). Many other topics showed no clear general pattern (religion, finances and jobs, misanthropy, socializing, spending/taxes, crime and firearms, and miscellaneous). Other patterns include: 1) moving toward Jews but no convergence (sexual morality), 2) moving toward Jews but divergence (spending on Blacks and school prayers), 3) no movement, no convergence (abortion rights), 4) moving away from Jews and divergence (newspaper readership, trust in people, spending on welfare, capital punishment, some politics), and 5) moving away from Jews and converging (life after death, getting ahead via hard work, socializing with friends, and divorce laws). In brief, when changes have occurred, they have most frequently been shifts in which society in general moved toward the position held by Jews, and as such, Jews have often been the harbingers of change by holding positions toward which the country as a whole has since shifted. Of course, many trends do not follow this pattern, but it is much more common than cases in which the country moved away from the position toward which Jews leaned.

Of course, moving in the direction of positions held by Jews means moving in a liberal direction. For many topics, such as suicide and euthanasia, sexual morality, intergroup relations, gender roles, and civil liberties, and on such miscellaneous items as the legalization of marijuana, most items have shifted toward granting greater personal liberties and more protection of group and minority rights. Thus, counter to some claims that Jews have been becoming more conservative either generally or politically (Glaser, 1997; Levey, 1996; Sigelman, 1991; Staub, 2002), with few exceptions, Jewish views have either held steady or, more often than not, grown more liberal in recent decades (Forman, 2001; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Shapiro, 2001; Sonenshein and Valentino, 2000).

In sum, there has been some decrease in the distance between Jews and non-Jews, and this is consistent with the argument of
declining Jewish distinctiveness (Glaser, 1997; Sigelman, 1991), but the reduction was modest in scope, the remaining differences are common and often large, and little of the change came from assimilation or the convergence of Jews toward the positions of non-Jews.

## ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG JEWS

Jews differ from non-Jews in many important ways and also show some distinctive trends over time. This section examines intra-Jewish variation on the nondemographic items, both to see how much solidarity there is among Jews and to see what insight intra-Jewish differences can provide to help understand Jewish/non-Jewish differences. (On Jewish subgroups, see Lazerwitz, et al., 1998; Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002; and United Jewish Communities, 2004a, b, c). (See Table 68.)

Jews, for this study, have been subdivided three ways: 1) those who are currently Jewish compared to those raised as Jews but without any current religious affiliation and those raised as Jewish but with some non-Jewish current affiliation; 2) the denominational streams of Judaism (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, No Affiliation), and 3) current Jews divided by level of attending religious services (high, medium, and low). These breakdowns are for the years 1988-2002. The denominational and religious service attendance measures cover current Jews only, while the current/raised-as measure covers a somewhat larger group. (See Appendix 4, page 289, for more details on these measures). This analysis does not present detailed reports of percentages as in the earlier sections, since most of the subgroups are based on fewer than 100 cases. Instead, overall tests of statistical significance are applied, and the direction of differences is highlighted. ${ }^{13}$

Overall, there were 459 tests of relationships (the 153 nondemographics times the three breakdowns of Jews for each). Of these,

83 items or 18.1 percent are statistically significant at the .05 level (or 3.6 times more than one would expect due to chance). Similarly, at the .10 level, 24.4 percent were statistically significant. Thus, while there is consensus among Jews on most issues, Jews are not a monolith and show notable within-group differences for a number of variables.

Relationships were about equally common for each of the three measures of Jews. For current-past Jewish identification, 22 percent were significant at the .05 level; for denominational stream, 16 percent; and for religious attendance, 16 percent. There was much greater variation by topic area. As Table 67 shows, religion and politics have the most within-Jewish differences (respectively 59 percent and 48 percent of relationships were statistically significant at the .05 level). Next come child values, miscellaneous, well-being, confidence in institutions, civil liberties, and abortion rights, with rates of 27 percent-20 percent. Then come socializing, social welfare, sexual morality, suicide, and spending/taxes with 17 percent-11 percent. Next, showing somewhat more differences than chance would predict were intergroup relations ( 10 percent) and crime ( 8 percent). Finally, with no meaningful within-group variation were gender roles, finances/jobs, and misanthropy ( $5-0$ percent).

Table 68 shows the relationship of each nondemographic with each of the three Jewish measures grouped by topical area. For each of these 459 relationships, it reports the statistical significance of the association and its direction. For example, for "Bible Inerrancy" it shows that all relationships are significant at the .001 level or greater (as indicated by "***" in Table 68) and that not believing in Bible inerrancy (i.e., "No") is associated with having no denominational affiliation and being Reform (i.e., "None, Ref"), attending religious services less than once yearly (i.e., "Low"), and currently having no religious preference (i.e., "None"). See the footnotes to Table 68 for more details.

As Table 68 shows, there are appreciable differences between
traditional, observant Jews and cultural, less observant Jews on most of the religion variables. Religious beliefs and behaviors are lower among those raised Jewish but with no current religion, those mentioning no denominational affiliation, and those attending services less than once a year. Sometimes, as in belief in an afterlife and in Bible inerrancy, Reform Jews closely resemble Jews with no denominational affiliation. ${ }^{14}$

Politically, voting is highest among Reform Jews and those with moderate attendance levels. Voting for a Democrat for president varies little among Jews. But identification as Democrats is greatest among Conservative Jews and current Jews. (Nonaffiliated Jews are the group most likely to be Independents.) On political ideology, liberals tend to be secularists (i.e., having no affiliation, low attendance, and those raised as Jews who are now Nones).

On child values, obedience is rated most highly by religious and traditional Jews (i.e., Conservative and Orthodox Jews and high attenders) and by former Jews now following other faiths. Thinking for oneself is more favored by secular Jews (no denominational affiliation and currently no religion).

The miscellaneous topic shows that the legalization of marijuana is more supported by Jews with low attendance and no current religion. Newspaper readership is highest among Jews with moderate religious attendance and those who are current Jews, while high TV viewing is greatest among those with high attendance. Expectation of a world war is higher among Jews with no current religion. Support for civil liberties tends to be higher among Jews with no affiliation and no current religion at all.

Well-being has no consistent relationship among types of Jews. General happiness and job satisfaction are greatest among those with frequent religious attendance; marital happiness highest for those with moderate attendance; and the other measures show no clear and significant patterns. Marital happiness is also elevated among Reform Jews and those with no affiliation.

Confidence in institutions also shows a complex pattern. The strongest and most consistent result is that confidence in religion is greater among the Orthodox, frequent attenders, and current Jews. Confidence in banks/financial institutions is higher among Jews with some denominational identification and those with frequent attendance (but only marginally), but this later pattern is contradicted by the fact that confidence in companies increases as attendance falls. Confidence in the executive branch of the federal government rises with religious attendance. Confidence in labor unions is higher among those with no denominational affiliation.

Abortion rights are most often supported by Reform Jews, but there is little difference by attendance and current/past religion.

Support for social welfare policies is pretty uniform, but those with no denominational affiliation and no current religion are somewhat more for expanded government programs.

When attitudes toward sexual behavior and suicide differ among Jews, they tend to be more permissive among those with no affiliation, no current religion, and low attendance.

Most spending/taxes items show no subgroup differences among Jews, but for several items there is the somewhat surprising finding that support for more spending is higher for Conservative Jews (solving problems of big cities, crime rate, mass transportation) and more moderate attenders (solving problems of big cities, mass transportation, assistance to big cities).

Likewise, there are relatively few differences among Jews on intergroup relations (Glaser, 1997), but integration and racial equality are somewhat more strongly backed by Reform Jews, those with no denominational affiliation, and those with no current affiliation.

On crime, subgroup differences are scattered and form no clear pattern (Greenberg and Wald, 2001). Perhaps the only notable result is that Reform Jews are more likely to own guns.

Finally, the remaining survey topics (gender roles, socializing, finances/jobs, and misanthropy) show little meaningful differentia-
tion among Jews.
In summary, in over 80 percent of the comparisons, there are no statistically significant differences among Jews. Thus similarity among Jews rather than division is the most prominent feature (Glaser, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001).

Second, when the subgroup differences do appear, one dominant pattern emerges. Jews tend to differ from non-Jews in the same direction that more secular Jews differ from more religious Jews. That is, Jews with no denominational affiliation, those with low religious attendance, and those with no current religion tend to hold positions compared to more religious Jews that follow the differences between Jews and non-Jews. As detailed in the preceding discussion on ethnic/racial and religious groups, compared to other groups, Jews generally are less religious and have less confidence in organized religion, are more for abortion rights, allowing suicide, sexual permissiveness, integration and racial equality, thinking for oneself as the most important value for children, civil liberties, and legalizing marijuana than non-Jews are, and more secular Jews differ from other Jews in a similar manner. Likewise, when either measured by themselves or along with those with no denominational affiliation, Reform Jews differ from Conservative and Orthodox Jews in the same direction that Jews differ from non-Jews. This suggests that nonreligious aspects of Jewish culture often do as much to distinguish them from non-Jews as do religious matters.

Third, this in turn means that when differences occur, secular and less observant Jews generally hold more liberal positions than do more traditional and religiously active Jews (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Legge, 1995a; Levey, 1996; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003). This result is usually seen as weakening support for accepting traditional religious beliefs such as tzedaka (charity or, more loosely, social justice) as an explanation for Jewish distinctiveness in general and liberalism in particular, since one would assume that more observant Jews would be the most likely to hold
such values. However, it might be argued that these are the values of Judaism that the more secular Jews keep with them and perhaps emphasize as they discard other values and practices (e.g., patriarchalism and keeping kosher).

Finally, there are a small number of other patterns that emerge from the subgroup analysis of Jews: 1) Pro-spending positions on urban issues are most often taken by Conservative Jews and moderate attenders; 2) those with high attendance tend to be happier and have more job satisfaction; 3) moderate attenders are most likely to believe in an afterlife; and 4) voting and newspaper readership are highest among moderate attenders.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Both demographically and attitudinally, Jews in America are a distinctive ethnic/religious group. Demographically, Jews are especially distinguished by their older age, lower fertility, high socioeconomic achievement in terms of education, occupational prestige, income, and class identification, and concentration in large metropolitan centers and the Northeast. This distinctive Jewish profile has been around for some time, prevailing both for the parental generation and across recent decades.

Attitudinally, Jews differ most from non-Jews in general and other specific ethnic/racial and religious groups in particular on the topics of abortion rights, religion, sexual morality, partisanship/voting, and suicide/euthanasia, with average differences between Jews and non-Jews of 29-18 percentage points. Also, differences were larger than average for the miscellaneous group, civil liberties, and child values (averages of 13-12 points). Next, with lower than average differences were gender equality, intergroup relations, crime and firearms, psychological well-being/health, government spending and taxes, misanthropy, confidence in institutions, socializing, finances/
jobs, and, lastly, social welfare policy (10-4 points).
Looking within and across these eighteen topics, the main metapatterns were for Jews to be distinctive in their high support of 1) education, learning, and related areas like science, 2) expressive individualism and personal choice, 3 ) other liberal positions related to partisanship, group and minority rights, and, to a lesser degree, social welfare spending and policies, 4) pro-urban programs, 5) progressive child rearing, and 6) a less pro-military point of view.

Overall, Jews are the most distinctive of all ethnic/racial and all religious groups. On average, Jews differ from the national average by 11.4 points, more than any other group. Comparing Jews to other ethnic/racial groups, they are closest to Eastern Europeans and Italians (but still separated from them by almost 10 points) and most distant from Hispanics and racial minorities, especially Blacks (17 points). Among religious groups, Jews are closest to those with no religion (7 points) and furthest from Fundamentalist Protestants (16 points).

At the extremes, Jews and non-Jews have fundamentally different points of view about society. On twenty-one measures Jews differ by 20 percentage points or more from the national average, and there are gaps of $30+$ percentage points on four abortion items (legal abortion if woman is not married, 42 points; woman does not want more children, 40 points; cannot afford another child, 38 points; and for any reason, 37 points), three religion variables (school prayers, 45 points; belief in God, 38 points; and belief in an afterlife, 30 points), one political item (presidential vote in 1992, 31 points), and one sexual morality item (homosexual sex, 41 points). In addition, Jews differ more from the national average than do any of the other fifteen ethnic/racial or seven religious groups.

Moreover, the Jewish/non-Jewish differences would have been even larger if items on Israel (American Jewish Committee, 2004; Cohen, 2002; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002; Raab, 1999; United Jewish Communities, 2003) or
anti-Semitism (American Jewish Committee, 2004; Dinnerstein, 2004; Sigelman, 1995; Smith, 1994, 2001) had been available for comparison.

But by another standard, Jews and non-Jews are not so different. On 84 percent of the comparisons, Jews and non-Jews are on the same side of an issue. That is, the majority of Jews and the overall majority are in agreement (e.g., most Jews and the majority of the total population taking a pro-civil liberties position on fourteen of the fifteen measures). On 88 percent of the items Jews and non-Jews are either on the same side or on opposite sides, but differ by fewer than 10 percentage points.

Demographically, the major trends include a) an increase in divorce and decline in marriage for both Jews and non-Jews; b) smaller family size, with non-Jewish families coming to more closely resemble the Jewish pattern; c) less concentration in the Northeast and a shift from central cities to suburbs (but not to small towns or rural areas); and d) increased social mobility and greater gains in education, occupation, and income than non-Jews experienced.

Attitudinally, there was a decline of almost 19 percent in the average difference between Jews and non-Jews (from about 14 points to 11.5 points). Many different patterns of change occurred, but the most common situation was for both Jews and non-Jews to move in the same direction toward the position held by Jews and for nonJews to slightly narrow the gap by moving a bit further than Jews did. That is, non-Jews tended to partly catch up with Jews. This in turn meant that change was usually in a liberal direction, especially for such topics as suicide and euthanasia, sexual morality, intergroup relations, gender roles, civil liberties, and on such miscellaneous items as the legalization of marijuana.

Within the Jewish community there is a fairly high degree of consensus, with statistically significant differences appearing for only about 20 percent of the items. When differences do exist, the major pattern is that more secular Jews differ from more religious Jews in
the same direction that Jews altogether differ from non-Jews. More often than not, this means that less observant Jews hold more liberal positions than more observant Jews do.

What gives Jews their distinctive profile among America's ethnic/religious groups? Discussions of Jewish distinctiveness or even more broadly of the place of Jews in American society have mostly centered on examining and looking for explanations of Jewish liberalism (Cohen, 1989; Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Fisher, 1976; Fisher, 1981; Glaser, 1997; Glazer, 1995; Goren, 1999; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Legge, 1995a, 1995b; Lerner, et al., 1989; Levey, 1996; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Medding, 1981; Sonenshein and Valentino, 2000; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003). The various factors evoked across these many studies vary in terms of the specific descriptions of values or conditions, which ones are mentioned, and how they are characterized and grouped together.

The most prominently mentioned group of factors are what are variously described as Judaic values or Jewish religious teachings. The most frequently mentioned of these are: 1) tzedaka, meaning charity or, more broadly, social justice, 2) nonasceticism or a focus on this world rather than an afterlife, with the corollary ideas that one should reform this world rather than wait for the afterlife and that this life should be appreciated and enjoyed rather than endured, and 3) the role of study of the Torah (the Pentateuch, or the body of Jewish wisdom and law based upon the Jewish Bible) and the teachings of the Talmud (the written collection of the Jewish oral tradition, commenting on and interpreting the Torah), which are more broadly seen as leading to a dedication to education, learning, and reasoning. Or, alternatively, "universal compassion" and "argumentative individualism" have been discerned from these and other Jewish tenets as the key Judaic values (Cohen and Liebman, 1997).

A second set of factors are sociological and include the role of 1) status inconsistency, 2) marginality, and 3) minority group status in general and a perceived threat or a "defensive impulse" (Lipset and

Raab, 1995) resulting from anti-Semitism.
Third, there are political explanations, such as 1) a tradition of radicalism and support for socialism in Europe, 2) a democratic, reformist tradition against authoritarian governments in Europe, 3) intergenerational inheritance of Democratic Party allegiance within the U.S., and 4) political responses to anti-Semitism.

Fourth, there are regional factors, such as living in modern and cosmopolitan urban centers, being raised and residing in liberal and progressive regions (bicoastalism), and being geographically separated from the centers of Protestant fundamentalism.

Fifth, there are other explanations such as the immigrant experience, internationalism (stemming originally from the stateless condition of the Jews and more recently from ties to Israel), and collectivism coming from group solidarity and communalism.

Keeping the various factors straight is difficult. For example, anti-Semitism was mentioned above both as a sociological factor related to minority group defense and to solidarity with other minority groups and as a political factor for opposing authoritarian governments. Similarly, while some scholars have wanted to keep a clear separation between religious beliefs and cultural traits, Lipset and Raab (1995) have proposed the construct of "tribal values" that are both religious and cultural.

Related to the issue of why Jews are liberals is the question raised by many investigators of why Jews are more Democratic and liberal than their socioeconomic status would predict (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Glaser, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Levey, 1996; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003). As Milton Himmelfarb put it, "Jews earn like Episcopalians and vote like Puerto Ricans" (quoted in Greenberg and Wald, 2001). One part of the explanation is that education can trump income. In general in America, more education tends to make people more liberal, more income tends to make people more conservative, and the education effect is often both stronger and broader than the income effect
(Davis, 1979, 1981; Hyman and Wright, 1981). This may be especially true for Jews given a) the high value given to schooling and learning in their culture and b) the fact that Jewish education, and especially the higher education received by Jews, is higher quality and more liberal than American education in general (i.e., Jews are overrepresented in elite universities and public universities in the Northeast that are highest in prestige and more liberal in their cultures and curriculums than are the typical universities attended by non-Jews). As Table 69 shows, among Jews, years of schooling has more impact than household income in all eight models (e.g., abortion scale, political ideology, civil liberties scale, etc.), and in six of the eight models education and income have opposite signs, with more schooling predicting more liberal positions and more household income associated with more conservative positions (but usually not reaching statistical significance). In the remaining two models, education has a moderately strong and statistically significant liberal relationship, and income has a weak and not statistically significant liberal association. In brief, income often does not exercise a strong conservative influence, while education clearly moves Jews in a liberal direction. ${ }^{15}$

While many of the dimensions that separate Jews from nonJews do involve liberalism, seeing this as the defining difference is wrong on two counts. First, Jews and non-Jews do not differ uniformly on all liberal/conservative topics. For example, they are much closer in agreement on government spending priorities than they are on matters of expressive individualism such as abortion rights, sexual morality, and civil liberties. Second, Jews do not differ only on topics with a left-right divide. Jews differ from non-Jews in other important ways that cannot be reduced to liberal-conservative matters. These include their greater confidence in science, lower expectation of a future world war, less socializing with relatives, and higher newspaper readership. Thus, liberalism is both too broad and too simple a construct to describe the range of attitudes on which Jews and non-Jews differ to varying degrees and too limited in that it does
not provide an adequate explanation for all the ways that Jews and non-Jews differ.

The suggested explanations for Jewish distinctiveness in general and liberalism in particular are mostly quite sensible and plausible, and it is not possible to formally test many of them. However, the pattern of results does suggest that certain ones have more credence than others do. Among the Judaic values explanations, the importance of education and learning both as a value and an objective attribute of Jews is well-supported by the data. Education itself is an important predictor of the liberal attitudes held by Jews and influences attitudes directly and indirectly across most topics. Nonasceticism also plausibly relates to the observed differences, both as a general reason for Jewish interest in reforms in this world and for taking tolerant positions on certain morality and lifestyle issues. But the social justice/Judaic values explanation finds little support in the data. Jews exceed non-Jews in support for domestic social spending only by modest margins, and even the direction is wrong for support for Social Security and assistance to the poor. In addition, there is little or no Jewish edge in support for social welfare policies.

But the most frequently offered basic Judaic values explanations seem to offer little help in understanding the basis for the major differences on expressive individualism and moral choice. Cohen and Liebman's (1997) "argumentative individualism" comes closest, but it blends elements subsumed above under the education and learning explanation with a basis for individualism that they describe as partly representing a rejection of religious authority and partly recent and areligious in origin. As such, it hardly represents a Jewish religious teaching nor is it clearly a traditional Judaic value.

For the basis of expressive liberalism, one may need to look for other sources, such as a minority group's support for minority rights, the Jewish association with reform and anti-authoritarian movements in Europe (emanating from their repressed minority status), and residential concentration in a cosmopolitan region noted for
supporting individual rights even prior to the arrival of a major Jewish community. These nonreligious explanations would also comport with the fact that more secular, less observant Jews are more supportive of these values than are more traditional, religiously active Jews.

The comparative perspective comparing Jews to other ethnic/ racial and religious groups helps us understand one basic reason for Jewish distinctiveness. The American immigration model was for newcomers to give up their original political allegiance and national identity, drop their mother tongue, but keep their religion. The special status of Jews as both an ethnic/racial and a religious group helps to explain both why Jews are so distinctive and the endurance of Jewishness a century after the peak period of immigration. Judaism is an ethnic religion essentially passed on along with other cultural traits from parents to children. Moreover, the religious side of Judaism is totally intermingled with other cultural aspects of being Jewish, and the ethnic and religious duality are hard to distinguish or separate. Being Jewish is both a cultural, ethnic trait and a religious belief, and these two aspects of being Jewish reinforce that identity.

Moreover, religion is a generationally transmitted characteristic that is not only promoted by family socialization, but formally maintained by other institutions (synagogues, schools, and congregations) and leaders (rabbis) and frequently reinforced by practices such as daily prayers, weekly services, and yearly high holy days. This double distinction both helps to explain why Jews were more different from other groups in America to start with and why they have maintained greater distinctiveness over time.

In addition, Israel helps to keep American Jews distinctive. For other groups the "old country" tie is progressively lost across time and generations, and under the American immigrant pact it is considered disloyal to maintain an allegiance to another country. But it is considered natural and acceptable for Jews, as a religious group, to have connections to and strong, positive feelings toward Israel (up to the line that Jonathan Pollard crossed). Nor is this attachment
expected to wane (as, for example, fourth-generation Italian-Americans' affection for Italy would be) since one's current religion makes the Israel connection fresh and relevant, not merely ancestral and historical.

As the Great Seal of the United States proclaims, America is a nation formed "e pluribus unum" (from many, one). It amalgamates people from all of the world's nationalities into one new nation and invites the adherents of all the world's faiths to practice their different religions as part of that nation. Both in terms of background, attributes, and attitudes, Jews have a highly distinctive profile highlighted by their high educational and economic achievements, regional and metropolitan concentrations, and Democratic partisanship, as well as by their decided support for such values as individual choice, civil liberties, equal rights for women and minorities, the separation of church and state, education and learning, and political and civic participation. Jews differ more from Americans overall and from other ethnic/racial and religious groups individually than do any other ethnic/racial or religious group. Following the logic of Animal Farm, while all ethnic/racial and religious groups are unique, Jews are more unique than others.

As both an ethnicity and a religion, Jews occupy a special place in America's ethnic/religious mosaic. Unlike groups that are only ethnic, Jews, as a religious group, are expected to maintain and pass on their Jewish identity. As an ethnic group, their religion is not only an attribute of individuals and families, but a trait of the collective Jewish community. Together these joint aspects of Judaism make American Jewry distinctive and help to sustain that distinctiveness.

Given the high and growing level of intermarriage (Lazerwitz, 1995; United Jewish Communities, 2003; Waite, 2002), the increasing geographic dispersion of Jews, the growing generational distance from immigrant roots, and the small and declining share of Jews in an overwhelmingly ( 98 percent) non-Jewish society, what is striking is how distinctive Jews remain from non-Jews, the modest decline in
intergroup differences on attitudes, and the fact that the narrowing mostly results from non-Jews moving toward the position held by Jews rather than Jews adopting the positions of non-Jews. This suggests that Jews are likely to maintain an important and special position in American society for the foreseeable future.

## NOTES

1. Many works describe the American Jewish community. For a selection of recent examples, see American Jewish Historical Society, 1999; Cohen and Eisen, 2000; Diner, 2004; Eisen, 1997; Feingold, 2004; Linzer, Schnall, and Chanes, 1998; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002; Raphael, 2003.
2. These groups represent people with these ethnic backgrounds who reside in the United States and as such could be referred to as Jewish Americans, German Americans, etc. Except for Native Americans, we have used the shorter, unhyphenated ethnic terms in this report.
3. Some comparisons report on means, but most show the proportion in a particular category. In all cases in which categorical proportions are reported, full cross tabulations were run with all categories (e.g., the five marital and eight labor force categories). For attitudinal variables No Opinions or Don't Know cases were retained in the base. For example, the percent agreeing on a particular item is based on the sum of agrees, disagrees, and don't knows.
4. While most Jews apparently marry at somewhat later ages than non-Jews do, their older ages and greater marital stability raise the proportion currently married (United Jewish Communities, 2003; Waite, 2002).
5. Kosmin and Lachman (1993) found that Hindus and Unitarians had more education than Jews. Detailed analysis of over almost 200 different religions on the GSS finds only Unitarians with more mean years of schooling than Jews have, but the number of Unitarians in the sample is too small to firmly establish that they have more education than Jews do.
6. Confidence in the executive is strongly tied to party identification. When a Democrat is in office, Democrats have more confidence in the executive, and when a Republican is serving, Republicans have more confidence
(Smith, Taylor, and Mathiowetz, 1980; Smith and Kim, 2003). The Jewish edge comes largely from the fact that Bill Clinton was president during most of the period under observation (1991-2002).
7. The GSS uses an experimental split-ballot design to compare different ways of describing similar areas. For research on the impact of these variations in wordings beyond what is pointed out here, see Smith, 1987, and Rasinski, 1989.
8. The average difference figures point to a more modest differential because these are five ranked differences and the large difference on thinking for oneself as the most important value leads to relatively small differences on the rankings of the other four values.
9. Likewise, in an item asked only on the 2002 GSS, Jews notably led all other groups in wanting more spending on scientific research. However, there are too few cases for this to be statistically significant.
10. On changes in belief in an afterlife by religious groups, see Greeley and Hout, 1999 and 2001, and Stolzenberg, 2001.
11. Confidence in the executive branch reflects large, event-driven, year-to-year changes and also major switches when the political party occupying the White House changes. The pooled results obscure these important trends, but there are not enough Jewish respondents to examine them. See Smith, Taylor, and Mathiowetz, 1981; Smith and Kim, 2003.
12. These are based on the time series in Table 47 that excludes Blacks, since they provide the longest consistent trends. Figures with Blacks included are also given in Table 47.
13. Limited sample size also precludes looking at these three subdivisions of Jews simultaneously (e.g., denominational stream by level of attending religious services).
14. Cultural or ethnic Jews would mostly consist of those raised as Jewish but with no current religion, those not identifying with any of the denominational groups of Jews, and those with low attendance of religious services. Religious or practicing Jews would tend to be those with Jewish as their current religion, with a denominational affiliation, and with moderate or greater attendance. Within the three main denominational groups, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform, religious practices are naturally most traditional for the Orthodox and least for the Reform. In addition, levels of observance for a wide range of Judaic rituals (e.g., fasting on Yom Kippur, keeping kosher, holding a Seder, and attending services) are highest for the

## Tables

Orthodox and lowest for the Reform (United Jewish Communities, 2004a, b, c). Thus, Reform Jews are closer to cultural Jews than Orthodox or Conservative Jews are on the traditional/nontraditional and observant/nonobservant continua.
15. One should not assume that more education always promotes more liberal attitudes. While this is usually the case in the United States, research has shown a much weaker or even reversed relationship in some European societies (Weil, 1985; 1987). Thus, the relationship is known to be well-established and strong only within the American context.

Table 1
Demographic Profile by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 1.A Age |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | Mean Years |
| British | 49.6 |
| Jewish | 47.7 |
| Scandinavian | 47.6 |
| Eastern European | 46.9 |
| German | 45.1 |
| lrish | 4.1 |
| Other White | 44.5 |
| French | 44.3 |
| Polish | 44.0 |
| Italian | 43.2 |
| Black | 42.7 |
| Native American | 39.9 |
| Asian | 39.7 |
| Hispanic | 36.5 |
| Other | 36.3 |
| Average | 44.4 |
| 1.B Marital Status |  |
| Group | \% Married |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{4 4 . 6}$ |
| Asian | 64.0 |
| British | 63.8 |
| Scandinavian | 62.9 |
| Eastern European | 62.6 |
| French | 60.3 |
| Native American | 59.9 |
| Italian | 59.8 |
| German | 59.7 |
| Polish | 59.3 |
| Other White | 59.0 |
| Irish | 58.7 |
| Hispanic | 52.3 |
| Other | 43.0 |
| Black | 39.1 |
| Average | 57.2 |
|  |  |


| 1.C Divorce History |  |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | \% Ever |
| Groups |  |
| Divorced |  |
| Native American | 38.5 |
| British | 28.1 |
| Irish | 27.6 |
| Scandinavian | 27.4 |
| Other White | 27.0 |
| German | 25.7 |
| Eastern European | 25.3 |
| French | 24.6 |
| Italian | 22.7 |
| Polish | 22.7 |
| Black | 22.3 |
| Hispanic | 21.8 |
| Other | 20.8 |
| Jewish | 20.6 |
| Asian | 11.1 |
| Average | 25.6 |
|  |  |
| 1.D Residence in Cities | $\%$ in Central Cities |
|  | of Twelve Largest |
| Groups | Metro Areas |
| Jewish | 26.3 |
| Black | 19.3 |
| Hispanic | 18.1 |
| Other | 17.1 |
| Asian | 11.6 |
| Italian | 9.5 |
| Eastern European | 9.2 |
| Polish | 9.2 |
| lrish | 5.0 |
| Other White | 4.7 |
| British | 3.1 |
| Native American | 2.5 |
| German | 2.3 |
| French | 2.2 |
| Scandinavian | 2.0 |
| Average | 7.7 |
|  |  |


| Group | \% Living in Suburbs of Twelve Largest Metro Areas |
| :---: | :---: |
| Jewish | 27.2 |
| Italian | 25.3 |
| Asian | 23.8 |
| Eastern European | 20.6 |
| Polish | 17.3 |
| Other | 16.8 |
| Hispanic | 14.3 |
| lrish | 14.1 |
| Other White | 13.4 |
| French | 11.8 |
| British | 11.7 |
| Black | 10.3 |
| German | 8.3 |
| Scandinavian | 6.7 |
| Native American | 5.7 |
| Average | 12.0 |
| 1.F Region |  |
|  | \% Living in |
| Group | Northeast |
| Italian | 51.4 |
| Jewish | 43.3 |
| French | 37.6 |
| Polish | 36.2 |
| Eastern European | 29.0 |
| Irish | 23.6 |
| Hispanic | 22.9 |
| Other | 22.2 |
| Asian | 19.7 |
| Black | 18.1 |
| Other White | 16.1 |
| German | 15.6 |
| British | 14.4 |
| Scandinavian | 10.8 |
| Native American | 4.3 |
| Average | 20.2 |


| 1.G Years of Schooling |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | Mean Years |
| Jewish | 15.7 |
| Asian | 14.9 |
| British | 13.9 |
| Scandinavian | 13.8 |
| Polish | 13.7 |
| Eastern European | 13.5 |
| Irish | 13.5 |
| Italian | 13.5 |
| German | 13.3 |
| French | 13.1 |
| Other | 12.9 |
| Other White | 12.9 |
| Black | 12.4 |
| Hispanic | 12.4 |
| Native American | 12.2 |
| Average | 13.2 |
|  |  |
| 1.H Education | \% Four-Year |
| Group | College Degree+ |
| Jewish |  |
| Asian | 61.2 |
| British | 49.8 |
| Scandinavian | 32.1 |
| Polish | 28.4 |
| Eastern European | 27.4 |
| Irish | 27.2 |
| German | 26.2 |
| Other | 25.8 |
| Italian | 25.2 |
| French | 25.1 |
| Other White | 20.5 |
| Hispanic | 20.3 |
| Black | 14.0 |
| Native American | 11.5 |
| Average | 8.3 |
|  | 23.1 |


| 1.J1 Spouse's Years of Schooling |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group |  |
|  | Mean Years |
| Jewish | 15.6 |
| Asian | 14.6 |
| British | 13.9 |
| Eastern European | 13.6 |
| Irish | 13.6 |
| Polish | 13.6 |
| Italian | 13.4 |
| Scandinavian | 13.4 |
| German | 13.3 |
| French | 13.2 |
| Other White | 13.1 |
| Other | 12.9 |
| Black | 12.7 |
| Native American | 12.6 |
| Hispanic | 12.2 |
| Average | 13.3 |
|  |  |
| 1.J2 Spouse's Education | $\%$ College |
|  | Grad+ |
| Group | 59.4 |
| Jewish | 49.7 |
| Asian | 33.6 |
| British | 30.1 |
| Eastern European | 29.0 |
| Irish | 28.4 |
| Polish | 27.2 |
| Other | 26.4 |
| Italian | 23.9 |
| Scandinavian | 23.3 |
| German | 22.2 |
| Other White | 21.1 |
| French | 18.1 |
| Hispanic | 15.0 |
| Black | 12.4 |
| Native American | 25.6 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 1.K Vocabulary | Mean Items | 1.L2 Labor Force Status |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Group | \% Employed |
| Group | Correct | Asian | 78.5 |
|  |  |  |  |
| Jewish | 7.2 | Hispanic | 76.1 |
| British | 6.9 | Scandinavian | 71.9 |
| Scandinavian | 6.6 | Jewish | 70.6 |
| Eastern European | 6.5 | Eastern European | 68.3 |
| lrish | 6.4 | French | 68.1 |
| Italian | 6.4 | German | 68.0 |
| Polish | 6.3 | Italian | 67.9 |
| French | 6.2 | Native American | 67.9 |
| German | 6.2 | Irish | 67.5 |
| Other White | 6.0 | Polish | 67.2 |
| Native American | 5.4 | Other White | 67.0 |
| Asian | 5.2 | Black | 64.9 |
| Black | 4.9 | British | 63.4 |
| Hispanic | 4.9 | Other | 55.9 |
| Other | 4.8 | Average | 67.5 |
| Average | 6.0 |  |  |
|  |  | 1.M Unemployment History |  |
| 1.L1 Labor Force Status Group | \% Retired | Group | \% Unemployed <br> in Last Ten Years |
|  |  |  |  |
| British | 19.0 | Jewish | 21.2 |
| Scandinavian | 14.8 | British | 25.6 |
| German | 14.0 | Eastern European | 26.0 |
| Eastern European | 13.8 | Scandinavian | 26.9 |
| Jewish | 13.7 | German | 29.4 |
| Polish | 13.3 | Irish | 30.6 |
| French | 12.5 | Other White | 31.7 |
| lrish | 12.4 | French | 32.5 |
| Other White | 12.1 | Italian | 32.5 |
| Black | 10.3 | Polish | 34.7 |
| Italian | 9.3 | Asian | 34.9 |
| Native American | 6.0 | Other | 36.2 |
| Other | 4.6 | Black | 37.5 |
| Hispanic | 2.8 | Hispanic | 38.7 |
| Asian | 2.4 | Native American | 42.2 |
| Average | 12.1 | Average | 31.6 |


| 1.N Occupational Prestige |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | Mean |
| Jewish | 51.9 |
| Asian | 46.5 |
| British | 46.4 |
| Scandinavian | 45.9 |
| Italian | 44.8 |
| Irish | 44.7 |
| Polish | 44.5 |
| Eastern European | 44.3 |
| German | 43.2 |
| Other White | 43.0 |
| French | 42.5 |
| Native American | 40.3 |
| Hispanic | 39.9 |
| Other White | 39.8 |
| Black | 39.4 |
| Average | 43.9 |
|  |  |
| 1.0 Labor Union Membership |  |
|  | \% Respondent |
| Group | and/or Spouse |
| Polish | 22.4 |
| French | 20.5 |
| Black | 20.3 |
| Hispanic | 19.9 |
| Italian | 19.7 |
| Eastern European | 19.6 |
| Irish | 18.4 |
| Scandinavian | 18.4 |
| German | 17.8 |
| Jewish | 17.7 |
| Other White | 15.7 |
| British | 13.9 |
| Native American | 13.0 |
| Asian | 8.5 |
| Other | 8.4 |
| Average | 17.2 |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 1.P Household Income | 1986 Dollars <br> Mean |
| :--- | :--- |
| Group | 58,938 |
| Jewish | 43,714 |
| Asian | 43,228 |
| Italian | 39,464 |
| lrish | 38,989 |
| British | 38,520 |
| Scandinavian | 36,533 |
| Polish | 35,424 |
| French | 35,263 |
| Eastern European | 35,228 |
| German | 34,151 |
| Other White | 30,858 |
| Hispanic | 28,409 |
| Other | 26,866 |
| Native American | 24,042 |
| Black | 35,032 |
| Average |  |

1.Q Per Capita Household Income

| Group | 1986 Dollars <br> Mean |
| :--- | :--- |
| Jewish | 27,479 |
| British | 17,025 |
| Italian | 16,968 |
| Scandinavian | 16,608 |
| Irish | 15,992 |
| Eastern European | 15,232 |
| Polish | 14,925 |
| Asian | 14,776 |
| German | 14,743 |
| Other White | 13,995 |
| French | 13,814 |
| Hispanic | 10,590 |
| Native American | 10,483 |
| Other | 9,941 |
| Black | 9,424 |
| Average | 14,292 |


| 1.R Self-Identified Class |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Middle/Upper |
| Jewish | $67.0 / 19.6$ |
| British | $55.6 / 5.1$ |
| Italian | $53.7 / 2.7$ |
| Polish | $51.9 / 2.7$ |
| Eastern European | $51.8 / 2.5$ |
| Irish | $50.7 / 3.6$ |
| German | $49.2 / 2.5$ |
| Scandinavian | $48.8 / 4.9$ |
| Asian | $48.4 / 2.3$ |
| Other White | $45.7 / 3.1$ |
| French | $45.5 / 3.1$ |
| Other | $41.5 / 2.4$ |
| Hispanic | $35.0 / 1.8$ |
| Black | $31.2 / 3.0$ |
| Native American | $30.1 / 1.8$ |
| Average | $46.1 / 3.5$ |
|  |  |
| 1.S Financial Situation | \% Above Average |
| Group | 51.0 |
| Jewish | 29.2 |
| British | 28.7 |
| Italian | 28.6 |
| lrish | 27.8 |
| Scandinavian | 24.8 |
| German | 23.3 |
| Asian | 22.2 |
| Eastern European | 22.2 |
| Polish | 21.9 |
| French | 21.0 |
| Other White | 16.2 |
| Hispanic | 15.2 |
| Native American | 13.9 |
| Other | 11.2 |
| Black | 22.9 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |


| 1.T Home Ownership |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Owning |
| British | 74.0 |
| Italian | 72.9 |
| Jewish | 72.3 |
| Scandinavian | 71.5 |
| French | 70.8 |
| German | 70.8 |
| Polish | 70.8 |
| Irish | 70.2 |
| Other White | 70.1 |
| Eastern European | 69.5 |
| Native American | 59.7 |
| Asian | 53.1 |
| Black | 49.6 |
| Hispanic | 49.4 |
| Other | 45.5 |
| Average | 66.2 |
|  |  |
| 1.U Number of Children Born |  |
| Group | Mean |
| Black | 2.3 |
| French | 2.0 |
| British | 1.9 |
| Native American | 1.9 |
| Scandinavian | 1.9 |
| Eastern European | 1.8 |
| German | 1.8 |
| Hispanic | 1.8 |
| lrish | 1.8 |
| Other | 1.8 |
| Other White | 1.8 |
| Polish | 1.8 |
| Asian | 1.6 |
| Jewish | 1.6 |
| Italian | 1.6 |
| Average | 1.9 |
|  |  |


| 1.V Number of Siblings Group | Mean | 1.X Children under Eighteen in Household |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Group | Mean |
| Black | 5.3 | Hispanic | 1.1 |
| Hispanic | 4.9 | Asian | 0.9 |
| Other | 4.8 | Black | 0.9 |
| Asian | 4.2 | Native American | 0.9 |
| Native American | 4.1 | Other | 0.8 |
| French | 3.6 | French | 0.7 |
| lrish | 3.5 | Irish | 0.7 |
| Other White | 3.5 | Italian | 0.7 |
| German | 3.4 | Other White | 0.7 |
| Polish | 3.3 | Eastern European | 0.6 |
| British | 3.2 | German | 0.6 |
| Italian | 3.2 | Jewish | 0.6 |
| Scandinavian | 3.2 | Polish | 0.6 |
| Eastern European | 3.0 | Scandinavian | 0.6 |
| Jewish | 2.4 | British | 0.5 |
| Average | 3.8 | Average | 0.7 |
| 1.W Household Size |  |  |  |
| Group | Mean |  |  |
| Asian | 3.5 |  |  |
| Hispanic | 3.5 |  |  |
| Other | 3.4 |  |  |
| Native American | 3.2 |  |  |
| Black | 3.1 |  |  |
| French | 2.9 |  |  |
| Italian | 2.9 |  |  |
| German | 2.8 |  |  |
| lrish | 2.8 |  |  |
| Other White | 2.8 |  |  |
| Polish | 2.8 |  |  |
| Eastern European | 2.7 |  |  |
| Scandinavian | 2.7 |  |  |
| British | 2.6 |  |  |
| Jewish | 2.5 |  |  |
| Average | 2.9 |  |  |


| Table $\mathbf{2}$ |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Demographic Profile by Religious Groups |  |
|  |  |
| 2.A Age | Mean Years |
| Religion | 50.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 47.7 |
| Jewish | 46.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 45.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 43.1 |
| Catholic | 38.3 |
| Other Religions | 37.8 |
| None |  |
|  |  |
| 2.B Marital Status |  |
| Religion |  |
| Jewish | 64.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 61.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 61.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 58.3 |
| Catholic | 57.9 |
| Other Religions | 52.7 |
| None | 43.2 |
| 2.C Divorce History |  |
| Religion | \% Ever Divorced |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 29.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 28.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 27.8 |
| None | 25.6 |
| Other Religions | 24.8 |
| Jewish | 20.6 |
| Catholic | 19.7 |
|  |  |


| 2.D Residence in Cities | \% in Central Cities <br> of Twelve Largest <br> Metro Areas |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | $\mathbf{2 6 . 3}$ |
| Jewish | 14.0 |
| Other Religions | 9.6 |
| Catholic | 9.1 |
| None | 6.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 5.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 3.8 |
| Liberal Protestant |  |
|  |  |
| 2.E Residence in Suburbs | \% Living in Suburbs |
|  | of Twelve Largest |
| Religion | Metro Areas |
| Jewish | 27.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 16.5 |
| Catholic | 16.2 |
| Other Religions | 15.9 |
| None | 11.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 10.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 10.2 |
| 2.F Region |  |
| Religion | \% Living in |
| Jewish | Northeast |
| Catholic | 43.3 |
| Other Religions | 33.4 |
| None | 20.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 20.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 19.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 16.7 |
|  | 9.3 |


| 2.G Years of Schooling |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | Mean Years |
| Jewish | 15.7 |
| Other Religions | 14.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 13.8 |
| None | 13.5 |
| Catholic | 13.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 13.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 12.5 |
|  |  |
| 2.H Education | \% Four-Year |
|  | College Degree+ |
| Religion |  |
|  | 61.2 |
| Jewish | 32.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 31.5 |
| Other Religions | 25.0 |
| None | 24.2 |
| Catholic | 22.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 13.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |
|  |  |
| 2.I Spouse's Years of Schooling | Mean |
| Religion |  |
| Jewish | 15.6 |
| Other Religions | 13.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 13.8 |
| None | 13.6 |
| Catholic | 13.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 13.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 12.7 |
| 2.J Spouse's Education |  |
| Religion | \% College |
| Jewish | Grad+ |
| Other Religions | 39.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 33.5 |
| None | 31.7 |
| Catholic | 28.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 28.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 24.5 |
|  | 16.6 |


| 2.K Vocabulary |  |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | Mean Items |
| Religion | Correct |
| Jewish | 7.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 6.5 |
| None | 6.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 6.2 |
| Catholic | 6.1 |
| Other Religions | 5.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 5.6 |
|  |  |
| 2.L1 Labor Force Status | \% Retired |
| Religion | 19.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 14.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 13.7 |
| Jewish | 12.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 10.4 |
| Catholic | 6.1 |
| None | 4.6 |
| Other Religions |  |
|  |  |
| 2.L2 Labor Force Status | \% Employed |
| Religion | 73.6 |
| Other Religions | 73.5 |
| None | 70.6 |
| Jewish | 68.7 |
| Catholic | 66.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 65.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 63.0 |
| Liberal Protestant |  |
| 2.M Unemployment History | \% Unemployed |
| Religion | in Last Ten Years |
| Jewish | 21.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 22.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 29.6 |
| Catholic | 30.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 32.6 |
| None | 42.4 |
| Other Religions | 42.8 |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 2.N Occupational Prestige |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | Mean |
| Jewish | 51.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 45.9 |
| Other Religions | 44.7 |
| Catholic | 43.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 43.3 |
| None | 43.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 41.3 |
|  |  |
| 2.0 Labor Union Membership | \% Respondent |
|  | and/or Spouse |
| Religion | 20.1 |
|  | 19.4 |
| Catholic | $\mathbf{1 7 . 7}$ |
| Moderate Protestant | 16.4 |
| Jewish | 15.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 15.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 10.8 |
| None |  |
| Other Religions |  |
| 2.P Household Income | 1986 Dollars |
| Religion | Mean |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{5 8 , 9 3 8}$ |
| Liberal Protestant | 39,982 |
| Catholic | 38,760 |
| Moderate Protestant | 34,850 |
| None | 33,896 |
| Other Religions | 32,907 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 29,189 |
|  |  |


| 2.Q Per Capita Household Income |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Religion | 1986 Dollars |
| Mean |  |
| Jewish | 27,479 |
| Liberal Protestant | 17,641 |
| None | 14,770 |
| Catholic | 14,729 |
| Moderate Protestant | 14,536 |
| Other Religions | 13,465 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 11,550 |
|  |  |
| 2.R Self-Identified Class |  |
|  | \% Middle/ |
| Religion | Upper |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{2 7 . 0 / 1 9 . 1}$ |
| Liberal Protestant | $55.6 / 5.4$ |
| Catholic | $49.0 / 3.0$ |
| Moderate Protestant | $47.2 / 3.7$ |
| Other Religions | $43.6 / 3.2$ |
| None | $43.2 / 3.9$ |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | $39.1 / 1.9$ |
|  |  |
| 2.S Financial Situation | $\%$ Above |
| Religion | Average |
| Jewish | 51.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 30.3 |
| Catholic | 23.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 23.4 |
| None | 23.3 |
| Other Religions | 21.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 16.7 |


| 2.T Home Ownership |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | \% Owning |
| Liberal Protestant | 76.1 |
| Jewish | 72.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 70.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 66.4 |
| Catholic | 66.3 |
| None | 54.7 |
| Other Religions | 47.2 |
|  |  |
| 2.U Number of Children Born |  |
| Religion | Mean |
|  |  |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 2.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 1.9 |
| Catholic | 1.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 1.9 |
| Jewish | 1.6 |
| Other Religions | 1.4 |
| None | 1.2 |
| 2.V Number of Siblings |  |
| Religion | Mean |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 4.3 |
| Catholic | 3.9 |
| Other Religions | 3.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 3.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 3.3 |
| None | 3.3 |
| Jewish | 2.4 |
| 2.W Household Size |  |
| Religion | 2.3 |
| Catholic | 2.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 3.0 |
| Other Religions | 3.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 2.8 |
| None |  |
| Liberal Protestant | Jewish |
|  |  |

## 2.X Children under Eighteen in Household

Religion Mean

| Catholic | 0.8 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 0.8 |
| Other Religions | 0.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 0.7 |
| None | 0.7 |
| Jewish | 0.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 0.6 |

Table 3
Demographic Profile, 1972-2002

| 3.A Age (Mean) |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| $1972-80$ | 46.6 | 43.5 |
| $1981-90$ | 48.8 | 43.7 |
| 1991-2002 | 47.7 | 44.3 |
| 3.B Marital Status (\% Married) |  |  |


| $1972-80$ | 75.4 | 71.4 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| 1981-90 | 68.4 | 62.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 64.6 | 57.0 |
|  |  |  |
| 3.C Divorce History (\% Ever Divorced) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 8.4 | 15.7 |
| 1981-90 | 15.5 | 20.9 |
| $1991-2002$ | 20.6 | 25.7 |

3.D Residence (\% in Central Cities of Twelve Largest Metro Areas)

| $1972-80$ | 37.7 | 9.3 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1981-90 | 31.1 | 7.4 |
| 1991-2002 | 26.3 | 7.3 |
|  |  |  |
| 3.E Residence (\% Living in Suburbs of Twelve Largest Metro Areas) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 17.0 | 9.9 |
| 1981-90 | 24.9 | 11.1 |
| 1991-2002 | 27.2 | 11.7 |
|  |  |  |
| 3.F Region (\% Living in Northeast) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 58.9 | 21.8 |
| 1981-90 | 52.3 | 20.4 |
| 1991-2002 | 43.3 | 19.7 |


| 3.G Years of Schooling (Mean) <br> Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 13.8 | 11.7 |
| $1981-90$ | 14.8 | 12.4 |
| $1991-2002$ | 15.7 | 13.1 |

3.H Education (\% Four-Year College Degree+)

| $1972-80$ | 39.3 | 12.6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 49.3 | 16.4 |
| $1991-2002$ | 61.2 | 22.4 |

3.J1 Spouse's Years of Schooling (Mean)

| $1972-80$ | 13.9 | 11.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 15.2 | 12.5 |
| $1991-2002$ | 15.6 | 13.3 |

3.J2 Spouse's Education (\% College Grad)

| $1972-80$ | 38.8 | 13.2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 55.0 | 17.9 |
| $1991-2002$ | 59.4 | 25.0 |

3.K Vocabulary (Mean Items Correct)

| $1972-80$ | 7.4 | 5.9 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 7.6 | 5.9 |
| $1991-2002$ | 7.2 | 6.0 |

3L1. Labor Force Status (\% Retired)

| $1972-80$ | 6.6 | 9.1 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| $1981-90$ | 8.4 | 11.0 |
| $1991-2002$ | 13.7 | 12.1 |

3.L2 Labor Force Status (\% Employed)

| $1972-80$ | 60.1 | 56.8 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 72.1 | 62.9 |
| $1991-2002$ | 70.6 | 67.6 |

3.M Unemployment History (\% Unemployed in Last Ten Years)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 24.6 | 28.2 |
| 1981-90 | 19.8 | 32.3 |
| 1991-2002 | 21.2 | 31.9 |
|  |  |  |
| 3.N Occupational Prestige (Mean) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 46.2 | 38.4 |
| 1981-90 | 50.4 | 39.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 51.9 | 43.2 |

3.0 Labor Union Membership (\% Respondent and/or Spouse)

| $1972-80$ | 16.7 | 26.2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 15.0 | 20.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 17.7 | 17.2 |

3.P Household Income, 1986 Dollars (Mean)

| $1972-80$ | 50,568 | 32,735 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 5,219 | 32,324 |
| $1991-2002$ | 58,938 | 34,613 |

3.Q Per Capita Household Income 1986 Dollars (Mean)

| $1972-80$ | 18,795 | 10,856 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 21,766 | 12,175 |
| $1991-2002$ | 27,479 | 14,067 |

3.R Self-Identified Class (\% Middle/Upper)

| $1972-80$ | $67.9 / 10.0$ | $44.6 / 2.6$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | $69.4 / 15.2$ | $46.1 / 3.2$ |
| $1991-2002$ | $67.0 / 19.6$ | $45.7 / 3.2$ |

3.S Financial Situation (\% Above Average)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 40.5 | 18.9 |
| $1981-90$ | 52.3 | 20.6 |
| $1991-2002$ | 51.0 | 22.4 |

3.T Home Ownership (\% Owning)

| $1972-80$ | ---- | --- |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| $1981-90$ | 71.2 | 67.5 |
| $1991-2002$ | 72.3 | 66.0 |

3.U Number of Children Born (Mean)

| $1972-80$ | 1.7 | 2.2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| $1991-2002$ | 1.6 | 1.9 |

3.V Number of Siblings (Mean)

| $1972-80$ | 2.6 | 4.3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 2.3 | 4.0 |
| $1991-2002$ | 2.4 | 3.8 |

3.W Household Size (Mean)

| $1972-80$ | 2.9 | 3.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 2.8 | 3.1 |
| $1991-2002$ | 2.5 | 2.9 |

3.X Children under Eighteen in Household (Mean)

| $1972-80$ | 0.6 | 1.1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| $1991-2002$ | 0.6 | 0.7 |

Table 4
Family of Origin by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 4.A Country of Birth

| Group | \% United <br> States |
| :--- | :---: |
| Native American | 99.5 |
| Irish | 97.8 |
| German | 96.3 |
| Scandinavian | 96.3 |
| British | 95.8 |
| Other White | 95.4 |
| French | 94.7 |
| Italian | 94.4 |
| Black | 93.3 |
| Polish | 91.7 |
| Eastern European | 86.5 |
| Jewish | 85.6 |
| Hispanic | 59.2 |
| Other | 58.9 |
| Asian | 16.2 |
| Average | 91.0 |

## 4.B Region at Age Sixteen

| Group | \% Northeast |
| :--- | :---: |
| Italian | 58.0 |
| Jewish | 50.8 |
| French | 41.5 |
| Polish | 37.1 |
| Eastern European | 32.3 |
| Irish | 27.9 |
| Other White | 18.2 |
| German | 17.2 |
| British | 16.9 |
| Hispanic | 15.0 |
| Black | 14.2 |
| Other | 13.0 |
| Scandinavian | 13.0 |
| Asian | 5.7 |
| Native American | 4.6 |
| Average | 20.9 |

## 4.C Residence at Age Sixteen

| Group | \% Living <br> in Big City |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 41.0 |
| Black | 28.1 |
| Asian | 27.7 |
| Hispanic | 25.8 |
| Other | 21.4 |
| Polish | 20.8 |
| Italian | 20.1 |
| Eastern European | 18.4 |
| lrish | 13.0 |
| Other White | 10.7 |
| British | 8.6 |
| German | 8.6 |
| Native American | 7.0 |
| Scandinavian | 6.5 |
| French | 5.2 |
| Average | 14.9 |

4.D Family Raised in

|  | \% with Both |
| :--- | :--- |
| Group | Mother and Father |


| Jewish | 82.2 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Polish | 81.2 |
| Asian | 80.9 |
| Eastern European | 79.6 |
| German | 77.5 |
| Scandinavian | 76.4 |
| British | 75.9 |
| French | 75.7 |
| Italian | 74.2 |
| Irish | 72.9 |
| Other White | 71.7 |
| Other | 62.7 |
| Hispanic | 62.4 |
| Native American | 59.9 |
| Black | 51.5 |
| Average | 70.8 |
|  |  |


| 4.E Father's Years of Schooling |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | Mean Years |
| Jewish | 13.5 |
| Asian | 12.8 |
| British | 12.1 |
| Irish | 11.8 |
| Scandinavian | 11.7 |
| German | 11.5 |
| Other | 11.3 |
| Other White | 11.3 |
| Eastern European | 11.2 |
| Italian | 11.2 |
| Polish | 11.2 |
| French | 11.0 |
| Native American | 9.9 |
| Black | 9.6 |
| Hispanic | 8.8 |
| Average | 11.2 |
|  |  |
| 4.F Father's Education | \% College Grad |
| Group |  |
|  | 41.2 |
| Jewish | 38.7 |
| Asian | 24.2 |
| British | 21.2 |
| Other | 19.3 |
| Irish | 18.7 |
| Scandinavian | 17.9 |
| Eastern European | 17.3 |
| German | 15.4 |
| Other White | 15.2 |
| Polish | 14.8 |
| Italian | 13.3 |
| French | 8.2 |
| Hispanic | 6.6 |
| Black | 6.0 |
| Native American | 17.0 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 4.G Mother's Years of Schooling |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | Mean Years |
| Jewish | 13.0 |
| British | 12.0 |
| Irish | 11.9 |
| Scandinavian | 11.8 |
| German | 11.6 |
| Other White | 11.5 |
| Eastern European | 11.3 |
| French | 11.3 |
| Italian | 11.3 |
| Polish | 11.1 |
| Asian | 10.7 |
| Black | 10.6 |
| Native American | 10.5 |
| Other | 10.4 |
| Hispanic | 8.9 |
| Average | 11.3 |
|  |  |
| 4.H Mother's Education | $\%$ College |
| Group | Grad+ |
| Jewish | 28.5 |
| Asian | 20.2 |
| British | 15.4 |
| Eastern European | 13.6 |
| Scandinavian | 13.0 |
| German | 11.5 |
| Irish | 11.5 |
| Other | 10.9 |
| Other White | 10.3 |
| Italian | 9.3 |
| French | 7.8 |
| Black | 6.9 |
| Hispanic | 6.6 |
| Polish | 5.7 |
| Native American | 5.0 |
| Average | 11.0 |
|  |  |


| 4.I Father's Occupational Prestige |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Group | Mean |
| Jewish | 49.4 |
| Asian | 48.3 |
| British | 45.9 |
| Irish | 45.0 |
| Scandinavian | 44.2 |
| Other | 43.9 |
| German | 43.7 |
| Italian | 43.4 |
| Eastern European | 43.3 |
| Polish | 43.3 |
| Other White | 43.2 |
| French | 42.8 |
| Hispanic | 40.6 |
| Native American | 39.8 |
| Black | 38.1 |
| Average | 43.3 |
| 4.J Mother's Occupational Prestige |  |
| Group |  |
| Jewish |  |
| Asian | 49.1 |
| Other | 46.6 |
| British | 44.2 |
| Scandinavian | 43.1 |
| Irish | 42.9 |
| Italian | 42.6 |
| Eastern European | 41.7 |
| German | 41.5 |
| Other White | 41.0 |
| French | 40.9 |
| Polish | 39.9 |
| Hispanic | 39.5 |
| Black | 38.0 |
| Native American | 37.4 |
| Average | 37.0 |
|  | 40.8 |


| 4.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | \% Above |
| Group | Average |
| Jewish | 52.4 |
| Other | 29.5 |
| Scandinavian | 24.4 |
| Italian | 23.0 |
| Asian | 21.8 |
| British | 21.6 |
| German | 21.5 |
| lrish | 19.2 |
| Other White | 17.6 |
| Native American | 16.7 |
| Eastern European | 15.9 |
| Polish | 14.8 |
| Hispanic | 14.6 |
| French | 12.2 |
| Black | 10.8 |
| Average | 18.7 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

Table 5

## Family of Origin by Religious Groups

| 5.A Country of Birth |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | \% United States |
| Liberal Protestant | 95.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 95.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 95.0 |
| None | 90.7 |
| Jewish | 85.6 |
| Catholic | 84.8 |
| Other Religions | 70.9 |
|  |  |
| 5.B Region at Age Sixteen | \% Northeast |
| Religion |  |
|  | 50.8 |
| Jewish | 34.3 |
| Catholic | 22.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 21.5 |
| None | 17.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 16.4 |
| Other Religions | 9.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |
|  |  |
| 5.C Residence at Age Sixteen | \% Living in |
|  | Big City |
| Religion | 41.0 |
| Jewish | 24.9 |
| Other Religions | 17.9 |
| Catholic | 15.9 |
| None | 12.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 12.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 9.2 |
| Liberal Protestant |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 5.D Family Raised in |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion with Both <br> Mother and Father  |  |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{2 2 . 2}$ |
| Liberal Protestant | 76.3 |
| Catholic | 75.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 71.5 |
| Other Religions | 67.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 67.0 |
| None | 63.6 |
|  |  |
| 5.E Father's Years of Schooling | Mean Years |
| Religion | $\mathbf{1 3 . 5}$ |
| Jewish | 12.5 |
| None | 12.2 |
| Other Religions | 11.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 11.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 11.2 |
| Catholic | 10.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |
|  |  |
| 5.F Father's Education | \% College Grad |
| Religion | $\mathbf{4 1 . 2}$ |
| Jewish | 12.2 |
| None | 12.2 |
| Other Religions | 11.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 11.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 11.2 |
| Catholic | 10.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |
| 5.G Mother's Years of Schooling |  |
| Religion | Mean Years |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{1 3 . 0}$ |
| None | 12.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 11.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 11.5 |
| Other Religions | 11.4 |
| Catholic | 11.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 10.7 |
|  |  |


| 5.H Mother's Education |  |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | \% College |
| Religion | Grad+ |
| Jewish | 28.5 |
| Other Religions | 16.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 15.8 |
| None | 15.0 |
| Catholic | 9.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 9.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 7.1 |
|  |  |
| 5.I Father's Occupational Prestige |  |
| Religion | Mean |
|  |  |
| Jewish | 49.4 |
| Other Religions | 46.0 |
| None | 45.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 44.7 |
| Catholic | 43.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 43.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 41.2 |
|  |  |
| 5.J Mother's Occupational Prestige |  |
| Religion | Mean |
| Jewish | 49.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 42.9 |
| None | 42.1 |
| Other Religions | 41.9 |
| Catholic | 41.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 40.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 39.0 |
| 5.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen |  |
| Religion | Above Average |
| Jewish | 52.4 |
| None | 23.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 21.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 20.4 |
| Other Religions | 19.9 |
| Catholic | 19.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 12.5 |
|  |  |

Table 6
Family of Origin, 1972-2002

| 6.A Countr Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1972-80 | 87.0 | 93.8 |
| 1981-90 | 86.3 | 93.5 |
| 1991-2002 | 85.6 | 91.0 |
| 6.B Region at Age Sixteen (\% Northeast) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 57.9 | 21.3 |
| 1981-90 | 57.2 | 20.8 |
| 1991-2002 | 50.8 | 20.3 |
| 6.C Residence at Age Sixteen (\% Living in Big City) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 52.8 | 15.2 |
| 1981-90 | 52.0 | 14.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 41.0 | 14.4 |
| 6.D Family Raised in (\% with Both Mother and Father) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 80.7 | 76.2 |
| 1981-90 | 84.7 | 75.2 |
| 1991-2002 | 82.2 | 70.6 |
| 6.E Father's Years of Schooling (Mean) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 10.4 | 9.1 |
| 1981-90 | 11.8 | 10.2 |
| 1991-2002 | 13.5 | 11.2 |
| 6.F Father's Education (\% College Grad) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 14.9 | 7.5 |
| 1981-90 | 24.2 | 11.5 |
| 1991-2002 | 41.2 | 16.5 |


| 6.G Mother's Years of Schooling (Mean) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| 1972-80 | 9.9 | 9.5 |
| 1981-90 | 11.4 | 10.4 |
| 1991-2002 | 13.0 | 11.3 |
| 6.H Mother's Education (\% College Grad) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 8.0 | 4.6 |
| 1981-90 | 13.9 | 7.1 |
| 1991-2002 | 28.5 | 10.7 |
| 6.I Father's Occupational Prestige (Mean) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 44.2 | 38.7 |
| 1981-90 | 45.0 | 40.2 |
| 1991-2002 | 49.4 | 43.2 |
| 6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | --- | --- |
| 1981-90 | --- | --- |
| 1991-2002 | 49.1 | 40.7 |
| 6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (\% Above Average) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 24.4 | 14.0 |
| 1981-90 | 30.1 | 16.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 52.4 | 18.2 |

Table 7
Religion by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 7.A Frequency of Prayers |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Daily+ |
| Black | 76.4 |
| Other | 58.1 |
| Native American | 56.1 |
| Asian | 55.0 |
| Irish | 54.3 |
| German | 53.9 |
| Hispanic | 53.3 |
| British | 52.9 |
| Polish | 52.7 |
| Italian | 52.3 |
| Other White | 52.2 |
| Eastern European | 50.8 |
| French | 50.1 |
| Scandinavian | 48.0 |
| Jewish | 25.5 |
| Average | 55.3 |

7.B Attend Religious Services

| Group | \% Weekly + |
| :--- | :---: |
| Asian | 35.2 |
| Black | 31.0 |
| Polish | 30.4 |
| British | 29.0 |
| German | 28.8 |
| Irish | 26.9 |
| Eastern European | 26.7 |
| French | 26.6 |
| Hispanic | 25.5 |
| Other | 23.9 |
| Scandinavian | 23.9 |
| Other White | 23.1 |
| Italian | 22.8 |
| Native American | 19.6 |
| Jewish | 7.4 |
| Average | 26.4 |


| 7.C Supreme Court Ruling Against School Prayers <br> \% Approve <br> Ruling |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | 84.2 |
| Jewish | 49.2 |
| Scandinavian | 46.7 |
| Italian | 44.1 |
| Asian | 43.8 |
| Other | 42.2 |
| Irish | 41.9 |
| Polish | 41.8 |
| British | 41.3 |
| French | 41.2 |
| Hispanic | 38.9 |
| German | 38.8 |
| Eastern European | 37.1 |
| Other White | 30.2 |
| Native American | 23.9 |
| Black | 39.0 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |
| 7.D Nature of World | Mostly |
| Group | Good--6\&7 |
| Other | 39.2 |
| Asian | 35.8 |
| Polish | 33.7 |
| French | 33.4 |
| Italian | 31.9 |
| British | 31.5 |
| Black | 31.0 |
| Scandinavian | 30.7 |
| Eastern European | 30.3 |
| lrish | 30.1 |
| Other White | 29.7 |
| German | 29.5 |
| Native American | 26.8 |
| Hispanic | 25.5 |
| Jewish | 24.8 |
| Average | 30.3 |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 7.E Human Nature |  |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | \% Mostly <br> Good-1\&2 |
| Group | 54.6 |
| Other | 47.0 |
| Jewish | 42.4 |
| Irish | 41.1 |
| French | 39.5 |
| Eastern European | 38.2 |
| Scandinavian | 37.6 |
| Italian | 37.1 |
| Other White | 37.0 |
| German | 36.9 |
| Asian | 36.9 |
| British | 34.6 |
| Polish | 33.3 |
| Native American | 31.6 |
| Hispanic | 29.1 |
| Black | 36.6 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |
| 7.F Religious Strength | Stronga |
| Group | 48.5 |
| Black | 42.7 |
| Asian | 38.9 |
| German | 38.4 |
| Eastern European | 37.9 |
| British | 37.7 |
| Other | 37.6 |
| Jewish | 37.0 |
| Irish | 36.5 |
| French | 35.7 |
| Scandinavian | 33.8 |
| Italian | 33.6 |
| Polish | 32.6 |
| Other White | 32.4 |
| Hispanic | 31.5 |
| Native American | 37.4 |
| Average |  |
| a. Religious strength is asked only for those who report some religious |  |
| preference. |  |
|  |  |


| 7.G God |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| \% Knows |  |
| God Exists |  |$|$| Group | 80.5 |
| :--- | :---: |
| Black | 76.2 |
| Hispanic | 65.9 |
| Asian | 64.8 |
| German | 64.8 |
| Native American | 63.2 |
| Other White | 63.0 |
| British | 61.2 |
| Scandinavian | 60.4 |
| lrish | 60.0 |
| Italian | 58.4 |
| Eastern European | 58.1 |
| French | 55.2 |
| Polish | 51.7 |
| Other | 27.0 |
| Jewish | 64.7 |
| Average |  |
| 7.H Life after Death | \% Believes in |
| Group | 80.2 |
| Native American | 78.4 |
| German | 77.2 |
| Other | 76.0 |
| French | 76.0 |
| Polish | 75.2 |
| British | 74.9 |
| lrish | 73.5 |
| Asian | 72.6 |
| Other White | 72.4 |
| Scandinavian | 70.1 |
| Black | 70.1 |
| Italian | 68.2 |
| Hispanic | 66.5 |
| Eastern European | 42.8 |
| Jewish | 73.1 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 7.I Bible | \% Exact |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | Word of God |$|$| Black | 63.7 |
| :--- | :---: |
| Native American | 42.6 |
| Hispanic | 38.3 |
| Other White | 33.9 |
| German | 30.7 |
| Asian | 27.7 |
| British | 27.1 |
| Irish | 27.0 |
| Other | 26.1 |
| Scandinavian | 24.4 |
| Eastern European | 23.2 |
| French | 21.5 |
| Polish | 20.7 |
| Italian | 18.5 |
| Jewish | 10.8 |
| Average | 32.4 |


| Table $\mathbf{8}$ <br> Religion by Religious Groups <br>  <br>  <br> 8.A Frequency of Prayers <br> Religion |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | \% Daily+ |
| Other Religions | 69.6 |
| Moderate Protestant | 62.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 58.7 |
| Catholic | 54.1 |
| Jewish | 55.3 |
| None | 25.5 |
|  | 18.8 |
| 8.B Attend Religious Service |  |
| Religion | \% Weekly + |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 36.3 |
| Catholic | 30.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 25.9 |
| Other Religions | 23.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 21.5 |
| Jewish | 7.4 |
| None | 1.5 |
|  |  |
| 8.C Supreme Court Ruling Against School Prayers |  |
| Religion | $\%$ Approve |
| Jewish | Ruling |
| None | 84.2 |
| Other Religions | 64.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 46.9 |
| Catholic | 39.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 39.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 36.9 |
|  | 24.8 |


| 8.D Nature of World | \% Mostly |
| :--- | :---: |
| Good-6\&7 |  |$|$| Religion | 38.3 |
| :--- | :---: |
| Liberal Protestant | 33.8 |
| Other Religions | 33.5 |
| Catholic | 32.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 26.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 24.8 |
| Jewish | 20.6 |
| None |  |
|  |  |
| 8.E Human Nature | Mostly |
|  | Good-1\&2 |
| Religion | 47.0 |
| Jewish | 44.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 4.1 |
| Other Religions | 40.2 |
| Catholic | 37.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 30.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 30.1 |
| None |  |
|  |  |
| 8.F Religious Strength | \% Stronga |
| Religion | 52.0 |
| Other Religions | 49.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 37.6 |
| Jewish | 37.2 |
| Catholic | 34.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 42.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | $---a$ |
| None |  |
| a. People with no religion were not asked about the strength of their |  |
| religion. |  |
|  |  |


| 8.G God | \% Knows |
| :--- | :---: |
| Gel Exists |  |$|$| Religion | 82.4 |
| :--- | :---: |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 67.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 65.4 |
| Catholic | 58.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 56.2 |
| Other Religions | 27.0 |
| Jewish | 22.0 |
| None |  |
|  |  |
| 8.H Life after Death | 79.9 |
| Religion | 78.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant in | 75.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 75.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 74.2 |
| Other Religions | 49.3 |
| Catholic | 42.8 |
| None |  |
| Jewish | \% Exact |
|  | Word of God |
| 8.I Bible | 56.5 |
| Religion | 33.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 32.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 22.3 |
| Other Religions | 20.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | $\mathbf{1 0 . 8}$ |
| Catholic | 9.6 |
| Jewish |  |

Table 9
Religion, 1972-2002
9.A Frequency of Prayers (\% Daily+)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | --- | ---- |
| $1981-90$ | 25.9 | 55.1 |
| $1991-2002$ | 25.5 | 55.9 |

9.B Attend Religious Services (\% Weekly +)

| $1972-80$ | 7.0 | 30.7 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1981-90 | 12.0 | 30.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 7.4 | 26.8 |
|  |  |  |
| 9.C Supreme Court Ruling Against School Prayers |  |  |
| (\% Approve Ruling) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 66.9 | 32.9 |
| $1981-90$ | 76.5 | 39.0 |
| $1991-2002$ | 84.2 | 38.1 |

9.D Nature of World (\% Mostly Good—6\&7)

| $1972-80$ | --- | ---- |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| $1981-90$ | 27.3 | 29.4 |
| $1991-2002$ | 24.8 | 30.3 |

9.E Human Nature (\% Mostly Good-1\&2)

| $1972-80$ | ---- | ---- |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| $1981-90$ | 53.8 | 42.6 |
| $1991-2002$ | 47.0 | 36.4 |

9.F Religious Strength (\% Strong) ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| $1972-80$ |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 41.5 | 38.2 |
| $1991-2002$ | 37.6 | 39.9 |

a. Includes people with no religion in base. Because all Jews by definition have a religion, all are asked this item. But some non-Jews have no religion and thus cannot be a "strong" member of their religion.

| 9.G God (\% Knows God Exists) <br> Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | --- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 26.3 | 64.1 |
| 1991-2002 | 27.0 | 65.4 |
|  |  |  |
| 9.H Life after Death (\% Believes In) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 17.5 | 71.4 |
| 1981-90 | 31.3 | 73.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 42.8 | 73.7 |
| 9.1 Bible (\% Exact Word of God) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | ---- |  |
| 1981-90 | 4.5 | 35.8 |
| 1991-2002 | 10.8 | 32.9 |

Table 10
Abortion Attitudes by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 10.A Abortion if Strong Chance of Serious Birth Defects <br> \% Allow |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group |  |
| Jewish | 94.6 |
| Scandinavian | 86.4 |
| Eastern European | 81.7 |
| British | 81.5 |
| Italian | 80.8 |
| Polish | 77.8 |
| Other White | 77.2 |
| lrish | 75.6 |
| German | 75.0 |
| Asian | 74.9 |
| Native American | 74.1 |
| Hispanic | 73.7 |
| Other | 73.4 |
| French | 71.7 |
| Black | 70.9 |
| Average | 76.8 |

10.B Abortion if Woman Not Married

| Group | \% Allow |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 83.2 |
| Scandinavian | 50.3 |
| Italian | 49.1 |
| Other | 48.2 |
| Eastern European | 48.1 |
| British | 46.8 |
| Polish | 4.6 |
| Asian | 42.1 |
| Other White | 40.2 |
| Irish | 41.1 |
| German | 39.7 |
| French | 39.1 |
| Hispanic | 34.7 |
| Black | 33.1 |
| Native American | 29.6 |
| Average | 41.4 |


| 10.C Abortion if Raped |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Allow |
| Jewish | 96.2 |
| British | 83.2 |
| Scandinavian | 83.0 |
| Italian | 82.7 |
| Eastern European | 80.8 |
| Polish | 80.6 |
| Other White | 78.9 |
| Irish | 78.8 |
| French | 78.3 |
| German | 78.2 |
| Native American | 75.7 |
| Black | 74.7 |
| Other | 74.1 |
| Hispanic | 71.5 |
| Asian | 66.8 |
| Average | 78.6 |
|  |  |
| 10.D Abortion if Woman Wants No More Children |  |
| Group | \% Allow |
| Jewish | 82.2 |
| Asian | 51.3 |
| Eastern European | 49.8 |
| Italian | 48.4 |
| Scandinavian | 47.4 |
| British | 46.4 |
| Other | 43.4 |
| Irish | 41.7 |
| Other White | 40.4 |
| Polish | 39.9 |
| Black | 38.7 |
| German | 38.3 |
| French | 37.9 |
| Hispanic | 36.7 |
| Native American | 34.9 |
| Average | 42.2 |
|  |  |


| 10.E Abortion if Woman's Health Seriously Endangered <br> Group Allow |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 96.0 |
| Scandinavian | 93.2 |
| Italian | 90.0 |
| British | 89.4 |
| Eastern European | 88.0 |
| Asian | 87.3 |
| Irish | 86.8 |
| Other White | 86.4 |
| German | 85.8 |
| Black | 85.0 |
| Native American | 84.4 |
| Other | 84.3 |
| Polish | 84.1 |
| French | 82.0 |
| Hispanic | 82.0 |
| Average | 86.7 |
|  |  |
| 10.F Abortion if Can't Afford More Children |  |
| Group | \% Allow |
| Jewish | 81.1 |
| Eastern European | 50.8 |
| Scandinavian | 49.5 |
| Other | 48.3 |
| Italian | 47.5 |
| British | 46.5 |
| Asian | 44.9 |
| Polish | 44.9 |
| lrish | 43.8 |
| Other White | 42.6 |
| Black | 41.2 |
| French | 40.9 |
| German | 40.0 |
| Hispanic | 38.1 |
| Native American | 34.7 |
| Average | 43.6 |
|  |  |


| 10.G Abortion for Any Reason |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Allow |
| Jewish | 77.3 |
| Eastern European | 50.2 |
| Scandinavian | 46.8 |
| Italian | 45.8 |
| Other | 45.5 |
| British | 43.8 |
| Irish | 41.6 |
| Polish | 39.9 |
| Asian | 39.8 |
| Other White | 39.7 |
| German | 37.7 |
| Black | 37.4 |
| French | 37.0 |
| Hispanic | 35.4 |
| Native American | 30.0 |
| Average | 40.7 |

Table 11
Abortion Attitudes by Religious Groups

| 11.A Abortion if Strong Chance of Serious Birth Defects <br> \% Allow |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion |  |
| Jewish | 94.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 88.3 |
| None | 88.2 |
| Other Religions | 79.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 79.5 |
| Catholic | 73.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 67.5 |

11.B Abortion if Woman Not Married

| Religion | \% Allow |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 83.2 |
| None | 60.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 53.0 |
| Other Religions | 52.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 43.0 |
| Catholic | 37.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 27.5 |
|  |  |
| 11.C Abortion if Raped | \% Allow |
| Religion |  |
|  | 96.2 |
| Jewish | 89.8 |
| None | 88.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 83.6 |
| Other Religions | 81.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 75.7 |
| Catholic | 69.5 |


| 11.D Abortion if Woman Wants <br> Religion | More Children <br> \% Allow |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 82.2 |
| None | 63.0 |
| Other Religions | 53.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 51.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 43.7 |
| Catholic | 37.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 28.9 |
| 11.E Abortion if Woman's Health Seriously Endangered |  |
| Religion | \% Allow |
|  |  |
| Jewish | 96.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 94.0 |
| None | 92.6 |
| Other Religions | 89.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 88.1 |
| Catholic | 84.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 81.9 |
|  |  |
| 11.F Abortion if Can't Afford More Children |  |
| Religion | \% Allow |
| Jewish | 81.1 |
| None | 63.4 |
| Other Religions | 53.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 53.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 44.6 |
| Catholic |  |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 39.6 |
|  | 30.8 |
| 11.G Abortion for Any Reason |  |
| Religion | \% Allow |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{7 7 . 3}$ |
| None | 60.0 |
| Other Religions | 52.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 48.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 43.1 |
| Catholic |  |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 37.2 |
|  | 27.9 |

Table 12
Abortion, 1972-2002

## 12.A Abortion if Strong Chance of Serious Birth Defects <br> (\% Allow)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 96.0 | 80.0 |
| $1981-90$ | 94.0 | 77.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 94.6 | 76.5 |

12.B Abortion if Woman Not Married (\% Allow)

| $1972-80$ | 85.0 | 44.1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1981-90 | 85.3 | 40.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 83.2 | 40.6 |
|  |  |  |
| 12.C Abortion if Raped (\% Allow) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 97.3 | 79.6 |
| 1981-90 $1991-2002$ | 95.0 | 78.8 |
|  | 96.2 | 78.3 |

12.D Abortion if Woman Wants No More Children (\% Allow)

| $1972-80$ | 82.3 | 42.1 |
| :--- | ---: | :---: |
| 1981-90 | 82.2 | 40.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 82.2 | 41.4 |
|  |  |  |
| 12.E Abortion if Woman's Health Seriously Endangered (\% Allow) |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 97.0 | 88.2 |
| $1981-90$ | 97.4 | 87.6 |
| $1991-2002$ | 96.0 | 86.5 |


| 12.F Abortion if Can't Afford More Children (\% Allow) <br> Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 84.8 | 48.7 |
| $1981-90$ | 84.5 | 42.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 81.1 | 42.8 |
|  |  |  |
| 12.G Abortion for Any Reason (\% Allow) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 71.9 | 34.8 |
| $1981-90$ | 76.5 | 35.8 |
| $1991-2002$ | 77.3 | 40.0 |

Table 13
Suicide and Euthanasia by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 13.A Suicide if Person Has Incurable Disease <br> \% Person <br> Has Right to |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | 84.1 |
| Jewish | 68.3 |
| Eastern European | 66.3 |
| Polish | 66.3 |
| Scandinavian | 63.9 |
| Italian | 63.2 |
| British | 61.7 |
| German | 61.4 |
| French | 61.0 |
| Irish | 59.7 |
| Other White | 55.0 |
| Other | 53.6 |
| Native American | 51.3 |
| Hispanic | 49.9 |
| Asian | 41.1 |
| Black | 58.5 |
| Average |  |

13.B Suicide if Person Is Bankrupt

| Group | \% Person <br> Has Right to |
| :--- | :--- |


| Jewish | $\mathbf{2 2 . 3}$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Eastern European | 12.3 |
| Other | 11.7 |
| British | 10.6 |
| Irish | 10.2 |
| Scandinavian | 10.1 |
| Italian | 8.8 |
| Other White | 8.5 |
| German | 7.9 |
| Polish | 6.9 |
| Native American | 6.8 |
| Asian | 6.3 |
| Hispanic | 6.3 |
| Black | 5.4 |
| French | 5.4 |
| Average | 8.5 |


| 13.C Suicide if Person Dishonors Family |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | \% Person |
| Group | Has Right to |
| Jewish | 22.7 |
| Other | 11.1 |
| Eastern European | 10.8 |
| British | 10.6 |
| Scandinavian | 9.5 |
| lrish | 9.4 |
| Italian | 9.4 |
| Native American | 9.3 |
| Other White | 8.8 |
| Asian | 8.3 |
| German | 7.5 |
| Polish | 6.6 |
| Black | 5.3 |
| Hispanic | 5.2 |
| French | 4.8 |
| Average | 8.4 |
| 13.D Suicide if Person Is Tired of Living |  |
|  | \% Person |
| Group | Has Right to |
| Jewish | 33.4 |
| Eastern European | 19.3 |
| British | 18.1 |
| Scandinavian | 18.1 |
| lrish | 17.9 |
| Other | 16.6 |
| Other White | 15.8 |
| German | 15.6 |
| Italian | 14.9 |
| Native American | 13.1 |
| Asian | 12.8 |
| Hispanic | 12.7 |
| Polish | 12.1 |
| Black | 11.6 |
| French | 9.6 |
| Average | 15.6 |


| 13.E Euthanasia for Incurable Patients <br> \%roup | For Allowing |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 85.7 |
| Eastern European | 76.4 |
| Other | 75.9 |
| Italian | 72.2 |
| Polish | 71.7 |
| British | 71.1 |
| French | 70.9 |
| Scandinavian | 70.9 |
| lrish | 70.4 |
| German | 69.4 |
| Other White | 68.0 |
| Native American | 66.6 |
| Asian | 63.0 |
| Hispanic | 62.6 |
| Black | 48.0 |
| Average | 66.9 |
|  |  |

13.D Suicide if Person Is Tired of Living

Table 14
Suicide and Euthanasia by Religious Groups

\section*{14.A Suicide if Person Has Incurable Disease <br> | Religion | \% Person |
| :--- | :--- |
| Has Right to |  |}


| Jewish | $\mathbf{8 4 . 1}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| None | 80.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 67.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 59.1 |
| Catholic | 58.4 |
| Other Religions | 57.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 44.1 |

Fundamentalist Protestant 44.1
14.B Suicide if Person Is Bankrupt

| Religion | \% Person <br> Has Right to |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 22.3 |
| None | 20.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 10.1 |
| Other Religions | 9.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 7.3 |
| Catholic | 6.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 4.7 |

14.C Suicide if Person Dishonors Family

| Religion | \% Person <br> Has Right to |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 22.7 |
| None | 19.9 |
| Other Religions | 12.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 9.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 6.7 |
| Catholic | 5.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 4.9 |

14.D Suicide if Person Is Tired of Living

| Religion | Has Right to |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 33.4 |
| None | 32.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | 18.8 |
| Other Religions | 18.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 13.2 |
| Catholic | 12.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 9.4 |

14.E Euthanasia for Incurable Patients Religion \% For Allowing

| Jewish | $\mathbf{8 5 . 7}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| None | 84.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 76.2 |
| Catholic | 67.6 |
| Other Religions | 66.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 66.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 54.2 |

Table 15
Suicide and Euthanasia, 1972-2002
15.A Suicide if Person Has Incurable Disease (\% Person Has Right to)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 73.4 | 37.1 |
| $1981-90$ | 78.0 | 47.7 |
| $1991-2002$ | 84.1 | 58.0 |

15.B Suicide if Person Is Bankrupt (\% Person Has Right to)

| $1972-80$ | 20.8 | 5.1 |
| :--- | :---: | ---: |
| 1981-90 | 19.4 | 6.4 |
| 1991-2002 | 22.3 | 8.2 |
|  |  |  |
| 15.C Suicide if Person Dishonors Family (\% Person Has Right to) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 20.8 | 5.9 |
|  | 19.4 | 6.6 |
| $1991-2002$ | 22.7 | 8.1 |

15.D Suicide if Person Is Tired of Living (\% Person Has Right to)

| $1972-80$ | 30.8 | 11.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 26.5 | 12.8 |
| $1991-2002$ | 33.4 | 15.2 |

15.E Euthanasia for Incurable Patients (\% For Allowing)

| $1972-80$ | 73.3 | 57.8 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 79.1 | 64.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 85.7 | 66.5 |

Table 16
Sexual Morality by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 16.A Premarital Sex |  |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | \% Always |
| Group | Wrong |
| Jewish | 4.0 |
| Italian | 12.0 |
| Eastern European | 18.5 |
| French | 20.4 |
| Polish | 20.7 |
| Hispanic | 21.1 |
| Irish | 25.0 |
| Scandinavian | 25.1 |
| Other White | 25.7 |
| British | 27.0 |
| German | 27.9 |
| Native American | 28.9 |
| Other | 30.3 |
| Asian | 32.8 |
| Black | 33.9 |
| Average | 25.7 |
|  |  |
| 16.B Extramarital Sex | $\%$ Always |
| Group | Wrong |
| Jewish | 51.9 |
| Other | 72.1 |
| Asian | 73.3 |
| Italian | 73.4 |
| Scandinavian | 75.0 |
| Polish | 75.9 |
| Black | 76.4 |
| French | 76.9 |
| Eastern European | 77.2 |
| British | 77.8 |
| Irish | 78.5 |
| Hispanic | 79.4 |
| Other White | 80.6 |
| German | 81.7 |
| Native American | 83.7 |
| Average | 78.2 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  | 123 |
|  |  |


| 16.C Homosexual Sex |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Group | \% Always |
| Wrong |  |
| Jewish | 18.3 |
| Italian | 44.5 |
| Polish | 48.2 |
| Eastern European | 49.8 |
| Scandinavian | 51.4 |
| Hispanic | 55.5 |
| French | 55.6 |
| Irish | 55.9 |
| Other | 56.6 |
| British | 57.3 |
| Asian | 60.1 |
| Other White | 61.3 |
| German | 62.7 |
| Native American | 66.6 |
| Black | 71.1 |
| Average | 59.1 |
| 16.D Teenage Sex |  |
|  | $\%$ Always |
| Group | Wrong |
| Jewish | 52.0 |
| Eastern European | 65.2 |
| Hispanic | 65.5 |
| Italian | 65.7 |
| French | 67.3 |
| lrish | 68.0 |
| Scandinavian | 68.1 |
| Asian | 69.4 |
| Other White | 70.4 |
| Other | 70.5 |
| German | 70.8 |
| Native American | 71.6 |
| Black | 72.6 |
| British | 72.7 |
| Polish | 73.3 |
| Average | 69.7 |
|  |  |


| 16.E Birth Control for Teenagers |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group |  |
| \% Agree |  |
| Jewish | 76.0 |
| Native American | 62.8 |
| Hispanic | 62.3 |
| Italian | 62.0 |
| Irish | 59.0 |
| French | 58.6 |
| Black | 58.1 |
| Eastern European | 57.1 |
| Other White | 56.0 |
| Polish | 55.8 |
| Scandinavian | 54.9 |
| Asian | 54.7 |
| German | 54.6 |
| Other | 54.5 |
| British | 53.0 |
| Average | 57.0 |
|  |  |
| 16.F Pornography |  |
|  | $\%$ Illegal |
| Group | for All |
|  |  |
| Jewish | 16.5 |
| Italian | 28.4 |
| Black | 30.8 |
| Asian | 31.3 |
| Eastern European | 32.9 |
| Other | 35.5 |
| Hispanic | 35.7 |
| Polish | 35.8 |
| lrish | 37.3 |
| Scandinavian | 38.9 |
| Other White | 39.2 |
| Native American | 39.3 |
| French | 40.3 |
| German | 40.7 |
| British | 43.4 |
| Average | 37.2 |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 16.G X-Rated Movie | \% Saw in <br> Last Year |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | 41.7 |
| Other | 33.9 |
| Asian | 30.9 |
| Hispanic | 29.9 |
| French | 29.6 |
| Black | 26.2 |
| Italian | 25.3 |
| Native American | 24.0 |
| Other White | 23.7 |
| German | 23.1 |
| Eastern European | 22.1 |
| Jewish | 20.9 |
| Scandinavian | 20.1 |
| Irish | 19.0 |
| Polish | 18.3 |
| British | 24.3 |
| Average |  |

Table 17
Sexual Morality by Religious Groups

| 17.A Premarital Sex |  |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | \% Always |
| Group | Wrong |
|  |  |
| Jewish | 4.0 |
| None | 6.9 |
| Catholic | 16.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 20.4 |
| Other Religions | 25.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 27.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 43.7 |
|  |  |
| 17.B Extramarital Sex | \% Always |
| Group | Wrong |
| Jewish | 51.9 |
| None | 59.4 |
| Other Religions | 74.0 |
| Catholic | 78.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | 79.6 |
| Moderate Protestant | 80.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 85.6 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| 17.C Homosexual Sex | \% Always |
|  | Wrong |
| Group | 18.3 |
| Jewish | 31.6 |
| None | 50.6 |
| Other Religions | 52.1 |
| Catholic | 56.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 63.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 78.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |


| 17.D Teenage Sex |  |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | \% Always |
| Group | Wrong |
|  | 43.3 |
| None | 52.0 |
| Jewish | 66.6 |
| Other Religions | 67.4 |
| Catholic | 70.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 74.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 81.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |
|  |  |
| 17.E Birth Control for Teenagers Agree |  |
| Group | 76.0 |
| Jewish | 74.8 |
| None | 59.3 |
| Other Religions | 58.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 58.4 |
| Catholic | 54.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 48.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |
|  |  |
| 17.F Pornography | \% Ilegal |
|  | for All |
| Group | 17.6 |
| None | $\mathbf{1 6 . 5}$ |
| Jewish | 32.2 |
| Catholic | 32.5 |
| Other Religions | 39.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 40.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 47.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |


| 16.G X-Rated Movie | \% Saw in <br> Last Year |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | 36.5 |
| None | 30.8 |
| Other Religions | 26.1 |
| Catholic | 22.1 |
| Jewish | 21.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 20.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 19.5 |

Table 18
Sexual Morality, 1972-2002
18.A Premarital Sex (\% Always Wrong)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | ---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 13.3 | 31.4 |
| $1981-90$ | 11.5 | 27.1 |
| 1991-2002 | 4.0 | 26.2 |
|  |  |  |
| 18.B Extramarital Sex (\% Always Wrong) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 48.2 | 71.1 |
| $1981-90$ | 50.4 | 75.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 51.9 | 78.7 |

18.C Homosexual Sex (\% Always Wrong)

| 1972-80 | 32.2 | 69.8 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1981-90 | 32.8 | 73.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 18.3 | 59.9 |
| 18.D Teenage Sex (\% Always Wrong) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | ---- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 57.2 | 67.7 |
| 1991-2002 | 52.0 | 70.2 |
| 18.E Birth Control for Teenagers (\% Agree) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | ---- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 73.4 | 56.1 |
| 1991-2002 | 76.0 | 56.6 |
| 18.F Pornography (\% Illegal for All) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 24.4 | 41.0 |
| 1981-90 | 18.5 | 41.4 |
| 1991-2002 | 16.5 | 37.7 |
| 18.G X-Rated Movie (\% Saw in Last Year) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 33.7 | 18.8 |
| 1981-90 | 35.6 | 24.2 |
| 1991-2002 | 22.1 | 24.4 |
|  |  |  |

Table 19
Gender Roles and Gender Equality by Ethnic/Racial Groups
19.A Vote for a Woman President

| Group | \% Would <br> Vote For |
| :--- | :---: |
| French | 94.7 |
| Jewish | 93.5 |
| Black | 91.1 |
| Italian | 91.1 |
| British | 90.4 |
| Eastern European | 90.4 |
| Irish | 90.1 |
| Scandinavian | 89.8 |
| German | 89.4 |
| Hispanic | 89.1 |
| Other White | 88.5 |
| Asian | 88.2 |
| Polish | 87.9 |
| Native American | 86.3 |
| Other | 78.4 |
| Average | 89.7 |

19.B Women Not Emotionally as Suited for Politics
Group $\%$ Disagree

| Jewish | 83.2 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Italian | 77.4 |
| French | 75.6 |
| Irish | 75.0 |
| German | 74.6 |
| Polish | 74.6 |
| Scandinavian | 73.2 |
| Black | 73.1 |
| Other White | 72.8 |
| Eastern European | 72.6 |
| British | 72.1 |
| Hispanic | 71.3 |
| Native American | 70.3 |
| Other | 67.2 |
| Asian | 49.0 |
| Average | 73.0 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 19.C Wife Working if Husband Can Support Them <br> \% Approve |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 90.2 |
| Irish | 86.4 |
| Scandinavian | 85.9 |
| Asian | 85.3 |
| British | 83.2 |
| Italian | 82.7 |
| Polish | 81.9 |
| French | 81.6 |
| German | 81.1 |
| Eastern European | 80.7 |
| Other White | 79.4 |
| Native American | 77.6 |
| Hispanic | 75.4 |
| Black | 73.9 |
| Other | 65.8 |
| Average | 80.6 |
|  |  |
| 19.D Women Should Take Care of Home, Not Run Country |  |
| Group | \% Disagree |
| Jewish | 92.1 |
| lrish | 87.0 |
| Italian | 86.7 |
| Eastern European | 85.2 |
| Scandinavian | 84.8 |
| Polish | 84.7 |
| British | 83.8 |
| German | 83.5 |
| French | 83.0 |
| Other White | 79.7 |
| Hispanic | 79.2 |
| Native American | 79.1 |
| Black | 77.5 |
| Asian | 73.3 |
| Other | 68.5 |
| Average | 82.1 |
|  |  |

## 19.E Preschool Children Suffer if Mother Works

| Group | \% Disagree |
| :--- | :---: |
| Black |  |
| Jewish | 63.3 |
| Polish | 61.3 |
| Native American | 59.5 |
| Other | 57.4 |
| Irish | 56.7 |
| Italian | 56.3 |
| Eastern European | 55.5 |
| German | 55.0 |
| Hispanic | 53.0 |
| Other White | 52.6 |
| French | 52.5 |
| Scandinavian | 50.8 |
| British | 50.7 |
| Asian | 48.1 |
| Average | 37.3 |
|  | 54.0 |
| 19.F Wife Should First Help Husband's Career |  |
| Group | \% Disagree |
| Jewish | 88.1 |
| Native American | 80.9 |
| Irish | 80.6 |
| French | 80.5 |
| Italian | 80.4 |
| German | 77.7 |
| Other White | 76.4 |
| Scandinavian | 76.1 |
| Black | 74.7 |
| Eastern European | 74.5 |
| British | 73.8 |
| Polish | 72.8 |
| Hispanic | 70.9 |
| Other | 63.8 |
| Asian | 57.3 |
| Average | 76.2 |
|  |  |

19.G Family Better if Man Works, Woman Tends Home

Group \% Disagree

| French | 80.5 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Jewish | 73.5 |
| Irish | 66.0 |
| Italian | 65.6 |
| French | 65.5 |
| Native American | 63.9 |
| Polish | 63.0 |
| Black | 62.9 |
| German | 62.5 |
| Scandinavian | 62.3 |
| Other White | 60.3 |
| Eastern European | 59.7 |
| Hispanic | 56.8 |
| British | 56.6 |
| Other | 55.5 |
| Asian | 53.7 |
| Average | 61.5 |

19.H Mother Working Does Not Hurt Children

| Group | \% Agree |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 77.9 |
| Black | 71.4 |
| lrish | 69.1 |
| Polish | 68.7 |
| Scandinavian | 67.4 |
| Italian | 65.3 |
| German | 65.0 |
| Other White | 63.8 |
| Native American | 63.7 |
| Hispanic | 63.5 |
| French | 63.0 |
| Asian | 62.5 |
| Eastern European | 61.8 |
| British | 61.7 |
| Other | 59.3 |
| Average | 65.6 |

Table 20
Gender Roles and Gender Equality by Religious Groups
20.A Vote for a Woman President

| Religion | \% Would <br> Vote For |
| :--- | :---: |
| None | 94.1 |
| Jewish | 93.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 92.1 |
| Catholic | 91.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 90.4 |
| Other Religions | 89.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 85.4 |
|  |  |
| 20.B Women Not Emotionally as Suited for Politics |  |
| Religion | \% Disagree |
| Jewish | 83.2 |
| None | 78.7 |
| Catholic | 75.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 75.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 75.0 |
| Other Religions | 69.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 67.0 |
| 20.C Wife Working if Husband Can Support Them |  |
| Religion | \% Approve |
| Jewish |  |
| None | 90.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 85.9 |
| Other Religions | 82.6 |
| Catholic | 82.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 80.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 80.7 |
|  | 77.2 |

20.D Women Should Take Care of Home, Not Run Country

| Religion | \% Disagree |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 92.1 |
| None | 88.9 |
| Catholic | 85.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 84.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 81.9 |
| Other Religions | 78.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 76.0 |
|  |  |
| 20.E Preschool Children Suffer if Mother Works |  |
| Religion | \% Disagree |
|  |  |
| None | 61.8 |
| Jewish | 61.3 |
| Catholic | 55.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 53.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 53.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 50.7 |
| Other Religions | 49.0 |
|  |  |
| 20.F Wife Should First Help Husband's Caree |  |
| Religion | \% Disagree |
| Jewish | 88.1 |
| None | 87.0 |
| Catholic | 78.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 76.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 74.9 |
| Other Religions | 73.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 70.5 |


| Religion | \% Disagree |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 92.1 |
| None | 88.9 |
| Catholic | 85.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 84.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 81.9 |
| Other Religions | 78.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 76.0 |

20.E Preschool Children Suffer if Mother Works
20.F Wife Should First Help Husband's Career

| 20.G Family Better if Man Works, Woman Tends Home <br> Religion |
| :--- | :---: |
| None Disagree |


| 20.H Mother Working Does Not Hurt Children <br> Religion Agree |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 77.9 |
| None | 72.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 67.8 |
| Catholic | 67.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 63.6 |
| Other Religions | 64.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 60.7 |

Table 21

| Gender Roles and Gender Equality, 1972-2002 <br>  <br> 21.A Vote for a Woman President (\% Would Vote For) <br> Years |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | Jews | Non-Jews |
| $1981-90$ | 92.4 | 76.5 |
| $1991-2002$ | 89.6 | 83.7 |

21.B Women Not Emotionally as Suited for Politics (\% Disagree)

| $1972-80$ | 69.1 | 49.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 81.7 | 61.7 |
| $1991-2002$ | 83.2 | 72.8 |

21.C Wife Working if Husband Can Support Them (\% Approve)

| $1972-80$ | 79.7 | 68.4 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 90.6 | 78.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 90.2 | 80.4 |

21.D Women Should Take Care of Home, Not Run Country
(\% Disagree)

| $1972-80$ | 88.4 | 62.4 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 87.2 | 74.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 92.1 | 81.8 |

21.E Preschool Children Suffer if Mother Works (\% Disagree)

| $1972-80$ | 53.9 | 30.8 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 58.4 | 48.2 |
| $1991-2002$ | 61.3 | 53.8 |

21.F Wife Should First Help Husband's Career (\% Disagree)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 61.6 | 41.1 |
| $1981-90$ | 69.6 | 65.1 |
| $1991-2002$ | 88.1 | 76.0 |

21.G Family Better if Man Works, Woman Tends Home (\% Disagree)

| 1972-80 | 60.0 | 33.1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1981-90 | 67.1 | 54.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 73.5 | 61.3 |
| 21.H Mother Working Does Not Hurt Children (\% Agree) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 69.2 | 47.8 |
| 1981-90 | 65.5 | 62.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 77.9 | 65.3 |

Table 22
Child Values by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 22.A Obedience |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% First Choice |
| Black | 29.0 |
| Other White | 20.1 |
| Other | 18.7 |
| Hispanic | 18.0 |
| Asian | 17.6 |
| French | 17.3 |
| German | 17.3 |
| British | 17.0 |
| Scandinavian | 15.8 |
| Native American | 15.6 |
| lrish | 15.4 |
| Eastern European | 15.1 |
| Italian | 14.4 |
| Polish | 12.8 |
| Jewish | 5.8 |
| Average | 18.6 |

22.B Being Well-liked/Popular

|  | \% First- <br> Group |
| :--- | :--- |


| Jewish | 42.6 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Asian | 41.6 |
| Other | 40.0 |
| Eastern European | 28.0 |
| Hispanic | 27.0 |
| Polish | 26.7 |
| Other White | 25.2 |
| Italian | 24.4 |
| British | 23.6 |
| German | 21.9 |
| Irish | 21.9 |
| Black | 20.9 |
| Scandinavian | 20.3 |
| Native American | 19.6 |
| French | 18.5 |
| Average | 24.0 |


| 22.C Think for Oneself |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% First Choice |
| Jewish | 70.9 |
| Scandinavian | 60.7 |
| Polish | 56.6 |
| Irish | 56.4 |
| Eastern European | 55.4 |
| British | 54.9 |
| Italian | 53.7 |
| German | 53.0 |
| French | 50.0 |
| Other White | 49.7 |
| Native American | 47.2 |
| Black | 40.6 |
| Other | 38.6 |
| Hispanic | 37.4 |
| Asian | 24.3 |
| Average | 50.3 |
|  |  |
| 22.D Work Hard | \% First Choice |
| Group | 37.4 |
| Asian | 26.9 |
| Other | 25.0 |
| Hispanic | 20.7 |
| Italian | 18.7 |
| Black | 17.8 |
| Native American | 17.3 |
| French | 16.8 |
| Other White | 16.6 |
| German | 14.6 |
| British | 13.8 |
| Irish | 13.8 |
| Polish | 13.5 |
| Eastern European | 13.0 |
| Jewish | 9.2 |
| Scandinavian | 17.2 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 22.E Help Others |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% First Choice |
| Asian | 18.8 |
| Hispanic | 18.3 |
| Native American | 18.0 |
| Polish | 16.3 |
| Other | 15.9 |
| French | 15.3 |
| Eastern European | 14.4 |
| lrish | 14.1 |
| Scandinavian | 14.3 |
| British | 13.1 |
| Other White | 12.7 |
| German | 12.6 |
| Black | 11.0 |
| Italian | 10.1 |
| Jewish | 9.0 |
| Average | 13.4 |

Table 23
Child Values by Religious Groups

| 23.A Obedience |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | \% First Choice |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 28.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 17.8 |
| Catholic | 14.9 |
| Other Religions | 14.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 13.3 |
| None | 9.4 |
| Jewish | 5.8 |
|  |  |
| 23.B Being Well-liked/Popular | \% First- |
| Religion | Fourth Choice |
|  |  |
| Jewish | 42.6 |
| Other Religions | 36.1 |
| None | 34.3 |
| Catholic | 23.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 23.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 22.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 18.5 |
|  |  |
| 23.C Think for Oneself | \% First Choice |
| Religion | 70.9 |
| Jewish | 60.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | 60.3 |
| None | 53.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 49.5 |
| Catholic | 49.0 |
| Other Religions | 40.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |


| 23.D Work Hard |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | \% First Choice |
| Catholic | 20.7 |
| Other Religions | 20.1 |
| None | 16.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 15.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 15.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 14.4 |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{1 3 . 0}$ |
|  |  |
| 23.E Help Others |  |
| Religion |  |
| Other Religions Choice |  |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 15.3 |
| Catholic | 14.4 |
| None | 14.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 13.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 12.6 |
| Jewish | 10.9 |
|  | 9.0 |

Table 24
Child Values, 1972-2002

| 24.A Obedience (\% First Choice)   <br> Years Jews Non-Jews <br> $1972-80$ --- ---- <br> $1981-90$ 8.1 20.7 <br> 1991-2002 5.8 18.8 <br> 24.B Being Well-liked/Popular (\% First Choice)   $\mathbf{l}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |


| $1972-80$ | --- | ---- |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1981-90$ | 0.0 | 0.8 |
| $1991-2002$ | 1.3 | 0.6 |

24.C Think for Oneself (\% First Choice)

| 1972-80 | --- | ---- |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1981-90 | 76.8 | 51.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 70.9 | 49.8 |
|  |  |  |
| 24.D Work Hard (\% First Choice) |  |  |


| $1972-80$ | --- | ---- |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1981-90 | 7.5 | 13.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 13.0 | 17.3 |
|  |  |  |
| 24.E Help Others (\% First Choice) |  |  |


| $1972-80$ | --- | ---- |
| :--- | :---: | ---: |
| $1981-90$ | 7.6 | 13.1 |
| $1991-2002$ | 9.0 | 13.5 |


| Table 25 |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Misanthropy by Ethnic/Racial Groups |  |
|  |  |
| 25.A Trustworthy |  |
|  | \% Most |
| Group | People Are |
|  |  |
| Scandinavian | 47.4 |
| Jewish | 47.3 |
| British | 46.5 |
| German | 41.6 |
| Irish | 41.6 |
| Eastern European | 40.1 |
| Polish | 38.7 |
| Italian | 37.1 |
| French | 36.8 |
| Other White | 34.1 |
| Asian | 30.8 |
| Native American | 29.8 |
| Other | 23.4 |
| Hispanic | 22.2 |
| Black | 15.5 |
| Average | 35.5 |
|  |  |
| 25.B Helpful | Most |
| Group | People Are |
| Scandinavian | 60.5 |
| British | 56.2 |
| Irish | 52.7 |
| German | 51.3 |
| French | 50.8 |
| Jewish | 50.0 |
| Other White | 46.6 |
| Polish | 46.1 |
| Asian | 45.7 |
| Italian | 45.7 |
| Eastern European | 45.6 |
| Native American | 38.6 |
| Hispanic | 34.2 |
| Black | 33.6 |
| Other | 25.1 |
| Average | 47.0 |
|  |  |

Table 25
25.B Helpful

| 25.C Fair | \% Most <br> People Are |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | 70.0 |
| Scandinavian | 63.3 |
| British | 61.0 |
| Eastern European | 59.6 |
| German | 58.9 |
| Irish | 58.9 |
| Polish | 58.2 |
| Jewish | 52.3 |
| Asian | 52.2 |
| Italian | 51.6 |
| Other White | 51.2 |
| French | 42.6 |
| Native American | 39.9 |
| Hispanic | 36.2 |
| Other | 32.0 |
| Black | 52.7 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |

Table 26
Misanthropy by Religious Groups

| 26.A Trustworthy |  |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | \% Most |
| Reople Are |  |

Table 27
Misanthropy, 1972-2002
27.A Trustworthy (\% Most People Are)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 1972-80 | 47.2 | 43.4 |
| 1981-90 | 50.4 | 41.3 |
| 1991-2002 | 47.3 | 35.3 |
| 27.B Helpful (\% Most People Are) |  |  |


|  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1972-80$ | 45.5 | 50.0 |
| $1981-90$ | 57.3 | 52.5 |

57.3 52.5
27.C Fair (\% Most People Are)

| $1972-80$ | 68.0 | 60.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 64.6 | 60.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 58.2 | 52.7 |


| Table 28 Socializing by Ethnic/Racial Groups |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 28.A Spend an Evening with Relatives |  |
|  | \% Several |
| Group | Times a Week+ |
| Hispanic | 49.9 |
| Native American | 45.2 |
| Black | 43.8 |
| Italian | 38.1 |
| French | 37.9 |
| Other White | 37.5 |
| Asian | 37.2 |
| Other | 36.5 |
| German | 32.1 |
| Polish | 32.0 |
| Irish | 31.1 |
| British | 29.9 |
| Eastern European | 29.4 |
| Scandinavian | 27.1 |
| Jewish | 26.0 |
| Average | 36.0 |
| 28.B Spend an Evening with a Neighbor |  |
|  | \% Several |
| Group | Times a Week+ |
| Scandinavian | 27.7 |
| Other | 26.9 |
| Black | 25.9 |
| French | 24.8 |
| Native American | 22.9 |
| Asian | 21.0 |
| Irish | 21.0 |
| Polish | 20.7 |
| Other White | 20.4 |
| Hispanic | 20.1 |
| Italian | 19.9 |
| Eastern European | 19.7 |
| German | 19.2 |
| British | 18.7 |
| Jewish | 17.1 |
| Average | 21.2 |


| 28.C Spend an Evening with Friends |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | \% Several |
| Group | Times a Week+ |
| Other | 36.5 |
| Hispanic | 27.9 |
| Black | 24.7 |
| French | 24.4 |
| Other White | 24.2 |
| German | 23.7 |
| Jewish | 23.6 |
| Irish | 23.2 |
| Eastern European | 22.9 |
| Asian | 22.7 |
| Italian | 22.7 |
| Polish | 21.4 |
| Native American | 21.1 |
| Scandinavian | 20.3 |
| British | 19.4 |
| Average | 23.4 |
| 28.D Spend an Evening at a Bar |  |
| Group | \% Once a Year+ |
| Scandinavian | 62.5 |
| Italian | 59.2 |
| Polish | 58.3 |
| Irish | 58.1 |
| French | 57.7 |
| Eastern European | 55.5 |
| Jewish | 55.4 |
| German | 55.0 |
| Hispanic | 49.9 |
| British | 49.6 |
| Other White | 48.4 |
| Native American | 44.0 |
| Other | 44.0 |
| Black | 38.9 |
| Asian | 30.8 |
| Average | 50.5 |


| Table 29 <br> Socializing by Religious Groups <br> 29.A Spend an Evening with Relatives <br> \% Several <br>  <br> Religion <br> Times a Week+ |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Other Religions | 40.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 40.1 |
| Catholic | 37.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 33.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 32.5 |
| None | 29.6 |
| Jewish | 26.0 |
|  |  |
| 29.B Spend an Evening with a Neighbor |  |
| \%eligion | Several |
|  | Times a Week+ |
| Other Religions | 24.7 |
| None | 23.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 21.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 21.1 |
| Catholic | 20.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 20.1 |
| Jewish | 17.1 |
|  |  |
| 29.C Spend an Evening with Friends |  |
| Religion | \% Several |
| Other Religions | Times a Week+ |
| None | 28.8 |
| Jewish | 28.4 |
| Catholic | 23.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 23.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 22.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 20.0 |
|  |  |


| 29.D Spend an Evening at a Bar <br> Religion | \% Once a Year+ |
| :--- | :---: |
| None | 65.2 |
| Catholic | 57.6 |
| Jewish | 55.4 |
| Other Religions | 52.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 51.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 51.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 37.3 |
|  |  |

Table 30
Socializing, 1972-2002
30.A Spend an Evening with Relatives (\% Several Times a Week+)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 30.4 | 37.8 |
| $1981-90$ | 28.8 | 35.6 |
| $1991-2002$ | 26.0 | 36.4 |

30.B Spend an Evening with a Neighbor
(\% Several Times a Week+)

| $1972-80$ | 34.7 | 27.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 22.3 | 24.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 17.1 | 21.3 |

30.C Spend an Evening with Friends (\% Several Times a Week+)

| $1972-80$ | 30.9 | 21.2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 19.3 | 21.4 |
| $1991-2002$ | 23.6 | 23.4 |

30.D Spend an Evening at a Bar (\% Once a Year+)

| $1972-80$ | 40.9 | 47.6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 36.4 | 48.7 |
| $1991-2002$ | 55.4 | 50.4 |

Table 31
Politics and Voting by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 31.A1 1992 Presidential Election |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Reported Voting |
| Jewish | 84.7 |
| Scandinavian | 80.0 |
| British | 76.5 |
| Polish | 75.3 |
| Irish | 73.0 |
| Eastern European | 69.3 |
| German | 68.9 |
| French | 67.1 |
| Italian | 64.9 |
| Black | 63.1 |
| Other White | 62.2 |
| Native American | 56.5 |
| Hispanic | 42.1 |
| Asian | 36.3 |
| Other | 33.1 |
| Average | 65.9 |


| 31.A2 1996 Presidential Election <br> Group |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| \% Reported Voting |  |
| Scandinavian | 76.5 |
| British | 73.9 |
| Jewish | 73.5 |
| Eastern European | 69.6 |
| Irish | 67.5 |
| German | 67.3 |
| Italian | 65.6 |
| French | 64.6 |
| Polish | 64.5 |
| Black | 59.6 |
| Other White | 58.5 |
| Native American | 54.6 |
| Hispanic | 36.5 |
| Other | 32.7 |
| Asian | 32.0 |
| Average | 61.9 |


| 31.A3 2000 Presidential Election |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group |  |
| Reported Voting |  |
| Jewish | 79.5 |
| Scandinavian | 78.1 |
| British | 74.4 |
| Eastern European | 73.5 |
| Irish | 71.2 |
| German | 69.1 |
| Polish | 67.2 |
| Italian | 62.7 |
| Other White | 62.4 |
| French | 60.5 |
| Black | 57.9 |
| Native American | 48.0 |
| Asian | 45.2 |
| Other | 44.1 |
| Hispanic | 44.0 |
| Average | 63.7 |
|  |  |
| 31.B1 Presidential Vote, 1992 |  |
| Group | Democratic |
| Black |  |
| Jewish | 90.8 |
| Other | 76.6 |
| Hispanic | 69.4 |
| Asian | 61.9 |
| Eastern European | 47.0 |
| Scandinavian | 46.9 |
| Native American | 42.6 |
| lrish | 41.8 |
| Polish | 41.4 |
| Italian | 40.7 |
| French | 40.2 |
| Other White | 38.2 |
| British | 37.2 |
| German | 34.6 |
| Average | 34.6 |
|  | 46.0 |


| 31. B2 Presidential Vote, 1996 <br> Group |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| \% Democratic |  |
| Black | 93.2 |
| Asian | 77.5 |
| Hispanic | 72.0 |
| Jewish | 71.0 |
| Other | 70.3 |
| Eastern European | 54.1 |
| Italian | 54.1 |
| Polish | 52.1 |
| French | 49.1 |
| Irish | 47.9 |
| Scandinavian | 47.5 |
| Other White | 47.0 |
| Native American | 45.5 |
| British | 44.8 |
| German | 41.2 |
| Average | 54.4 |
|  |  |
| 31.C Party Identification | \% Democratic |
| Group |  |
| Black | 64.5 |
| Jewish | 51.7 |
| Hispanic | 43.4 |
| Polish | 38.3 |
| Other | 36.4 |
| Eastern European | 33.4 |
| Italian | 32.0 |
| Irish | 31.7 |
| French | 30.3 |
| Asian | 28.3 |
| Native American | 28.1 |
| British | 26.2 |
| Other White | 26.1 |
| Scandinavian | 25.8 |
| German | 22.8 |
| Average | 33.3 |
|  |  |


| 31.D Political Ideology |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | Liberal |
| Jewish | 47.8 |
| Black | 32.6 |
| Asian | 31.7 |
| Hispanic | 30.2 |
| Other | 29.4 |
| Polish | 28.7 |
| Irish | 28.6 |
| Scandinavian | 27.8 |
| French | 25.1 |
| Eastern European | 24.7 |
| British | 24.2 |
| Italian | 24.0 |
| Native American | 23.6 |
| Other White | 23.0 |
| German | 22.1 |
| Average | 26.5 |

Table 32
Politics and Voting by Religious Groups
32.A1 1992 Presidential Election

| Religion | \% Reported Voting |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 84.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | 78.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 71.6 |
| Catholic | 65.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 63.9 |
| None | 54.0 |
| Other Religions | 49.7 |
| 32.A2 1996 Presidential Election |  |
| Religion |  |
| \%eported Voting |  |
| Liberal Protestant |  |
| Jewish | 77.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 73.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 69.4 |
| Catholic | 61.2 |
| Other Religions | 59.5 |
| None | 51.8 |

## 32.A3 2000 Presidential Election

Religion \% Reported Voting

## Jewish

Liberal Protestant 79.5

Catholic 64
Fundamentalist Protestant $\quad 62.1$
None 52.7
Other Religions 51.8

| 32.B1 Presidential Vote, 1992 |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | \% Democratic |
| Jewish | 76.6 |
| Other Religions | 55.1 |
| None | 54.3 |
| Catholic | 45.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 45.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 43.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 40.6 |
| 32B2. Presidential Vote, 1996 |  |
| Religion | \% Democratic |
| Jewish |  |
| None | 71.0 |
| Other Religions | 64.8 |
| Catholic | 59.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 56.6 |
| Moderate Protestant | 53.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 48.8 |
|  | 46.6 |
| 32.C Party Identification |  |
| Religion | \% Democratic |
| Jewish | 51.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 35.6 |
| Catholic | 35.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 31.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 30.2 |
| Other Religions | 29.8 |
| None | 28.7 |
| 32.D Political Ideology |  |
| Religion | \% Liberal |
| Jewish | 47.8 |
| None | 43.5 |
| Other Religions | 35.0 |
| Catholic | 26.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 25.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 24.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 19.2 |
|  |  |

Table 33
Politics and Voting, 1972-2002
33.A Presidential Election (\% Reported Voting)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Election of |  |  |
| 1968 | 78.3 | 63.6 |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 2}$ | 85.8 | 64.6 |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 6}$ | 77.4 | 61.7 |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 0}$ | 85.0 | 64.8 |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 4}$ | 82.9 | 65.1 |
| $\mathbf{1 9 8 8}$ | 82.3 | 63.6 |
| 1992 | 84.7 | 65.5 |
| $\mathbf{1 9 9 6}$ | 73.5 | 61.7 |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 9 . 5}$ | 63.5 |

33.B Presidential Candidate (\% Voting Democratic)

| Election of |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1968 (Humphrey) | 79.0 | 39.9 |
| 1972 (McGovern) | 63.5 | 36.6 |
| 1976 (Carter) | 69.0 | 54.6 |
| 1980 (Carter) | 46.9 | 46.1 |
| 1984 (Mondale) | 57.3 | 35.9 |
| 1988 (Dukakis) | 70.2 | 36.5 |
| 1992 (Clinton) | 76.6 | 45.2 |
| 1996 (Clinton) | 71.0 | 54.0 |
| 2000 (Gore) | 67.2 | 42.8 |
| 33.C Party Identification (\% Democratic) |  |  |

33.C Party Identification (\% Democratic)

| 1972-80 | 57.8 | 41.8 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1981-90 | 53.9 | 37.7 |
| 1991-2002 | 51.7 | 33.2 |
|  |  |  |
| 33.D Political Ideology (\% Liberal) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 47.8 | 28.0 |
| 1981-90 |  |  |
| 1991-2002 | 42.5 | 25.7 |
|  | 47.8 | 26.0 |

Table 34
Confidence in Institutions by Ethnic/Racial Groups
34.A Confidence in Financial Institutions

| Group | \% Great Deal |
| :--- | :---: |
| Asian | 28.0 |
| Other | 27.1 |
| British | 23.5 |
| Other White | 23.0 |
| Black | 22.9 |
| German | 22.6 |
| Italian | 21.7 |
| Hispanic | 21.0 |
| Irish | 20.8 |
| Native American | 20.8 |
| Polish | 19.0 |
| Scandinavian | 19.0 |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{1 8 . 6}$ |
| French | 17.8 |
| Eastern European | 17.4 |
| Average | 22.1 |

34.B Confidence in Major Companies

| Group | \% Great Deal |
| :--- | :---: |
| Asian | 37.1 |
| British | 29.1 |
| Scandinavian | 29.0 |
| Native American | 28.2 |
| German | 27.5 |
| Jewish | 2.1 |
| French | 24.4 |
| Irish | 23.8 |
| Other White | 23.3 |
| Italian | 23.0 |
| Eastern European | 22.6 |
| Hispanic | 21.3 |
| Other | 18.7 |
| Polish | 18.6 |
| Black | 16.4 |
| Average | 24.4 |


| 34.C Confidence in Organized Labor <br> Group |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Great Deal |  |
| Hispanic | 15.5 |
| Black | 14.8 |
| Italian | 13.3 |
| Eastern European | 12.2 |
| Asian | 11.8 |
| Native American | 10.9 |
| Other | 10.9 |
| Polish | 10.9 |
| Other White | 10.8 |
| Irish | 10.7 |
| German | 9.9 |
| French | 9.5 |
| British | 8.8 |
| Scandinavian | 8.2 |
| Jewish | 4.7 |
| Average | 11.1 |
|  |  |
| 34.D Confidence in Organized Religion |  |
| Group | Great Deal |
| Black | 29.8 |
| Polish | 27.0 |
| British | 26.6 |
| German | 26.5 |
| Scandinavian | 26.1 |
| French | 25.9 |
| Italian | 25.3 |
| lrish | 24.9 |
| Hispanic | 24.3 |
| Other White | 22.8 |
| Other | 22.6 |
| Asian | 21.9 |
| Eastern European | 21.5 |
| Native American | 19.0 |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{1 2 . 1}$ |
| Average | 25.1 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 34.E Confidence in Education |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Great Deal |
| Other | 37.5 |
| Black | 37.0 |
| Asian | 36.5 |
| Hispanic | 31.8 |
| Eastern European | 28.7 |
| Native American | 25.8 |
| Irish | 24.0 |
| German | 23.3 |
| British | 23.2 |
| Other White | 23.1 |
| Jewish | 22.5 |
| French | 22.3 |
| Polish | 21.0 |
| Scandinavian | 20.3 |
| Italian | 20.2 |
| Average | 25.8 |
|  |  |
| 34.F Confidence in Executive Branch |  |
| Group | Great Deal |
| Other | 23.8 |
| Jewish | 21.4 |
| Eastern European | 20.9 |
| Asian | 20.6 |
| Polish | 19.7 |
| Hispanic | 19.2 |
| Black | 16.0 |
| British | 14.6 |
| Irish | 14.3 |
| Other White | 13.7 |
| Italian | 13.3 |
| French | 12.2 |
| Scandinavian | 12.2 |
| German | 11.6 |
| Native American | 11.3 |
| Average | 14.6 |
|  |  |


| 34.G Confidence in the Congress |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group |  |
| \% Great Deal |  |
| Asian | 18.3 |
| Hispanic | 18.3 |
| Other | 16.7 |
| Black | 13.4 |
| Eastern European | 12.9 |
| Italian | 12.8 |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{1 1 . 0}$ |
| Other White | 9.8 |
| Irish | 9.4 |
| French | 9.3 |
| Scandinavian | 8.4 |
| German | 7.9 |
| Polish | 7.7 |
| British | 7.6 |
| Native American | 6.9 |
| Average | 10.4 |
|  |  |
| 34.H Confidence in the Supreme Court |  |
| Group | Great Deal |
| Jewish | 40.2 |
| Asian | 37.5 |
| Hispanic | 37.4 |
| British | 36.4 |
| Other | 35.6 |
| Polish | 34.8 |
| Scandinavian | 34.3 |
| Irish | 33.4 |
| Italian | 33.2 |
| Eastern European | 33.1 |
| German | 30.8 |
| Other White | 30.1 |
| French | 29.2 |
| Native American | 26.4 |
| Black | 24.8 |
| Average | 31.8 |
|  |  |


| 34.I Confidence in Television |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Great Deal |
| Asian | 17.8 |
| Hispanic | 15.9 |
| Black | 15.0 |
| French | 11.7 |
| Other White | 11.4 |
| Italian | 10.9 |
| Native American | 10.9 |
| Eastern European | 10.4 |
| Other | 10.3 |
| Irish | 9.1 |
| Scandinavian | 8.8 |
| Jewish | 8.6 |
| German | 8.2 |
| British | 7.0 |
| Polish | 6.7 |
| Average | 10.6 |
|  |  |
| 34.J Confidence in the Press |  |
| Group | Great Deal |
| Hispanic | 17.7 |
| Asian | 17.1 |
| Other | 14.1 |
| Black | 12.2 |
| Eastern European | 12.2 |
| Other White | 10.5 |
| French | 10.2 |
| Scandinavian | 10.0 |
| Jewish | 9.9 |
| Polish | 9.6 |
| British | 9.5 |
| Italian | 9.3 |
| German | 9.0 |
| Native American | 8.8 |
| Irish | 8.5 |
| Average | 10.6 |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 34.K Confidence in Medicine |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Great Deal |
| Asian | 50.4 |
| Eastern European | 46.6 |
| French | 46.1 |
| German | 45.2 |
| Hispanic | 45.1 |
| Scandinavian | 44.9 |
| Italian | 44.5 |
| Other White | 43.4 |
| Native American | 43.3 |
| Other | 43.2 |
| Black | 42.9 |
| lrish | 42.4 |
| British | 41.9 |
| Jewish | 40.5 |
| Polish | 38.3 |
| Average | 43.7 |
|  |  |
| 34.L Confidence in Scientific Community |  |
| Group | \% Great Deal |
| Asian | 53.5 |
| Jewish | 50.1 |
| Other | 46.9 |
| Irish | 45.9 |
| Polish | 45.8 |
| French | 45.0 |
| Italian | 44.8 |
| British | 44.2 |
| Scandinavian | 43.1 |
| Eastern European | 41.5 |
| German | 40.2 |
| Hispanic | 39.9 |
| Other White | 37.2 |
| Native American | 33.2 |
| Black | 24.2 |
| Average | 39.5 |
|  |  |


| 34.M Confidence in the Military |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group |  |
| \% Great Deal |  |
| Other | 49.1 |
| Irish | 46.9 |
| French | 46.3 |
| Hispanic | 44.5 |
| Asian | 44.4 |
| Other White | 44.3 |
| British | 43.9 |
| Eastern European | 43.0 |
| Scandinavian | 42.2 |
| German | 41.5 |
| Native American | 41.4 |
| Potish | 41.4 |
| Italian | 37.8 |
| Black | 34.2 |
| Jewish | 29.9 |
| Average | 42.0 |

Table 35
Confidence in Institutions by Religious Groups

| 35.A Confidence in Financial <br> Religion <br> \% Great Deal |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Liberal Protestant | 24.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 23.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 22.0 |
| None | 21.9 |
| Catholic | 21.1 |
| Other Religions | 20.5 |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{1 8 . 6}$ |
|  |  |
| 35.B Confidence in Major Companies |  |
| Religion | \% Great Deal |
|  |  |
| Liberal Protestant | 28.6 |
| Jewish | 26.1 |
| Other Religions | 25.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 25.1 |
| Catholic | 24.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 23.1 |
| None | 21.3 |

35.C Confidence in Organized Labor

| Religion | \% Great Deal |
| :--- | :---: |
| Catholic | 13.1 |
| None | 12.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 11.5 |
| Other Religions | 11.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 10.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 7.8 |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{4 . 7}$ |


| 35.D Confidence in Organized Religion |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| \%eligion | Great Deal |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 29.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 28.5 |
| Catholic | 27.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 25.2 |
| Other Religions | 20.6 |
| Jewish | 12.1 |
| None | 7.5 |
|  |  |
| 35.E Confidence in Education |  |
| Religion |  |
|  | Great Deal |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 27.9 |
| Other Religions | 27.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 26.2 |
| Catholic | 26.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 22.7 |
| Jewish | 22.5 |
| None | 21.8 |
|  |  |
| 35.F Confidence in Executive Branch |  |
| Religion | \%reat Deal |
| Jewish | 21.4 |
| Catholic | 16.8 |
| Other Religions | 14.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 14.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 13.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 12.9 |
| None | 12.5 |
|  |  |
| 35.G Confidence in the Congress |  |
| Religion | Great Deal |
| Other Religions | 12.4 |
| Catholic | 12.4 |
| Jewish | 11.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 9.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 9.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 9.1 |
| None | 8.5 |
|  |  |


| 35.H Confidence in the Supreme Court |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Religion | \% Great Deal |
| Jewish | 40.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 36.7 |
| Other Religions | 36.7 |
| Catholic | 34.6 |
| Moderate Protestant | 33.3 |
| None | 30.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 26.3 |
| 35.I Confidence in Television Religion | \% Great Deal |
| None | 12.8 |
| Catholic | 11.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 10.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 9.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 9.6 |
| Other Religions | 8.9 |
| Jewish | 8.6 |
| 35.J Confidence in the Press |  |
| Religion | \% Great Deal |
| Catholic | 12.6 |
| None | 12.4 |
| Other Religions | 11.4 |
| Jewish | 9.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 9.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 9.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 9.1 |
| 35.K Confidence in Medicine Religion | \% Great Deal |
| Catholic | 46.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 44.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 42.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 42.8 |
| Other Religions | 42.8 |
| None | 41.1 |
| Jewish | 40.5 |


| 35.L Confidence in Scientific Community <br> Religion |
| :--- | :---: |
| Great Deal |

Table 36
Rankings of Confidence in Institutions for Jews and Non-Jews,1991-2002

|  | Jews <br> $\%$ with <br> Great Deal <br> of Confidence | Institutions | Non-Jews <br> $\%$ with <br> Great Deal <br> of Confidence |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :---: |
| Institutions | 50.1 | Medicine | 43.7 |
| Science | 40.5 | Military | 42.3 |
| Medicine | 40.2 | Science | 39.4 |
| Supreme Court | 29.9 | Supreme Court | 31.6 |
| Military | Education | 25.9 |  |
| Major Companies | 26.1 | Religion | 25.4 |
| Education | 22.5 | Major Companies | 24.3 |
| Executive Branch | 21.4 | Financial Insts. | 22.2 |
| Financial Insts. | 18.6 | Executive Branch | 14.5 |
| Religion | 12.1 | Labor Unions | 11.2 |
| Congress | 11.0 | Television | 10.6 |
| Press | 9.9 | Press | 10.6 |
| Television | 8.6 | Congress | 10.3 |
| Labor Unions | 4.7 |  |  |


| Table 37 <br> Confidence in Institutions, 1972-2002 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 37.A Confidence in Financial Institutions (\% Great Deal) |  |  |
| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| 1972-80 | 28.4 | 35.4 |
| 1981-90 | 23.1 | 24.1 |
| 1991-2002 | 18.6 | 22.2 |
| 37.B Confidence in Major Companies (\% Great Deal) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 24.0 | 25.2 |
| 1981-90 | 28.6 | 25.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 26.1 | 24.3 |
| 37.C Confidence in Organized Labor (\% Great Deal) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 9.4 | 13.9 |
| 1981-90 | 6.5 | 10.1 |
| 1991-2002 | 4.7 | 11.2 |
| 37.D Confidence in Organized Religion (\% Great Deal) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 20.0 | 34.4 |
| 1981-90 | 18.9 | 27.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 12.1 | 25.4 |
| 37.E Confidence in Education (\% Great Deal) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 21.4 | 36.5 |
| 1981-90 | 21.0 | 30.4 |
| 1991-2002 | 22.5 | 25.9 |
| 37.F Confidence in Executive Branch (\% Great Deal) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 10.8 | 17.4 |
| 1981-90 | 13.0 | 18.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 21.4 | 14.5 |


| 37.G Confidence in the Congress (\% Great Deal) <br> Years | Nows | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 10.9 | 15.5 |
| $1981-90$ | 17.7 | 14.5 |
| $1991-2002$ | 11.0 | 10.3 |

37.H Confidence in the Supreme Court (\% Great Deal)

| $1972-80$ | 38.6 | 30.9 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 43.9 | 32.4 |
| $1991-2002$ | 40.2 | 31.6 |

37.I Confidence in Television (\% Great Deal)

| $1972-80$ | 20.1 | 17.7 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 12.6 | 13.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 8.6 | 10.7 |

37.J Confidence in the Press (\% Great Deal)

| $1972-80$ | 28.1 | 23.7 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 19.6 | 17.0 |
| $1991-2002$ | 9.9 | 10.6 |

37.K Confidence in Medicine (\% Great Deal)

| $1972-80$ | 43.6 | 53.3 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 46.9 | 49.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 40.5 | 43.7 |

37.L Confidence in Scientific Community (\% Great Deal)

| $1972-80$ | 53.6 | 39.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 56.5 | 40.8 |
| $1991-2002$ | 50.1 | 39.4 |

37.M Confidence in the Military (\% Great Deal)

| $1972-80$ | 16.5 | 34.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 17.4 | 33.0 |
| $1991-2002$ | 29.9 | 42.3 |

Table 38
Government Spending Priorities and Taxes by
Ethnic/Racial Groups
38.A Spending on Space

Group

| Jewish | $\mathbf{1 5 . 0}$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Italian | 12.8 |
| Scandinavian | 12.8 |
| British | 12.6 |
| Native American | 12.4 |
| Irish | 11.9 |
| Polish | 11.7 |
| Other | 11.4 |
| German | 11.3 |
| Other White | 11.3 |
| French | 11.2 |
| Eastern European | 11.1 |
| Hispanic | 10.1 |
| Asian | 9.8 |
| Black | 6.0 |
| Average | 11.0 |

38.B Spending on the Environment

| Group | \% Too Little |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 70.6 |
| Polish | 66.2 |
| Native American | 66.1 |
| Italian | 65.7 |
| Black | 65.4 |
| Irish | 64.7 |
| French | 63.5 |
| Hispanic | 61.6 |
| British | 60.6 |
| Eastern European | 59.7 |
| German | 58.8 |
| Other | 58.7 |
| Scandinavian | 58.2 |
| Other White | 57.7 |
| Asian | 52.3 |
| Average | 61.3 |

38.C Spending on Health Care

| 38.C Spending on Health Care |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | Too Little |
| Black | 80.3 |
| Jewish | 75.8 |
| Other | 72.9 |
| Native American | 71.4 |
| Irish | 71.1 |
| Italian | 69.6 |
| Polish | 69.6 |
| Eastern European | 68.9 |
| French | 67.1 |
| Hispanic | 66.1 |
| Scandinavian | 65.5 |
| Other White | 65.3 |
| German | 64.2 |
| British | 63.3 |
| Asian | 53.1 |
| Average | 68.0 |
|  |  |
| 38.D Spending on "Solving Problems of Big Cities" |  |
| Group | Too Little |
| Black |  |
| Jewish | 65.2 |
| Italian | 62.4 |
| Hispanic | 57.5 |
| Polish | 53.4 |
| Irish | 51.2 |
| Other | 49.8 |
| Native American | 49.7 |
| Asian | 47.3 |
| Eastern European | 47.2 |
| British | 46.5 |
| French | 44.1 |
| Other White | 43.6 |
| German | 43.3 |
| Scandinavian | 43.2 |
| Average | 41.8 |
|  | 49.0 |


| 38.E Spending on Lowering Crime Rate <br> \%roup |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Too Little |  |
| Black | 74.7 |
| Polish | 70.6 |
| Hispanic | 68.8 |
| French | 68.1 |
| Irish | 66.2 |
| Other White | 64.6 |
| Italian | 64.4 |
| Eastern European | 64.2 |
| Native American | 64.1 |
| Other | 62.8 |
| German | 62.3 |
| Asian | 59.6 |
| British | 59.4 |
| Jewish | 58.1 |
| Scandinavian | 57.4 |
| Average | 65.0 |
|  |  |
| 38.F Spending on "Dealing with Drug Addiction" |  |
| Group | Too Little |
| Black | 72.1 |
| Hispanic | 62.2 |
| Polish | 60.9 |
| German | 58.2 |
| Irish | 58.0 |
| Italian | 57.1 |
| French | 56.8 |
| Scandinavian | 56.6 |
| Jewish | 56.3 |
| Other White | 56.2 |
| Native American | 54.7 |
| Other | 53.5 |
| Asian | 53.1 |
| British | 53.1 |
| Eastern European | 52.0 |
| Average | 58.6 |
|  |  |


| 38.G Spending on Education |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Too Little |
| Jewish | 82.0 |
| Black | 81.1 |
| Native American | 74.8 |
| Polish | 74.0 |
| Irish | 73.6 |
| Italian | 72.8 |
| Hispanic | 72.0 |
| French | 71.5 |
| Other White | 71.3 |
| Other | 69.7 |
| Eastern European | 69.6 |
| British | 68.7 |
| German | 68.5 |
| Scandinavian | 68.5 |
| Asian | 59.6 |
| Average | 72.1 |
|  |  |
| 38.H Spending on "Improving the Conditions of Blacks" |  |
| Group | Too Little |
| Black | 76.0 |
| Jewish | 40.0 |
| Other | 38.7 |
| Hispanic | 34.2 |
| Polish | 30.6 |
| Eastern European | 30.3 |
| Italian | 29.3 |
| Asian | 28.6 |
| Irish | 27.2 |
| Native American | 27.1 |
| German | 25.3 |
| British | 24.4 |
| Other White | 23.5 |
| French | 21.9 |
| Scandinavian | 21.4 |
| Average | 32.8 |
|  |  |


| 38.I Spending on the Military |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Too Little |
| British | 23.1 |
| Native American | 22.9 |
| Other White | 22.0 |
| Irish | 21.9 |
| German | 21.2 |
| French | 20.1 |
| Other | 20.3 |
| Italian | 20.0 |
| Scandinavian | 19.3 |
| Polish | 17.4 |
| Eastern European | 16.8 |
| Black | 15.9 |
| Hispanic | 15.9 |
| Jewish | 11.4 |
| Asian | 8.4 |
| Average | 19.9 |
|  |  |
| 38.J Spending on Foreign Aid |  |
| Group | Too Little |
| Other | 11.7 |
| Hispanic | 11.2 |
| Asian | 10.8 |
| Black | 8.9 |
| Jewish | 8.3 |
| lrish | 6.1 |
| Scandinavian | 5.8 |
| Polish | 5.5 |
| British | 5.1 |
| Italian | 4.5 |
| French | 4.3 |
| Other White | 4.0 |
| German | 3.7 |
| Eastern European | 3.5 |
| Native American | 3.3 |
| Average | 5.7 |
|  |  |


| 38.K Spending on Welfare |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Too Little |
| Black | 33.9 |
| Jewish | 25.5 |
| Other | 23.5 |
| Hispanic | 21.5 |
| Polish | 19.0 |
| Eastern European | 16.2 |
| Native American | 16.1 |
| Scandinavian | 16.0 |
| Asian | 13.7 |
| Other White | 13.7 |
| Italian | 13.6 |
| Irish | 13.5 |
| German | 13.2 |
| French | 12.0 |
| British | 11.9 |
| Average | 17.0 |
|  |  |
| 38.L Spending on Social Security |  |
| Group | Too Little |
| Black | 69.5 |
| Native American | 64.3 |
| French | 58.2 |
| Italian | 54.6 |
| Polish | 54.0 |
| Other | 53.2 |
| Hispanic | 52.2 |
| Other White | 52.0 |
| Irish | 51.3 |
| Eastern European | 51.1 |
| German | 47.8 |
| British | 44.2 |
| Jewish | 41.8 |
| Scandinavian | 39.9 |
| Asian | 38.4 |
| Average | 52.4 |
|  |  |

## 38.M Spending on Highways and Bridges

| Group | \% Too Little |
| :--- | :---: |
| French | 42.4 |
| British | 40.6 |
| Polish | 39.5 |
| Eastern European | 39.0 |
| Native American | 38.8 |
| Jewish | 38.6 |
| Irish | 37.2 |
| Other White | 37.0 |
| German | 36.9 |
| Italian | 35.0 |
| Black | 34.8 |
| Scandinavian | 32.3 |
| Other | 29.7 |
| Hispanic | 25.6 |
| Asian | 22.2 |
| Average | 36.2 |
| 38.N Spending on Parks and Recreation |  |
| Group | Too Little |
| Black | 46.7 |
| Hispanic | 39.4 |
| Other | 35.7 |
| Italian | 35.3 |
| Jewish | 34.3 |
| Native American | 34.0 |
| Polish | 32.6 |
| lrish | 30.5 |
| Other White | 29.6 |
| British | 29.5 |
| French | 29.5 |
| German | 29.0 |
| Asian | 28.0 |
| Scandinavian | 27.6 |
| Eastern European | 26.8 |
| Average | 32.8 |
|  |  |

### 38.0 Spending on Mass Transportation

| Broup <br> Group | \% Too Little |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 45.9 |
| Eastern European | 43.9 |
| Asian | 40.4 |
| British | 38.0 |
| Scandinavian | 37.5 |
| Italian | 35.7 |
| Black | 34.0 |
| Polish | 32.9 |
| lrish | 32.8 |
| Hispanic | 32.3 |
| German | 31.6 |
| Other White | 30.4 |
| French | 30.2 |
| Other | 30.0 |
| Native American | 26.6 |
| Average | 33.6 |
|  |  |
| 38.P Spending on Assistance to the Poor |  |
| Group | Too Little |
|  |  |
| Black | 84.1 |
| Other | 70.3 |
| Hispanic | 68.2 |
| Native American | 65.4 |
| lrish | 61.8 |
| Polish | 61.7 |
| Scandinavian | 58.4 |
| Other White | 58.1 |
| Italian | 57.0 |
| Asian | 56.4 |
| French | 56.2 |
| Eastern European | 54.6 |
| Jewish | 54.2 |
| German | 51.8 |
| British | 51.6 |
| Average | 60.6 |
|  |  |


| 38.Q Spending on Law <br> Group | Enforcement <br> \% Too Little |
| :--- | :---: |
| Other | 64.3 |
| Black | 60.8 |
| lrish | 59.4 |
| Italian | 58.5 |
| Polish | 57.9 |
| Native American | 57.2 |
| German | 55.1 |
| British | 54.8 |
| Other White | 54.6 |
| Jewish | 52.5 |
| Hispanic | 52.1 |
| French | 51.1 |
| Eastern European | 49.1 |
| Scandinavian | 46.8 |
| Asian | 33.9 |
| Average | 55.2 |
|  |  |
| 38.R Spending on Assistance to Blacks |  |
| Group | \% Too Little |
|  |  |
| Black | 69.6 |
| Hispanic | 33.3 |
| Other | 32.0 |
| Jewish | 30.5 |
| Italian | 22.2 |
| Asian | 21.4 |
| Polish | 21.4 |
| French | 20.1 |
| lrish | 19.7 |
| Eastern European | 18.8 |
| British | 17.9 |
| Native American | 17.3 |
| Other White | 15.8 |
| German | 15.2 |
| Scandinavian | 13.7 |
| Average | 25.3 |
|  |  |


| 38.S Spending on Assistance to Big Cities <br> Group <br> \% Too Little |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Black | 37.8 |
| Jewish | 35.0 |
| Hispanic | 30.9 |
| Other | 30.6 |
| Asian | 22.5 |
| Polish | 21.8 |
| Italian | 21.4 |
| Irish | 19.8 |
| Eastern European | 18.8 |
| British | 15.9 |
| Native American | 15.8 |
| German | 15.4 |
| Other White | 15.4 |
| Scandinavian | 14.8 |
| French | 13.0 |
| Average | 20.7 |
|  |  |
| 38.T Spending on Drug Rehabilitation |  |
| Group | Too Little |
| Black | 70.1 |
| Hispanic | 62.1 |
| Native American | 53.5 |
| Asian | 52.9 |
| Italian | 51.6 |
| British | 50.7 |
| Jewish | 49.9 |
| Eastern European | 49.8 |
| Scandinavian | 49.8 |
| lrish | 49.7 |
| Other White | 49.3 |
| German | 48.0 |
| French | 47.0 |
| Polish | 46.9 |
| Other | 43.6 |
| Average | 52.9 |
|  |  |


| 38.U Own Federal Income Tax <br> Group |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| \% Too High |  |
| Polish | 75.6 |
| Black | 71.9 |
| Jewish | 70.2 |
| Italian | 69.4 |
| Other | 68.7 |
| Native American | 66.7 |
| French | 64.2 |
| Other White | 64.1 |
| Eastern European | 63.6 |
| German | 63.1 |
| Hispanic | 62.4 |
| British | 62.0 |
| Irish | 61.7 |
| Asian | 56.1 |
| Scandinavian | 54.2 |
| Average | 64.5 |

Table 39
Government Spending Priorities and Taxes by Religious Groups
39.A Spending on Space

Religion
\% Too Little

| None | 18.1 |
| :---: | :---: |
| Jewish | 15.0 |
| Other Religions | 12.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 11.3 |
| Catholic | 11.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 9.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 7.6 |
| 39.B Spending on the Environment |  |
| Religion | \% Too Little |
| None | 70.9 |
| Jewish | 70.6 |
| Other Religions | 68.6 |
| Catholic | 62.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 60.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 59.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 56.2 |
| 39.C Spending on Health Care |  |
| Religion | \% Too Little |
| Jewish | 75.8 |
| None | 69.5 |
| Other Religions | 68.5 |
| Catholic | 68.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 68.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 66.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 66.7 |


| 39.D Spending on "Solving Problems of Big Cities" <br> Religion Too Little |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 62.4 |
| Other Religions | 55.5 |
| Catholic | 50.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 50.2 |
| None | 48.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 47.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 44.0 |
|  |  |
| 39.E Spending on Lowering Crime Rate |  |
| Religion | Too Little |
|  |  |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 67.9 |
| Catholic | 67.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 65.6 |
| Moderate Protestant | 64.6 |
| Other Religions | 60.8 |
| Jewish | 58.1 |
| None | 55.1 |
|  |  |
| 39.F Spending on "Dealing with Drug Addiction"" |  |
| Religion | Too Little |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 63.2 |
| Catholic | 58.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 58.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 57.8 |
| Jewish | 56.3 |
| None | 52.1 |
| Other Religions | 51.1 |
| 39.G Spending on Education |  |
| Religion | Too Little |
| Jewish | 82.0 |
| Other Religions | 77.9 |
| None | 76.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 71.3 |
| Catholic |  |
| Liberal Protestant | 71.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 70.9 |
|  | 70.5 |


| 39.H Spending on "Improving <br> Religion | Conditions of Blacks" <br> \% Too Little |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 40.0 |
| None | 36.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 35.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 31.9 |
| Catholic | 30.5 |
| Other Religions | 30.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 27.5 |
|  |  |
| 39.I Spending on the Military | \% Too Little |
| Religion | 23.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 21.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 20.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 18.9 |
| Catholic | 14.5 |
| None | 12.6 |
| Other Religions | 11.4 |
| Jewish |  |
|  |  |
| 39.J Spending on Foreign Aid | Too Little |
| Religion |  |
| Jewish | 8.3 |
| None | 7.8 |
| Other Religions | 7.5 |
| Catholic | 6.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 5.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 4.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 4.0 |
| 39.K Spending on Welfare |  |
| Religion | \% Too Little |
| Jewish | 25.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 18.0 |
| None | 17.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 17.2 |
| Catholic | 16.7 |
| Other Religions | 15.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 13.2 |
|  |  |


| 39.L Spending on Social Security <br> Religion |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| \% Too Little |  |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 58.6 |
| Catholic | 53.6 |
| None | 49.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 48.8 |
| Other Religions | 48.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 44.5 |
| Jewish | 41.8 |
|  |  |
| 39.M Spending on Highways and Bridges |  |
| Religion | \% Too Little |
|  |  |
| Liberal Protestant | 39.5 |
| Jewish | 38.6 |
| Moderate Protestant | 37.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 37.0 |
| None | 35.0 |
| Catholic | 34.5 |
| Other Religions | 30.8 |
| 39.N Spending on Parks and Recreation |  |
| Religion | Too Little |
|  |  |
| None | 40.4 |
| Jewish | 34.3 |
| Other Religions | 34.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 33.1 |
| Catholic | 31.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 30.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 28.9 |
| 39.0 Spending on Mass Transportation |  |
| Religion | Too Little |
| Jewish | 45.9 |
| Other Religions | 41.2 |
| None | 40.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 37.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 34.3 |
| Catholic |  |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 32.8 |
|  | 27.4 |


| 39.P Spending on Assistance to the Poor <br> Religion |
| :--- | :---: |
| \% Too Little |


| 39.T Spending on Drug Rehabilitation <br> \% Too Little |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | Other Religions |
| None | 56.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 55.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 53.6 |
| Catholic | 52.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 51.7 |
| Jewish | 51.6 |
|  | 49.9 |
| 39.U Own Federal Income Tax |  |
| Religion |  |
| \% Too High |  |
| Jewish |  |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 70.2 |
| Catholic | 66.5 |
| Other Religions | 65.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 64.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 62.1 |
| None | 61.9 |
|  | 61.7 |

Table 40
Ranking of Spending Priorities for Jews and Non-Jews, 1991-2002
$\left.\begin{array}{llll} & \begin{array}{l}\text { Jews } \\ \text { \% Say }\end{array} & & \begin{array}{l}\text { Non-Jews } \\ \text { \% Say }\end{array} \\ & \begin{array}{llll}\text { Spending } \\ \text { Too Little }\end{array} & & \text { Spending Priority }\end{array} \begin{array}{l}\text { Spending } \\ \text { Too Little }\end{array}\right]$

Table 41
Governmental Spending Priorities and Taxes, 1972-2002

| 41.A Spending on Space (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| 1972-80 | 13.0 | 10.1 |
| 1981-90 | 15.9 | 13.4 |
| 1991-2002 | 15.0 | 10.9 |
| 41.B Spending on the Environment (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 67.3 | 54.2 |
| 1981-90 | 70.6 | 61.3 |
| 1991-2002 | 70.6 | 61.1 |
| 41.C Spending on Health Care (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 76.5 | 59.2 |
| 1981-90 | 73.7 | 61.7 |
| 1991-2002 | 75.8 | 67.9 |
| 41.D Spending on "Solving Problems of Big Cities" (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 69.4 | 43.9 |
| 1981-90 | 63.8 | 43.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 62.4 | 48.7 |
| 41.E Spending on Lowering Crime Rate (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 72.9 | 66.2 |
| 1981-90 | 75.0 | 68.2 |
| 1991-2002 | 58.1 | 65.2 |
| 41.F Spending on "Dealing with Drug Addiction" (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 60.5 | 58.8 |
| 1981-90 | 61.2 | 61.7 |
| 1991-2002 | 56.3 | 58.7 |

$\left.\begin{array}{lcc}\begin{array}{l}\text { 41.G Spending on Education (\% Too Little) } \\ \text { Years }\end{array} & \text { Jews }\end{array}\right]$ Non-Jews
41.H Spending on "Improving the Conditions of Blacks" (\% Too Little)

| $1972-80$ | 30.7 | 27.6 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1981-90 | 40.9 | 31.7 |
| 1991-2002 | 40.0 | 32.6 |
|  |  |  |
| 41.I Spending on the Military (\% Too Little) |  |  |


| $1972-80$ | 13.4 | 25.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 14.6 | 18.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 11.4 | 20.1 |

41.J Spending on Foreign Aid (\% Too Little)

| $1972-80$ | 3.6 | 4.1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 5.9 | 5.4 |
| $1991-2002$ | 8.3 | 5.7 |

41.K Spending on Welfare (\% Too Little)

| $1972-80$ | 17.6 | 16.9 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| 1981-90 | 22.7 | 21.3 |
| 1991-2002 | 25.5 | 16.8 |
|  |  |  |
| 41.L Spending on Social Security (\% Too Little) |  |  |


| $1972-80$ | ---- | ---- |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| $1981-90$ | 45.1 | 53.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 41.8 | 52.6 |

41.M Spending on Highways and Bridges (\% Too Little)

| $1972-80$ | ---- | ---- |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| $1981-90$ | 38.9 | 39.2 |
| $1991-2002$ | 38.6 | 36.1 |


| 41.N Spending on Parks and Recreation (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| 1972-80 | ---- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 31.9 | 30.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 34.3 | 32.7 |
| 41.0 Spending on Mass Transportation (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | ---- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 52.4 | 29.3 |
| 1991-2002 | 45.9 | 33.3 |
| 41.P Spending on Assistance to the Poor (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | ---- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 57.7 | 65.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 54.2 | 60.8 |
| 41.Q Spending on Law Enforcement (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | ---- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 57.5 | 54.8 |
| 1991-2002 | 52.5 | 55.3 |
| 41.R Spending on Assistance to Blacks (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | ---- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 40.0 | 25.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 30.5 | 25.2 |
| 41.S Spending on Assistance to Big Cities (\% Too Little) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | ---- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 39.4 | 18.4 |
| 1991-2002 | 35.0 | 20.3 |


| 41.T Spending on Drug Rehabilitation (\% Too Little) <br> Years <br> Jews | Non-Jews |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{1 9 7 2 - 8 0}$ | --- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 64.9 | 56.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 49.9 | 53.0 |
|  |  |  |
| 41.U Own Federal Income Tax (\% Too High) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 73.1 | 67.6 |
| 1981-90 | 70.9 | 63.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 70.2 | 64.4 |


| Table 42 |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Social Welfare Policies by Ethnic/Racial Groups |  |
|  |  |
| 42.A Government Reduction of Income Differences |  |
| Group | Favoring |
|  |  |
| Other | 58.2 |
| Black | 55.9 |
| Asian | 48.4 |
| French | 48.2 |
| Native American | 48.0 |
| Hispanic | 47.0 |
| Eastern European | 44.6 |
| Other White | 43.5 |
| Irish | 43.3 |
| Polish | 43.3 |
| Italian | 38.5 |
| German | 38.2 |
| Jewish | 38.2 |
| British | 37.2 |
| Scandinavian | 33.5 |
| Average | 43.5 |
|  |  |
| 42.B Government Improve Living Standards |  |
| Group | \% Favoring |
| Black | 45.3 |
| Hispanic | 34.5 |
| Polish | 32.3 |
| Asian | 30.4 |
| French | 27.4 |
| Native American | 27.3 |
| Other White | 24.9 |
| Jewish | 24.8 |
| Other | 24.0 |
| lrish | 22.9 |
| Italian | 22.6 |
| German | 21.9 |
| Eastern European | 21.0 |
| British | 19.4 |
| Scandinavian | 17.1 |
| Average | 26.5 |
|  |  |


| 42.C Government Assist with <br> Group <br> \% Favoring |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Black | 63.8 |
| Jewish | 56.9 |
| Polish | 53.9 |
| Hispanic | 53.3 |
| Asian | 52.9 |
| Other | 52.5 |
| Eastern European | 51.7 |
| Native American | 51.6 |
| Italian | 50.8 |
| French | 49.6 |
| Irish | 49.0 |
| Other White | 45.5 |
| Scandinavian | 44.5 |
| British | 43.5 |
| German | 42.2 |
| Average | 49.1 |
|  |  |
| 42.D Government Should Do More |  |
| Group | \% Favoring |
| Black | 40.8 |
| Asian | 38.4 |
| Hispanic | 36.6 |
| Jewish | 27.5 |
| Native American | 27.3 |
| Other | 26.5 |
| Eastern European | 26.0 |
| Italian | 24.6 |
| Irish | 23.0 |
| Other White | 22.2 |
| French | 21.8 |
| Polish | 21.0 |
| Scandinavian | 18.8 |
| German | 18.1 |
| British | 17.3 |
| Average | 24.8 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

Table 43
Social Welfare Policies by Religious Groups

## 43.A Government Reduction of Income Differences

Religion \% Favoring
None 47.8
Other Religions 47.8

Fundamentalist Protestant 44.2
Catholic 43.0

Moderate Protestant 41.9
Liberal Protestant 39.3
Jewish 38.2
43.B Government Improve Living Standards

| Religion | \% Favoring |
| :--- | :---: |
| None | 32.4 |
| Other Religions | 31.0 |
| Catholic | 27.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 26.7 |
| Jewish | 24.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 24.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 20.3 |

43.C Government Assist with Health Care

Religion \% Favoring

| Jewish | $\mathbf{5 6 . 9}$ |
| :--- | ---: |
| Other Religions | 56.3 |
| None | 53.9 |
| Catholic | 51.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 46.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 46.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 44.9 |

## 43.D Government Should Do More

| Religion | \% Favoring |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 27.5 |
| Other Religions | 27.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 26.7 |
| Catholic | 26.4 |
| None | 26.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 23.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 17.1 |

Table 44
Social Welfare Policies, 1972-2002
$\left.\begin{array}{lcc}\begin{array}{l}\text { 44.A Government Reduction of } \\ \text { Years }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Income Differences (\% } \\ \text { Jews }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Favoring) } \\ \text { Non-Jews }\end{array} \\ \hline \text { 1972-80 } & 35.1 & 44.1 \\ \text { 1981-90 } & 32.2 & 47.7 \\ \text { 1991-2002 } & 38.2 & 43.6 \\ \text { 44.B Government Improve Living Standards (\% Favoring) }\end{array}\right]$

Table 45
Intergroup Relations by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 45.A Government Special Help for Blacks <br> Group |
| :--- | :---: |
| Black For | \left\lvert\, | Bla |
| :--- |
| Other |
| Asian |
| Hispanic |
| Jewish |
| Polish |
| Irish |
| Eastern European |
| French |
| British |
| Italian |
| Scandinavian |
| Native American |
| Other White |
| German |
| Average | 15.6\right.

45.B1 Black-White Differences Due to Discrimination

| Group | \% Yes |
| :--- | :--- |
| Black | 64.8 |
| Other | 57.3 |
| Hispanic | 44.3 |
| Asian | 40.9 |
| Jewish | 40.6 |
| lrish | 36.2 |
| Scandinavian | 34.7 |
| Native American | 31.9 |
| British | 31.7 |
| Eastern European | 31.1 |
| German | 31.1 |
| Other White | 30.4 |
| Polish | 30.2 |
| Italian | 29.7 |
| French | 29.2 |
| Average | 37.3 |


| 45.C1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Ability of Blacks <br> Group |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Ysias | 18.2 |
| Eastern European | 14.8 |
| Other | 14.1 |
| Italian | 13.6 |
| Polish | 13.0 |
| Hispanic | 12.6 |
| Native American | 11.8 |
| Other White | 11.4 |
| Black | 11.1 |
| German | 10.9 |
| Irish | 10.5 |
| French | 10.2 |
| British | 9.9 |
| Scandinavian | 8.7 |
| Jewish | 7.3 |
| Average | 11.2 |
|  |  |
| 45.D1 Black-White Differences Due to Less Black Education |  |
| Group | \% Yes |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{y y}$ |
| Black | 52.9 |
| Other | 53.2 |
| Irish | 49.0 |
| Eastern European | 49.2 |
| Scandinavian | 48.5 |
| British | 47.4 |
| Italian | 44.8 |
| French | 44.5 |
| Asian | 44.3 |
| German | 43.5 |
| Polish | 42.7 |
| Hispanic | 41.9 |
| Other White | 38.9 |
| Native American | 37.3 |
| Average | 45.8 |
|  |  |


| 45.E1 Black-White DifferencesDue to Less Black Motivation <br> Group <br> Asian |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Polish | 58.6 |
| Native American | 55.4 |
| Other White | 55.0 |
| Hispanic | 51.2 |
| Eastern European | 50.8 |
| German | 50.7 |
| French | 50.5 |
| British | 48.7 |
| Italian | 46.9 |
| lrish | 46.8 |
| Other | 45.1 |
| Scandinavian | 43.3 |
| Black | 41.4 |
| Jewish | 38.0 |
| Average | 32.2 |
|  | 47.6 |
| 45.F1 Laws against Black-White Intermarriage |  |
| Group | Opposed to |
| Jewish | 97.3 |
| Black | 93.5 |
| Asian | 91.8 |
| Other | 91.8 |
| Hispanic | 91.7 |
| Polish | 89.3 |
| Scandinavian | 88.8 |
| Eastern European | 88.4 |
| Italian | 87.4 |
| French | 86.5 |
| lrish | 85.3 |
| British | 84.8 |
| German | 83.4 |
| Other White | 80.4 |
| Native American | 79.7 |
| Average | 86.0 |
|  |  |


| 45.G1 Whites Can Segregate Their <br> Group <br> \% Disagree |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Black | 89.5 |
| Jewish | 88.2 |
| Hispanic | 88.0 |
| French | 85.7 |
| Irish | 85.1 |
| Scandinavian | 84.3 |
| Eastern European | 83.9 |
| German | 83.9 |
| Italian | 83.5 |
| Native American | 83.1 |
| Polish | 82.8 |
| British | 82.0 |
| Other White | 79.7 |
| Asian | 77.5 |
| Other | 75.5 |
| Average | 83.8 |
|  |  |
| 45.H1 Blacks Shouldn't Push for Rights |  |
| Group | Disagree |
| Jewish | 77.7 |
| Other | 66.4 |
| Black | 62.3 |
| Eastern European | 60.3 |
| Scandinavian | 58.6 |
| Hispanic | 58.0 |
| German | 57.1 |
| Irish | 56.7 |
| British | 55.5 |
| Polish | 53.8 |
| Italian | 53.3 |
| French | 52.2 |
| Other White | 51.9 |
| Native American | 49.5 |
| Asian | 48.0 |
| Average | 56.2 |
|  |  |

### 45.11 Has "Opposite Race" Black/White Neighbor

| 45.IT Has <br> Group | Opposite Race |
| :--- | :---: |
| Black | 78.7 |
| Jewish | 75.8 |
| Other | 74.2 |
| Hispanic | 70.8 |
| Asian | 69.6 |
| Native American | 63.6 |
| Italian | 61.2 |
| Polish | 60.7 |
| Eastern European | 60.5 |
| Irish | 60.4 |
| Other White | 57.9 |
| French | 55.6 |
| German | 55.4 |
| British | 55.2 |
| Scandinavian | 48.1 |
| Average | 61.6 |

45.J School Busing to Desegregate

| Group | \% Favoring |
| :--- | :---: |
| Black | 58.1 |
| Hispanic | 47.2 |
| Scandinavian | 34.4 |
| Eastern European | 33.5 |
| Native American | 33.4 |
| Asian | 32.5 |
| Jewish | 31.8 |
| French | 30.0 |
| Irish | 29.1 |
| Italian | 28.9 |
| Other White | 28.9 |
| Other | 28.5 |
| British | 25.1 |
| Polish | 23.9 |
| German | 23.6 |
| Average | 32.6 |


| 45.K1 Vote for a Black for President |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| \% Would |  |


| Table $\mathbf{4 6}$ |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Intergroup Relations by Religious Groups |  |
|  |  |
| 46.A Government Special Help for Blacks |  |
| Religion | \% For |
|  |  |
| None | 22.4 |
| Other Religions | 21.3 |
| Jewish | 18.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 18.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 16.3 |
| Catholic | 14.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 13.9 |
|  |  |
| 46.B1 Black-White Differences Due to Discrimination |  |
| Religion | $\%$ Yes |
| Other Religions | 42.9 |
| None | 41.3 |
| Jewish | 40.6 |
| Moderate Protestant | 38.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 37.8 |
| Catholic | 35.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 33.8 |
|  |  |
| 46.C1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Ability of Blacks |  |
| Religion | \% Yes |
| Catholic | 12.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 12.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 11.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 10.6 |
| Other Religions | 8.3 |
| None | 7.5 |
| Jewish | 7.3 |
|  |  |

46.D1 Black-White Differences Due to Less Black Education

| Religion | \% Yes |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 62.9 |
| None | 51.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 49.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | 49.2 |
| Other Religions | 47.3 |
| Catholic | 45.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 40.2 |
|  |  |
| 46.E1 Black-White Differences Due to Less Black Motivation |  |
| Religion | \% Yes |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 52.2 |
| Catholic | 49.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 48.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 45.2 |
| Other Religions | 43.3 |
| None | 37.6 |
| Jewish | 32.2 |
|  |  |
| 46.F1 Laws against Black-White Intermarriage |  |
| Religion | Opposed to |
|  |  |
| Jewish | 97.3 |
| Other Religions | 93.3 |
| None | 91.3 |
| Catholic | 89.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 86.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 84.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 79.9 |
| 46.G1 Whites Can Segregate Their | Neighborhoods |
| Religion | Disagree |
| None | 89.6 |
| Other Religions | 88.9 |
| Jewish | 88.2 |
| Catholic | 85.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 84.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | 82.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 80.2 |
|  |  |


| 46.H1 Blacks Shouldn't Push for Rights <br> Religion <br> \% Disagree |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 77.7 |
| None | 62.4 |
| Other Religions | 61.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 57.0 |
| Catholic | 55.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 55.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 51.3 |
|  |  |
| 46.I1 Has "Opposite Race" Black/White Neighbor |  |
| Religion | \% Yes |
|  |  |
| Jewish | 75.8 |
| Other Religions | 69.1 |
| None | 65.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 62.2 |
| Catholic | 61.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 57.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 55.4 |
|  |  |
| 46.J School Busing to Desegregate |  |
| Religion | \% Favoring |
| Other Religions | 42.9 |
| Catholic | 34.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 32.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 32.0 |
| Jewish | 31.8 |
| None | 31.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 28.9 |
| 46K1. Vote for a Black for President |  |
| Religion | Would |
| Jewish | 95.6 |
| Other Religions | 94.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 92.0 |
| None | 89.3 |
| Catholic | 88.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 87.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 84.0 |
|  |  |

46.L1 Open Housing Law

| Religion | \% Vote for |
| :--- | :---: |
| None | 70.9 |
| Other Religions | 70.6 |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{7 0 . 5}$ |
| Catholic | 67.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 64.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 60.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 60.3 |

## 46.M Preferences in Hiring Blacks

## Religion

\% Supporting

| Other Religions | 21.2 |
| :--- | ---: |
| None | 18.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 18.1 |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{1 5 . 3}$ |
| Moderate Protestant | 14.8 |
| Catholic | 13.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | $\mathbf{1 2 . 4}$ |

46.N Blacks Should Overcome Prejudice without Special Favors

| Religion | \% Disagree |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{2 2 . 2}$ |
| None | 20.1 |
| Other Religions | 19.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 15.3 |
| Liberal Protestant | 13.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 13.3 |
| Catholic | 11.4 |

Table 47
Intergroup Relations, 1972-2002

| 47.A Government Special Help for Black (\% For) <br> Years | Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |$\quad$ Non-Jews

47.B1 Black-White Differences Due to Discrimination (\% Yes)*

| $1972-80$ | 52.3 | 39.2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 46.2 | 42.0 |
| $1991-2002$ | 40.6 | 37.2 |

47.B2 Black-White Differences Due to Discrimination, Blacks Excluded in All Years (\% Yes)*

| $1972-80$ | 52.3 | 39.2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 45.1 | 38.2 |
| $1991-2002$ | 39.5 | 33.0 |

47.C1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Ability of Blacks (\% Yes)*

| $1972-80$ | 6.2 | 25.2 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 14.4 | 18.5 |
| $1991-2002$ | 7.3 | 11.4 |

47.C2 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Ability of Blacks, Blacks Excluded in All Years (\% Yes)

| $1972-80$ | 6.2 | 25.2 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 14.7 | 18.9 |
| $1991-2002$ | 7.4 | 11.4 |

*For those variables marked with an asterisk (*), the items were asked only of nonBlacks in 1972-77. These items were asked of all respondents after 1977. Thus, the Jewish/non-Jewish comparisons for these variables in the 1972-80 period are not strictly comparable to those on other variables. Also, the over-time comparisons for these variables are not comparable, since Blacks are excluded from some of the early years and included in the later two time periods.

| 47.D1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Black Education <br> (\% Yes) | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Years | 56.9 | 49.2 |
| $1972-80$ | 62.5 | 52.1 |
| $1981-90$ | 62.9 | 45.5 |

47.D2 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Black Education, Blacks Excluded in All Years (\% Yes)*

| $1972-80$ |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 63.0 | 49.2 |
| $1991-2002$ | 63.6 | 50.2 |
|  |  | 43.9 |

47.E1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Black Motivation (\% Yes)*

| $1972-80$ | 44.6 | 61.6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 50.6 | 56.8 |
| $1991-2002$ | 32.2 | 48.0 |

47.E2 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Black Motivation, Blacks Excluded in All Years (\% Yes)*

| $1972-80$ | 44.6 | 61.6 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| 1981-90 | 50.4 | 59.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 32.4 | 49.6 |
|  |  |  |
| 47.F1 Laws against |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 84.9 | 64.7 |
| 1981-90 | 89.6 | 73.9 |
| $1991-2002$ | 97.3 | 85.8 |

47.F2 Laws against Black-White Intermarriage, Blacks Excluded in All Years (\% Opposed to)*

| $1972-80$ | 84.9 | 64.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 89.4 | 71.8 |
| $1991-2002$ | 97.8 | 84.6 |

47.G1 Whites Can Segregate Their Neighborhoods
(\% Opposed to)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 70.6 | 60.0 |
| $1981-90$ | 83.3 | 74.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 88.2 | 83.8 |

47.G2 Whites Can Segregate Their Neighborhoods, Blacks Excluded from All Years (\% Disagree)*

| 1972-80 | 70.6 | 59.3 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 1981-90 | 84.0 | 73.2 |
| 1991-2002 | 88.6 | 82.8 |
|  |  |  |
| 47.H1 Blacks Shouldn't Push for |  |  |
| Rights (\% Disagree)* |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 47.8 | 26.8 |
| 1981-90 | 62.3 | 41.0 |

47.H2 Blacks Shouldn't Push for Rights, Blacks Excluded from All Years (\% Disagree)*

| $1972-80$ | 47.8 | 26.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 63.5 | 38.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 77.7 | 54.9 |

47.I1 Has "Opposite Race" Black/White Neighbor (\% Yes)*

| $1972-80$ | 50.1 | 39.1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 68.7 | 48.9 |
| $1991-2002$ | 75.8 | 61.3 |

47.I2 Has "Opposite Race" Black/White Neighbor, Blacks Excluded in All Years (\% Yes)*

| $1972-80$ | 50.1 | 38.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 68.3 | 45.5 |
| $1991-2002$ | 75.7 | 58.6 |

47.J School Busing to Desegregate (\% Favoring)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 15.7 | 18.4 |
| 1981-90 | 27.8 | 26.2 |
| 1991-2002 | 31.8 | 32.7 |
|  |  |  |
| 47.K1 Vote for a Black for President $(\%$ Would)* |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 85.1 | 77.1 |
| 1981-90 | 82.6 | 82.5 |
| $1991-2002$ | 95.6 | 87.6 |

47.K2 Vote for a Black for President, Blacks Excluded in All Years (\% Would)*

| $1972-80$ | 85.1 | 76.3 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| 1981-90 | 82.4 | 80.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 95.5 | 86.2 |
| 47.L1 Open Housing Law (\% Vote for)* |  |  |

47.L2 Open Housing Law, Blacks Excluded in All Years (\% Vote for)*

| $1972-80$ | 52.1 | 35.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 55.5 | 50.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 71.3 | 62.2 |

Strictly comparable time series are possible if Blacks are excluded from all years. These are presented after the full-presentations in the items with a 2 in their headings (e.g., 47B2).

Table 48
Support for Civil Liberties by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 48.A Public Speech byAnti-Religionist <br> Group <br> Allowing |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 86.1 |
| Scandinavian | 82.3 |
| British | 79.9 |
| Irish | 78.7 |
| Polish | 78.7 |
| Eastern European | 78.5 |
| Italian | 76.4 |
| German | 75.4 |
| French | 74.7 |
| Other White | 73.0 |
| Native American | 71.6 |
| Other | 67.5 |
| Asian | 66.8 |
| Hispanic | 66.1 |
| Black | 63.9 |
| Average | 74.0 |

48.B Anti-Religionist College Teacher
\% Not Fire
Group Allow to Teach

| Scandinavian | 67.3 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Other | 62.2 |
| Eastern European | 61.9 |
| Jewish | 61.3 |
| British | 58.9 |
| Italian | 58.6 |
| German | 58.3 |
| French | 57.5 |
| lrish | 56.6 |
| Other White | 54.4 |
| Polish | 54.1 |
| Asian | 53.9 |
| Hispanic | 51.9 |
| Native American | 48.6 |
| Black | 45.8 |
| Average | 55.3 |

## 48.C Anti-Religionist Book in Library

| Group | $\%$ Not <br> Remove |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 87.7 |
| Scandinavian | 79.9 |
| Polish | 77.4 |
| Eastern European | 76.4 |
| Italian | 75.7 |
| British | 74.0 |
| Irish | 73.1 |
| French | 71.5 |
| German | 70.3 |
| Other White | 68.4 |
| Other | 66.1 |
| Asian | 64.9 |
| Hispanic | 60.9 |
| Native American | 60.4 |
| Black | 57.1 |
| Average | 69.2 |

48.D Public Speech by Racist
Group $\quad$ \% Allowing

|  |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Scandinavian | 70.2 |
| Jewish | 68.8 |
| Eastern European | 68.0 |
| British | 67.6 |
| Irish | 66.3 |
| Polish | 65.3 |
| French | 63.7 |
| Italian | 62.7 |
| German | 62.2 |
| Other White | 61.1 |
| Asian | 59.6 |
| Other | 59.3 |
| Native American | 58.2 |
| Black | 52.8 |
| Hispanic | 50.0 |
| Average | 61.6 |


| 48.E Racist College Teacher <br> Group | \% Not Fire/ <br> Allow to Teach |
| :--- | :---: |
| Eastern European | 53.0 |
| Scandinavian | 52.2 |
| Italian | 50.5 |
| Irish | 49.0 |
| British | 48.5 |
| German | 48.4 |
| Asian | 48.1 |
| Jewish | 48.0 |
| Polish | 46.0 |
| Other White | 45.6 |
| French | 45.5 |
| Other | 44.9 |
| Hispanic | 39.9 |
| Native American | 37.8 |
| Black | 33.6 |
| Average | 45.3 |
|  |  |
| 48.F Racist's Book in Library |  |
|  | $\%$ Not |
| Group | Remove |
| Jewish | 76.4 |
| Polish | 75.2 |
| Eastern European | 71.3 |
| Scandinavian | 70.7 |
| British | 70.6 |
| Irish | 69.7 |
| Italian | 68.8 |
| German | 66.9 |
| French | 65.6 |
| Other White | 64.4 |
| Asian | 60.0 |
| Native American | 58.3 |
| Other | 57.2 |
| Hispanic | 54.2 |
| Black | 50.2 |
| Average | 64.4 |
|  |  |

## 48.G Public Speech by Communist

| Group | \% Allowing |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 85.0 |
| Eastern European | 80.2 |
| Scandinavian | 78.4 |
| British | 74.2 |
| Polish | 72.8 |
| lrish | 72.5 |
| French | 72.0 |
| Italian | 68.9 |
| German | 68.5 |
| Other White | 65.1 |
| Other | 62.0 |
| Asian | 58.2 |
| Hispanic | 57.0 |
| Black | 54.9 |
| Native American | 54.6 |
| Average | 66.9 |
| 48.H Communist College Teacher |  |
|  |  |
| Group | Allow Fire/ |


|  |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Jewish | 70.5 |
| Other | 63.5 |
| Polish | 62.3 |
| Scandinavian | 62.2 |
| Eastern European | 62.0 |
| British | 60.4 |
| Irish | 59.6 |
| Italian | 59.6 |
| French | 58.1 |
| German | 57.6 |
| Asian | 56.4 |
| Other White | 55.5 |
| Hispanic | 53.4 |
| Native American | 49.8 |
| Black | 48.9 |
| Average | 56.8 |


| 48.1 Communist's Book in Library |  | 48.K Militarist College Teacher |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \% Not |  | \% Not Fire/ |
| Group | Remove | Group | Allow to Teach |
| Jewish | 85.0 | Jewish | 58.9 |
| Scandinavian | 76.8 | Eastern European | 55.5 |
| Eastern European | 75.7 | Scandinavian | 54.0 |
| Polish | 74.9 | Polish | 53.8 |
| British | 74.2 | Italian | 53.5 |
| lrish | 72.1 | lrish | 52.5 |
| Italian | 71.6 | British | 51.9 |
| German | 68.5 | Other | 51.8 |
| French | 67.9 | French | 51.5 |
| Asian | 65.7 | German | 49.9 |
| Other White | 65.7 | Asian | 48.2 |
| Hispanic | 58.3 | Other White | 47.7 |
| Native American | 58.2 | Hispanic | 44.4 |
| Other | 58.0 | Native American | 44.2 |
| Black | 51.3 | Black | 38.5 |
| Average | 66.7 | Average | 48.7 |
| 48.J Public Speech by Militarist |  | 48.L Militarist's |  |
| Group | \% Allowing | Group | \% Allowing |
| Jewish | 75.9 | Jewish | 82.0 |
| Scandinavian | 74.3 | Scandinavian | 77.6 |
| British | 71.4 | Polish | 72.8 |
| Eastern European | 71.3 | British | 71.3 |
| Irish | 70.6 | Irish | 71.1 |
| Polish | 69.9 | Eastern European | 70.9 |
| French | 67.0 | Italian | 69.6 |
| Italian | 66.5 | German | 67.7 |
| German | 65.3 | Other White | 65.1 |
| Native American | 64.6 | French | 64.8 |
| Other White | 64.0 | Other | 62.0 |
| Other | 58.0 | Native American | 61.3 |
| Asian | 57.7 | Asian | 58.4 |
| Hispanic | 56.6 | Hispanic | 58.2 |
| Black | 52.8 | Black | 54.3 |
| Average | 64.8 | Average | 66.0 |


| 48.M Public Speech by Homosexual <br> Group Allowing |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 93.2 |
| Scandinavian | 89.7 |
| Polish | 87.1 |
| Italian | 86.7 |
| Eastern European | 85.9 |
| French | 85.9 |
| Irish | 85.3 |
| British | 82.2 |
| German | 81.1 |
| Hispanic | 79.6 |
| Black | 75.7 |
| Other White | 75.7 |
| Native American | 74.7 |
| Asian | 73.9 |
| Other | 69.4 |
| Average | 80.4 |
| 48.N Homosexual College Teacher |  |
|  |  |
| Group |  |
|  | Not Fire/ |
| Jewish | Allow to Teach |
| Polish | 93.7 |
| Italian | 85.5 |
| Scandinavian | 85.2 |
| French | 81.5 |
| Eastern European | 80.5 |
| lrish | 80.0 |
| Hispanic | 78.7 |
| Asian | 77.5 |
| German | 76.1 |
| Black | 75.6 |
| British | 75.2 |
| Other White | 74.1 |
| Native American | 71.2 |
| Other | 68.1 |
| Average | 65.0 |
|  | 75.6 |

### 48.0 Homosexual's Book in Library

| Group | Remove |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 88.2 |
| Scandinavian | 81.4 |
| Polish | 79.0 |
| Italian | 78.1 |
| Irish | 73.8 |
| French | 73.5 |
| Eastern European | 73.2 |
| British | 72.5 |
| German | 70.3 |
| Hispanic | 67.3 |
| Other | 66.7 |
| Other White | 66.5 |
| Asian | 66.1 |
| Native American | 63.5 |
| Black | 61.7 |
| Average | 69.5 |

Table 49
Support for Civil Liberties by Religious Groups

| 49.A Public Speech by Anti-Religionist <br> \% Allowing |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | 87.6 |
| None | 86.1 |
| Jewish | 78.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 78.0 |
| Other Religions | 74.7 |
| Catholic | 73.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 65.1 |

49.B Anti-Religionist College Teacher

| Religion | \% Not Fire/ <br> Allow to Teach |
| :--- | :---: |
| None | 73.3 |
| Jewish | 61.3 |
| Other Religions | 61.3 |
| Catholic | 57.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 56.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 55.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 45.4 |


| 49.C Anti-Religionist Book in Library |  |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | \% Not |
| Religion | Remove |


|  |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Jewish | 87.7 |
| None | 84.4 |
| Other Religions | 73.5 |
| Catholic | 72.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 71.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 68.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 58.0 |


| 49.D Public Speech by Racist <br> Religion |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| \% Allowing |  |
| None | 74.4 |
| Jewish | 68.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 65.6 |
| Moderate Protestant | 62.2 |
| Catholic | 61.6 |
| Other Religions | 60.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 54.2 |
|  |  |
| 49.E Racist College Teacher | \% Not Fire/ |
|  | Allow to Teach |
| Religion | 55.9 |
| None | 48.0 |
| Jewish | 47.8 |
| Catholic | 47.0 |
| Other Religions | 46.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 43.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 38.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |
|  |  |
| 49.F Racist's Book in Library | \% Not |
| Religion | Remove |
| None | 77.4 |
| Jewish | 76.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 68.6 |
| Catholic | 67.0 |
| Other Religions | 65.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 62.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 55.2 |


| 49.G Public Speech by Communist |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Religion | \% Allowing |
| None | 82.6 |
| Jewish | 85.0 |
| Other Religions | 73.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 69.3 |
| Catholic | 67.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 67.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 56.5 |
| 49.H Communist College Teacher |  |
|  | \% Not Fire/ |
| Religion | Allow to Teach |
| Jewish | 70.5 |
| None | 69.6 |
| Other Religions | 64.9 |
| Catholic | 59.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 57.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 55.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 48.3 |
| 49.I Communist's Book in Library |  |
|  | \% Not |
| Religion | Remove |
| None | 82.2 |
| Jewish | 85.0 |
| Other Religions | 73.9 |
| Catholic | 69.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 69.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 66.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 55.5 |
| 49.J Public Speech by Militarist |  |
| Religion | \% Allowing |
| None | 78.7 |
| Jewish | 75.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 66.5 |
| Other Religions | 67.9 |
| Catholic | 66.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 65.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 55.3 |
| 228 |  |


| 49.K Militarist College Teacher |  |
| :--- | :---: |
|  | \% Not Fire/ <br> Allow to Teach |
| Religion | 63.1 |
| None | $\mathbf{5 8 . 9}$ |
| Jewish | 52.3 |
| Other Religions | 51.3 |
| Catholic | 49.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | 47.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 39.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |
|  |  |
| 49.L Militarist's Book in Library |  |
| Religion | $\mathbf{8 2 . 0}$ |
|  | 80.2 |
| Jewish | 70.0 |
| None | 69.0 |
| Other Religions | 68.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 66.1 |
| Catholic | 56.0 |

## 49.M Public Speech by Homosexual

Religion $\quad$ \% Allowing

| Jewish | 93.2 |
| :--- | :--- |
| None | 89.0 |
| Catholic | 85.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 83.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 82.2 |
| Other Religions | 78.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 70.6 |

49.N Homosexual College Teacher

|  | \% Not Fire/ <br> Allow to Teach |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | 93.7 |
| Jewish | 86.0 |
| None | 82.1 |
| Catholic | 78.2 |
| Other Religions | 77.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 74.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 64.2 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |

### 49.0 Homosexual's Book in Library

| Religion | Remove |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 88.2 |
| None | 82.9 |
| Catholic | 76.1 |
| Other Religions | 75.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 73.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 69.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 56.3 |

Table 50
Support for Civil Liberties, 1972-2002

| 50.A Public Speech by Anti-Religionist (\% Allowing) <br> Years |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Jews |  |$\quad$ Non-Jews.


| $1972-80$ | 67.9 | 41.3 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 1981-90 | 56.7 | 47.1 |
| 1991-2002 | 61.3 | 55.3 |
|  |  |  |
| 50.C Anti-Religionist Book in Library (\% Not Remove) |  |  |


| $1972-80$ | 85.5 | 60.0 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 86.1 | 64.1 |
| $1991-2002$ | 87.7 | 68.8 |

50.D Public Speech by Racist (\% Allowing)

| $1972-80$ | 67.1 | 60.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 67.9 | 59.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 68.8 | 61.5 |

50.E Racist College Teacher (\% Not Fire/Allow to Teach)

| 1972-80 | 50.3 | 41.0 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1981-90 | 43.6 | 42.5 |
| 1991-2002 | 48.0 | 45.3 |
| 50.F Racist's Book in Library (\% Not Remove) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 73.6 | 61.5 |
| 1981-90 | 82.5 | 62.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 76.4 | 64.2 |


| 50.G Public Speech by Communist <br> Years | (\% Allowing) <br> Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 81.0 | 55.7 |
| $1981-90$ | 87.1 | 59.6 |
| $1991-2002$ | 85.0 | 66.5 |

50.H Communist College Teacher (\% Not Fire/Allow to Teach)

| $1972-80$ | 58.2 | 38.8 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 65.3 | 46.8 |
| $1991-2002$ | 70.5 | 56.6 |

50.I Communist's Book in Library (\% Not Remove)

| $1972-80$ | 82.0 | 56.1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 82.8 | 59.8 |
| $1991-2002$ | 85.0 | 66.4 |

50.J Public Speech by Militarist (\% Allowing)

| $1972-80$ | 71.1 | 53.8 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 68.6 | 56.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 75.9 | 64.6 |

50.K Militarist College Teacher (\% Not Fire/Allow to Teach)

| $1972-80$ | 52.7 | 36.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 47.4 | 40.3 |
| $1991-2002$ | 58.9 | 48.5 |

50.L Militarist's Book in Library (\% Allowing)

| $1972-80$ | 77.4 | 55.7 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 74.8 | 58.2 |
| $1991-2002$ | 82.0 | 65.7 |

Table 51
Crime and Firearms by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 51.A Capital Punishment |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Favor |
| Black | 47.9 |
| Hispanic | 63.3 |
| Jewish | 64.1 |
| Other | 64.6 |
| Asian | 65.4 |
| Polish | 71.2 |
| Irish | 71.8 |
| Scandinavian | 71.8 |
| Italian | 73.4 |
| Other White | 73.8 |
| Eastern European | 74.1 |
| French | 75.8 |
| British | 76.1 |
| German | 77.1 |
| Native American | 77.5 |
| Average | 70.2 |
|  |  |
| 51.B Courts | \% Not |
| Group | Harsh Enough |
| Asian | 65.4 |
| Other | 67.0 |
| Jewish | 70.6 |
| Black | 72.2 |
| Hispanic | 75.1 |
| Scandinavian | 75.9 |
| Polish | 77.6 |
| British | 77.9 |
| Other White | 77.9 |
| French | 78.0 |
| Irish | 78.4 |
| Italian | 78.9 |
| German | 79.3 |
| Eastern European | 79.4 |
| Native American | 80.7 |
| Average | 76.9 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

51.C Fear to Walk Alone at Night

| Group | \% Yes |
| :--- | :---: |
| Scandinavian | 28.6 |
| French | 31.8 |
| German | 34.4 |
| Other | 35.1 |
| Italian | 36.3 |
| Other White | 38.5 |
| British | 38.7 |
| Irish | 39.7 |
| Native American | 40.8 |
| Polish | 41.9 |
| Eastern European | 43.2 |
| Asian | 45.0 |
| Hispanic | 45.9 |
| Black | 49.6 |
| Jewish | 51.6 |
| Average | 39.9 |
|  |  |
| 51.D Gun in Household | $\%$ Yes |
| Group | 12.9 |
|  | 13.2 |
| Asian | 17.0 |
| Jewish | 17.5 |
| Other | 25.3 |
| Hispanic | 31.3 |
| Black | 37.4 |
| Italian | 40.1 |
| Polish | 42.3 |
| Eastern European | 46.1 |
| Irish | 47.2 |
| Scandinavian | 49.2 |
| Other White | 49.7 |
| German | 50.3 |
| French | 50.6 |
| British | 40.3 |
| Native American |  |
| Average |  |
|  |  |


| 51.E Personally Own Gun |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Group | \% Yes |
| Asian | 7.3 |
| Hispanic | 8.4 |
| Jewish | 9.5 |
| Other | 11.6 |
| Black | 17.0 |
| Italian | 18.3 |
| Polish | 22.6 |
| Eastern European | 25.2 |
| Irish | 27.2 |
| Scandinavian | 29.0 |
| Other White | 30.4 |
| Native American | 32.2 |
| British | 32.5 |
| French | 32.6 |
| German | 32.9 |
| Average | 25.9 |
|  |  |
| 51.F Police Permit before Gun Purchase |  |
| Group | $\%$ Favor |
| Jewish | 92.2 |
| Other | 91.8 |
| Asian | 90.8 |
| Italian | 87.6 |
| Hispanic | 85.7 |
| Black | 84.3 |
| Polish | 84.2 |
| Irish | 82.2 |
| Eastern European | 81.3 |
| French | 78.5 |
| German | 76.7 |
| Other White | 76.6 |
| Scandinavian | 76.5 |
| British | 75.8 |
| Native American | 75.3 |
| Average | 80.0 |
|  |  |


| 51.G Police Ever Strike Citizen |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Approve |
| Black | 46.4 |
| Other | 46.4 |
| Asian | 48.5 |
| Hispanic | 48.5 |
| Eastern European | 65.1 |
| Jewish | 69.0 |
| Other White | 69.7 |
| French | 70.6 |
| Polish | 72.9 |
| Italian | 73.5 |
| lrish | 73.9 |
| German | 75.3 |
| Native American | 76.6 |
| British | 77.6 |
| Scandinavian | 78.7 |
| Average | 68.0 |
|  |  |
| 51.H Police Strike Escapee | \% Approve |
| Group | 50.7 |
| Black | 54.2 |
| Other | 57.9 |
| Hispanic | 59.4 |
| Asian | 69.2 |
| Eastern European | 70.6 |
| Other White | 72.4 |
| French | 72.7 |
| Native American | 72.9 |
| Polish | 73.6 |
| Scandinavian | 74.7 |
| Italian | 75.2 |
| German | 76.9 |
| lrish | 77.4 |
| Jewish | 78.0 |
| British | 69.9 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |


| 51.I Police Strike Person Hitting Police <br> Group |
| :--- | :---: |
| Approve |

Table 52

## Crime and Firearms by Religious Groups

| 52.A Capital Punishment <br> Religion | \% Favor |
| :--- | :---: |
| Other Religions | 63.3 |
| Jewish | 64.1 |
| None | 66.1 |
| Catholic | 70.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 71.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 72.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 72.6 |


| 52.B Courts | \% Not |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | Harsh Enough |
| Other Religions | 66.0 |
| None | 66.7 |
| Jewish | 70.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 77.7 |
| Catholic | 78.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 78.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 80.6 |

## 52.C Fear to Walk Alone at Night

Religion
\% Yes
None 34.0

Moderate Protestant 38.4
Catholic 38.8
Liberal Protestant 39.4
Fundamentalist Protestant 42.4
Other Religions 43.7
Jewish 51.6

| 52.D Gun in Household |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | \% Yes |
| Jewish | 13.2 |
| Other Religions | 25.7 |
| Catholic | 32.8 |
| None | 33.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 44.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 46.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 48.5 |
|  |  |
| 52.E Personally Own Gun |  |
| Religion | Yes |
|  |  |
| Jewish | 9.5 |
| Other Religions | 17.8 |
| Catholic | 19.9 |
| None | 23.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 28.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | 29.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 31.5 |
| 52.F Police Permit before Gun Purchase |  |
| Religion | \% Favor |
| Jewish | 92.2 |
| Catholic | 84.3 |
| Other Religions | 81.6 |
| None | 81.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 80.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 78.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 76.9 |
|  |  |
| 52.G Police Ever Strike Citizen | \% Approve |
| Group | 63.6 |
| Other Religions | 63.9 |
| Catholic | 67.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 69.0 |
| Jewish | 70.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 71.8 |
| None | 73.9 |
| Liberal Protestant |  |
|  |  |


| 52.H Police Strike Escapee |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Approve |
| None | 65.4 |
| Other Religions | 66.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 68.7 |
| Catholic | 68.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 70.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 75.3 |
| Jewish | 77.4 |
|  |  |
| 52.I Police Strike Person Hitting Police |  |
| Group | \% Approve |
|  |  |
| Other Religions | 87.9 |
| None | 90.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 90.7 |
| Catholic | 91.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 91.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 93.2 |
| Jewish | 94.0 |
|  |  |
| 52.J Police Strike Murder Suspect |  |
| Group | Approve |
| None | 4.8 |
| Moderate Protestant | 5.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 5.7 |
| Jewish | 6.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 6.5 |
| Catholic | 7.0 |
| Other Religions | 7.4 |
| 52.K Police Strike Person Verbally Abusing Police |  |
| Group | \% Approve |
|  |  |
| Other Religions | 5.1 |
| None | 5.3 |
| Jewish | 6.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 6.7 |
| Catholic | 7.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 7.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 8.1 |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 52.L Wiretapping | \% Approving |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | 20.3 |
| Other Religions | 20.3 |
| None | 20.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 21.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 22.5 |
| Jewish | 22.8 |
| Catholic | 28.4 |
| Liberal Protestant |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

Table 53
Crime and Firearms, 1972-2002
53.A Capital Punishment (\% Favor)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 64.2 | 65.5 |
| $1981-90$ | 72.4 | 73.0 |
| $1991-2002$ | 64.1 | 70.3 |

53.B Courts (\% Not Harsh Enough)

| 1972-80 |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| 1981-90 | 74.9 | 79.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 86.0 | 83.4 |
|  | 70.6 | 77.0 |
| 53.C Fear to Walk Alone at Night $(\%$ Yes $)$ |  |  |

53.C Fear to Walk Alone at Night (\% Yes)

| $1972-80$ | 49.1 | 41.9 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 57.5 | 39.2 |
| $1991-2002$ | 51.6 | 39.7 |

53.D Gun in Household (\% Yes)

| $1972-80$ |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 13.2 | 51.2 |
| $1991-2002$ | 13.2 | 48.3 |
|  |  | 40.9 |

53.E Personally Own Gun (\% Yes)

| $1972-80$ | $*$ | 29.6 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1981-90$ | 7.5 | 28.4 |
| $1991-2002$ | 9.5 | 26.2 |
|  |  |  |
| 53.F Police Permit before Gun Purchase (\% Favor) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ |  | 94.9 |
| $1981-90$ | 93.5 | 71.4 |
| $1991-2002$ | 92.2 | 72.7 |

*Too few cases to report

## 53.G Police Ever Strike Citizen (\% Approve)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | 75.9 | 74.2 |
| $1981-90$ | 77.8 | 72.5 |
| $1991-2002$ | 69.0 | 68.0 |

53.H Police Strike Escapee (\% Approve)

| $1972-80$ | 79.6 | 79.5 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 76.0 | 75.0 |
| $1991-2002$ | 77.4 | 69.8 |

53.I Police Strike Person Hitting Police (\% Approve)

| 1972-80 | 94.5 | 95.1 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 1981-90 | 93.1 | 92.6 |
| 1991-2002 | 94.0 | 91.3 |
|  |  |  |
| 53.J Police Strike Murder Suspect (\% Approve) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ |  | 6.7 |
| 1981-90 | 6.3 | 7.6 |
| $1991-2002$ | 6.3 | 9.2 |
|  |  | 6.2 |

53.K Police Strike Person Verbally Abusing Police (\% Approve)

| $1972-80$ | 12.9 | 17.9 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| $1981-90$ | 5.7 | 12.6 |
| $1991-2002$ | 6.0 | 7.1 |

53.L Wiretapping (\% Approve)

| $1972-80$ | 13.5 | 17.6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 17.2 | 21.6 |
| $1991-2002$ | 22.5 | 22.3 |

Table 54
Psychological Well-being and Health by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 54.A Overall Happiness

Group
\% Very Happy

| British | 36.4 |
| :--- | ---: |
| Polish | 36.0 |
| Other | 35.6 |
| Jewish | 35.4 |
| French | 35.1 |
| German | 34.4 |
| Native American | 34.1 |
| Other White | 33.8 |
| Irish | 33.7 |
| Scandinavian | 33.4 |
| Italian | 32.6 |
| Eastern European | 31.5 |
| Asian | 31.4 |
| Hispanic | 28.4 |
| Black | 23.5 |
| Average | 32.6 |

54.B Marital Happiness
Group \% Very Happy

| British | 67.5 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Jewish | 67.1 |
| Italian | 66.2 |
| French | 64.9 |
| Asian | 64.5 |
| Irish | 63.3 |
| Other | 63.1 |
| German | 62.9 |
| Native American | 62.1 |
| Other White | 61.5 |
| Polish | 60.3 |
| Scandinavian | 60.3 |
| Eastern European | 60.2 |
| Hispanic | 58.4 |
| Black | 46.9 |
| Average | 61.8 |


| 54.C Financial Satisfaction |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Satisfied |
| Jewish | 38.8 |
| British | 35.5 |
| Eastern European | 33.9 |
| German | 33.7 |
| Scandinavian | 32.5 |
| Italian | 32.0 |
| Irish | 31.0 |
| Other White | 29.9 |
| French | 27.2 |
| Polish | 26.2 |
| Asian | 26.0 |
| Native American | 19.8 |
| Hispanic | 19.7 |
| Black | 18.9 |
| Other | 17.8 |
| Average | 29.1 |
|  |  |
| 54.D Job Satisfaction | \% Very Satisfied |
| Group | 51.5 |
| Irish | 50.4 |
| Jewish | 48.8 |
| French | 48.3 |
| Italian | 48.0 |
| German | 48.0 |
| Other White | 47.7 |
| Native American | 47.5 |
| British | 47.5 |
| Scandinavian | 46.3 |
| Polish |  |
| Eastern European | 44.8 |
| Hispanic | 43.1 |
| Black | 36.1 |
| Asian | 34.7 |
| Other | 34.4 |
| Average | 46.0 |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |


| 54.E Health |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Excellent |
| Jewish | 43.2 |
| Other | 37.6 |
| Scandinavian | 37.5 |
| German | 35.1 |
| Irish | 32.9 |
| British | 32.8 |
| Italian | 32.8 |
| French | 32.1 |
| Other White | 31.8 |
| Asian | 30.9 |
| Polish | 30.8 |
| Hispanic | 29.8 |
| Eastern European | 29.2 |
| Black | 25.5 |
| Native American | 24.0 |
| Average | 31.7 |
|  |  |
| 54.F Life | \% Is Exciting |
| Group | 61.3 |
| Other | 56.3 |
| Jewish | 55.1 |
| Polish | 51.9 |
| British | 50.7 |
| Eastern European | 50.3 |
| Irish | 50.0 |
| Scandinavian | 47.3 |
| German | 47.1 |
| Asian | 46.4 |
| French | 46.2 |
| Italian | 45.8 |
| Hispanic | 45.4 |
| Other White | 44.2 |
| Native American | 41.9 |
| Black | 47.4 |
| Average |  |
|  |  |

Table 55
Psychological Well-being and Health by Religious Groups

| 55.A Overall Happiness |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | \% Very Happy |
| Liberal Protestant | 36.0 |
| Jewish | 35.4 |
| Other Religions | 35.3 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 33.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 33.1 |
| Catholic | 32.0 |
| None | 24.4 |
|  |  |
| 55.B Marital Happiness | \% Very Happy |
| Religion | $\mathbf{~}$ |
| Jewish | 65.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 62.6 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 62.5 |
| Other Religions | 60.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 60.4 |
| Catholic | 56.4 |
| None |  |
| 55.C Financial Satisfaction | \% Satisfied |
| Religion | 38.8 |
| Jewish | 37.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 32.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 27.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 26.6 |
| Catholic | 25.8 |
| None | 22.6 |
| Other Religions |  |


| 55.D Job Satisfaction |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | \% Very Satisfied |
| Jewish | 50.4 |
| Liberal Protestant | 49.6 |
| Catholic | 46.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 46.1 |
| Moderate Protestant | 45.6 |
| Other Religions | 42.9 |
| None | 40.5 |
|  |  |
| 55.E Health | \% Excellent |
| Religion |  |
| Jewish | 43.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 35.1 |
| None | 33.7 |
| Catholic | 32.7 |
| Other Religions | 32.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 31.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 27.9 |
|  |  |
| 55.F Life | \% Is Exciting |
| Religion | 57.4 |
| Other Religions | 56.3 |
| Jewish | 49.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 47.7 |
| Catholic | 47.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 46.5 |
| None | 44.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant |  |

Table 56
Psychological Well-being and Health, 1972-2002

| 56.A Overall Happiness (\% Very Happy) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| 1972-80 | 34.8 | 34.9 |
| 1981-90 | 32.9 | 33.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 35.4 | 32.5 |
| 56.B Marital Happiness (\% Very Happy) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 72.9 | 66.6 |
| 1981-90 | 61.9 | 62.8 |
| 1991-2002 | 67.1 | 61.7 |
| 56.C Financial Satisfaction (\% Satisfied) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 33.4 | 31.8 |
| 1981-90 | 44.1 | 29.4 |
| 1991-2002 | 38.8 | 28.9 |
| 56.D Job Satisfaction (\% Very Satisfied) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 45.3 | 49.4 |
| 1981-90 | 52.4 | 46.7 |
| 1991-2002 | 50.4 | 45.7 |
| 56.E Health (\% Excellent) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 37.1 | 32.1 |
| 1981-90 | 36.6 | 32.8 |
| 1991-2002 | 43.2 | 31.5 |
| 56.F Life (\% Is Exciting) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 46.2 | 44.9 |
| 1981-90 | 55.4 | 45.8 |
| 1991-2002 | 56.3 | 47.2 |


| Table 57 |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Financial and Job Changes and Expectations by Ethnic/Racial Groups |  |
| 57.A Own Standard of Living Compared to Parent's |  |
| Group | \% Better |
| Asian | 74.8 |
| Hispanic | 70.5 |
| Black | 68.5 |
| Eastern European | 68.1 |
| Italian | 68.1 |
| Irish | 66.5 |
| British | 66.2 |
| Jewish | 65.9 |
| German | 65.7 |
| Native American | 65.1 |
| Polish | 64.8 |
| Other | 64.2 |
| Other White | 62.7 |
| French | 60.7 |
| Scandinavian | 58.6 |
| Average | 65.8 |
| 57.B Expected Standard of Living of Children |  |
|  | \% Better |
| Group | than Own |
| Asian | 72.9 |
| Hispanic | 69.3 |
| Black | 68.5 |
| Other | 66.5 |
| Polish | 65.0 |
| Native American | 59.9 |
| French | 54.3 |
| Irish | 53.7 |
| Italian | 51.1 |
| Eastern European | 50.9 |
| Other White | 49.8 |
| British | 48.4 |
| German | 48.3 |
| Scandinavian | 48.0 |
| Jewish | 47.5 |
| Average | 54.6 |

## 57.C Financial Situation in Recent Years

\% Getting

| Group | \% Getting <br> Better |
| :--- | :--- |
| Irish | 44.5 |
| Hispanic | 44.4 |
| German | 44.2 |
| Polish | 43.3 |
| British | 41.9 |
| Italian | 41.6 |
| Scandinavian | 41.2 |
| Jewish | 41.1 |
| Asian | 39.7 |
| French | 39.4 |
| Native American | 39.2 |
| Other White | 39.2 |
| Other | 38.3 |
| Black | 35.5 |
| Eastern European | 35.3 |
| Average | 40.9 |

57.D Losing Job in Next Twelve Months

| Group | \% Not at Likely <br> All |
| :--- | :---: |
| Polish | 76.1 |
| Jewish | 72.9 |
| Italian | 68.0 |
| Other White | 67.1 |
| German | 65.7 |
| British | 64.6 |
| Scandinavian | 64.1 |
| Asian | 63.3 |
| French | 62.7 |
| Native American | 62.6 |
| Eastern European | 62.2 |
| Irish | 62.1 |
| Hispanic | 60.4 |
| Black | 58.4 |
| Other | 55.4 |
| Average | 64.3 |


| 57.E Finding as Good a Job, if Lost Job <br> Group |
| :--- | :---: |
| Very Easy |


| 57.G How People Get Ahead | \% From <br> Hard Work |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | 72.6 |
| Native American | 72.3 |
| German | 71.8 |
| Other | 69.4 |
| Irish | 69.3 |
| British | 68.0 |
| Other White | 66.8 |
| French | 66.5 |
| Hispanic | 66.2 |
| Asian | 65.1 |
| Black | 64.8 |
| Italian | 62.8 |
| Eastern European | 61.8 |
| Scandinavian | 58.0 |
| Jewish | 57.3 |
| Polish | 67.7 |
| Average |  | without Work

Table 58
Financial and Job Changes and Expectations by
Religious Groups
58.A Own Standard of Living Compared to Parent's

| Religion | \% Better |
| :--- | :---: |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 67.9 |
| Catholic | 67.3 |
| Moderate Protestant | 66.7 |
| Jewish | 65.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 64.7 |
| None | 60.6 |
| Other Religions | 59.3 |
|  |  |
| 58.B Expected Standard of Living of Children |  |
|  | \% Better |
| Religion | than Own |
| Other Religions | 58.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 56.5 |
| Catholic | 56.3 |
| None | 52.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 51.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 51.0 |
| Jewish | 47.5 |
|  |  |
| 58.C Financial Situation in Recent Years |  |
| Religion | Getting Better |
| Other Religions | 43.1 |
| None | 41.7 |
| Moderate Protestant | 41.6 |
| Catholic | 41.4 |
| Jewish | 41.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 40.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 39.3 |

58.D Losing Job in Next Twelve Months

| Religion | \% Not at <br> All Likely |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 72.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 67.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 65.7 |
| Catholic | 64.1 |
| Other Religions | 63.0 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 62.9 |
| None | 61.6 |


| 58.E Finding as Good a Job, if Lost Job <br> \% Very Easy |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | 30.9 |
| None | 29.6 |
| Catholic | 28.1 |
| Other Religions | 27.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 26.9 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 26.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | $\mathbf{2 6 . 7}$ |
| Jewish |  |

58.F Continued to Work if Able to Live Comfortably without Work

| Religion | \% Work |
| :--- | :---: |
| Other Religions | 73.3 |
| Jewish | 72.5 |
| None | 70.1 |
| Catholic | 67.8 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 67.6 |
| Moderate Protestant | 67.2 |
| Liberal Protestant | 66.3 |


| 58.G How People Get Ahead | \% From <br> Hard Work |
| :--- | :---: |
| Religion | 72.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 68.5 |
| Moderate Protestant | 67.6 |
| Liberal Protestant | 66.8 |
| Catholic | 61.5 |
| None | 59.8 |
| Other Religions | $\mathbf{5 8 . 0}$ |

Table 59
Financial and Job Changes and Expectations, 1972-2002
59.A Own Standard of Living Compared to Parent's (\% Better)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | ---- | ---- |
| $1981-90$ | --- | --- |
| $1991-2002$ | 65.9 | 65.8 |

59.B Expected Standard of Living of Children (\% Better than Own)

| $1972-80$ | ---- | ---- |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1981-90$ | --- | --- |
| $1991-2002$ | 47.5 | 54.7 |

59.C Financial Situation in Recent Years (\% Getting Better)

| $1972-80$ | 44.6 | 39.1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 48.8 | 38.9 |
| $1991-2002$ | 41.1 | 40.9 |

59.D Losing Job in Next Twelve Months (\% Not at All Likely)

| $1972-80$ | 80.1 | 68.2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 1981-90 | 79.9 | 65.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 72.9 | 64.1 |
|  |  |  |
| 59.E Finding as Good a Job, if Lost Job (\% Very Easy) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 30.6 | 26.6 |
| $1981-90$ | 32.4 | 26.2 |
| $1991-2002$ | 26.7 | 28.3 |

59.F Continued to Work if Able to Live Comfortably without

Work (\% Work)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 1972-80 | 65.6 | 70.1 |
| 1981-90 | 80.6 | 72.7 |
| 1991-2002 | 72.5 | 68.0 |
|  |  |  |
| 59.G How People Get Ahead (\% From Hard Work) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 41.4 | 62.8 |
| 1981-90 | 55.4 | 66.2 |
| 1991-2002 | 58.0 | 67.9 |

Table 60
Miscellaneous by Ethnic/Racial Groups

| 60.A Spanking Children |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Agree With |
| Jewish | 49.4 |
| Italian | 64.6 |
| Asian | 66.0 |
| Eastern European | 67.0 |
| Hispanic | 68.9 |
| Scandinavian | 69.3 |
| lrish | 69.6 |
| Polish | 70.1 |
| French | 72.0 |
| British | 73.2 |
| Other White | 74.2 |
| German | 74.4 |
| Other | 78.9 |
| Native American | 79.6 |
| Black | 83.5 |
| Average | 73.2 |

60.B Divorce Law

| Group | \% For <br> Easier Laws |
| :--- | :---: |
| Black | 46.3 |
| Hispanic | 33.7 |
| Native American | 30.3 |
| Jewish | 28.8 |
| Asian | 27.1 |
| Other | 25.9 |
| French | 22.5 |
| Irish | 22.5 |
| Other White | 22.3 |
| Italian | 21.2 |
| Eastern European | 20.1 |
| Polish | 20.0 |
| Scandinavian | 19.4 |
| German | 18.0 |
| British | 17.5 |
| Average | 25.1 |


| 60.C World War within Ten Years |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group |  |
| \%lack Expecting |  |
| Native American | 55.9 |
| Hispanic | 53.1 |
| French | 51.7 |
| Other | 49.2 |
| Polish | 45.6 |
| Other White | 45.5 |
| German | 43.5 |
| Eastern European | 42.0 |
| lrish | 41.9 |
| British | 40.2 |
| Italian | 39.5 |
| Scandinavian | 35.6 |
| Asian | 34.1 |
| Jewish | 29.1 |
| Average | 23.2 |
|  | 43.7 |
| 60.D Legalizing Marijuana |  |
| Group | \% ln Favor |
| Jewish | 41.3 |
| Native American | 30.0 |
| Other | 29.7 |
| Italian | 29.6 |
| Polish | 29.6 |
| Irish | 28.5 |
| French | 27.7 |
| German | 27.6 |
| Eastern European | 27.2 |
| Other White | 24.6 |
| British | 23.5 |
| Hispanic | 22.6 |
| Black | 22.3 |
| Scandinavian | 21.4 |
| Asian | 16.5 |
| Average | 25.7 |
|  |  |


| 60.E Newspaper Reading |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| Group | \% Daily |
| Jewish | 57.1 |
| British | 54.1 |
| Italian | 51.0 |
| Eastern European | 50.4 |
| German | 48.2 |
| Scandinavian | 48.0 |
| French | 47.9 |
| Irish | 46.2 |
| Other White | 42.1 |
| Polish | 38.2 |
| Other | 36.8 |
| Native American | 36.2 |
| Black | 35.4 |
| Asian | 34.8 |
| Hispanic | 32.8 |
| Average | 44.3 |
| 60.F TV Watching |  |
| Group | Mean Hours |
| Black | per Day |
| Native American | 3.8 |
| Hispanic | 3.0 |
| Irish | 2.9 |
| Other White | 2.8 |
| German | 2.8 |
| Italian | 2.7 |
| Polish | 2.7 |
| British | 2.7 |
| Other | 2.7 |
| French | 2.6 |
| Scandinavian | 2.6 |
| Eastern European | 2.5 |
| Jewish | 2.5 |
| Asian | 2.5 |
| Average | 2.3 |
|  | 2.9 |

Table 61
Miscellaneous by Religious Groups

## 61.A Spanking Children

| Religion | \% Agree with |
| :--- | :---: |
| Jewish | 49.4 |
| None | 65.5 |
| Catholic | 65.9 |
| Other Religions | 69.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 72.2 |
| Moderate Protestant | 74.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 84.3 |

## 61.B Divorce Law

| Religion | Easier Laws |
| :--- | :---: |
| None | 34.8 |
| Jewish | 28.8 |
| Other Religions | 27.7 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 24.6 |
| Catholic | 24.5 |
| Liberal Protestant | 21.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 21.1 |

61.C World War within Ten Years

Religion \% Expecting

| Fundamentalist Protestant | 52.1 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Moderate Protestant | 45.0 |
| Other Religions | 41.2 |
| Catholic | 41.2 |
| None | 39.8 |
| Liberal Protestant | 35.7 |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{2 3 . 2}$ |


| 61.D Legalizing Marijuana <br> Religion | \% In Favor |
| :--- | :---: |
| None | 47.7 |
| Jewish | 41.3 |
| Other Religions | 35.0 |
| Catholic | 24.7 |
| Liberal Protestant | 23.9 |
| Moderate Protestant | 23.1 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 17.8 |
|  |  |
| 61.E Newspaper Reading | \% Daily |
| Religion |  |
| Jewish | 57.1 |
| Liberal Protestant | 57.9 |
| Catholic | 48.4 |
| Moderate Protestant | 46.4 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 38.8 |
| None | 36.0 |
| Other Religions | 30.4 |
| 61.F TV Watching |  |
| Religion | Mean Hours |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | per Day |
| Catholic | 3.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 2.9 |
| None | 2.9 |
| Liberal Protestant | 2.9 |
| Jewish | 2.8 |
| Other Religions | 2.5 |
|  | 2.5 |

Table 62
Miscellaneous, 1972-2002
62.A Spanking Children (\% Agree with)

| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $1972-80$ | --- | ---- |
| 1981-90 | 58.5 | 79.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 49.4 | 73.6 |
|  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{6 2 . B}$ Divorce Law (\% For Easier Laws) |  |  |

62.B Divorce Law (\% For Easier Laws)

| $1972-80$ | 40.4 | 28.1 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1981-90$ | 31.1 | 23.9 |
| $1991-2002$ | 28.8 | 25.0 |

62.C World War within Ten Years (\% Expecting)

| 1972-80 | $*$ |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 1981-90 | 15.7 | 44.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 23.2 | 38.2 |
|  |  | 44.1 |
| 62.D Legalizing Marijuana (\% In Favor) |  |  |
| $1972-80$ | 43.2 | 24.0 |
| 1981-90 | 37.8 | 17.5 |
| 1991-2002 | 41.3 | 25.3 |
|  |  |  |
| 62.E Newspaper Reading (\% Daily) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 74.1 | 64.1 |
| 1981-90 | 71.7 | 52.9 |
| 1991-2002 | 57.1 | 44.1 |
| 62.F TV Watching (Mean Hours per Day) |  |  |
| 1972-80 | 2.5 | 2.9 |
| 1981-90 |  | 3.0 |
| 1991-2002 | 2.3 | 2.9 |
| *Too few cases to report | 2.5 |  |

Table 63
Differences of Ethnic/Racial and Religious Groups from the Overall National Average on Nondemographics

|  | Average Absolute <br> Percentage Point <br> Difference from the |
| :--- | :--- |
| Ethnic/Racial Groups | Overall Average |


|  |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Jewish | $\mathbf{1 1 . 4}$ |
| Black | 10.1 |
| Other | 7.2 |
| Asian | 6.9 |
| Hispanic | 5.8 |
| Scandinavian | 5.1 |
| Native American | 4.4 |
| British | 4.0 |
| Polish | 3.8 |
| Eastern European | 3.6 |
| Italian | 3.5 |
| French | 3.1 |
| German | 2.9 |
| Irish | 2.6 |
| Other Whites | 2.1 |

Average Absolute
Percentage Point
Difference from the
Overall Average

| Religious Groups | Difference from the <br> Overall Average |
| :--- | :--- |

Jewish 11.4

None $\quad 8.8$
Fundamentalist Protestant 5.2
Other
4.5

Liberal Protestant 3.7
Catholic 2.0
Moderate Protestant 1.7

Table 64
Average Difference from Jews of Other Ethnic/Racial and Religious Groups on Nondemographics

| Ethnic/Racial Groups | Average Difference <br> Percentage Points |
| :--- | :---: |
| Eastern European | 9.8 |
| Italian | 9.8 |
| Scandinavian | 10.2 |
| Irish | 10.3 |
| Polish | 10.5 |
| British | 11.1 |
| French | 12.0 |
| German | 12.2 |
| Other White | 12.8 |
| Other | 13.5 |
| Hispanic | 13.9 |
| Asian | 14.4 |
| Native American | 14.5 |
| Black | 17.0 |
|  |  |
| Religious Groups | Average Difference |
|  | Percentage Points |
| None | 7.1 |
| Other | 10.0 |
| Liberal Protestant | 10.2 |
| Catholic | 11.0 |
| Moderate Protestant | 11.5 |
| Fundamentalist Protestant | 16.1 |

Table 65
Jewish Distinctiveness by Topic Area

| Topic | Difference from <br> Overall Mean | Topic | Average Percent of <br> Items at Extremes |
| :--- | :---: | :--- | :--- |
| Abortion Rights | 28.7 | Abortion Rights | 100.0 |
| Religion | 22.2 | Suicide | 100.0 |
| Sexual Morality | 21.2 | Child Values | 90.0 |
| Politics | 19.0 | Sexual Morality | 71.4 |
| Suicide | 18.1 | Gender Roles | 68.8 |
| Misc. | 13.4 | Politics | 64.3 |
| Civil Liberties | 13.0 | Civil Liberties | 60.0 |
| Child Values | 12.1 | Misc. | 58.3 |
| Gender Roles | 9.6 | Religion | 55.6 |
| Intergroup Rel. | 8.3 | Intergroup Rel. | 50.0 |
| Crime | 7.7 | Socializing | 50.0 |
| Well-being | 7.1 | Well-being | 50.0 |
| Spending/Taxes | 6.9 | Confidence | 46.1 |
| Misanthropy | 6.8 | Social Welfare | 37.5 |
| Confidence | 5.1 | Finances/Jobs | 35.7 |
| Socializing | 4.8 | Spending/Taxes | 33.4 |
| Finances/Jobs | 4.5 | Crime | 29.2 |
| Social Welfare | 4.4 | Misanthropy | 16.7 |

a. This takes the percentage of items on which Jews are at the highest or lowest extreme among the fifteen ethnic groups and the seven religious groups and averages them.

Table 66
Changes in Average Difference between Jews and NonJews by Topic, 1972-2002a

| Topic | Average Difference 1972-80 | Average <br> Difference <br> 1991-2002 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1991-20021 } \\ & 1972-80 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender Roles (8) | 20.6 | 9.8 | 0.478 |
| Finances/Jobs (5) | 9.5 | 5.0 | 0.529 |
| Socializing (4) | 7.7 | 5.0 | 0.643 |
| Civil Liberties (15) | 20.0 | 13.2 | 0.661 |
| Confidence (13) | 8.4 | 5.7 | 0.674 |
| Intergroup Rel. (12) | 13.8 | 10.6 | 0.768 |
| Spend/Tax/Soc. Wel. (12) | 8.7 | 7.2 | 0.829 |
| Misc. (4) | 11.1 | 9.2 | 0.830 |
| Religion (4) | 28.4 | 24.2 | 0.850 |
| Crime (11) | 7.9 | 7.0 | 0.894 |
| Suicide (5) | 20.3 | 18.4 | 0.807 |
| Sexual Morality (5) | 22.0 | 22.8 | 1.036 |
| Abortion Rights (7) | 28.1 | 29.2 | 1.039 |
| Politics (2) | 17.9 | 20.2 | 1.126 |
| Misanthropy (3) | 5.3 | 6.8 | 1.297 |
| Well-being (6) | 3.1 | 7.3 | 2.375 |
| Overall (117) | 14.1 | 11.5 | 0.812 |

a. There were 117 items with trends for the entire period. They appear in sixteen topics in this table because there were no items in child values with trends for the whole period and only one trend for social welfare policy. That single social welfare item is included with the spending/taxes items.

Table 67
Jewish Subgroup Differences by Topics

|  | \% of Items with <br> Statistically Significant <br> Differences at .05 |
| :--- | :---: |
| Topics | 59.3 |
| Religion | 47.6 |
| Politics | 26.7 |
| Child Values | 22.2 |
| Miscellaneous | 2.2 |
| Well-being | 20.5 |
| Confidence in Institutions | 20.0 |
| Civil Liberties | 16.7 |
| Socializing | 16.7 |
| Social Welfare | 14.3 |
| Sexual Morality | 13.3 |
| Suicide | 11.1 |
| Spending/Taxes | 9.5 |
| Intergroup Relations | 8.3 |
| Crime | 5.3 |
| Abortion Rights | 4.2 |
| Gender Roles | 0.0 |
| Finance/Jobs | 0.0 |

Table 68
Differences among Jews on Nondemographics by Topics

| 68.A Religion Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Bible Inerrancy | No=None,Ref** | No=Low *** | No=None*** |
| Praying | Low=None*** | Low=Low*** | Low=None** |
| Attend Services | Low=None*** | ----a | Low $=$ None*** |
| School Prayers | For=NS | For=NS | For=Other* |
| World Evil/Good | Good=NS | Good=NS | Good=not None** |
| Humans Good/Bad | Good=NC* | Good=NS | Good=NS |
| Relig. Strength | Low=None** | Low=Low*** | ----b |
| God | No=NS | No=Low ** | No=None*** |
| Afterlife | No=NS | No=Mod** | No=None* |

## 68.B Abortion Rights

| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Defect in Fetus | Allow=NS | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| Not Married | Allow=Ref | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| Raped | Allow=NS | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| No More Children | Allow=Ref** | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| Mother's Health | Allow=NS | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| Can't Afford | Allow=Ref** | Allow=Mod* | Allow=NS |
| Any Reason | Allow=Ref** | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |

a. Since attendance is used to distinguish Jews, it would be redundant to report it here.
b. Religious strength is asked in terms of current affiliation and is not asked of those with no current affiliation.

For Denominations: Con=Conservative; None=no denomination chosen; Ortho=Orthodox; Ref=Reform; NC=no clear pattern
For Attendance: Low=less than yearly; Mod=moderate (less than monthly); High=monthly+; NC=no clear pattern
For Current/Past: Jew=current Jew; None=raised Jewish, now none; Other=raised Jewish, now other; NC=no clear pattern
NS =not statistically significant at the 0.1 level

* $=$ statistically significant at 0.1 level
${ }^{* *}=$ statistically significant at .05 level
***=statistical significant at . 001 level

| 68.C Suicide <br> Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Incurable Disease | Allow=NS | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| Bankrupt | Allow=NS | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| Dishonored Family | Allow=None ${ }^{*}$ | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| Tired of Living | Allow=None** | Allow=Low** | Allow=NS |
| Euthanasia | Allow=NS | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| 68.D Sexual Morality |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Premarital Sex | Yes=NS | Yes=Low** | Yes=NS |
| Extramarital Sex | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Homosexual Sex | Yes=None*** | Yes=NS | Yes=None** |
| Teenage Sex | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None** |
| Teen Contraceptive | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Porn Allowed | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| X-rated Movie | Saw=NS | Saw=NS | Saw=NS |
| 68.E Intergroup Relations |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Special Help Blks. | For=NS | For=NS | For=NS |
| Race Dif. Discrim. | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Race Dif. Inborn | Yes=NS | Yes=Mod* | Yes=NS |
| Race Dif. School | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Race Dif. Motivtn. | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Intermarriage | Legal=None, Ref** | Legal=NS | Legal=None ${ }^{* * *}$ |
| Segregate Neigh. | Allow=NS | Allow=NS | Allow=NS |
| Black Push Rights | For=None,Ref*** | For=NS | For=NS |
| Oth. Race Neighbor | Has=NS | Has=NS | Has=NS |
| Busing | For=None* | For=Low** | For=NS |
| BIk. President | For=NS | For=NS | For=NS |
| Open Housing Law | For=NS | For=NS | For=NS |
| Affirm. Action | For=NS | For=NS | For=NS |
| Spec. Favors Blks. | For=NS | For=NS | For=None* |


| 68.F Well-being Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| General Happiness | Very=NS | Very=High** | Very=NS |
| Marital Happiness | Very=None,Ref ${ }^{* * *}$ | Very=Mod** | Very=NS |
| Finan. Satisfied | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Job Satisfied | Yes=NS | Yes=High** | Yes=NS |
| Health | Excel=NC* | Excel=NS | Excel=NS |
| Life Exciting | Yes=NS | Yes=NC* | Yes=NS |
| 68.G Finances/Jobs |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Parents < Self | Self=NS | Self=NS | Self=NS |
| Kids > Self | Kids=NS | Kids=NS | Kids=NS |
| Lose Job | No=NS | No=NS | No=NS |
| Find Like Job | Can=NS | Can=NS | Can=NS |
| Work if Rich | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Ahead by Hard Work | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Finances Better | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| 68.H Gender Roles |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Woman President | For=NS | For=NS | For=None* |
| Women Suited Pols. | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Women Work | For=Ref** | For=NS | For=NS |
| Women Home, Pols. | No=NS | No=NS | No=NS |
| Preschlers. Suffer | No=NS | No=NS | No=NS |
| Help Husband Frst. | No=NS | No=NS | No=NS |
| Men Work | No=NS | No=NS | No=NS |
| Working Mother | OK=NS | OK=NS | OK=NS |
| 68.I Child Values |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Obeying | Top=Ortho, Con** | Top=High ** | Top=Other ${ }^{*}$ |
| Popularity | Top=NS | Top=NS | Top=NS |
| Think for Self | Top=None** | Top=NS | Top=None*** |
| Work Hard | Top=NS | Top=Mod* | Top=NS |
| Help Others | Top=NS | Top=NS | Top=NS |


| 68.J Misanthropy Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Trust | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Helpful | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Fair | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| 68.K Socializing |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| With Friends | Often=NS | Often=NS | Often=NS |
| With Neighbors | Often=NS | Often=NS | Often=NS |
| With Relatives | Often=NS | Often $=$ NC** | Often=NS |
| At Bars | Not Never=NS | Not Never=Mod** | Not Never=NS |
| 68.L Politics |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Voted in 1992 | Yes=Ref*** | Yes=Mod** | Yes=NS |
| Voted in 1996 | Yes=Ref** | Yes=Mod** | Yes=NS |
| Voted in 2000 | Yes=Ref** | Yes=Mod ${ }^{*}$ | Yes=NS |
| Voted Dem. in 1992 | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Voted Dem. in 1996 | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None,Other ${ }^{* *}$ |
| Pol. Ideology | Liberal=None** | Liberal=Low** | Liberal=None** |
| Party ID | Dem=Con* | Dem=NS | Dem $=$ Jew** |
| 68.M Confidence in Institutions |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Banks/Financial | GrtDeal=Not None*** | GrtDeal=High* | GrtDeal=NS |
| Major Companies | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=Low** | GrtDeal=NS |
| Organized Religion | GrtDeal=Ortho** | GrtDeal=High*** | GrtDeal=Jew*** |
| Education | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS |
| Fed. Exec. Branch | GrtDeal=NC** | GrtDeal=High** | GrtDeal=NS |
| Organized Labor | GrtDeal=None** | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS |
| Press | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS |
| Medicine | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS |
| TV | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS |
| Supreme Court | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS |
| Science | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS |
| Congress | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS |
| Military | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS | GrtDeal=NS |


| 68.N Spending/Taxes |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Space | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Environment | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Health | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Solve Big City | More=Con** | More=Mod* | More=NS |
| Crime Rate | More=Con* | More=NS | More=NS |
| Less Drug Addict. | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Education | More=Not Ortho** | More=NS | More=NS |
| Improvement Blks. | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| National Defense | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Foreign Aid | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Welfare | More=NS | More=Low** | More=NS |
| Social Security | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Roads/Bridges | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Parks | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Mass Transit | More=None, Con ${ }^{\text {* }}$ | More=Mod** | More=NS |
| Assist Poor | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Law Enforcement | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Assist Blacks | More=NS | More=NS | More=Other,None* |
| Assist Big Cities | More=NS | More=Mod** | More=None** |
| Drug Rehab | More=NS | More=NS | More=NS |
| Own Income Taxes | Too High=NS | Too High=NS | Too High=NS |
| 68.0 Social Welfare |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Equalize Wealth | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None** |
| Govt. Help Poor | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Govt. Help Sick | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None** |
| Govt. Do More | Yes=None* | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |


| 68.P Crime <br> Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Death Penalty | No=NS | No=NS | No=NS |
| Tougher Courts | No=NS | No=Low* | No=NS |
| Fear | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Gun in House | Yes=Ref, Missing** | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Personal Gun | Yes=Ref, Missing* | Yes=NS | Yes=Ns |
| Police Hit, Ever | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Pol. Hit, Escapee | Yes=Ref, Ortho** | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Pol. Hit, Attack | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=Jew** |
| Pol. Hit, Murderer | Yes=No | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Pol. Hit, Abuse | Yes=NS | Yes=Mod* | Yes=NS |
| Wiretap | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| 68.Q Civil Liberties |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Anti-Relig. Speak | Yes=None** | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Anti-Relig. Teach | Yes=None*** | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Anti-Relig. Book | Yes=None*** | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Racist Speak | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None* |
| Racist Teach | Yes=None* | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Racist Book | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None** |
| Communist Speak | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None* |
| Communist Teach | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Communist Book | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None** |
| Militarist Speak | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Militarist Teach | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Militarist Book | Yes=None,Ref*******) | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Homosexual Speak | Yes=not Ortho** | Yes=Low** | Yes=None** |
| Homosexual Teach | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=NS |
| Homosexual Book | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None** |
| 68.R Miscellaneous |  |  |  |
| Topics | Denominations | Attendance | Current/Past |
| Spanking Children | Approve=NS | Approve=NS | Approve=NS |
| Divorce Laws | Easier=NS | Easier=NS | Easier=NS |
| World War Expected | Yes=NS | Yes=NS | Yes=None** |
| Legalize Marijuana | Yes=NS | Yes=Low* | Yes=None*** |
| Newspaper Reading | Often=NS | Often=Mod** | Often=Jew** |
| TV Hours | High=NS | High=High* | High=NC** |

Table 69
Relationship of Education and Income to Selected Measures among Jews, 1988-2002

|  | (regression coefficient/probability level) <br> Independent Variables |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Dependent Variables | Years of Schooling | Household Income |
| Abortion scaleb | $-.209 / .006$ | $-.009 / .906$ |
| Political ideology | $-.196 / .001$ | $.166 / .006$ |
| Civil liberties scalec | $-.250 / .001$ | $-.005 / .949$ |
| Equalize wealth | $-.065 / .380$ | $.147 / .052$ |
| Homosexual behavior | $-.174 / .019$ | $-.043 / .567$ |
| Govt. help sick | $-.163 / .031$ | $.110 / .155$ |
| Spending on welfare | $-.080 / .323$ | $.049 / .554$ |
| Party identification | $-.070 / .228$ | $.020 / .741$ |

Note: Items are coded so a negative relationship indicates that years of schooling or household education is associated with the liberal positions (i.e., pro-choice, selfidentification as liberal, for free speech, etc., for equalizing wealth, accepting of homosexuality, for more government health care, for more welfare spending, and Democratic Party identification).
a. Multiple regression analysis was conducted with additional controls for age, sex, region (Northeast vs. other), and urbanicity.
b. A scale was made from the seven abortion items.
c. A scale was made from the fifteen civil liberties items.

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## Appendixes

## Appendix 1:

The National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey
The National Data Program for the Social Sciences has been monitoring trends in American society since 1972. It is the largest and longest-running research effort supported by the Sociology Program of the National Science Foundation. Since 1972 the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago has conducted the General Social Survey (GSS) twenty-four times to examine how American society works and what social changes are occurring. The GSSs are full-probability samples of adults (eighteen+) living in households in the United States. Interviews are conducted in person. The annual response rates have ranged from 70.0 percent to 82.4 percent. Across the surveys from 1972 to 2002, 43,698 people have been interviewed. For more details on sampling, survey design, question wordings, and other information, see James A. Davis, Tom W. Smith, and Peter V. Marsden, General Social Surveys: 19722002: Cumulative Codebook (Chicago: NORC, 2003). Also, consult the following Web site: www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss.

The GSSs are directed by James A. Davis (NORC, University of Chicago), Tom W. Smith (NORC, University of Chicago), and Peter V. Marsden (Harvard University).

## Appendix 2 :

## Ethnic Classification

Because the GSSs are replicating cross-sectional surveys, it is possible to aggregate subgroups by pooling across years. This is the strategy used in this analysis. For the trend analysis of how Jews and non-Jews have compared across time, surveys were grouped together as listed below:

|  | Sample Size |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Years | Jews | Non-Jews |
| $1972-80$ | 272 | 11,816 |
| $1981-90$ | 266 | 13,126 |
| $1991-2002$ | 333 | 17,015 |
| All Years | 871 | 41,957 |

To compare Jews with other ethnic groups, the 1991-2002 GSSs were combined into the following categories:

| Ethnicity | Sample <br> Size |
| :--- | ---: |
| German (includes Austrian, Dutch) | 2,662 |
| British (English, Welsh, Scottish) | 2,254 |
| Black | 2,228 |
| Irish | 1,631 |
| Hispanic (Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, etc.) | 1,033 |
| Italian | 779 |
| Native American (American Indian) | 601 |
| Scandinavian (Danish, Swedish, Norse, Finnish) | 566 |
| French | 516 |
| Eastern European (except Polish) | 430 |
| Asian | 395 |
| Polish | 351 |
| Jewish | 333 |
| Other White (Other Countries/DK Country) | 3,513 |
| Other (Non-White and Non-Black; Other/DK Country) | 140 |
| All | 17,433 |

This ethnic typology combines elements of national origins, religion, and race into fif teen groups. Classification as German, British, Irish, Hispanic, Italian, Scandinavian, Native American, French, Eastern European, Polish, and Asian is based on the nationa origin item. ("From what country or part of the world did your ancestors come?") Classification as Jewish is based on current religion. ("What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?") Classification as

Black, Other White, and Other is based in whole or in part on the race item. ("What race do you consider yourself?") Other Whites are those a) giving their race as White, b) not Jewish, and c) either mentioning a national origin not covered above or not selecting any national origin. Others are a) Other on race (non-White and non-Black), b) not Jewish, and c) either mentioning a national origin not covered above or not selecting any national origin.

In both of the above listings these are the maximum number of each group that the analysis is based on. Due to missing values or questions not being asked in a particular GSS, the number of respondents in many comparisons will be somewhat smaller

If Jewish was eliminated as an ethnic category and Jews were assigned to othe ethnic/racial groups, 95.7 percent would be non-Hispanic White ( 38.5 percent Eastern European, mostly Russian; 31.6 percent Other White; 9.9 percent Polish; 8.8 percent German; and 6.9 percent in the other European groups delineated above) and 4.3 percent other races and ethnicities ( 2.2 percent Black, 1.2 percent Hispanic, 0.9 percent Asian).

For alternative definitions and how their use affects the size of the Jewish population, see Appendices 4 and 5 .

## Appendix 3: <br> Religious Classification

Religions are divided into seven categories based on current religious preference ("What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?"): 1) Jewish, 2) Catholic, 3) those with no religious preference (i.e., "Nones" on current religion), 4) Protestants belonging to a fundamentalist denomination (e.g., Assemblies of God, Pentecostal, Southern Baptist), 5) Protestants belonging to a moderate denomination (e.g., American Baptist Churches, Evangelical Lutheran Church, Reformed), 6) Protestants belonging to a liberal denomination (e.g., Episcopal, United Church of Christ, Unitarian), and 7) all others (i.e., Other Religions). Protestant denominations are divided on a fundamentalist/liberal theological dimension as explained in Tom W. Smith, "Classifying Protestant Denominations," Review of Religious Research 31 (March 1990): 225-45. In 1991-2002 there were the following number of cases:

| Jews | 333 |
| :--- | ---: |
| Catholics | 4,430 |
| Nones | 3,799 |
| Fundamentalist Protestants | 5,248 |
| Moderate Protestants | 2,071 |
| Liberal Protestants | 2,296 |
| Other Religions | 807 |
| Total | 17,195 |

Due to missing values and questions not being asked in a particular GSS, the number in many comparisons will be somewhat smaller.

## Appendix 4: Classification of Jews

Jews were divided in three different ways to examine subgroup differences. The first classification considered current and previous religious identification. It consisted of a) those currently giving their religion as Jewish (the same definition of Jewish as used in the over-time and ethnic and religious group analyses), b) those raised as Jewish, but with no current religious preference, and c) those raised as Jewish, but with some other current religious preference (Catholic, Protestant, or some other religion). In the 19882002 GSSs there were 412 current Jews, 42 Jewish/None, and 29 Jewish/Other.

The second classification used an item first added in 1988 that asks current Jews, "Do you consider yourself Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or none of these?" There were 20 Orthodox, 116 Conservative, 174 Reform, 85 None of these, 1 Don't Know, and 17 No Answer/Missing. ${ }^{1}$ On denominational differences among Jews, see Lazerwitz, 1998; Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002; and United Jewish Communities, 2004a, b, c.

The third classification looked at current Jews by frequency of attending religious services. The three levels were: High (monthly or more often), Moderate (less than monthly, but at least once or twice a year), and Low (less than once a year or never) In 1988-2002 there were 99 High, 212 Moderate, and 99 Low cases.

[^0]
## Appendix 5: <br> Estimates of Jewish Proportion of American Population

Using current religious preference/affiliation as the criteria, Jews are about 1.5-2.0 percent of the adult population (Table A5.1). Using broader definitions of who is Jewish pushes estimates of the Jewish share of the adult population to 1.7-2.5 percent (Table A5.2). Figures for the total population (adults + children) in turn slightly reduce the estimates.

## Table A5.1

## Estimates of Number of Jews in the United States: Adults

| Orgs. | Dates | Mode | Sample Size | Estimates |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  |  |  | MVs Included MVs Excluded |  |
| Gallup | $1997-2001$ | T | 13,714 | -- | $1.8 \%$ |
| Gallup | $2001-02$ | T | 25,102 | -- | $1.9 \%$ |
| ANES/ISR | $1998-2000$ | T/P | $3,049-3,088$ | $2.0 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ |
| GSS | $1998-2002$ | P | $8,353-8,414$ | $1.8 \%$ | $1.8 \%$ |
| ARIS | 2001 | T | $47,525-50,238 \mathrm{a}$ | $1.3-1.4 \%$ | $1.4 \%$ |
| NJPS | $2000-01$ | T | $170,922-174,660^{\text {b }}$ | $1.6 \%$ | $1.6 \%$ |

## T=telephone

=in person/face-to-face
a. ARIS reports 1.3 percent in Exhibit 1, but using numbers also reported in Exhibit 1, a level of 1.4 percent is obtained. The number of cases with missing data excluded is estimated based on percentages reported in Exhibit 1.
b. The number of cases with missing data excluded is estimated based on reported 2.1 percent missing.

## Wordings:

Gallup:
What is your religious preference-is it Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or an Orthodox religion such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?

ANES/ISR (American National Election Studies/Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan):
If attends religious services: Do you mostly attend a place of worship that is Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or what?
If doesn't attend religious services: Regardless of whether you now attend religious services, do you ever think of yourself as part of a particular church or denomination? If yes: Do you consider yourself Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or what?

GSS (General Social Survey, NORC, University of Chicago)
What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?

ARIS (American Religious Identification Survey, City University of New York):
What is your religion, if any?
NJPS (National Jewish Population Survey, United Jewish Communities):
What is (your)(NAMES's) religion, if any?

Table A5.2
Estimates of Number of Jews in the United States for Adults and Total Population using Various Definitions

| Survey | Adults | Total <br> Populationa |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| GSS: |  |  |
| Religious Preference | 1.8 | 1.7 |
| Rel. Pref. + Religious Upbringing | 2.1 | 1.9 |
| Current or Raised Jewish <br> ARIS/AJIS: | 2.2 | 2.0 |
| Religious Preference <br> Rel. Pref. + Parentage | $1.3-1.4$ | --- |
| Rel. Pref. + Par. + Upbringing + <br> Considers Self Jewish <br> Core Jewish Population | 2.4 | --- |
| NJPS: <br> Religious Preference | 2.6 | --- |
| Rel. Pref. + Jewish Background, <br> no current religion <br> Rel. Pref., Jewish Background, <br> not now Christian or Muslim <br> Rel. Pref. + Jewish Background | 1.9 | 1.9 c |
|  | 1.5 | 1.5 |

a. Total population estimate for the GSS assumes that all members of a household (adults and children are the same religion as the randomly selected adult respondent.
b. While the ARIS and AJIS (American Jewish Identification Survey) are essentially the same survey, estimates from separate reports differ for reasons that are not clear. Two figures under adults are based respectively on number of cases divided by total number of respondents and estimated total number of adults that this represents divided by total number of adults according to the Census.
c. Includes adjustment for institutionalized population and omission of Alaska and Hawaii.

GSS:
Religious Preferences = Jewish on following question: "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?"

Religious Preference + Religious Upbringing = Jewish on religious preference item above + "no religion" on religious preference item and Jewish on item: "In what religion were you raised?"

Current or Raised Jewish = Jewish on either current religious preference or religion raised in. ARIS/AJIS:
Religious Preference = Jewish on the following question: "What is your religion, if any?"
Religious Preference + Parentage $=$ Jewish on religious preference item above + had Jewish parent ("Do you or does anyone else in your household have a Jewish mother or a Jewish father?" If "Yes" or "Partly/half Jewish," then: "Is it you, yourself, someone else in your household, or both you and someone else in the household that has a Jewish mother or father?")

Religious Preference + Parentage + Upbringing + Considers Self Jewish $=$ Jewish on religious preference or parentage or upbringing ("Were you, or anyone in your household raised as Jewish?" If
"Yes" or "Partly/half Jewish": "Is it you, yourself, or someone else in your household, or both you and someone else in your household that was raised Jewish?") or other self-identification: ("Do you, or anyone else in your household consider himself/herself to be Jewish?" If "Yes": "Is it just you yourself, someone else in your household, or both you and someone else in your household that considers himself/herself to be Jewish?")

Core Jewish Population = Religious preference is Jewish or has Jewish parent and no current religious preference or the minor, coresiding child of such a person

NJPS:
Religious Preference = Adults: "What is your (relationship's) religion, if any?" Children: "In what religion is your (relationship) being raised?"

Rel. Pref. + Jewish Background, no current religion = In addition to those with Jewish religious preference, includes the following:

Adults: "What is your (relation's) religion, if any?" None, No Religion, Secular, Atheist, Agnostic, Don't Know, Refused and Jewish to at least one of the following: "Was your (relationship's) mother born Jewish? Was your (relationship's) father born Jewish? Were you (was your [relationship]) raised Jewish?"

Children: "In what religion is your (relationship) being raised?" None, No Religion, Secular Atheist, Agnostic, Don't Know, Refused and Jewish to at least one of the following: "Is your (relationship) being raised Jewish? Is your (relationship) considered Jewish for any reason?"

Rel. Pref., Jewish Background, not now Christian or Muslim = to those with Jewish background, but no current religion, adds in those with any non-Christian and non-Muslim religion and some Jewish background.

Rel. Pref. + Jewish Background = adds in those now Christian or Muslim with some Jewish background (i.e., mother or father born Jewish or person raised as Jewish)

OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY TOM W. SMITH FOR THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Jewish Attitudes toward Blacks and Race Relations.
Jewish Sociology Papers.
New York: American Jewish Committee, 1990.
What Do Americans Think About Jews?
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New York: American Jewish Committee, December 2001.
Reprinted in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41
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[^0]:    1. The GSS appears to get more Reform Jews than the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) 2000-01 found (United Jewish Communities, 2003a, b, c). The GSS has 44 percent Reform, 29 percent Conservative, 5 percent Orthodox, and 20 percent none of these. The NJPS reports 35 percent Reform, 26 percent Conservative, 10 percent Orthodox, 20 percent "just Jewish," and 9 percent other. However most of the differences probably reflect the different way the items were asked and coded rather than real differences in the distribution of Jewish denominations across the surveys.
