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# Jewish Distinctiveness In America

A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT

Tom W. Smith



THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

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A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism and promotes human rights for all; works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between Americans and Israelis; advocates public policy positions rooted in American democratic values and the perspectives of the Jewish heritage; and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States.

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#### FOREWORD

Jewish conventional wisdom claims that "Jews are just like everybody else, only more so." The kernel of truth—and misunderstanding—in that bit of folklore is revealed in this multidimensional statistical portrait of American Jewry, based on the General Social Surveys (GSS) conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago between 1972 and 2002. Among the myriad of ethnic groups and religious denominations that make up the American mosaic, American Jews are the most distinctive. Yet on 84 percent of the items, Jews and non-Jews take the same side of the issue, and over the decades, the gap between Jews and other Americans has narrowed, largely by non-Jews moving toward the positions held by Jews.

Dr. Tom Smith, an eminent social scientist and the director of the GSS, has mined thirty years of surveys to profile American Jews statistically, for dozens of demographic categories and on 153 nondemographic questions—everything from family size and per capita income to viewing X-rated movies and spanking one's children. By comparing Jews to other ethnic/racial and religious groups within America, Smith shows their relative position and which groups are closest to Jews. By comparing Jews and non-Jews over time, he shows how changes have taken place.

Out of this treasure trove of data, Dr. Smith discerns six megapatterns that describe Jewish distinctiveness in the United States:

• Jews attach great importance to seeking knowledge and highly value education and science. Their pursuit of education leads them to higher occupational status, better vocabulary scores, and more vociferous newspaper reading. It also influences many attitudes and values, which, in America, tend to become more liberal with higher education. • Jews value individual freedom and choice. On many issues where Jews differ most markedly from non-Jews—on support for abortion rights, civil liberties, sexual freedom, and allowing euthanasia—Jews favor moral autonomy over governmental regulation or societal conformity.

• Jews identify themselves as liberal more than do others, and this is reflected in their political affiliation and voting patterns, their egalitarian views on gender roles, and their support for policies promoting integration and racial equality.

• Jews display an urban orientation, reflecting their high concentration in large metropolitan areas. This translates into support for greater spending for the cities and for mass transportation, and an aversion to owning guns and hunting.

• Jews are skeptical about the military, and favor cuts in defense spending.

• Jews take a nonpunitive approach to child-raising, disapproving of corporal punishment and valuing children who "think for themselves."

Why should we care about all of this—other than for "bragging rights" or a parlor game? We care because the numbers reveal an underlying strength of the American Jewish community: Despite our declining share of the overall American population, a high intermarriage rate, and a growing geographical dispersion, Jews have been able to retain a distinctive profile which bespeaks a unique core Jewish identity. Furthermore, Jews have embraced certain broad values, such as belief in the importance of education and in expressive individualism, that seem to have resonance for other Americans as well.

Dr. Smith theorizes that Jews occupy a special place in the American amalgam in that they are both an ethnic group and a religion, and these two aspects reinforce each other. "Jews, as a religious group, are expected to maintain and pass on their Jewish identity. As an ethnic group, their religion is not only an attribute of individuals and families, but a trait of the collective Jewish community." We at the American Jewish Committee value the research that informs our efforts to strengthen the quality of American Jewish life. Dr. Smith has given us as detailed a picture as we are likely to get of what American Jews think and believe, and from this we can take heart about our future viability and vitality.

David A. Harris Executive Director The American Jewish Committee April 2005

#### INTRODUCTION

America is a diverse society. Its citizens come from all of the world's peoples, practicing all of the world's faiths, to form, in Seymour Martin Lipset's phrase, the "first new nation." This nation joins together Native Americans with immigrants from all the continents and countries into a new American nationality. While the metaphor of a melting pot has often been used to describe this process, it is really more aptly characterized as an amalgamation or commingling, as the new is formed from the parts of the old. On top of this broad ethnic/racial diversity comes even greater religious variation. Hundreds of ethnic groups are subdivided into thousands of denominations. Nor are these religions expected to disappear or blend together as the old nationalities did. Quite the contrary—freedom of religion is a central guarantee of America, and faiths are expected to continue to flourish.

Moreover, not only is the ethnic/racial and religious mixture extensive and complex, but it is also dynamic. The flow of immigrants continues, and the mix of origins changes as once-small groups grow larger. These new immigrants not only bring new religions with them, but the domestic religious marketplace is continually adding new denominations from schisms, mergers, and the genesis of entirely new faiths.

Understanding America means understanding both its pluralistic nature and the groups that form its ethnic-religious mosaic. In turn, to understand each ethnic, racial, and religious group, one must compare and contrast each to other groups and society as a whole. To obtain a clear picture of the whole, one needs to look at the parts, and to see the position and importance of each part, one needs to have it reflected against the other parts. One important part of America's ethnic-religious mix is the Jewish people. Three hundred and fifty years ago Jewish refugees from the Portuguese Inquisition in Recife, Brazil, arrived in the future United States. Since then, Jews have been an integral part of the American nation and have made enormous contributions to the arts and sciences, the economy, the government, and all other spheres of life. The public readily acknowledges the important role of Jews, as indicated by a 2000 survey asking about twelve ethnic/racial groups, which ranked Jews second only to settlers from England in making positive contributions to America (Smith, 2001).

To extend our understanding of the position of Jews in contemporary society, this report examines American Jews through comparative perspectives. First, by comparing Jews to other ethnic/racial and religious groups, one can establish the relative position of Jews in America on both the ethnic/racial and religious dimensions and also determine which groups Jews are closer to and more distant from. Second, comparing Jews and non-Jews over time enables us to examine recent sociopolitical change both for Jews alone and with respect to other Americans. Finally, by comparing different types of Jews (e.g., by denomination and by level of observance), one can investigate the degree of internal solidarity and see how different subgroups of Jews are related to non-Jews. Collectively, these comparisons provide notable insights into the nature, role, and position of Jews in contemporary American society.<sup>1</sup>

## DATA, ORGANIZATION, AND METHODS

Almost all the data utilized in this report come from the General Social Surveys (GSSs) conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, between 1972 and 2002. The GSSs are full-probability, in-person samples of adults living in households in the United States. For more details, see Appendix 1 (page 285). For the exact wording of items, see Davis, Smith, and Marsden, 2003, or go to www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss.

The first section of the report compares Jews to other ethnic/ racial and religious groups. In the first series of comparisons, Jews are examined as one of fifteen ethnic/racial groups: Jews, Germans, the British, Blacks, the Irish, Hispanics, Italians, Native Americans, Scandinavians, the French, Eastern Europeans, Asians, the Polish, Other Whites, and Others.<sup>2</sup> Details on the definitions of these groups are given in Appendix 2 (page 286). In the second comparison, Jews are compared as one of seven religious groups: Jews, Fundamentalist Protestants, Moderate Protestants, Liberal Protestants, Catholics, those with no religious preference (None), and those in Other Religions. Details on this religious typology are given in Appendix 3 (page 288). Two separate comparisons are carried out because Jews are and should be examined as both an ethnic/racial group and a religious group.

The second section examines trends over time for Jews and non-Jews. The GSSs are grouped into three time periods: the 1970s (1972-80), the 1980s (1981-90), and the recent period (1991-2002). Appendix 1 (page 285) shows the distribution of groups by period. These three time periods were chosen to allow the aggregation of enough Jewish cases so that changes in demographics and attitudes could be analyzed over time.

The third section looks at differences among Jews. Three different analyses of intra-Jewish variation are carried out. The first compares those who currently identify as Jewish to those raised as Jewish and now without any religious preference, and to those raised as Jewish and now following some other religion. The second examines different denominational streams within Judaism (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Other). The third approach divides Jews by their level of attending religious services into high, moderate, and low levels. The Jewish subgroup analyses are carried out for the combined years 1988-2002. This represents all years in which information on Jewish denominational streams were collected. See Appendix 4 (page 289) for more details on these three classifications of Jews.

The data analyzed are divided into demographics (current and for family of origin) and nondemographics (mostly attitudes). The nondemographics cover 153 measures grouped into eighteen topical categories: Religion (nine items), Abortion Rights (seven), Suicide and Euthanasia (five), Sexual Morality (seven), Gender Roles/Equality (eight), Child Values (five), Misanthropy (three), Socializing (four), Politics and Voting (seven), Confidence in Institutions (thirteen), Government Spending Priorities/Taxes (twenty-one), Social-Welfare Policies (four), Intergroup Relations (fourteen), Civil Liberties (fifteen), Crime and Firearms (twelve), Psychological Wellbeing and Health (six), Finances and Jobs (seven), and Miscellaneous (six). Analysis examines patterns overall, within the eighteen topical categories, and those that emerge across topics.

#### JEWS IN AMERICA'S ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MOSAIC

#### Demographic Profile

America is made up of many different ethnic/racial and religious groups with unique histories and distinctive backgrounds and attributes. In many cases the various ethnic/racial and religious groups differ from one another on various basic demographic variables, including age, family characteristics, socioeconomic status, laborforce participation, and current and former residence.

Jews are very distinctive on family demographics (Tables 1-2, 4-5).<sup>3</sup> First, they are older than other Americans: The average age for adult Jews is 47.7 compared with 44.3 for non-Jews (United Jewish Communities, 2003). Among ethnic/racial groups only the British are older (49.6), and among religious groups only Liberal Protestants have a higher average age (50.8). This comes about because Jews have a high life expectancy and relatively low birthrates in recent decades.

Second, Jews exceed all other ethnic/racial and religious groups in being married (65 percent of Jews vs. 57 percent of non-Jews).<sup>4</sup> This in large part results from their relatively low level of divorce. With 21 percent ever having been divorced, Jews are lower than all other groups except Asians (11 percent) and Catholics (20 percent).

Third, despite having more stable marriages, Jews have smaller families than other groups do (Keister, 2003; Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; United Jewish Communities, 2003; Waite, 2002). They have fewer brothers and sisters than any other ethnic/racial or religious group (2.4 vs. an average of 3.8); they are tied with Italians for the lowest number of children ever born (1.6 compared to an average of 1.9), but do have more children than those with no religion (1.2) and Other Religions (1.4). They have the smallest current household size of any ethnic/racial or religious group (2.5 vs. an average of 2.9).

Jews also differ notably from others in their residential pattern (Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; United Jewish Communities, 2003). More than any other group, Jews live in and near the largest cities. They are more likely than any other ethnic or religious group to live in one of the twelve largest central cities and are also the ethnic/racial and religious group most likely to reside in a suburb of the twelve largest cities. Similarly, Jews are more than twice as concentrated in the Northeast than non-Jews are (43 percent vs. 20 percent). Only Italians are more likely to reside in the Northeast than Jews are (51 percent vs. 43 percent), and Jews lead all religious groups in being Northeasterners.

Jews exceed other groups in socioeconomic status (SES) (Alba, Lutz, and Vesselinov, 2001; Keister, 2003; Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; Lehrer, 1999; United Jewish Communities, 2003; Wilder, 1996; Wilder and Walters, 1998). First, Jews surpass all ethnic/racial and religious groups in education. Mean years of schooling is 15.7 for Jews vs. 13.1 for non-Jews, and 61 percent of Jews have at least a four-year college degree as compared with 22 percent of non-Jews.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, spouses of married Jews have much higher education than the spouses of non-Jews (Kalmijn, 1991). This educational edge leads to Jews topping all other groups in a measure of verbal ability (Lynn, 2004). On average Jews correctly identified 7.2 of 10 words compared to 6.0 words correct for non-Jews.

Second, Jews hold more prestigious jobs than any other ethnic/racial or religious group. Their occupational prestige averaged 51.9 compared to 43.2 for non-Jews. Third, the high education and occupational standing of Jews lead to their exceeding all other ethnic/racial and religious groups in household income (Kosmin and Lachman, 1993). In 1986 constant dollars Jews have an average income of \$58,900 compared to \$34,600 for non-Jews. When income per household member is calculated, Jewish per capita income (in 1986 constant dollars) is \$27,500 vs. \$14,100 for non-Jews. Thus, Jewish household income is greater than that of non-Jews by 70 percent, and Jewish per capita income is 95 percent higher. Furthermore, other research indicates that the net wealth of Jews is several times greater than that of those in other major religions (Keister, 2003).

Fourth, these large objective advantages, in turn, create major differences in class identification and self-assessment. Jews are more likely than any other ethnic/racial or religious group to say they are both middle class and upper class. Sixty-seven percent consider themselves to be middle class and 19 percent to be upper class. The respective figures for non-Jews are 46 percent and 3 percent. Likewise, Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group most likely to rate their financial situation as above average (51 percent for Jews vs. 22 percent for non-Jews). Finally, among the socioeconomic status (SES) measures, home ownership is the only indicator on which Jews do not distinguish themselves from other groups (Keister, 2003; Kosmin and Lachman, 1993). While home ownership among Jews is somewhat higher than among non-Jews (72 percent vs. 66 percent), the edge is not statistically significant, and the British, Italians, and Liberal Protestants have higher home-ownership levels than Jews do.

Jews are less distinctive in their labor force status and work history (Kosmin and Lachman, 1993). They do not differ notably from non-Jews in overall employment levels (71 percent for Jews and 68 percent for non-Jews) or proportion retired (14 percent for Jews and 12 percent for non-Jews). However, reflecting their greater education and higher occupational standing, Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group with the lowest level of unemployment during the previous ten years (21 percent for Jews and 32 percent for non-Jews). Also, their concentration in professional, managerial, and proprietary positions holds down their membership in labor unions, so that 17-18 percent of both Jews and non-Jews come from union households.

The decided demographic differences between Jews and non-Jews are not recent developments, but have prevailed across generations (Tables 4-5). First, in terms of family structure, Jews not only are more likely to live in intact marriages, but are more likely to have been raised in a family with both a mother and father present than any other ethnic/racial or religious group. Eighty-two percent of Jews vs. 71 percent of non-Jews grew up in an intact family. Similarly, just as current Jewish families tend to have fewer children than others have, so too were Jews raised in smaller families. They have fewer brothers and sisters than any other ethnic/racial or religious group (2.4 for Jews and 3.8 for non-Jews).

Second, residentially, Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group most likely to have been raised in a large city (41 percent of Jews compared with 14 percent of non-Jews). Even the group with the second highest level of urban origins, Blacks, had only 28 percent from large cities. Likewise, Jews were the religious group most often raised in the Northeast and were behind only Italians in being from the Northeast.

Third, Jews grew up in families with high SES. Jewish mothers

and fathers had greater education than parents of any other ethnic/racial or religious group. Over two-fifths (41 percent) of Jewish fathers had a college education as did 29 percent of Jewish mothers, compared to respectively 17 percent and 11 percent of non-Jewish fathers and mothers. Likewise, the occupational prestige of both Jewish fathers and mothers was higher than that of any other ethnic/racial or religious group. These educational and occupational advantages gave Jews a great financial advantage. More than any other ethnic/racial or religious group, Jews said the homes they grew up in were financially above average. Fifty-two percent of Jews said that their family's financial standing was above average compared to 18 percent of non-Jews.

Fourth, Jews have enjoyed more social mobility than non-Jews have (Alba, Lutz, and Vesselinov, 2001; Chiswick, 1993; Keister, 2003). Compared to the average years of schooling for their parents, Jews have gained 2.5 years, while non-Jews only bettered their parents by 1.9 years of schooling. Likewise, in terms of occupational prestige, Jews score 2.7 points higher than their parents' standing, while non-Jews are up only by 1.3 points.

The success that Jews have achieved comes in part because many positive traits reinforce one another. For example, because of assortative mating, Jews have tended both to have well-educated fathers and mothers and to marry well-educated spouses. This helps to cement and transmit the benefits of education in particular and to promote high socioeconomic status (SES) in general. Similarly, their tendency to have more stable marriages reduces the social and economic disjunctions that divorce often causes within and across generations. Likewise, their relatively lower fertility levels mean that family resources can be concentrated on fewer children. Thus, socioeconomic, marital, and fertility characteristics work together to promote stability and success.

#### Religion

Religion is, of course, the attribute that definitively differentiates Jews from other Americans. But how do Jews and others differ on specific religious behaviors and beliefs, besides their different religious affiliations? As Tables 7-8 show, there are important differences within the religious dimension. First, Jews are less active in several overt expressions of their faith than are others. Of all ethnic/racial groups, Jews are the least likely to attend religious services. Just 7 percent of Jews report going to synagogue each week while 27 percent of non-Jews attend services weekly. At the other end, 31 percent of Blacks and 35 percent of Asians indicate weekly attendance. Among religious groups, only those with no religious preference attend worship services less frequently (1.5 percent weekly). In contrast 22-26 percent of Liberal to Moderate Protestants attend weekly, as do 31 percent of Catholics and 36 percent of Fundamentalist Protestants. Likewise, Jews are the ethnic/racial group least likely to pray daily (26 percent for Jews and 56 percent for non-Jews). At the high end are Blacks with 76 percent praying daily. Again, by religion only those with no religious preference pray less frequently (19 percent daily).

Second, while less engaged in these religious behaviors, Jews do not differ from others on self-ratings of religious strength (37-38 percent of both Jews and non-Jews saying they have a strong religious attachment), and Jews fall in the middle among ethnic/racial and religious groups on religious strength.

Third, Jews fall at or near the bottom on several measures of traditional religious beliefs (Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002). Among all ethnic groups, they are the least likely to be sure that God exists, to believe that there is an afterlife, and to say that the Bible is the exact word of God. Among religious groups, Jews are the least likely to believe in an afterlife, and only those without any religious preference are less likely to hold to these beliefs about God and the

Bible. Thus, certainty about God is held by 27 percent of Jews and 65 percent of non-Jews, belief in an afterlife by 43 percent of Jews and 74 percent of non-Jews, and Bible inerrancy is accepted by 11 percent of Jews and 33 percent of non-Jews. Blacks, at 81 percent, have the highest certitude about God, while Native Americans, at 80 percent, are tops in believing in an afterlife. The distance of Jews from other religious groups is underscored by the fact that their beliefs are much closer to those without any religious preference than to those of any of the other faith groups.

Fourth, on two existential measures about good and evil Jews show a disparate pattern (Cohen and Rankin, 2004). Jews are the ethnic group least likely to believe that the world is mostly good (25 percent of Jews vs. 30 percent of non-Jews) and below all religious groups except for those with no religion (21 percent saying the world is good). But on whether human nature is basically good, Jews are more likely to be optimistic (47 percent of Jews vs. 36 percent of non-Jews), and Jews are second to only Others among ethnic/racial groups and first among religious groups in thinking that people are basically good.

Finally, Jews strongly support the separation of church and state (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001). They differ dramatically from others in supporting the ban on school prayer. The Supreme Court ruling against school prayer is backed by 84 percent of Jews and only 38 percent of non-Jews. The court ban on school prayers is not supported by the majority of any other ethnic/racial group, and among religious groups even those without any religion are much less likely to favor the ban than are Jews (64 percent to 84 percent).

## Abortion Rights

Jews are strongly supportive of abortion rights (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Miller, 1996). On all seven measures on allowing legal abortions, Jews are the most supportive of all

ethnic/racial and religious groups, with majorities of from 77 percent to 96 percent approving (Tables 10-11). Scandinavians and those with no religion usually finish second to Jews in their support for abortion rights. Even for those reasons for which there is consensus for legal abortions (i.e., in cases of the mother's health being seriously endangered, a serious birth defect, or pregnancy from rape) support among Jews is 10-18 percentage points higher than among non-Jews. For the less supported reasons (not married, too poor, does not want more children, and for any reason) Jewish approval is about 40 percentage points above that of other groups.

## Suicide and Euthanasia

Jews are more in favor of a right to commit suicide and receive euthanasia than is any other ethnic/racial or religious group (Tables 13-14). About 85 percent of Jews would allow suicide or euthanasia when a person has an incurable disease, compared to 58-67 percent of non-Jews. Blacks have the lowest support at 41-48 percent. Support for suicide in the case of bankruptcy, dishonoring one's family, or being "tired of living" is backed by 22-33 percent of Jews and 8-15 percent of non-Jews.

## Sexual Morality

Jews generally have a more tolerant attitude toward sexual behavior than do others (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 1997; Waite, 2002), as Tables 16-17 show. They are more approving of premarital sex, extramarital sex, homosexual sex, teenage sex, birth control for teens, and sexually explicit material than any other ethnic/racial group and more accepting than any religious group on all items, except that those without any religion are more approving of teenage sex than Jews are. Few Jews (4 percent) think that premarital sex is always wrong, 18 percent consider homosexual sex always wrong, and 52 percent believe that both extramarital and teenage sex are always wrong. But if teenagers are sexually active, 76 percent of Jews agree that birth control should be available, even if the parents do not approve, compared to 57 percent of non-Jews. Regarding sexually explicit/pornographic material, only 17 percent of Jews as compared with 38 percent of non-Jews believe that it should be illegal for everyone (all adults and children). On premarital sex, homosexual sex, and pornography, Italians are second behind Jews in not viewing these as always wrong. But Jews and non-Jews are equally likely to have seen an X-rated movie in the last year (22 percent and 24 percent), and Jews fall among the middle of ethnic/racial and religious groups in having viewed X-rated movies. Thus, Jews are decidedly distinctive and permissive in their attitudes toward sexual matters, but merely typical and undistinctive in their consumption of sexually explicit movies.

## Gender Roles and Gender Equality

Jews are more in favor of modern gender roles for women and gender equality than non-Jews are (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Waite, 2002), as revealed in Tables 19-20. In the political realm 94 percent of Jews would vote for a woman for president, 92 percent disagree that women should take care of the home and let men run the country, and 83 percent disagree that "most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women." (Non-Jews, by contrast, are respectively at 90 percent, 82 percent, and 73 percent.) Jews also have more favorable views on employment for women than non-Jews have. For example, 90 percent of Jews approve of a wife working even if her husband can support the family, 88 percent reject the idea that a wife should put her husband's career ahead of her own, 78 percent agree that children are not hurt if their mother works, 74 percent disagree that a family is better off if the man works and the woman stays home, and 61 percent reject the idea that preschoolers suffer if the mother works outside the home. (Non-Jews are respectively at 80 percent, 76 percent, 65 percent, 61 percent, and 54 percent for each of these gender role items.)

Among ethnic/racial groups Jews take the most modern, proequality position on six out of the eight issues and finish second to the French on voting for a woman for president and second to Blacks on preschoolers not suffering if their mothers work. Asians or Others hold the most traditional position on all these gender-related measures.

Among religious groups, Jews hold the top position on women being suited for politics, on who should run the country, on wives working even when husbands can support families, and on not putting a husband's career first. Jews are second to those with no religion on the rest of the gender items. Fundamentalist Protestants hold the most traditional views on gender.

#### Child Values

Jews have distinctive views on children and child rearing (Ellison, Xu, and Grayson, 2002; Waite, 2002). When asked to rank five values that children should have, Jews led non-Jews in selecting to "think for himself or herself" as the most important value, with 71 percent of Jews and 50 percent of non-Jews placing it first (Tables 22-23). As a result, almost all other values were less likely to be ranked first by Jews than by non-Jews: to work hard (Jews 13 percent; non-Jews 17 percent), obedience (Jews 6 percent; non-Jews 19 percent), helping others (Jews 9 percent; non-Jews 14 percent), and being well-liked/popular (Jews 1 percent; non-Jews 1 percent). Thus, overall, Jews ranked desirable values for children as 1) thinking for oneself, 2) working hard, 3) helping others, 4) obedience, and 5) popularity, while non-Jews placed the values as 1) thinking for oneself, 2) obedience, 3) working hard, 4) helping others, and 5) popularity.

Of all ethnic/racial groups, Jews were top in selecting thinking for oneself (by 10 percentage points over even the second highest group), lowest on obedience and helping others, and next to the lowest, above the Scandinavians, on working hard. Since almost no one chooses popularity as the most important value, there is no variation across ethnic/racial groups in selecting it as the top value. But if one looks at selecting popularity as not the least important (fifth value), one sees that Jews are the group most likely to mention popularity. Forty-three percent of Jews compared to the average of 24 percent place popularity above last place. The child values held by Asians are most distant from those of Jews (e.g., lowest on thinking for oneself and highest on helping others and working hard).

Among religious groups, Jews are first in thinking for oneself and popularity (when looking at not being one's last choice) and lowest in selecting obedience, working hard, and helping others. Fundamentalist Protestants differ the most from Jews, ranking last on thinking for oneself and popularity and first on obedience.

#### Misanthropy

Jews have more positive views of people in general than non-Jews do (Tables 25-26). More Jews believe that most people are fair (58 percent), helpful (50 percent), and trustworthy (47 percent) than non-Jews do (respectively 53 percent, 47 percent, and 35 percent). This optimism also shows up on the item on human nature discussed above, in which Jews were more likely to indicate that humans were basically good.

Compared by ethnicity and religion, Jews do not stand out from most other groups on fairness and helpfulness, but on judging people to be trustworthy they are the second highest, below only Scandinavians, among ethnic/racial groups and first among all religious groups.

## Socializing

Jews and non-Jews show distinctive patterns in socializing (Tables 28-29). Jews are less likely to spend several evenings a week visiting with a relative (26 percent vs. 36 percent) and less likely to visit a neighbor (17 percent vs. 21 percent). At least part of the lower level of Jewish socializing with relatives may result from Jews having fewer

relatives. While the total number of relatives is not known, in the 1980s and early 1990s, Jews were less likely than non-Jews to have a living parent (64 percent to 73 percent) and less likely to have a living sibling (85 percent for Jews vs. 92 percent for non-Jews). The former difference results from Jews being older than non-Jews, and the latter from the combination of age and lower fertility. Jews and non-Jews do not differ on visiting other friends several times a week (23-24 percent for both groups). Jews are more likely to go at least occasionally to a bar (55 percent at least once a year vs. 50 percent for non-Jews).

Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group least likely to frequently visit either relatives or neighbors, but are in the middle of groups regarding visiting friends and going to bars. Those in Other Religions have the highest socializing rate except for going to bars.

## Politics and Voting

Jews are more likely to vote than are non-Jews (Tables 31-32). In presidential elections over the last thirty-six years Jewish turnout has exceeded non-Jewish voting by 10 to 20 percentage points (74-86 percent of Jews vs. 62-66 percent of non-Jews). In 1992 Jewish turnout topped that of any other ethnic/racial or religious group, and in 1996 Jews ranked third below the Scandinavians and the British and second on religion behind Liberal Protestants.

In terms of political orientation, Jews tend to be liberals and Democrats compared to non-Jews (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Forman, 2001; Goren, 1999; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Kosmin and Lachman, 1993; Sonenshein and Valentino, 2000; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003), as indicated in Tables 31-32. With the exception of the Jimmy Carter/Ronald Reagan/John Anderson race in 1980, Jews have heavily favored the Democratic candidate in all presidential races since 1968. In 1992-96, 71-77 percent of Jews voted for Bill Clinton compared to about half of non-Jews. On party identification, 52 percent of Jews are Democrats, while only 33 percent of non-Jews are. Likewise, on political ideology, 48 percent of Jews selfrate themselves as liberals vs. 26 percent of non-Jews.

In terms of presidential voting, Jews are more likely to vote Democratic than any other White ethnic group. Blacks always are the most Democratic presidential voters, and sometimes other ethnic/racial minorities such as Hispanics and Asians exceed the Jewish Democratic vote. By religion Jews are the most Democratic of presidential voters. Likewise, Jews are lower than only Blacks in identifying as Democrats and are the most Democratic of religious groups. On political ideology Jews are the ethnic/racial and religious group most likely to say they are liberal (by 15 percentage points over second-ranked Blacks and by a more modest four percentage points over those without any religion). Germans, followed by the British, are the least Democratic groups.

#### Confidence in Institutions

Jews and non-Jews differ in their evaluations of some institutions, but agree about many others (Tables 34-36). As Table 34 shows, rankings are fairly similar, but some divergences are apparent. The most notable difference in the ranking of institutions is that Jews place organized religion in ninth place, while non-Jews put it in sixth position. Other differences include that the military is rated lower by Jews (fourth place) than by non-Jews (second place), science is in the top spot for Jews and in third place for non-Jews, and Congress scores better than labor unions for Jews while the opposite is true for non-Jews.

In the economic realm Jews and non-Jews do not vary significantly in their confidence in major companies (26 percent of Jews and 24 percent of non-Jews have a "great deal of confidence") or in financial institutions (19 percent and 22 percent). Jews are significantly less confident in labor unions than non-Jews are (5 percent vs. 11 percent). On political groups Jews have more confidence in the executive branch than non-Jews do (21 percent vs. 14.5 percent).<sup>6</sup> By an even greater margin Jews have more confidence in the Supreme Court than non-Jews do (40 percent vs. 32 percent). Jews and non-Jews differ little on the Congress (11 percent vs. 10 percent). On media institutions Jews and non-Jews differ little in terms of either television (9 percent and 11 percent) or the press (10 percent and 11 percent).

Among the remaining institutions Jews and non-Jews differ little on education (23 percent vs. 26 percent) and medicine (41 percent vs. 44 percent). Jews have notably lower confidence than non-Jews do in the military (30 percent vs. 42 percent) and in organized religion (12 percent vs. 25 percent). Skepticism on religion probably results from Jews viewing organized religion as referring to the large Christian denominations. Jews have more confidence in the scientific community than non-Jews do (50 percent vs. 39 percent). Overall, Jews and non-Jews do not systematically differ in their confidence in institutions. No statistically meaningful differences occur for more than half of the institutions, and when differences do emerge, Jews have greater confidence in three (executive branch, Supreme Court, and science) and lower confidence in three (labor, religion, and the military).

By ethnicity, Jews have the lowest confidence of any group in labor unions, religion, and the military and next to the bottom, above only Poles, on medicine. Jews surpass all ethnic/racial groups on confidence in the Supreme Court and are second highest on the executive branch (after Others) and the scientific community (behind Asians). Asians have the highest confidence across all institutions. Likewise, compared by religion, Jews have the lowest confidence on financial institutions, organized labor, television, medicine, and the military, and the highest confidence in the executive branch, the Supreme Court, and science. No religion stands out as especially high or low on confidence overall.

#### Government Spending Priorities and Taxes

In general, the spending priorities of Jews and non-Jews are similar (Tables 38-40). Among Jews the top spending priority is education, with 82 percent favoring more funding. This is followed by supporting more spending in three other domestic areas: health (75 percent), the environment (71 percent), and solving the problems of big cities (62 percent). Then comes support for more spending on lowering the crime rate (fifth at 58 percent) and for law enforcement (eighth at 53 percent). Next is spending on the drug problem, with support for more spending to deal with drug addiction sixth, at 56 percent, and for drug rehabilitation ninth, at 50 percent.<sup>7</sup> In the middle of the crime and drugs priorities comes wanting to spend more on assistance to the poor (seventh place at 54 percent). In tenth place is support for added spending on mass transportation (46 percent). Next comes spending for Social Security (eleventh at 42 percent). Spending for Blacks is in twelfth position at 40 percent when described as for "improving the condition of Blacks" and in sixteenth position at 31 percent when phrased as "assistance for Blacks." At thirteenth position at 39 percent is spending for highways and bridges. Spending for assistance to big cities is fourteenth at 35 percent. In fifteenth position is spending for parks and recreation at 34 percent. The domestic program with the lowest support is welfare in seventeenth place with 26 percent favoring more spending. At the bottom of the spending priorities are space exploration (eighteenth at 15 percent), the military (nineteenth at 11 percent), and foreign aid (twentieth at 8 percent).

Non-Jews have a fairly similar ranking of spending priorities. Both Jews and non-Jews list education and health as the two top areas and have welfare, the military, space, and foreign aid at the bottom. The biggest difference is that Jews place solving the problems of big cities fourth, while non-Jews place solving the problems of large cities eleventh. This probably reflects the heavy concentration of Jews in large metropolitan areas discussed above. In all other cases, Jews and non-Jews differ in ranking by two positions or less.

In most, but not all, areas Jews favor more governmental spending than non-Jews do. Jews back more spending for most social welfare and domestic concerns (being significantly more pro-spending for the environment, health, education, large cities, welfare, parks, and mass transportation and marginally more so for Blacks and highways). Jews are also significantly more supportive of spending for space and foreign aid. Non-Jews support more spending on crime, drugs, and the military (significantly more for the military and one crime measure and marginally so for the second crime measure and both drug items). Non-Jews also favor more spending than Jews do on Social Security (53 percent to 42 percent) and assistance to the poor (61 percent to 54 percent). These last two areas deviate from the general pattern of spending priorities.

Among all ethnic/racial groups Jews are first in wanting more spending on space, the environment, education, and mass transportation and second behind only Blacks for more spending on health, solving the problems of big cities, improving the condition of Blacks, welfare, and assistance to big cities. Jews are not least for spending in any area, but are next to the lowest on crime (above Scandinavians) and the military (above Asians). Blacks are first for more spending in most areas and especially in domestic spending. Asians and Scandinavians tend to be least for government spending.

By religion, Jews are the most pro-spending group on health, solving the problems of big cities, education, improving the conditions of Blacks, foreign aid, welfare, mass transportation, assistance to Blacks, and assistance to big cities. Jews are the group least in favor of more spending on the military, Social Security, and drug rehabilitation. No religious group stands out overall on spending priorities, but Catholics are notable in always tending toward the middle ground. Jews take a general pro-spending slant despite being concerned about high federal income taxes. Seventy percent of Jews and 64 percent of non-Jews think their income taxes are too high. Among ethnic/racial groups only Poles and Blacks object more to their income taxes, and among religious groups Jews are first in saying their income taxes are too high.

#### Social Welfare Policies

Jews and non-Jews differ little on extending social welfare policies (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Hunt, 2002) as shown by Tables 42-43. Jews are more in favor of the government assisting people in obtaining health care than non-Jews are (57 percent to 49 percent) and doing more about problems in general (28 percent to 25 percent), but the differences are not statistically significant. Jews and non-Jews do not differ on the government doing more to improve living standards (25 percent vs. 27 percent). Jews are slightly less in favor of the government reducing income differences than non-Jews are (38 percent vs. 44 percent).

While differences among ethnic/racial and religious groups are not great, Jewish views are somewhat distinctive nevertheless. On health care Jews are second among ethnic/racial groups, below only Blacks, in supporting more government health care and top among the religious groups. On doing more in general, Jews surpass other White ethnic groups, but are lower than Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics. Their support is top among religious groups. On reducing income differences Jews are least supportive among religious groups and third from the bottom, above the Scandinavians and British, by ethnicity. Blacks top three of the four lists as most pro-social welfare, and the British and Scandinavians are typically the least in favor.

#### Intergroup Relations

On almost all measures Jews are more for racial equality, integration, and intergroup tolerance than non-Jews are (Cohen and Liebman,

1997; Glaser, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Smith, 1990) as shown in Tables 45-46. First, Jews tend to endorse liberal explanations and reject illiberal reasons for the socioeconomic disparities between Blacks and Whites. Sixty-three percent of Jews vs. 46 percent of non-Jews believe that lack of education causes the lower income and other disadvantages of Blacks, and 41 percent of Jews vs. 37 percent of non-Jews believe racial discrimination explains the differences. In contrast, lack of motivation is seen as the explanation by 48 percent of non-Jews, but by only 32 percent of Jews. Less inborn ability is mentioned as a reason by 11 percent of non-Jews and 7 percent of Jews. Second, integration is uniformly favored more by Jews than by non-Jews. For example, 97 percent of Jews and 85 percent of non-Jews oppose laws forbidding Black-White marriage, 88 percent of Jews vs. 84 percent of non-Jews disagree with the idea that Whites have a right to exclude Blacks from their neighborhoods, and 70 percent of Jews vs. 64 percent of non-Jews favor an open housing law outlawing housing discrimination. Third, Jews are more likely to live in a racially integrated neighborhood than non-Jews are (76 percent vs. 61 percent). Fourth, Jews support minorities in other ways. For example, 78 percent disagree with the idea that Blacks should not push for their rights compared to 56 percent of non-Jews; 40 percent want the government to spend more on improving the conditions of Blacks vs. 33 percent of non-Jews (see Table 38.H), and 96 percent of Jews vs. 88 percent of non-Jews would be willing to vote for a Black for president if their party nominated such a candidate. Finally, Jews and non-Jews are indistinguishable in their positions on affirmative action and school busing. Neither group favors preferences to help racial minorities, 19 percent of Jews and 17 percent of non-Jews believe that government should give special assistance to Blacks, and 15 percent of Jews and 16 percent of non-Jews back hiring preferences for Blacks. However, Jews are more likely than non-Jews to disagree with the idea that Blacks should overcome prejudice without special favors as some

other groups have (22 percent vs. 14 percent). School busing to integrate schools is supported by 32 percent of Jews and 33 percent of non-Jews.

A comparison across all ethnic/racial groups shows that Jews take the most pro-racial equality/integration positions on Black-White differences due to inborn ability, lack of education and motivation, opposition to antimiscegenation laws, and Blacks pushing for rights; they are second only to Blacks in opposition to Whites segregating neighborhoods, in living in an integrated neighborhood, and in disagreeing that Blacks should overcome prejudice without special favors. On all other issues except school busing Jews take a more prointergroup relations position than any other White ethnic group. No ethnic/racial group stands out as being least supportive of racial equality and integration.

Among religious groups Jews hold the most pro-racial equality/ integration stance on Black-White differences and lack of education, inborn ability, and motivation, opposition to antimiscegenation laws, Blacks pushing for rights, living in an integrated neighborhood, voting for a Black for president, and disagreeing that Blacks should overcome prejudice without special favors. Jews score lower than those with no religion and sometimes those with Other Religions on special government help for Blacks, differences due to discrimination, Whites segregating neighborhoods, open housing laws, and school busing. With one exception, Jews take more pro-intergroup relations positions than do Catholics or any of the Protestant groups on all measures. Fundamentalist Protestants followed by Liberal Protestants tend to be the least supportive of measures aimed to bolster racial equality and integration.

#### Civil Liberties

Jews support civil liberties for various socially and/or politically suspect groups, including those against all churches, racists, Communists, militarists, and homosexuals (Cohen and Liebman, 1997;

Miller, 1996) as evidenced in Tables 48-49. Specifically, in all but one instance, Jewish majorities believe that members of these groups should be allowed to a) give a public speech, b) teach in a college, and c) have a book in the public library. Support for public speech ranges from 69 percent for a racist to 93 percent for a homosexual (averaging 88 percent). Approval of college teaching starts at 48 percent for a racist and goes up to 94 percent for a homosexual (averaging 67 percent). On having a book in the public library, support goes from 76 percent for a racist to 88 percent for either an anti-religionist or a homosexual (averaging 83 percent). Across the suspect groups, Jews support civil liberties the most for homosexuals (averaging 92 percent) followed by Communists (80 percent), anti-religionists (78 percent), militarists (72 percent), and racists (64 percent). In all but two cases, non-Jews are significantly less in favoring of granting rights to these groups. Jews are marginally, but not significantly, more for allowing a racist to teach in a college and to make a public speech.

Among ethnic/racial groups Jews are the most pro-civil liberties on twelve of the fifteen measures. They fall behind only Scandinavians on letting a racist make a public speech, are lower than Scandinavians, Others, and Eastern Europeans on letting an anti-religionist teach in college, and are in the middle on allowing a racist college teacher. At the opposite end Blacks are least supportive on eleven out of fifteen indicators. Among religious groups Jews are the most for civil liberties on six measures and second behind those with no religion on the other nine. Fundamentalist Protestants show the least support for all measures.

## Crime and Firearms

Jews and non-Jews differ moderately in their views on crime and firearms (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001) according to Tables 51-52. Despite the fact that Jews are more likely than non-Jews to be afraid to walk alone at night near their home (respectively 52 percent vs. 40 percent), Jews are less likely to take a punitive position toward criminals or to own guns. Sixty-four percent of Jews compared to 70 percent of non-Jews support the death penalty for murder, and 71 percent of Jews vs. 77 percent of non-Jews believe courts are not harsh enough with sentences. Only 13 percent of Jewish households contain firearms (vs. 41percent for non-Jews) and just 10 percent of Jews personally own a gun (vs. 26 percent for non-Jews). Their low level of firearm ownership, in turn, explains their higher level of support for requiring a permit from the police before a firearm is purchased (92 percent of Jews vs. 80 percent of non-Jews).

Jews and non-Jews differ little in their approval of when police should be allowed to strike people. For Jews approval is at 94 percent when the person is hitting the police officer, 77 percent when a suspect is trying to escape, 69 percent under an unspecified "ever" situation, 6 percent when a murder suspect is involved, and 6 percent in response to verbal abuse. For non-Jews the respective approval levels are 91 percent, 70 percent, 68 percent, 6 percent, and 7 percent. Jews and non-Jews also do not differ on the use of wiretaps (supported by 25 percent of Jews and 22 percent of non-Jews).

Of all ethnic/racial and religious groups Jews have the highest level of fear and the greatest support for gun control. Jews are lowest of all religious groups in ownership of firearms, second lowest to Asians in having a gun in their household, and below all but Asians and Hispanics in personally owning a firearm. Fundamentalist Protestants have the most pro-gun profile. On measures of punitiveness, Jews are less supportive than all other ethnic/racial groups except for Blacks and Hispanics on capital punishment, and less for tougher courts except for Asians and Others. Among religious groups only those in Other Religions and those with no religion (on the question of courts) are less in favor of the punitive approach. For police use of force, Jews differ little from most ethnic/racial groups. They are the religious group most supportive of the police striking in self-defense and to stop an escape, but the absolute differences are modest. On wiretapping Jews vary little from other ethnic/racial and religious groups.

#### Psychological Well-Being and Health

By mostly modest differentials Jews give more positive assessments of their well-being and health than do non-Jews (Tables 54-55). In terms of overall happiness 35 percent of Jews vs. 32.5 percent of non-Jews are very happy (not statistically significant). On marital happiness the edge is a bit larger, with 67 percent of Jews and 62 percent of non-Jews very happy—but still not statistically significant. Likewise, 50 percent of employed Jews are very satisfied with their job vs. 46 percent of non-Jews (not statistically significant). Jews are significantly more likely than non-Jews to be financially satisfied (39 percent to 20 percent), to find life exciting rather than routine or dull (56 percent to 47 percent), and to rate their health as excellent (43 percent to 32 percent).

Among ethnic/racial groups Jews lead all groups in financial satisfaction (as they did also in objective financial measures) and health. They finished second highest on marital happiness (to the British), job satisfaction (to the Irish), and excitement (to the Other group). Blacks and Hispanics tended to register the least positive scores overall.

Likewise, among religious groups, Jews were highest on marital happiness, financial satisfaction, job satisfaction, and health. They were behind Liberal Protestants on overall happiness and Other Religions on excitement. Those with no religion ranked lowest on three measures and next to lowest on two items.

#### Financial and Job Changes and Expectations

Despite their strong socioeconomic status position, Jews differ little from non-Jews on changes and values related to finances and jobs (Tables 57-58). Two-thirds of both groups report being better off than their parents, and 41 percent say that their financial situation improved in recent years. Looking to the future, 48 percent of Jews and 55 percent of non-Jews expect their children to be better off than they are (not statistically significant). Among the employed, both Jews and non-Jews think that they are "not at all likely" to lose their jobs in the next twelve months (respectively 73 percent and 64 percent), but only 27 percent of Jews and 28 percent of non-Jews feel it would be "very easy" to find as good a job if they did become unemployed.

On work-related values, 73 percent of Jews and 68 percent of non-Jews would continue to work, even if they were able to live comfortably without being employed (not statistically significant); and Jews are less likely than non-Jews to believe that people mostly get ahead in life from hard work rather than from luck or help from others (respectively 58 percent vs. 68 percent and statistically significant).

Jews are not distinctive from other ethnic/racial groups on most of the financial and job measures. Jews are the group least likely to think their children will have a higher standard of living than they do, while racial minorities are the most optimistic in this regard (47.5 percent of Jews vs. 67-73 percent of Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Others). Probably the high current SES of many Jews creates a perceived ceiling effect for their offspring. On the other hand, Jews are next to the top, behind only the Poles, in seeing their jobs as secure. Jews are next to the bottom, ahead of only the Poles, in thinking that one gets ahead in life mostly from hard work.

Similarly, Jews are the religious group least likely to believe that their children will be better off than they are, with the lowest faith in hard work, and the most assurance about keeping one's job.

#### Miscellaneous

Less than a majority of Jews (49 percent) agree that "it is sometimes necessary to discipline a child with a good, hard spanking," but almost three-quarters of non-Jews (74 percent) support corporal punishment (Tables 60-61). Jews are less supportive of spanking than any other ethnic/racial or religious groups, 15-16 percentage points lower than the second least supportive group. Blacks and Fundamentalist Protestants are the most in favor of spanking (both 84 percent).

Easier divorce laws are backed by 29 percent of Jews and 25 percent of non-Jews. Jews are more supportive of easier divorces than any other White ethnic group, but the differences are modest. Only those with no religion are more in favor of easier divorce among religious groups.

Of all ethnic/racial and religious groups Jews are least likely to think a world war will occur in the next ten years. This is expected by 23 percent of Jews and 44 percent of non-Jews. It is possible that Jewish orientation toward Israel makes them aware that wars and conflict frequently occur, but that does not mean that a "world war" is likely. Blacks and Fundamentalist Protestants see a world war as most likely (respectively 56 percent and 52 percent).

More than two-fifths of Jews (41 percent) support the legalization of marijuana compared to a quarter of non-Jews. Jews are the ethnic/racial group most for legalization (by 11 percentage points over second-place Native Americans) and second behind those with no religion among religious groups (48 percent to 41 percent).

Jews have the highest level of newspaper readership of any ethnic/racial or religious group (57 percent daily vs. 44 percent for non-Jews). Conversely, TV watching is low among Jews compared to non-Jews (respectively 2.5 hours vs. 2.9 hours per day). Only Asians watch less TV among ethnic/racial groups, and Jews and those in Other Religions are tied for lowest among religious groups. Non-White minorities and Hispanics are lowest on newspaper readership and highest on TV viewing (with the exception of the low TV viewing of Asians).

#### Overall Differences among Ethnic and Religious Groups

Jews are the most distinctive of all ethnic/racial and religious groups. As Table 63 indicates, the position of Jews on the 153 nondemo-

graphic items differs from the national norms by an average of 11.4 percentage points, highest of all fifteen ethnic/racial groups. The average difference from the national norms was only 5.1 points. Jews are followed by non-White groups (Blacks, Others, Asians) and Hispanics and then other White ethnic groups. Large long-term immigrant groups, such as Germans, the Irish, and Other Whites (which include many earlier settlers with no known ethnic identity) are nearest the overall average. Similarly, Jews are the religious group most distant from the overall average by 11.4 points compared to 8.8 points for Nones, 5.2 points for Fundamentalist Protestants, 4.5 points for Other Religionists, 3.7 points for Liberal Protestants, 2.0 points for Catholics, and 1.7 points for Moderate Protestants.

Another way of seeing the distinctiveness of Jews is by looking at how many times they are at the extremes on each items—that is, at the top or bottom among the fifteen ethnic/racial groups and seven religious groups. Jews are at the poles in 73 of the 153 ethnic/racial breakdowns (47.7 percent) and in 91 of the 153 religious comparisons (59.5 percent). Given that the probabilities of being at the extremes by chance are .133 for ethnicity and .286 for religion, this means that Jews are overrepresented at the extremes by 3.6:1 on ethnicity and 2.1:1 on religion. No other group approaches these levels. Blacks are second among ethnic/racial groups in being in the extreme positions 56 times and Nones are next on religion with 58 extreme rankings.

As Table 64 shows, among ethnic/racial groups, Jews are closest to (i.e., have the smallest average distance from) Eastern Europeans (9.8 percentage points) and Italians (9.8 points)—two other immigrant groups that arrived about the same time as most Jewish immigrants did in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and are also concentrated in large metropolitan areas. The other White ethnic groups fall next, with average differences of 10.3 to 12.8 points. The most distant from Jews are non-White and Hispanic ethnic groups: Others (13.5 points), Hispanics (13.9 points), Asians (14.4 points), Native Americans (14.5 points), and Blacks (17.0 points).

Among religious groups, Jews are closest to Nones (7.1 points), followed by Other Religionists (10.0 points), Liberal Protestants (10.2 points), Catholics (11.0 points), Moderate Protestants (11.5 points), and finally, Fundamentalist Protestants (16.1 points). Thus Jews are closest to secular and religiously liberal groups and furthest from the religiously conservative. Not only do Jews and Nones often hold down the extreme poles (respectively 91 and 58 times), but Jews are second only to Nones in 28 cases and Nones are second to Jews in 41 cases.

#### Summary of Jewish/Non-Jewish Differences by Topics

Jews and non-Jews differ in many ways in their attitudes and actions. Of the 153 nondemographic comparisons there are statistically significant differences 70 percent of the time. Table 65 shows on what topics the views and behaviors of Jews are most distinctive. The first column shows the average difference between Jews and everyone else for each topic. Jews and non-Jews disagree the most (by an average of 29 percentage points) on abortion rights. This is followed by a cluster of other large Jewish/non-Jewish differences on religion (22 points), sexual morality (21 points), partisanship and voting (19 points), and suicide and euthanasia (18 points). Next, just slightly greater than the overall difference of 11 points are the miscellaneous items (13 points), civil liberties (13 points), and child values (12 points). Falling below the average overall difference are gender roles and gender equality (10 points), intergroup relations (8 points), crime and firearms (8 points), psychological well-being and health (7 points), spending and taxes (7 points), misanthropy (7 points), confidence in institutions (5 points), socializing (5 points), finances and jobs (4.5 points), and social welfare policy (4 points).

The second column looks at the percentage of cases that Jews are one of the most extreme groups among both ethnic/racial and religious groups. This measure emphasizes relative differences among the fifteen ethnic/racial and seven religious groups and not the absolute differences as in the first column. Of course, the two rankings are correlated with one another, but the relationship is far from perfect. On abortion rights and suicide and euthanasia, Jews occupy the most extreme positions on all items for both ethnicity and religion (i.e., scores of 100 percent). Next ranks child values, with a score of 90 percent.<sup>8</sup> Scoring in the extremes more than 50 percent of the time are sexual morality (71 percent), gender roles and gender equality (69 percent), partisanship and voting (64 percent), civil liberties (60 percent), miscellaneous (58 percent), and religion (56 percent). Right at or near half are intergroup relations (50 percent), socializing (50 percent), psychological well-being and health (50 percent), and confidence in institutions (46 percent). Around a third are social welfare policies (38 percent), finances and jobs (36 percent), spending/taxes (33 percent), and crime and firearms (29 percent). Showing the least extremity is misanthropy (17 percent).

#### Across-Topic Patterns

While attitudes and values have been grouped together into eighteen areas and examining each individually provides great insight into the place of Jews in American society, it is also necessary to look for patterns that prevail across the topics.

One metapattern involves the role and importance of seeking knowledge and the promotion of education and science in pursuit of that quest. First, education, of course, has had a profound, direct effect on the lives and circumstances of Jews. Jews have been both raised in better-educated homes and have themselves acquired more education than any other group. This, in turn, in large part explains their greater occupational standing, higher income, superior vocabulary scores, and more frequent newspaper reading.

Second, education also has a strong effect on many attitudes and values. Prior research has established that in America education has larger, broader, and longer-lasting impact than any other demographic variable. In particular, education often has a liberalizing influence that can trump the often conservative impact of more income (Davis, 1979 and 1981; Hyman and Wright, 1979).

But beyond the direct effects of education, the strong interest of Jews in learning and education also helps to shape many attitudes. Education not only has instrumental value to most Jews, but also has intrinsic value-with learning being a positive goal in and of itself. The importance given education and learning shows up in various ways. First, Jews lead all other groups in wanting more spending for education and space exploration.9 Second, Jews have notably more confidence in science than non-Jews do. But, in a contrary result, Jews have marginally less confidence in education than non-Jews do (respectively 23 percent to 26 percent). Perhaps it is their high interest in quality education and concern about what is being delivered that makes their confidence relatively low. Third, Jews are much more likely to rank thinking for oneself as the top value for a child (71 percent for Jews vs. 50 percent for non-Jews). Fourth, while Jews are more supportive of integration and racial equality than most other groups are, their ranking is lowest on supporting school busing and marginally lower than non-Jews (respectively 32 percent vs. 33 percent). Their relatively low support for school busing may reflect concerns over the quality of schooling.

Fifth, Jewish support for civil liberties is notably higher than any other group, but support for college teachers from suspect groups drops off more among Jews than among non-Jews (among Jews support for teachers across the five suspect groups is 66.5 percent compared for an average of 82.9 percent for speeches and books or 16.4 points difference; for non-Jews the average for teachers is 56.2 percent and the average for speeches and books is 68.1 percent or 11.7 points difference). Thus, while Jews are absolutely more supportive of civil liberties than non-Jews are (by 10.3 points, e.g., 66.5 percent compared to 56.2 percent), relatively they are less so (by 4.7 points: 11.7 percent vs. 16.4 percent). Finally, on religion, Jews are much less likely to say that the Bible is the exact word of God than non-Jews are (11 percent to 33 percent). While this undoubtedly mainly reflects different religious tenets, it may also indicate a stronger critical, knowledge-based perspective among Jews. In brief, high regard for gaining knowledge, science, and education influences attitudes in a wide range of ways.

A second major metapattern is Jewish support for expressive individualism and moral autonomy. On the issues showing the largest differences between Jews and non-Jews (sexual morality, abortion rights, suicide/euthanasia, civil liberties, and some of the items in the religion and miscellaneous groups), Jews consistently are more supportive of letting individuals decide on what course to follow rather than having options restricted by government or social conformity. In part, Jews are more supportive of legalizing abortions and marijuana, more inclined to find actions by suspect groups tolerable, more accepting of behaviors such as suicide and sexual activity, and more tolerant on other issues because they want to leave choices open to each individual.

A third general pattern is liberal leanings on other topics. First, Jews show liberal leanings on political and voting variables, being solidly Democratic in party identification and presidential voting and self-identifying as liberal. Second, Jews are more supportive of group and minority rights. They favor modern, egalitarian positions on gender and support integration and racial equality. Finally, to a lesser degree, Jews take liberal positions on government spending and policies. They are more likely to favor increased spending and expanded programs on the domestic social agenda and less spending for conservative items such as the military and controlling crime and drugs.

A minor, but clear fourth pattern is an urban orientation among Jews. Jews are heavily concentrated in large metropolitan areas, and they strongly reflect that perspective. They are more supportive of increased spending for cities and mass transportation, and the margin here is larger than on any other spending areas. They are the group most fearful of walking alone at night and among the least likely to own a gun or to hunt.

A fifth pattern is that Jews are less supportive of the military. They have low confidence in the military and favor cuts in military spending. This may, in part, reflect their relatively low level of expectation of a world war occurring.

A sixth pattern is a nonpunitive or nonauthoritarian attitude toward raising children. Jews rate obedience low as a child value and are less in favor of the use of corporal punishment.

A final general pattern relates to two of the previously discussed metapatterns. The liberal edge of Jews on expressive individualism and group equality is much greater than their leaning toward social welfare liberalism.

Thus, looking across the eighteen topics reveals several important metatrends. Jewish attitudes are shaped by 1) their high level of and interest in education and learning, 2) the values of individual freedom and choice, 3) other liberal values, such as support for group and minority rights and social justice, 4) an urban orientation, 5) nonpunitive child rearing, and 6) skepticism about the military.

#### TRENDS, 1972-2002

The current attributes and attitudes of groups are not writ in stone, but have changed (and will change) over time. This section reviews Jewish trends for the last thirty years and compares Jewish changes against those of non-Jews.

## Demographic Profile

The background characteristics of Jews and non-Jews have been changing in many important ways over the last thirty years. First, more people have experienced divorces and fewer adults are married than before (Tables 3 and 6). While only 8 percent of Jews had been divorced in the 1970s, 21 percent are during the recent period (+13 percentage points). Likewise, divorce rose from 16 percent to 26 percent (+ 10 points) for non-Jews. Partly as a result, 65 percent of Jews are now married vs. 75 percent in the 1970s (-10 points). For non-Jews the decline was from 71 percent to 57 percent (-14 points).

Second, there were declines in family size. This occurred for number of siblings, current household size, and number of children ever born. In each case, the non-Jewish decline was greater than the Jewish decrease. This means that Jewish and non-Jewish families are now more similar in size than they used to be.

Third, Jews in particular have become less concentrated in large cities and in the Northeast. While the share of Jews living in the largest twelve metropolitan areas changed little (from 55 percent to 54 percent), those living in the central cities dropped by 11 points and suburban residents increased by 10 points. Similarly, the proportion raised in a big city declined from 53 percent to 41 percent. Non-Jews showed much more modest switches in the same direction. Likewise, the proportion of Jews living in the Northeast dropped from 59 percent to 43 percent (-16 points), while non-Jews had a very modest decline from 22 percent to 20 percent (-2 points). Similarly, the proportion of Jews raised in the Northeast fell from 58 percent to 51 percent (-7 points), while non-Jews showed virtually no change in being raised in the Northeast (21 percent to 20 percent, just -1 point).

Fourth, socioeconomically Jews substantially improved their position over the last thirty years, both objectively and subjectively. Objectively, they had notable gains in education, occupational prestige, and real household income. For example, having a four-year college degree rose from 39 percent in the 1970s to 61 percent in the most recent period; average occupational prestige climbed from a score of 46 to 52; and per capita income in 1986 dollars grew from \$18,800 to \$27,500. Jews also showed major gains in parental education. In each case Jews outpaced non-Jews in their gains. Subjectively, identification as upper class grew from 10 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in the most recent period, self-ranking as being financially above average increased from 41 percent to 51 percent, and evaluations of having been raised in a family with above-average finances went up from 24 percent to 52 percent. Again, the Jewish gains surpassed those of non-Jews on all items. Only for vocabulary score and home ownership did neither Jews nor non-Jews show any meaningful improvements.

Finally, in terms of labor force participation, retirement and employment have both increased for Jews and non-Jews, and keeping house declined. For Jews retirement more than doubled, by about 7 percent to 14 percent, and for non-Jews it grew from 9 percent to 12 percent. Employment rose from 60 percent to 71 percent for Jews and from 57 percent to 68 percent for non-Jews.

#### Religion

Jews have shown little change in most of their religious beliefs and behaviors (Table 9). The major exception is that belief in an afterlife increased notably from 18 percent in the 1970s to 43 percent recently (+25 percentage points). This shift moved Jews much closer to the predominately Christian position of non-Jews (74 percent believing in life after death).<sup>10</sup> The one other notable change in belief represents divergence between the two groups. Support for the Supreme Court ruling against school prayers rose among Jews from 67 percent in the 1970s to 84 percent now (+17 points), while among non-Jews there was a modest rise from 33 percent to 38 percent (+5 points).

## Abortion Rights

Jewish support for abortion rights has been high throughout the last thirty years and has changed little (Table 12). With non-Jewish attitudes also largely stable, there has been little variation in the large intergroup differences.

#### Suicide and Euthanasia

For both Jews and non-Jews there has been modest growth in support for suicide and euthanasia (Table 15). For Jews the most notable changes were that approval of suicide when one had an incurable disease rose from 73 percent in the 1970s to 84 percent (+11 percentage points) at present, and support for allowing euthanasia increased from 73 percent to 86 percent (+13 points). Among non-Jews acceptance also climbed for these two measures (respectively by 19 and 9 points). Thus, the Jewish/non-Jewish gap widened somewhat in the former case, but narrower in the later. Little change occurred for either Jews or non-Jews on the other suicide measures.

#### Sexual Morality

Both Jews and non-Jews have become less disapproving of various sexual behaviors except for extramarital sex (Table 18). The one notable change is that starting in the 1990s the share thinking that homosexual relations were always wrong fell among Jews from 33 percent to 18 percent (-15 percentage points) and from 74 percent to 60 percent (-14 points) among non-Jews. Smaller tolerant shifts occurred for both Jews and non-Jews on premarital sex, teenage sex, contraceptives for teenagers, and the legalization of pornography. In contrast, opposition to extramarital sex rose by 4 points for Jews and 8 points for non-Jews.

In terms of watching X-rated movies, Jews and non-Jews moved in opposite directions. Viewing fell among Jews from 34 percent to 22 percent (-12 points) and climbed by 5 points among non-Jews. As a result, Jews and non-Jews no longer differ in their level of viewing X-rated movies (22 percent of Jews and 24 percent of non-Jews).

## Gender Roles and Gender Equality

Jews and non-Jews have both grown more supportive of modern gender roles and gender equality (Table 21). In part because Jewish

support was high from early on, the gains have been notably greater among non-Jews. For example, in the 1970s 69 percent of Jews disagreed that women were not emotionally suited for politics, and this rose to 83 percent at present (+14 percentage points), while for non-Jews it started at 50 percent and ended at 73 percent (+23 points). Likewise, disagreement with the idea that it is better for a family if the man works and the woman stays home increased from 60 percent to 74 percent (+14 points) among Jews and from 33 percent to 61 percent (+28 points) for non-Jews. Thus, non-Jews have been closing the gender rights gap with Jews.

## Child Values

The child-values measures only go back to the 1980s, and during this abbreviated period there were no meaningful changes in the absolute or relative endorsement of items (Table 24).

## Misanthropy

Jewish trust in people did not change during the last thirty years, but since non-Jews became less trusting, a notable gap of 12 percentage points opened up (Table 27). Both groups thought people were more helpful in the 1980s than before or after, but there was little meaningful change across all years. Both groups did see people as less fair, with Jews falling from 68 percent to 58 percent (-10 points) and non-Jews decreasing from 61 percent to 53 percent (-8 points). Taking the three items together, there was no change in misanthropy for Jews, but small-to-moderate increases on each item for non-Jews.

## Socializing

Over the last thirty years the level of socializing with relatives and visiting bars did not change significantly and meaningfully for Jews or non-Jews (Table 30). But social relations within neighborhoods did decline, and the drop among Jews (from 35 percent visiting several times a week in the 1970s to 17 percent recently, a decrease of

18 percentage points) was larger than that among non-Jews (from 28 percent to 21 percent, a decline of 7 points). Jewish visits with friends outside one's neighborhood also fell (from 31 percent to 24 percent, or -7 points), while there was no meaningful change among non-Jews (from 21 percent to 23 percent, or +2 points). As a result of these differential shifts, the greater Jewish socializing with neighbors and friends that happened in the 1970s no longer occurs.

## Politics and Voting

Jews have consistently been Democratic in their party identification and voting and liberal in their political ideology over the last thirty years (Fisher, 1976, 1981; Forman, 2001; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Goren, 1999; Medding, 1981; Sonenshein and Valentino, 2000) as indicated by Table 33. With one exception, the 1980 election, when many Jews voted for John Anderson (Greenberg and Wald, 2001), strong majorities of Jews have voted for the Democratic presidential candidate. Typically, the Democratic vote of Jews has exceeded that of non-Jews by 20-30 percentage points. Democratic Party identification did slide from 58 percent in the 1970s to 52 percent recently (-6 percentage points), but among non-Jews the decline was even greater from 42 percent to 33 percent (-9 points), so the Jewish edge in Democratic identification actually grew from 16 points to 19 points. On political ideology neither Jews nor non-Jews changed positions meaningfully over the last thirty years.

## Confidence in Institutions

Overall for Jews and non-Jews there has been a decline in confidence in most institutions over the last thirty years (Table 37). Jews show declines in confidence in nine of thirteen institutions (not all significantly) and non-Jews had decreases on ten. On economic institutions confidence dropped for financial institutions and labor unions, but held up for major companies. The percentage with a great deal of confidence in financial institutions fell from 28 percent to 19 percent (-9 percentage points) among Jews and from 35 percent to 22 percent (-13 points) among non-Jews. For labor unions it fell 4 points among Jews and 3 points among non-Jews.

On the media, confidence decreased for both the press and television, and the decline was somewhat greater among Jews than non-Jews. Jewish confidence in television went from 20 percent in the 1970s to 9 percent recently (-11 points), while among non-Jews it slipped from 18 percent to 11 percent (-7 points). For the press Jewish confidence fell from 28 percent to 10 percent (-18 points), while for non-Jews it went from 24 percent to 11 percent (-13 points).

Also showing a decline was confidence in religion (from 20 percent to 12 percent or -8 points for Jews, and from 34 percent to 25 percent or - 9 points for non-Jews).

On education Jews show no meaningful change in the proportion with a great deal of confidence (from 21 percent to 23 percent or +2 points) while the level went from 37 percent to 26 percent (-11 points) for non-Jews. However, since the percentage of respondents with hardly any confidence rose 6 points for Jews (and 6 points for non-Jews), there was a net loss of confidence in education, even among Jews.

In the areas of medicine and science, Jews showed no decline in confidence. Non-Jews were unchanged in their evaluation of science, but their confidence in medicine did fall by 9 points. As a result, the higher confidence in medicine by non-Jews in the 1970s (+9 points) virtually disappeared (+3 points).

Politics showed the most complex pattern. For the executive branch, Jewish confidence rose from 11 percent to 21 percent (+10 points), while for non-Jews, it went from 17 percent to 14 percent (-3 points).<sup>11</sup> For the Congress, the proportion with a great deal of confidence showed no change for Jews and a modest decline for non-Jews (-5 points). But looking at the "hardly any confidence" category makes clear that there was a notable decline for both groups, with

the proportion lacking confidence rising from 16 percent to 35 percent (+19 points) for Jews and from 23 percent to 34 percent (+11 points) for non-Jews. On the Supreme Court, there has been no meaningful change for either group.

The military showed the largest gains in confidence from 17 percent to 30 percent for Jews (+13 points) and from 35 percent to 42 percent for non-Jews (+ 7 points).

#### Government Spending Priorities and Taxes

Among Jews and non-Jews there have been few changes in governmental spending priorities that have been statistically significant and meaningful (Table 41). The most important was the rise in support among Jews for more educational spending from 65 percent in the 1970s to 82 percent recently (+17 percentage points). Similarly, among non-Jews those favoring expanded educational spending went from 50 percent to 72 percent (+22 points). Also, showing gains among Jews was more spending for welfare (from 18 percent to 26 percent or +8 points). Among non-Jews there was no change in support for welfare spending.

Jewish support for spending declined for some of the crime and drugs measures. Among Jews backing of more spending to reduce the crime rate fell from 73 percent in the 1970s to 58 percent recently (-15 points), while among non-Jews there was only a drop from 66 percent to 65 percent (-1 point). Jews favoring more spending on dealing with drug addiction dropped from 61 percent to 56 percent (-5 points), but non-Jews showed no change.

On space and the military, the changes were more complex. Jews show no meaningful rise in wanting increased spending on space, but there was a decline in wanting to spend less from 48 percent in the 1970s to 31 percent from the 1980s through the recent period. Non-Jews showed a similar trend. On the military Jews showed little change in wanting more spending (13 percent in the 1970s and 11 percent in the recent period), but there was a significant rise and then fall in saying that too much was being spent (from 46 percent to 51 percent to 37 percent). Non-Jews showed similar shifts with too much spending rising from 26 percent to 37 percent and then falling to 29 percent, but those for less spending grew modestly larger in the recent period than in the 1970s, counter to the Jewish pattern.

Finally, for Social Security there was from the 1980s to the recent period a rise in uncertainty. Jewish support for more spending and less spending both fell modestly (respectively by -3 points and -4 points) and those saying they did not know rose from 2 percent to 9 percent (+7 points). For non-Jews there were no meaningful changes.

## Social Welfare Policies

Support for reducing income differences and for more government assistance with health care changed little for both Jews and non-Jews (Table 44). For non-Jews there was a decline, mostly from the 1970s to the 1980s, in backing for government to improve the living standards of the poor and in doing more in general. For Jews there were too few observations in the 1970s to tell if a similar trend existed.

## Intergroup Relations

With one major exception, Jews and non-Jews both moved toward greater approval of racial equality and integration (Table 47). For example, opposition to antimiscegenation laws grew among Jews from 85 percent to 98 percent (+13 percentage points) and among non-Jews from 65 percent to 85 percent (+20 points); willingness to vote for a Black for president climbed from 85 percent to 96 percent (+11 points) among Jews and from 76 percent to 86 percent (+10 points) among non-Jews; and disagreement that Blacks should not push for their rights grew among Jews from 48 percent to 78 percent (+30 points) and among non-Jews from 27 percent to 55 percent (+28 points).<sup>12</sup> Growth in backing tolerance and equal treatment

was greater on some items for Jews and on others for non-Jews, but overall there was little change in the difference.

The one exception to the pattern of rising support for measures aimed to strengthen intergroup equality occurred on affirmative action. Approval of the government giving special help to Blacks fell from 25 percent to 17 percent (-8 points) among non-Jews and by an even greater margin from 41 percent to 19 percent (-22 points) among Jews. As a result, at present Jews and non-Jews differ little on this issue.

## Civil Liberties

On almost all measures, support for civil liberties increased for the last thirty years (Table 50). For Jews the gains were mostly small, averaging just +4.2 percentage points. For non-Jews they were larger, averaging 10.4 points. As a result, the Jewish lead in supporting civil liberties narrowed for all but one item (allowing a Communist to teach in a college). For both Jews and non-Jews the gains were greatest vis-à-vis homosexuals. For Jews the increases were smallest regarding anti-religionists and racists, and for non-Jews they were the least concerning racists.

## Crime and Firearms

For both Jews and non-Jews punitive attitudes increased in the 1980s and then declined in the recent period (Table 53). For example, among Jews support for capital punishment rose from 64 percent to 72 percent and then fell back to 64 percent; for tougher courts it went from 75 percent to 86 percent and down to 71 percent; and for approval of the police ever striking someone it moved from 76 percent to 78 percent and then to 69 percent. A similar pattern occurred for non-Jews.

On firearms Jewish household ownership remained low and stable throughout the period (14 percent, 13 percent, 13 percent) and support for requiring a police permit to purchase a gun was high and stable (95 percent, 94 percent, 92 percent). Among non-Jews household gun ownership fell from 51 percent to 41 percent and support for requiring a police permit to purchase a gun climbed from 71 percent to 80 percent. As a result, the gap between Jews and non-Jews narrowed on both.

## Psychological Well-Being and Health

Neither Jews nor non-Jews showed much change in their evaluation of their mental or physical well-being (Table 56). While none of the trends among Jews were statistically significant, their gains in financial and job satisfaction, health, and life assessment compared to static or declining levels among non-Jews may indicate a modest relative improvement in the status of Jews compared to non-Jews.

## Financial and Job Changes and Expectations

Job and financial expectations for Jews have not meaningfully changed, but their commitment to hard work has strengthened (Table 59). In the 1970s 41 percent of Jews believed people got ahead mainly from hard work and that rose to 58 percent recently (+17 percentage points). Among non-Jews it climbed from 63 percent to 68 percent (+5 points), so Jews have been converging with non-Jews. On wanting to keep working even if able to live comfortably, Jews moved from 66 percent to 73 percent (+7 points), while non-Jews went from 70 percent to 68 percent (-2 points).

## Miscellaneous

Few of the trends among Jews were statistically significant, but Jews and non-Jews both showed less support for spanking children (-9 percentage points from the 1980s to the present period for Jews and -6 points for non-Jews) and a decline in support for easier divorce laws (-11 points for Jews and -3 points for non-Jews)(Waite, 2002) as seen in Table 62. Those favoring the legalization of marijuana decreased in the 1980s (down 5 points for Jews and 6 points for nonJews) and then rose in the recent period (+3 points for Jews and +7 for non-Jews). Expectations of a world war in the next ten years climbed from the 1980s to the recent period (+7 points for Jews and +6 points for non-Jews). Hours of TV watching changed little for Jews or non-Jews. Newspaper readership significantly dropped for both groups, with daily reading falling from 74 percent in the 1970s for Jews to 57 percent (-17 points) in the recent period and by an even greater margin from 64 percent to 44 percent (-20 points) for non-Jews.

#### Summary of Trends

Looking at the trends from the 1970s to the present, there was a moderate decline in the gap between Jews and non-Jews. For the 117 nondemographic items with data points covering the entire time period, the average difference declined from 14 percentage points to 11.5 points, a decrease of almost 19 percent. As Table 66 shows, there was convergence between Jews and non-Jews within the topics of religion, intergroup relations, finances and jobs, gender roles, socializing, confidence in institutions, spending/taxes/social welfare policy, crime and firearms, civil liberties, suicide, and miscellaneous. Divergence occurred slightly for abortion rights and sexual morality, and to a greater degree for politics, psychological well-being, and misanthropy. However, the gaps between Jews and non-Jews on psychological wellbeing and misanthropy have never been very notable. Thus, in general, a few of the large Jewish/non-Jewish differences maintained themselves (e.g., abortion rights and sexual morality), but most moderate-to-large gaps narrowed somewhat in recent decades.

The relative and absolute trends of Jews and non-Jews are quite varied, and there are individual items that follow almost all possible patterns. However, the most common pattern, affecting most trends for intergroup relations, gender roles, civil liberties, suicide, and confidence in institutions in general and such specific items in other topics as spending on health and education and the ownership and

regulation of firearms was for differences to close, with general movement toward the side favored by Jews (e.g., more support for gender equality and civil liberties). Many other topics showed no clear general pattern (religion, finances and jobs, misanthropy, socializing, spending/taxes, crime and firearms, and miscellaneous). Other patterns include: 1) moving toward Jews but no convergence (sexual morality), 2) moving toward Jews but divergence (spending on Blacks and school prayers), 3) no movement, no convergence (abortion rights), 4) moving away from Jews and divergence (newspaper readership, trust in people, spending on welfare, capital punishment, some politics), and 5) moving away from Jews and converging (life after death, getting ahead via hard work, socializing with friends, and divorce laws). In brief, when changes have occurred, they have most frequently been shifts in which society in general moved toward the position held by Jews, and as such, Jews have often been the harbingers of change by holding positions toward which the country as a whole has since shifted. Of course, many trends do not follow this pattern, but it is much more common than cases in which the country moved away from the position toward which Jews leaned.

Of course, moving in the direction of positions held by Jews means moving in a liberal direction. For many topics, such as suicide and euthanasia, sexual morality, intergroup relations, gender roles, and civil liberties, and on such miscellaneous items as the legalization of marijuana, most items have shifted toward granting greater personal liberties and more protection of group and minority rights. Thus, counter to some claims that Jews have been becoming more conservative either generally or politically (Glaser, 1997; Levey, 1996; Sigelman, 1991; Staub, 2002), with few exceptions, Jewish views have either held steady or, more often than not, grown more liberal in recent decades (Forman, 2001; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Shapiro, 2001; Sonenshein and Valentino, 2000).

In sum, there has been some decrease in the distance between Jews and non-Jews, and this is consistent with the argument of

declining Jewish distinctiveness (Glaser, 1997; Sigelman, 1991), but the reduction was modest in scope, the remaining differences are common and often large, and little of the change came from assimilation or the convergence of Jews toward the positions of non-Jews.

#### ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG JEWS

Jews differ from non-Jews in many important ways and also show some distinctive trends over time. This section examines intra-Jewish variation on the nondemographic items, both to see how much solidarity there is among Jews and to see what insight intra-Jewish differences can provide to help understand Jewish/non-Jewish differences. (On Jewish subgroups, see Lazerwitz, et al., 1998; Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002; and United Jewish Communities, 2004a, b, c). (See Table 68.)

Jews, for this study, have been subdivided three ways: 1) those who are currently Jewish compared to those raised as Jews but without any current religious affiliation and those raised as Jewish but with some non-Jewish current affiliation; 2) the denominational streams of Judaism (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, No Affiliation), and 3) current Jews divided by level of attending religious services (high, medium, and low). These breakdowns are for the years 1988-2002. The denominational and religious service attendance measures cover current Jews only, while the current/raised-as measure covers a somewhat larger group. (See Appendix 4, page 289, for more details on these measures). This analysis does not present detailed reports of percentages as in the earlier sections, since most of the subgroups are based on fewer than 100 cases. Instead, overall tests of statistical significance are applied, and the direction of differences is highlighted.<sup>13</sup>

Overall, there were 459 tests of relationships (the 153 nondemographics times the three breakdowns of Jews for each). Of these, 83 items or 18.1 percent are statistically significant at the .05 level (or 3.6 times more than one would expect due to chance). Similarly, at the .10 level, 24.4 percent were statistically significant. Thus, while there is consensus among Jews on most issues, Jews are not a monolith and show notable within-group differences for a number of variables.

Relationships were about equally common for each of the three measures of Jews. For current-past Jewish identification, 22 percent were significant at the .05 level; for denominational stream, 16 percent; and for religious attendance, 16 percent. There was much greater variation by topic area. As Table 67 shows, religion and politics have the most within-Jewish differences (respectively 59 percent and 48 percent of relationships were statistically significant at the .05 level). Next come child values, miscellaneous, well-being, confidence in institutions, civil liberties, and abortion rights, with rates of 27 percent-20 percent. Then come socializing, social welfare, sexual morality, suicide, and spending/taxes with 17 percent-11 percent. Next, showing somewhat more differences than chance would predict were intergroup relations (10 percent) and crime (8 percent). Finally, with no meaningful within-group variation were gender roles, finances/jobs, and misanthropy (5-0 percent).

Table 68 shows the relationship of each nondemographic with each of the three Jewish measures grouped by topical area. For each of these 459 relationships, it reports the statistical significance of the association and its direction. For example, for "Bible Inerrancy" it shows that all relationships are significant at the .001 level or greater (as indicated by "\*\*\*" in Table 68) and that not believing in Bible inerrancy (i.e., "No") is associated with having no denominational affiliation and being Reform (i.e., "None, Ref"), attending religious services less than once yearly (i.e., "Low"), and currently having no religious preference (i.e., "None"). See the footnotes to Table 68 for more details.

As Table 68 shows, there are appreciable differences between

traditional, observant Jews and cultural, less observant Jews on most of the religion variables. Religious beliefs and behaviors are lower among those raised Jewish but with no current religion, those mentioning no denominational affiliation, and those attending services less than once a year. Sometimes, as in belief in an afterlife and in Bible inerrancy, Reform Jews closely resemble Jews with no denominational affiliation.<sup>14</sup>

Politically, voting is highest among Reform Jews and those with moderate attendance levels. Voting for a Democrat for president varies little among Jews. But identification as Democrats is greatest among Conservative Jews and current Jews. (Nonaffiliated Jews are the group most likely to be Independents.) On political ideology, liberals tend to be secularists (i.e., having no affiliation, low attendance, and those raised as Jews who are now Nones).

On child values, obedience is rated most highly by religious and traditional Jews (i.e., Conservative and Orthodox Jews and high attenders) and by former Jews now following other faiths. Thinking for oneself is more favored by secular Jews (no denominational affiliation and currently no religion).

The miscellaneous topic shows that the legalization of marijuana is more supported by Jews with low attendance and no current religion. Newspaper readership is highest among Jews with moderate religious attendance and those who are current Jews, while high TV viewing is greatest among those with high attendance. Expectation of a world war is higher among Jews with no current religion. Support for civil liberties tends to be higher among Jews with no affiliation and no current religion at all.

Well-being has no consistent relationship among types of Jews. General happiness and job satisfaction are greatest among those with frequent religious attendance; marital happiness highest for those with moderate attendance; and the other measures show no clear and significant patterns. Marital happiness is also elevated among Reform Jews and those with no affiliation. Confidence in institutions also shows a complex pattern. The strongest and most consistent result is that confidence in religion is greater among the Orthodox, frequent attenders, and current Jews. Confidence in banks/financial institutions is higher among Jews with some denominational identification and those with frequent attendance (but only marginally), but this later pattern is contradicted by the fact that confidence in companies increases as attendance falls. Confidence in the executive branch of the federal government rises with religious attendance. Confidence in labor unions is higher among those with no denominational affiliation.

Abortion rights are most often supported by Reform Jews, but there is little difference by attendance and current/past religion.

Support for social welfare policies is pretty uniform, but those with no denominational affiliation and no current religion are somewhat more for expanded government programs.

When attitudes toward sexual behavior and suicide differ among Jews, they tend to be more permissive among those with no affiliation, no current religion, and low attendance.

Most spending/taxes items show no subgroup differences among Jews, but for several items there is the somewhat surprising finding that support for more spending is higher for Conservative Jews (solving problems of big cities, crime rate, mass transportation) and more moderate attenders (solving problems of big cities, mass transportation, assistance to big cities).

Likewise, there are relatively few differences among Jews on intergroup relations (Glaser, 1997), but integration and racial equality are somewhat more strongly backed by Reform Jews, those with no denominational affiliation, and those with no current affiliation.

On crime, subgroup differences are scattered and form no clear pattern (Greenberg and Wald, 2001). Perhaps the only notable result is that Reform Jews are more likely to own guns.

Finally, the remaining survey topics (gender roles, socializing, finances/jobs, and misanthropy) show little meaningful differentia-

tion among Jews.

In summary, in over 80 percent of the comparisons, there are no statistically significant differences among Jews. Thus similarity among Jews rather than division is the most prominent feature (Glaser, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001).

Second, when the subgroup differences do appear, one dominant pattern emerges. Jews tend to differ from non-Jews in the same direction that more secular Jews differ from more religious Jews. That is, Jews with no denominational affiliation, those with low religious attendance, and those with no current religion tend to hold positions compared to more religious Jews that follow the differences between Jews and non-Jews. As detailed in the preceding discussion on ethnic/racial and religious groups, compared to other groups, Jews generally are less religious and have less confidence in organized religion, are more for abortion rights, allowing suicide, sexual permissiveness, integration and racial equality, thinking for oneself as the most important value for children, civil liberties, and legalizing marijuana than non-Jews are, and more secular Jews differ from other Jews in a similar manner. Likewise, when either measured by themselves or along with those with no denominational affiliation, Reform Jews differ from Conservative and Orthodox Jews in the same direction that Jews differ from non-Jews. This suggests that nonreligious aspects of Jewish culture often do as much to distinguish them from non-Jews as do religious matters.

Third, this in turn means that when differences occur, secular and less observant Jews generally hold more liberal positions than do more traditional and religiously active Jews (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Legge, 1995a; Levey, 1996; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003). This result is usually seen as weakening support for accepting traditional religious beliefs such as *tzedaka* (charity or, more loosely, social justice) as an explanation for Jewish distinctiveness in general and liberalism in particular, since one would assume that more observant Jews would be the most likely to hold such values. However, it might be argued that these are the values of Judaism that the more secular Jews keep with them and perhaps emphasize as they discard other values and practices (e.g., patriar-chalism and keeping kosher).

Finally, there are a small number of other patterns that emerge from the subgroup analysis of Jews: 1) Pro-spending positions on urban issues are most often taken by Conservative Jews and moderate attenders; 2) those with high attendance tend to be happier and have more job satisfaction; 3) moderate attenders are most likely to believe in an afterlife; and 4) voting and newspaper readership are highest among moderate attenders.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Both demographically and attitudinally, Jews in America are a distinctive ethnic/religious group. Demographically, Jews are especially distinguished by their older age, lower fertility, high socioeconomic achievement in terms of education, occupational prestige, income, and class identification, and concentration in large metropolitan centers and the Northeast. This distinctive Jewish profile has been around for some time, prevailing both for the parental generation and across recent decades.

Attitudinally, Jews differ most from non-Jews in general and other specific ethnic/racial and religious groups in particular on the topics of abortion rights, religion, sexual morality, partisanship/voting, and suicide/euthanasia, with average differences between Jews and non-Jews of 29-18 percentage points. Also, differences were larger than average for the miscellaneous group, civil liberties, and child values (averages of 13-12 points). Next, with lower than average differences were gender equality, intergroup relations, crime and firearms, psychological well-being/health, government spending and taxes, misanthropy, confidence in institutions, socializing, finances/ jobs, and, lastly, social welfare policy (10-4 points).

Looking within and across these eighteen topics, the main metapatterns were for Jews to be distinctive in their high support of 1) education, learning, and related areas like science, 2) expressive individualism and personal choice, 3) other liberal positions related to partisanship, group and minority rights, and, to a lesser degree, social welfare spending and policies, 4) pro-urban programs, 5) progressive child rearing, and 6) a less pro-military point of view.

Overall, Jews are the most distinctive of all ethnic/racial and all religious groups. On average, Jews differ from the national average by 11.4 points, more than any other group. Comparing Jews to other ethnic/racial groups, they are closest to Eastern Europeans and Italians (but still separated from them by almost 10 points) and most distant from Hispanics and racial minorities, especially Blacks (17 points). Among religious groups, Jews are closest to those with no religion (7 points) and furthest from Fundamentalist Protestants (16 points).

At the extremes, Jews and non-Jews have fundamentally different points of view about society. On twenty-one measures Jews differ by 20 percentage points or more from the national average, and there are gaps of 30+ percentage points on four abortion items (legal abortion if woman is not married, 42 points; woman does not want more children, 40 points; cannot afford another child, 38 points; and for any reason, 37 points), three religion variables (school prayers, 45 points; belief in God, 38 points; and belief in an afterlife, 30 points), one political item (presidential vote in 1992, 31 points), and one sexual morality item (homosexual sex, 41 points). In addition, Jews differ more from the national average than do any of the other fifteen ethnic/racial or seven religious groups.

Moreover, the Jewish/non-Jewish differences would have been even larger if items on Israel (American Jewish Committee, 2004; Cohen, 2002; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002; Raab, 1999; United Jewish Communities, 2003) or anti-Semitism (American Jewish Committee, 2004; Dinnerstein, 2004; Sigelman, 1995; Smith, 1994, 2001) had been available for comparison.

But by another standard, Jews and non-Jews are not so different. On 84 percent of the comparisons, Jews and non-Jews are on the same side of an issue. That is, the majority of Jews and the overall majority are in agreement (e.g., most Jews and the majority of the total population taking a pro-civil liberties position on fourteen of the fifteen measures). On 88 percent of the items Jews and non-Jews are either on the same side or on opposite sides, but differ by fewer than 10 percentage points.

Demographically, the major trends include a) an increase in divorce and decline in marriage for both Jews and non-Jews; b) smaller family size, with non-Jewish families coming to more closely resemble the Jewish pattern; c) less concentration in the Northeast and a shift from central cities to suburbs (but not to small towns or rural areas); and d) increased social mobility and greater gains in education, occupation, and income than non-Jews experienced.

Attitudinally, there was a decline of almost 19 percent in the average difference between Jews and non-Jews (from about 14 points to 11.5 points). Many different patterns of change occurred, but the most common situation was for both Jews and non-Jews to move in the same direction toward the position held by Jews and for non-Jews to slightly narrow the gap by moving a bit further than Jews did. That is, non-Jews tended to partly catch up with Jews. This in turn meant that change was usually in a liberal direction, especially for such topics as suicide and euthanasia, sexual morality, intergroup relations, gender roles, civil liberties, and on such miscellaneous items as the legalization of marijuana.

Within the Jewish community there is a fairly high degree of consensus, with statistically significant differences appearing for only about 20 percent of the items. When differences do exist, the major pattern is that more secular Jews differ from more religious Jews in the same direction that Jews altogether differ from non-Jews. More often than not, this means that less observant Jews hold more liberal positions than more observant Jews do.

What gives Jews their distinctive profile among America's ethnic/religious groups? Discussions of Jewish distinctiveness or even more broadly of the place of Jews in American society have mostly centered on examining and looking for explanations of Jewish liberalism (Cohen, 1989; Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Fisher, 1976; Fisher, 1981; Glaser, 1997; Glazer, 1995; Goren, 1999; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Legge, 1995a, 1995b; Lerner, et al., 1989; Levey, 1996; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Medding, 1981; Sonenshein and Valentino, 2000; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003). The various factors evoked across these many studies vary in terms of the specific descriptions of values or conditions, which ones are mentioned, and how they are characterized and grouped together.

The most prominently mentioned group of factors are what are variously described as Judaic values or Jewish religious teachings. The most frequently mentioned of these are: 1) *tzedaka*, meaning charity or, more broadly, social justice, 2) nonasceticism or a focus on this world rather than an afterlife, with the corollary ideas that one should reform this world rather than wait for the afterlife and that this life should be appreciated and enjoyed rather than endured, and 3) the role of study of the Torah (the Pentateuch, or the body of Jewish wisdom and law based upon the Jewish Bible) and the teachings of the Talmud (the written collection of the Jewish oral tradition, commenting on and interpreting the Torah), which are more broadly seen as leading to a dedication to education, learning, and reasoning. Or, alternatively, "universal compassion" and "argumentative individualism" have been discerned from these and other Jewish tenets as the key Judaic values (Cohen and Liebman, 1997).

A second set of factors are sociological and include the role of 1) status inconsistency, 2) marginality, and 3) minority group status in general and a perceived threat or a "defensive impulse" (Lipset and Raab, 1995) resulting from anti-Semitism.

Third, there are political explanations, such as 1) a tradition of radicalism and support for socialism in Europe, 2) a democratic, reformist tradition against authoritarian governments in Europe, 3) intergenerational inheritance of Democratic Party allegiance within the U.S., and 4) political responses to anti-Semitism.

Fourth, there are regional factors, such as living in modern and cosmopolitan urban centers, being raised and residing in liberal and progressive regions (bicoastalism), and being geographically separated from the centers of Protestant fundamentalism.

Fifth, there are other explanations such as the immigrant experience, internationalism (stemming originally from the stateless condition of the Jews and more recently from ties to Israel), and collectivism coming from group solidarity and communalism.

Keeping the various factors straight is difficult. For example, anti-Semitism was mentioned above both as a sociological factor related to minority group defense and to solidarity with other minority groups and as a political factor for opposing authoritarian governments. Similarly, while some scholars have wanted to keep a clear separation between religious beliefs and cultural traits, Lipset and Raab (1995) have proposed the construct of "tribal values" that are both religious and cultural.

Related to the issue of why Jews are liberals is the question raised by many investigators of why Jews are more Democratic and liberal than their socioeconomic status would predict (Cohen and Liebman, 1997; Glaser, 1997; Greenberg and Wald, 2001; Levey, 1996; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003). As Milton Himmelfarb put it, "Jews earn like Episcopalians and vote like Puerto Ricans" (quoted in Greenberg and Wald, 2001). One part of the explanation is that education can trump income. In general in America, more education tends to make people more liberal, more income tends to make people more conservative, and the education effect is often both stronger and broader than the income effect

(Davis, 1979, 1981; Hyman and Wright, 1981). This may be especially true for Jews given a) the high value given to schooling and learning in their culture and b) the fact that Jewish education, and especially the higher education received by Jews, is higher quality and more liberal than American education in general (i.e., Jews are overrepresented in elite universities and public universities in the Northeast that are highest in prestige and more liberal in their cultures and curriculums than are the typical universities attended by non-Jews). As Table 69 shows, among Jews, years of schooling has more impact than household income in all eight models (e.g., abortion scale, political ideology, civil liberties scale, etc.), and in six of the eight models education and income have opposite signs, with more schooling predicting more liberal positions and more household income associated with more conservative positions (but usually not reaching statistical significance). In the remaining two models, education has a moderately strong and statistically significant liberal relationship, and income has a weak and not statistically significant liberal association. In brief, income often does not exercise a strong conservative influence, while education clearly moves Jews in a liberal direction.<sup>15</sup>

While many of the dimensions that separate Jews from non-Jews do involve liberalism, seeing this as the defining difference is wrong on two counts. First, Jews and non-Jews do not differ uniformly on all liberal/conservative topics. For example, they are much closer in agreement on government spending priorities than they are on matters of expressive individualism such as abortion rights, sexual morality, and civil liberties. Second, Jews do not differ only on topics with a left-right divide. Jews differ from non-Jews in other important ways that cannot be reduced to liberal-conservative matters. These include their greater confidence in science, lower expectation of a future world war, less socializing with relatives, and higher newspaper readership. Thus, liberalism is both too broad and too simple a construct to describe the range of attitudes on which Jews and non-Jews differ to varying degrees and too limited in that it does not provide an adequate explanation for all the ways that Jews and non-Jews differ.

The suggested explanations for Jewish distinctiveness in general and liberalism in particular are mostly quite sensible and plausible, and it is not possible to formally test many of them. However, the pattern of results does suggest that certain ones have more credence than others do. Among the Judaic values explanations, the importance of education and learning both as a value and an objective attribute of Jews is well-supported by the data. Education itself is an important predictor of the liberal attitudes held by Jews and influences attitudes directly and indirectly across most topics. Nonasceticism also plausibly relates to the observed differences, both as a general reason for Jewish interest in reforms in this world and for taking tolerant positions on certain morality and lifestyle issues. But the social justice/Judaic values explanation finds little support in the data. Jews exceed non-Jews in support for domestic social spending only by modest margins, and even the direction is wrong for support for Social Security and assistance to the poor. In addition, there is little or no Jewish edge in support for social welfare policies.

But the most frequently offered basic Judaic values explanations seem to offer little help in understanding the basis for the major differences on expressive individualism and moral choice. Cohen and Liebman's (1997) "argumentative individualism" comes closest, but it blends elements subsumed above under the education and learning explanation with a basis for individualism that they describe as partly representing a rejection of religious authority and partly recent and areligious in origin. As such, it hardly represents a Jewish religious teaching nor is it clearly a traditional Judaic value.

For the basis of expressive liberalism, one may need to look for other sources, such as a minority group's support for minority rights, the Jewish association with reform and anti-authoritarian movements in Europe (emanating from their repressed minority status), and residential concentration in a cosmopolitan region noted for supporting individual rights even prior to the arrival of a major Jewish community. These nonreligious explanations would also comport with the fact that more secular, less observant Jews are more supportive of these values than are more traditional, religiously active Jews.

The comparative perspective comparing Jews to other ethnic/ racial and religious groups helps us understand one basic reason for Jewish distinctiveness. The American immigration model was for newcomers to give up their original political allegiance and national identity, drop their mother tongue, but keep their religion. The special status of Jews as both an ethnic/racial and a religious group helps to explain both why Jews are so distinctive and the endurance of Jewishness a century after the peak period of immigration. Judaism is an ethnic religion essentially passed on along with other cultural traits from parents to children. Moreover, the religious side of Judaism is totally intermingled with other cultural aspects of being Jewish, and the ethnic and religious duality are hard to distinguish or separate. Being Jewish is both a cultural, ethnic trait and a religious belief, and these two aspects of being Jewish reinforce that identity.

Moreover, religion is a generationally transmitted characteristic that is not only promoted by family socialization, but formally maintained by other institutions (synagogues, schools, and congregations) and leaders (rabbis) and frequently reinforced by practices such as daily prayers, weekly services, and yearly high holy days. This double distinction both helps to explain why Jews were more different from other groups in America to start with and why they have maintained greater distinctiveness over time.

In addition, Israel helps to keep American Jews distinctive. For other groups the "old country" tie is progressively lost across time and generations, and under the American immigrant pact it is considered disloyal to maintain an allegiance to another country. But it is considered natural and acceptable for Jews, as a religious group, to have connections to and strong, positive feelings toward Israel (up to the line that Jonathan Pollard crossed). Nor is this attachment expected to wane (as, for example, fourth-generation Italian-Americans' affection for Italy would be) since one's current religion makes the Israel connection fresh and relevant, not merely ancestral and historical.

As the Great Seal of the United States proclaims, America is a nation formed "e pluribus unum" (from many, one). It amalgamates people from all of the world's nationalities into one new nation and invites the adherents of all the world's faiths to practice their different religions as part of that nation. Both in terms of background, attributes, and attitudes, Jews have a highly distinctive profile highlighted by their high educational and economic achievements, regional and metropolitan concentrations, and Democratic partisanship, as well as by their decided support for such values as individual choice, civil liberties, equal rights for women and minorities, the separation of church and state, education and learning, and political and civic participation. Jews differ more from Americans overall and from other ethnic/racial and religious groups individually than do any other ethnic/racial or religious group. Following the logic of Animal Farm, while all ethnic/racial and religious groups are unique, Jews are more unique than others.

As both an ethnicity and a religion, Jews occupy a special place in America's ethnic/religious mosaic. Unlike groups that are only ethnic, Jews, as a religious group, are expected to maintain and pass on their Jewish identity. As an ethnic group, their religion is not only an attribute of individuals and families, but a trait of the collective Jewish community. Together these joint aspects of Judaism make American Jewry distinctive and help to sustain that distinctiveness.

Given the high and growing level of intermarriage (Lazerwitz, 1995; United Jewish Communities, 2003; Waite, 2002), the increasing geographic dispersion of Jews, the growing generational distance from immigrant roots, and the small and declining share of Jews in an overwhelmingly (98 percent) non-Jewish society, what is striking is how distinctive Jews remain from non-Jews, the modest decline in

intergroup differences on attitudes, and the fact that the narrowing mostly results from non-Jews moving toward the position held by Jews rather than Jews adopting the positions of non-Jews. This suggests that Jews are likely to maintain an important and special position in American society for the foreseeable future.

#### NOTES

1. Many works describe the American Jewish community. For a selection of recent examples, see American Jewish Historical Society, 1999; Cohen and Eisen, 2000; Diner, 2004; Eisen, 1997; Feingold, 2004; Linzer, Schnall, and Chanes, 1998; Lipset and Raab, 1995; Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002; Raphael, 2003.

2. These groups represent people with these ethnic backgrounds who reside in the United States and as such could be referred to as Jewish Americans, German Americans, etc. Except for Native Americans, we have used the shorter, unhyphenated ethnic terms in this report.

3. Some comparisons report on means, but most show the proportion in a particular category. In all cases in which categorical proportions are reported, full cross tabulations were run with all categories (e.g., the five marital and eight labor force categories). For attitudinal variables No Opinions or Don't Know cases were retained in the base. For example, the percent agreeing on a particular item is based on the sum of agrees, disagrees, and don't knows.

4. While most Jews apparently marry at somewhat later ages than non-Jews do, their older ages and greater marital stability raise the proportion currently married (United Jewish Communities, 2003; Waite, 2002).

5. Kosmin and Lachman (1993) found that Hindus and Unitarians had more education than Jews. Detailed analysis of over almost 200 different religions on the GSS finds only Unitarians with more mean years of schooling than Jews have, but the number of Unitarians in the sample is too small to firmly establish that they have more education than Jews do.

6. Confidence in the executive is strongly tied to party identification. When a Democrat is in office, Democrats have more confidence in the executive, and when a Republican is serving, Republicans have more confidence (Smith, Taylor, and Mathiowetz, 1980; Smith and Kim, 2003). The Jewish edge comes largely from the fact that Bill Clinton was president during most of the period under observation (1991-2002).

7. The GSS uses an experimental split-ballot design to compare different ways of describing similar areas. For research on the impact of these variations in wordings beyond what is pointed out here, see Smith, 1987, and Rasinski, 1989.

8. The average difference figures point to a more modest differential because these are five ranked differences and the large difference on thinking for oneself as the most important value leads to relatively small differences on the rankings of the other four values.

9. Likewise, in an item asked only on the 2002 GSS, Jews notably led all other groups in wanting more spending on scientific research. However, there are too few cases for this to be statistically significant.

10. On changes in belief in an afterlife by religious groups, see Greeley and Hout, 1999 and 2001, and Stolzenberg, 2001.

11. Confidence in the executive branch reflects large, event-driven, year-to-year changes and also major switches when the political party occupying the White House changes. The pooled results obscure these important trends, but there are not enough Jewish respondents to examine them. See Smith, Taylor, and Mathiowetz, 1981; Smith and Kim, 2003.

12. These are based on the time series in Table 47 that excludes Blacks, since they provide the longest consistent trends. Figures with Blacks included are also given in Table 47.

13. Limited sample size also precludes looking at these three subdivisions of Jews simultaneously (e.g., denominational stream by level of attending religious services).

14. Cultural or ethnic Jews would mostly consist of those raised as Jewish but with no current religion, those not identifying with any of the denominational groups of Jews, and those with low attendance of religious services. Religious or practicing Jews would tend to be those with Jewish as their current religion, with a denominational affiliation, and with moderate or greater attendance. Within the three main denominational groups, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform, religious practices are naturally most traditional for the Orthodox and least for the Reform. In addition, levels of observance for a wide range of Judaic rituals (e.g., fasting on Yom Kippur, keeping kosher, holding a Seder, and attending services) are highest for the

# Tables

Orthodox and lowest for the Reform (United Jewish Communities, 2004a, b, c). Thus, Reform Jews are closer to cultural Jews than Orthodox or Conservative Jews are on the traditional/nontraditional and observant/nonobservant continua.

15. One should not assume that more education always promotes more liberal attitudes. While this is usually the case in the United States, research has shown a much weaker or even reversed relationship in some European societies (Weil, 1985; 1987). Thus, the relationship is known to be well-established and strong only within the American context.

#### Table 1 Demographic Profile by Ethnic/Racial Groups

1.A Age	
Group	Mean Years
British	49.6
Jewish	47.7
Scandinavian	47.6
Eastern European	46.9
German	45.1
Irish	45.1
Other White	44.5
French	44.3
Polish	44.0
Italian	43.2
Black	42.7
Native American	39.9
Asian	39.7
Hispanic	36.5
Other	36.3
Average	44.4
1.B Marital Status Group	% Married
Group	,o manea
Jewish	64.6
Asian	64.0
British	63.8
Scandinavian	62.9
Eastern European	62.6
French	60.3
Native American	59.9
Italian	59.8
German	59.7
Polish	59.3
Other White	59.0
Irish	58.7
Hispanic	52.3
Other	43.0
Black	39.1
Average	57.2

#### 1.C Divorce History

The Divorce mistory	
	% Ever
Groups	Divorced
	20 5
Native American	38.5
British	28.1
Irish	27.6
Scandinavian	27.4
Other White	27.0
German	25.7
Eastern European	25.3
French	24.6
Italian	22.7
Polish	22.7
Black	22.3
Hispanic	21.8
Other	20.8
Jewish	20.6
Asian	11.1
Average	25.6

#### 1.D Residence in Cities

Groups	% in Central Cities of Twelve Largest Metro Areas
Jewish	26.3
Black	19.3
Hispanic	18.1
Other	17.1
Asian	11.6
Italian	9.5
Eastern European	9.2
Polish	9.2
Irish	5.0
Other White	4.7
British	3.1
Native American	2.5
German	2.3
French	2.2
Scandinavian	2.0
Average	7.7

#### 1.E Residence in Suburbs % Living in Suburbs of Twelve Largest Metro Areas Group Jewish 27.2 Italian 25.3 Asian 23.8 Eastern European 20.6 Polish 17.3 16.8 Other Hispanic 14.3 . Irish 14.1 Other White 13.4 French 11.8 British 11.7 Black 10.3 German 8.3 Scandinavian 6.7 Native American Average 12.0 1.F Region % Living in Northeast Group lt Je

Italian	51.4
Jewish	43.3
French	37.6
Polish	36.2
Eastern European	29.0
Irish	23.6
Hispanic	22.9
Other	22.2
Asian	19.7
Black	18.1
Other White	16.1
German	15.6
British	14.4
Scandinavian	10.8
Native American	4.3
Average	20.2

5.7

#### 1.G Years of Schooling

Group	Mean Years
Jewish	15.7
Asian	14.9
British	13.9
Scandinavian	13.8
Polish	13.7
Eastern European	13.5
Irish	13.5
Italian	13.5
German	13.3
French	13.1
Other	12.9
Other White	12.9
Black	12.4
Hispanic	12.4
Native American	12.2
Average	13.2

#### 1.H Education

Group	% Four-Year College Degree+
Jewish	61.2
Asian	49.8
British	32.1
Scandinavian	28.4
Polish	27.4
Eastern European	27.2
Irish	26.2
German	25.8
Other	25.2
Italian	25.1
French	20.5
Other White	20.3
Hispanic	14.0
Black	11.5
Native American	8.3
Average	23.1

#### 1.J1 Spouse's Years of Schooling Group Mean Years Jewish 15.6 Asian 14.6 British 13.9 Eastern European 13.6 Irish 13.6 Polish 13.6 Italian 13.4 Scandinavian 13.4 German 13.3 French 13.2 13.1 Other White Other 12.9 Black 12.7 Native American 12.6 Hispanic 12.2 13.3 Average 1.J2 Spouse's Education % College Grad+ Group 59.4 Jewish Asian 49.7 British 33.6 Eastern European 30.1 Irish 29.0 Polish 28.4 Other 27.2 Italian 26.4 Scandinavian 23.9 German 23.3 Other White 22.2 French 21.1 Hispanic 18.1 Black 15.0 Native American 12.4 Average 25.6

#### 1.K Vocabulary

Group	Mean Items Correct
Jewish	7.2
British	6.9
Scandinavian	6.6
Eastern European	6.5
Irish	6.4
Italian	6.4
Polish	6.3
French	6.2
German	6.2
Other White	6.0
Native American	5.4
Asian	5.2
Black	4.9
Hispanic	4.9
Other	4.8
Average	6.0

#### 1.L1 Labor Force Status

Group	% Retired
British	19.0
Scandinavian	14.8
German	14.0
Eastern European	13.8
Jewish	13.7
Polish	13.3
French	12.5
Irish	12.4
Other White	12.1
Black	10.3
Italian	9.3
Native American	6.0
Other	4.6
Hispanic	2.8
Asian	2.4
Average	12.1

\_\_\_\_

Group	% Employed
Asian	78.5
Hispanic	76.1
Scandinavian	71.9
Jewish	70.6
Eastern European	68.3
French	68.1
German	68.0
Italian	67.9
Native American	67.9
Irish	67.5
Polish	67.2
Other White	67.0
Black	64.9
British	63.4
Other	55.9
Average	67.5
1.M Unemployment History	
	% Unemployed
Group	in Last Ten Years
Jewish	21.2
British	25.6

Jewish	21.2
British	25.6
Eastern European	26.0
Scandinavian	26.9
German	29.4
Irish	30.6
Other White	31.7
French	32.5
Italian	32.5
Polish	34.7
Asian	34.9
Other	36.2
Black	37.5
Hispanic	38.7
Native American	42.2
Average	31.6

#### 1.N Occupational Prestige

Group	Mean
Jewish	51.9
Asian	46.5
British	46.4
Scandinavian	45.9
Italian	44.8
Irish	44.7
Polish	44.5
Eastern European	44.3
German	43.2
Other White	43.0
French	42.5
Native American	40.3
Hispanic	39.9
Other White	39.8
Black	39.4
Average	43.9

#### 1.0 Labor Union Membership

no Eason onnon membership	
C	% Respondent
Group	and/or Spouse
Polish	22.4
French	20.5
Black	20.3
Hispanic	19.9
Italian	19.7
Eastern European	19.6
Irish	18.4
Scandinavian	18.4
German	17.8
Jewish	17.7
Other White	15.7
British	13.9
Native American	13.0
Asian	8.5
Other	8.4
Average	17.2

#### 1.P Household Income 1986 Dollars Mean Group Jewish 58,938 43,714 Asian Italian 43,228 Irish 39,464 British 38,989 Scandinavian 38,520 Polish 36,533 35,424 French Eastern European 35,263 35,228 German Other White 34,151 Hispanic 30,858 . Other 28,409 Native American 26,866

Black

Average

#### 1.Q Per Capita Household Income

	1986 Dollars
Group	Mean
Jewish	27,479
British	17,025
Italian	16,968
Scandinavian	16,608
Irish	15,992
Eastern European	15,232
Polish	14,925
Asian	14,776
German	14,743
Other White	13,995
French	13,814
Hispanic	10,590
Native American	10,483
Other	9,941
Black	9,424
Average	14,292

24,042

35,032

#### 1.R Self-Identified Class

Group	% Middle/Upper
Jewish	67.0/19.6
British	55.6/ 5.1
Italian	53.7/ 2.7
Polish	51.9/ 2.7
Eastern European	51.8/ 2.5
Irish	50.7/ 3.6
German	49.2/ 2.5
Scandinavian	48.8/ 4.9
Asian	48.4/ 2.3
Other White	45.7/ 3.1
French	45.5/ 3.1
Other	41.5/ 2.4
Hispanic	35.0/ 1.8
Black	31.2/ 3.0
Native American	30.1/ 1.8
Average	46.1/ 3.5

#### 1.S Financial Situation

Group	% Above Average
Jewish	51.0
British	29.2
Italian	28.7
Irish	28.6
Scandinavian	27.8
German	24.8
Asian	23.3
Eastern European	22.2
Polish	22.2
French	21.9
Other White	21.0
Hispanic	16.2
Native American	15.2
Other	13.9
Black	11.2
Average	22.9

Group	% Owning
British	74.0
Italian	72.9
Jewish	72.3
Scandinavian	71.5
French	70.8
German	70.8
Polish	70.8
Irish	70.2
Other White	70.1
Eastern European	69.5
Native American	59.7
Asian	53.1
Black	49.6
Hispanic	49.4
Other	45.5
Average	66.2

#### 1.U Number of Children Born

Group	Mean	
Black	2.3	
French	2.0	
British	1.9	
Native American	1.9	
Scandinavian	1.9	
Eastern European	1.8	
German	1.8	
Hispanic	1.8	
Irish	1.8	
Other	1.8	
Other White	1.8	
Polish	1.8	
Asian	1.6	
Jewish	1.6	
Italian	1.6	
Average	1.9	

#### 1.V Number of Siblings

Group	Mean
Black	5.3
Hispanic	4.9
Other	4.8
Asian	4.2
Native American	4.1
French	3.6
Irish	3.5
Other White	3.5
German	3.4
Polish	3.3
British	3.2
Italian	3.2
Scandinavian	3.2
Eastern European	3.0
Jewish	2.4
Average	3.8

#### 1.X Children under Eighteen in Household Mean Group Hispanic 1.1 Asian 0.9 Black 0.9 Native American 0.9 Other 0.8 0.7 French Irish 0.7 Italian 0.7 Other White 0.7 Eastern European 0.6 German 0.6 Jewish 0.6 Polish 0.6 Scandinavian 0.6 British 0.5

Average

0.7

#### 1.W Household Size

THE HOUSEHOLD SILC	
Group	Mean
Asian	2 E
	3.5
Hispanic	3.5
Other	3.4
Native American	3.2
Black	3.1
French	2.9
Italian	2.9
German	2.8
Irish	2.8
Other White	2.8
Polish	2.8
Eastern European	2.7
Scandinavian	2.7
British	2.6
Jewish	2.5
Average	2.9

#### Table 2 Demographic Profile by Religious Groups

#### 2.A Age

Religion	Mean Years
Liberal Protestant	50.8
Jewish	<b>47.7</b>
Moderate Protestant	46.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	45.2
Catholic	43.1
Other Religions	38.3
None	37.8
2.B Marital Status Religion	% Married
Jewish	<b>64.6</b>
Liberal Protestant	61.8
Moderate Protestant	61.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	58.3
Catholic	57.9
Other Religions	52.7
None	43.2
2.C Divorce History Religion	% Ever Divorced
Fundamentalist Protestant	29.0
Liberal Protestant	28.1
Moderate Protestant	27.8
None	25.6
Other Religions	24.8
<b>Jewish</b>	<b>20.6</b>
Catholic	19.7

#### 2.D Residence in Cities % in Central Cities of Twelve Largest Religion Metro Areas 26.3 Jewish Other Religions 14.0 Catholic 9.6 None 9.1 Moderate Protestant 6.3 Fundamentalist Protestant 5.7 Liberal Protestant 3.8 2.E Residence in Suburbs % Living in Suburbs of Twelve Largest Religion Metro Areas 27.2 Jewish Fundamentalist Protestant 16.5 Catholic 16.2 Other Religions 15.9 None 11.4 Moderate Protestant 10.5 Liberal Protestant 10.2 2.F Region % Living in Northeast Religion Jewish 43.3 Catholic 33.4 Other Religions 20.8 20.4 None Liberal Protestant 19.1 Moderate Protestant 16.7 Fundamentalist Protestant 9.3

## 2.G Years of Schooling

Religion	Mean Years
Jewish	15.7
Other Religions	14.0
Liberal Protestant	13.8
None	13.5
Catholic	13.3
Moderate Protestant	13.3
Fundamentalist Protestant	12.5

#### 2.H Education

2.11 Education		
	% Four-Year	
Religion	College Degree+	
Lundah	64.2	
Jewish	61.2	
Liberal Protestant	32.6	
Other Religions	31.5	
None	25.0	
Catholic	24.2	
Moderate Protestant	22.2	
Fundamentalist Protestant	13.9	

#### 2.I Spouse's Years of Schooling

Religion	Mean
Jewish	15.6
Other Religions	13.9
Liberal Protestant	13.8
None	13.6
Catholic	13.4
Moderate Protestant	13.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	12.7

#### 2.J Spouse's Education

2.5 Spouse 5 Education		
Religion	% College Grad+	
Jewish	59.4	
Other Religions	33.5	
Liberal Protestant	31.7	
None	28.7	
Catholic	28.5	
Moderate Protestant	24.5	
Fundamentalist Protestant	16.6	

-	Mean Items
Religion	Correct
Jewish	7.2
Liberal Protestant	6.5
None	6.4
Moderate Protestant	6.2
Catholic	6.1
Other Religions	5.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	5.6
2.L1 Labor Force Status	
Religion	% Retired
Liberal Protestant	19.3
Moderate Protestant	14.4
Jewish	13.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	12.7
Catholic	10.4
None	6.1
Other Religions	4.6
J.	
2.L2 Labor Force Status	% Employed
	70 LIIDIOVEU
Religion	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
	73.6
Other Religions	
Other Religions None	73.6
Other Religions None <b>Jewish</b>	73.6 73.5
Other Religions None <b>Jewish</b> Catholic	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b>
Other Religions None <b>Jewish</b> Catholic Moderate Protestant	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7
Other Religions None <b>Jewish</b> Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0
Other Religions None <b>Jewish</b> Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6
Other Religions None <b>Jewish</b> Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6
Other Religions None Jewish Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant 2.M Unemployment History	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6 63.0
Conter Religions None Jewish Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant 2.M Unemployment History Religion Jewish	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6 63.0 % Unemployed
Other Religions None Jewish Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant 2.M Unemployment History Religion	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6 63.0 % Unemployed in Last Ten Years
Other Religions None Jewish Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant 2.M Unemployment History Religion Jewish Liberal Protestant	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6 63.0 % Unemployed in Last Ten Years <b>21.2</b> 22.9
Other Religions None Jewish Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant 2.M Unemployment History Religion Jewish Liberal Protestant Moderate Protestant	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6 63.0 % Unemployed in Last Ten Years <b>21.2</b> 22.9 29.6
Other Religions None Jewish Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant 2.M Unemployment History Religion Jewish Liberal Protestant Moderate Protestant Catholic	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6 63.0 % Unemployed in Last Ten Years <b>21.2</b> 22.9 29.6 30.4
Other Religions None Jewish Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant 2.M Unemployment History Religion Jewish Liberal Protestant Moderate Protestant Catholic Fundamentalist Protestant	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6 63.0 % Unemployed in Last Ten Years <b>21.2</b> 22.9 29.6 30.4 32.6
Other Religions None Jewish Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant 2.M Unemployment History Religion Jewish Liberal Protestant Moderate Protestant Catholic Fundamentalist Protestant None	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6 63.0 % Unemployed in Last Ten Years <b>21.2</b> 22.9 29.6 30.4 32.6 42.4
Other Religions None Jewish Catholic Moderate Protestant Fundamentalist Protestant Liberal Protestant 2.M Unemployment History Religion Jewish Liberal Protestant Moderate Protestant Catholic Fundamentalist Protestant	73.6 73.5 <b>70.6</b> 68.7 66.0 65.6 63.0 % Unemployed in Last Ten Years <b>21.2</b> 22.9 29.6 30.4 32.6

#### 2.N Occupational Prestige

Religion	Mean
Jewish	51.9
Liberal Protestant	45.9
Other Religions	44.7
Catholic	43.7
Moderate Protestant	43.3
None	43.1
Fundamentalist Protestant	41.3

#### 2.0 Labor Union Membership

	% Respondent	
Religion	and/or Spouse	
Catholic	20.1	
Moderate Protestant	19.4	
Jewish	17.7	
Fundamentalist Protestant	16.4	
Liberal Protestant	15.7	
None	15.5	
Other Religions	10.8	

#### 2.P Household Income

Religion	1986 Dollars Mean	
Jewish	58,938	
Liberal Protestant	39,982	
Catholic	38,760	
Moderate Protestant	34,850	
None	33,896	
Other Religions	32,907	
Fundamentalist Protestant	29,189	

#### 2.Q Per Capita Household Income

Religion	1986 Dollars Mean	
Jewish	27,479	
Liberal Protestant	17,641	
None	14,770	
Catholic	14,729	
Moderate Protestant	14,536	
Other Religions	13,465	
Fundamentalist Protestant	11,550	
2.R Self-Identified Class		
	% Middle/	
Religion	Upper	
Jewish	67.0/19.1	
Liberal Protestant	55.6/ 5.4	
Catholic	49.0/ 3.0	
Moderate Protestant	47.2/ 3.7	
Other Religions	43.6/ 3.2	
None	43.2/ 3.9	
Fundamentalist Protestant	39.1/ 1.9	
2.S Financial Situation		
	% Above	
Religion	Average	
Jewish	51.0	
Liberal Protestant	30.3	
Catholic	23.7	
Moderate Protestant	23.4	
None	23.3	
Other Religions	21.7	
Fundamentalist Protestant	16.7	

#### 2.T Home Ownership

Religion	% Owning
Liberal Protestant	76.1
Jewish	72.3
Moderate Protestant	70.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	66.4
Catholic	66.3
None	54.7
Other Religions	47.2

#### 2.U Number of Children Born

Religion	Mean	
Fundamentalist Protestant	2.1	
Liberal Protestant	1.9	
Catholic	1.9	
Moderate Protestant	1.9	
Jewish	1.6	
Other Religions	1.4	
None	1.2	

#### 2.V Number of Siblings

Religion	Mean	
	4.2	
Fundamentalist Protestant	4.3	
Catholic	3.9	
Other Religions	3.7	
Moderate Protestant	3.5	
Liberal Protestant	3.3	
None	3.3	
Jewish	2.4	

#### 2.W Household Size

Religion	Mean	
Catholic	3.0	
Fundamentalist Protestant	3.0	
Other Religions	3.0	
Moderate Protestant	2.8	
None	2.8	
Liberal Protestant	2.6	
Jewish	2.5	

# 2.X Children under Eighteen in Household Religion Mean

Catholic	0.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	0.8
Other Religions	0.8
Moderate Protestant	0.7
None	0.7
Jewish	0.6
Liberal Protestant	0.6

# Table 3 Demographic Profile, 1972-2002

<b>3.A Age</b> (Mean) Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	46.6	43.5
1981-90	48.8	43.7
1991-2002	47.7	44.3
3.B Marital Status (% Married)		
1972-80	75.4	71.4
1981-90	68.4	62.9
1991-2002	64.6	57.0
3.C Divorce History (% Ever Divorce	d)	
1972-80	8.4	15.7
1981-90	15.5	20.9
1991-2002	20.6	25.7
3.D Residence (% in Central Cities o	f Twelve Largest	Metro Areas)
1972-80	37.7	9.3
1981-90	31.1	7.4
1991-2002	26.3	7.3
3.E Residence (% Living in Suburbs of	of Twelve Largest	Metro Areas)
1972-80	17.0	9.9
1981-90	24.9	11.1
1991-2002	27.2	11.7
3.F Region (% Living in Northeast)		
1972-80	58.9	21.8
1981-90	52.3	20.4
1991-2002	43.3	19.7

<b>3.G Years of Schooling</b> (Me Years	an) Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	13.8	11.7
1981-90	14.8	12.4
1991-2002	15.7	13.1
3.H Education (% Four-Year	College Degree+)	
1972-80	39.3	12.6
1981-90	49.3	16.4
1991-2002	61.2	22.4
3.J1 Spouse's Years of Scho	ooling (Mean)	
1972-80	13.9	11.7
1981-90	15.2	12.5
1991-2002	15.6	13.3
3.J2 Spouse's Education (%	o College Grad)	
1972-80	38.8	13.2
1981-90	55.0	17.9
1991-2002	59.4	25.0
3.K Vocabulary (Mean Items	Correct)	
1972-80	7.4	5.9
1981-90	7.6	5.9
1991-2002	7.2	6.0
3L1. Labor Force Status (%	Retired)	
1972-80	6.6	9.1
1981-90	8.4	11.0
1991-2002	13.7	12.1
3.L2 Labor Force Status (%	Employed)	
1972-80	60.1	56.8
1981-90	72.1	62.9
1991-2002	70.6	67.6

3.M Unemployment Histo Years	<b>ry</b> (% Unemployed in Last Te Jews	n Years) Non-Jews
1972-80	24.6	28.2
1981-90	19.8	32.3
1991-2002	21.2	31.9
3.N Occupational Prestige	e (Mean)	
1972-80	46.2	38.4
1981-90	50.4	39.9
1991-2002	51.9	43.2
3.0 Labor Union Members	<b>ship</b> (% Respondent and/or s	Spouse)
1972-80	16.7	26.2
1981-90	15.0	20.3
1991-2002	17.7	17.2
3.P Household Income, 19	986 Dollars (Mean)	
1972-80	50,568	32,735
1981-90	55,219	32,324
1991-2002	58,938	34,613
3.Q Per Capita Household Income 1986 Dollars (Mean)		
1972-80	18,795	10,856
1981-90	21,766	12,175
1991-2002	27,479	14,067
3.R Self-Identified Class (% Middle/Upper)		
1972-80	67.9/10.0	44.6/2.6
1981-90	69.4/15.2	46.1/3.2
1901-90	ODT IN TOTE	

<b>3.S Financial Situation</b> (% A Years	Above Average) Jews	Non-Jews	
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	40.5 52.3 51.0	18.9 20.6 22.4	
3.T Home Ownership (% Ov	wning)		
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	71.2 72.3	 67.5 66.0	
3.U Number of Children Bo	orn (Mean)		
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	1.7 1.7 1.6	2.2 2.0 1.9	
3.V Number of Siblings (Mean)			
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	2.6 2.3 2.4	4.3 4.0 3.8	
3.W Household Size (Mean)			
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	2.9 2.8 2.5	3.5 3.1 2.9	
3.X Children under Eighteen in Household (Mean)			
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	0.6 0.6 0.6	1.1 0.8 0.7	

# Table 4 Family of Origin by Ethnic/Racial Groups

#### 4.A Country of Birth

4.A Country of birth		
Group	% United States	
Native American	99.5	
Irish	97.8	
German	96.3	
Scandinavian	96.3	
British	95.8	
Other White	95.4	
French	94.7	
Italian	94.4	
Black	93.3	
Polish	91.7	
Eastern European	86.5	
Jewish	85.6	
Hispanic	59.2	
Other	58.9	
Asian	16.2	
Average	91.0	

#### 4.B Region at Age Sixteen

Group	% Northeast
Italian	58.0
Jewish	50.8
French	41.5
Polish	37.1
Eastern European	32.3
Irish	27.9
Other White	18.2
German	17.2
British	16.9
Hispanic	15.0
Black	14.2
Other	13.0
Scandinavian	13.0
Asian	5.7
Native American	4.6
Average	20.9

	% Living
Group	in Big City
Jewish	41.0
Black	28.1
Asian	27.7
Hispanic	25.8
Other	21.4
Polish	20.8
Italian	20.1
Eastern European	18.4
Irish	13.0
Other White	10.7
British	8.6
German	8.6
Native American	7.0
Scandinavian	6.5
French	5.2
Average	14.9
4.D Family Raised in	
	% with Both
Group	Mother and
Jewish	82.2
Polish	81.2
Asian	80.9
Eastern European	79.6
German	77.5
Scandinavian	76.4
British	75.9
French	75.7
	=
Italian	74.2
Italian Irish	74.2 72.9

Other White

Other

Black

Average

Hispanic Native American 71.7

62.7 62.4

59.9

51.5

70.8

#### 4.E Father's Years of Schooling

Group	Mean Years
Jewish	13.5
Asian	12.8
British	12.1
Irish	11.8
Scandinavian	11.7
German	11.5
Other	11.3
Other White	11.3
Eastern European	11.2
Italian	11.2
Polish	11.2
French	11.0
Native American	9.9
Black	9.6
Hispanic	8.8
Average	11.2

#### 4.F Father's Education

Group	% College Grad
Jewish	41.2
Asian	38.7
British	24.2
Other	21.2
Irish	19.3
Scandinavian	18.7
Eastern European	17.9
German	17.3
Other White	15.4
Polish	15.2
Italian	14.8
French	13.3
Hispanic	8.2
Black	6.6
Native American	6.0
Average	17.0

#### 4.G Mother's Years of Schooling Group Mean Years Jewish 13.0 British 12.0 Irish 11.9 Scandinavian 11.8 German 11.6 Other White 11.5 Eastern European 11.3 French 11.3 Italian 11.3 Polish 11.1 Asian 10.7 Black 10.6 Native American 10.5 Other 10.4 Hispanic 8.9 11.3 Average 4.H Mother's Education % College Grad+ ~

Grad+
28.5
20.2
15.4
13.6
13.0
11.5
11.5
10.9
10.3
9.3
7.8
6.9
6.6
5.7
5.0
11.0

#### 4.I Father's Occupational Prestige

Group	Mean
Jewish	49.4
Asian	48.3
British	45.9
Irish	45.0
Scandinavian	44.2
Other	43.9
German	43.7
Italian	43.4
Eastern European	43.3
Polish	43.3
Other White	43.2
French	42.8
Hispanic	40.6
Native American	39.8
Black	38.1
Average	43.3

#### 4.J Mother's Occupational Prestige

Group	Mean
Jewish	49.1
Asian	46.6
Other	44.2
British	43.1
Scandinavian	42.9
Irish	42.6
Italian	41.7
Eastern European	41.5
German	41.0
Other White	40.9
French	39.9
Polish	39.5
Hispanic	38.0
Black	37.4
Native American	37.0
Average	40.8

# 4.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen% AboveGroupAverageJewish52.4Other29.5Scandinavian24.4Italian23.0Asian21.8British21.6German21.5

Asian	21.8
British	21.6
German	21.5
Irish	19.2
Other White	17.6
Native American	16.7
Eastern European	15.9
Polish	14.8
Hispanic	14.6
French	12.2
Black	10.8
Average	18.7

#### Table 5 Family of Origin by Religious Groups

#### 5.A Country of Birth

Religion	% United States
Liberal Protestant	95.9
Fundamentalist Protestant	95.8
Moderate Protestant	95.0
None	90.7
Jewish	85.6
Catholic	84.8
Other Religions	70.9

#### 5.B Region at Age Sixteen

Religion	% Northeast
Jewish	50.8
Catholic	34.3
Liberal Protestant	22.1
None	21.5
Moderate Protestant	17.9
Other Religions	16.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	9.0

#### 5.C Residence at Age Sixteen

Religion	% Living in Big City
Jewish	41.0
Other Religions	24.9
Catholic	17.9
None	15.9
Fundamentalist Protestant	12.4
Moderate Protestant	12.0
Liberal Protestant	9.2

#### 5.D Family Raised in % with Both Religion Mother and Father Jewish 82.2 Liberal Protestant 76.3 Catholic 75.0 Moderate Protestant 71.5 Other Religions 67.7 Fundamentalist Protestant 67.0 None 63.6 5.E Father's Years of Schooling Religion Mean Years Jewish 13.5 None 12.5 Other Religions 12.2 Liberal Protestant 11.8 Moderate Protestant 11.3 11.2 Catholic

#### 5.F Father's Education

Fundamentalist Protestant

Religion	% College Grad	
Jewish	41.2	
None	12.2	
Other Religions	12.2	
Liberal Protestant	11.8	
Moderate Protestant	11.3	
Catholic	11.2	
Fundamentalist Protestant	10.2	

10.2

#### 5.G Mother's Years of Schooling

Religion	Mean Years	
Jewish	13.0	
None	12.2	
Liberal Protestant	11.9	
Moderate Protestant	11.5	
Other Religions	11.4	
Catholic	11.0	
Fundamentalist Protestant	10.7	

#### 5.H Mother's Education

% College Grad+
28.5
16.0
15.8
15.0
9.8
9.7
7.1

# 5.I Father's Occupational Prestige

Religion	Mean
Jewish	49.4
Other Religions	46.0
None	45.3
Liberal Protestant	44.7
Catholic	43.3
Moderate Protestant	43.1
Fundamentalist Protestant	41.2

#### 5.J Mother's Occupational Prestige

Religion	Mean
Jewish	49.1
Liberal Protestant	42.9
None	42.1
Other Religions	41.9
Catholic	41.0
Moderate Protestant	40.0
Fundamentalist Protestant	39.0

## 5.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen

Religion	% Above Average
Jewish	52.4
None	23.8
Liberal Protestant	21.4
Moderate Protestant	20.4
Other Religions	19.9
Catholic	19.6
Fundamentalist Protestant	12.5

## Table 6 Family of Origin, 1972-2002

Years	Jews	Non-Jews	
1972-80	87.0	93.8	
1981-90	86.3	93.5	
1991-2002	85.6	91.0	
6.B Region at Age Sixte	<b>en</b> (% Northeast)		
1972-80	57.9	21.3	
1981-90	57.2	20.8	
1991-2002	50.8	20.3	
6.C Residence at Age Si	xteen (% Living in Big City)		
1972-80	52.8	15.2	
1981-90	52.0	14.0	
1991-2002	41.0	14.4	
6.D Family Raised in (%	with Both Mother and Fathe	r)	
1972-80	80.7	76.2	
1981-90	84.7	75.2	
1991-2002	82.2	70.6	
	6.E Father's Years of Schooling (Mean)		
6.E Father's Years of Sch	ooling (Mean)		
6.E Father's Years of Sch	nooling (Mean) 10.4	9.1	
	• • •	9.1 10.2	
1972-80	10.4		
1972-80 1981-90	10.4 11.8 13.5	10.2	
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002 <b>6.F Father's Education</b> ( <sup>(</sup>	10.4 11.8 13.5	10.2	
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	10.4 11.8 13.5 % College Grad)	10.2 11.2	

1972-80       9.9       9.5         1981-90       11.4       10.4         1991-2002       13.0       11.3         6.H Mother's Education (% College Grad)       11.3         1972-80       8.0       4.6         1981-90       13.9       7.1         1991-2002       28.5       10.7         6.I Father's Occupational Prestige (Mean)       44.2       38.7         1972-80       44.2       38.7         1981-90       45.0       40.2         1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)          1972-80           1981-90           1972-80           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	6.G Mother's Years of Schooling (Mean)			
1981-90       11.4       10.4         1991-2002       13.0       11.3         6.H Mother's Education (% College Grad)       11.3         1972-80       8.0       4.6         1981-90       13.9       7.1         1991-2002       28.5       10.7         6.I Father's Occupational Prestige (Mean)       11.4       10.4         1972-80       44.2       38.7         1981-90       45.0       40.2         1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)       11         1972-80           1981-90           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	Years	Jews	Non-Jews	
1991-2002       13.0       11.3         6.H Mother's Education (% College Grad)       13.9       1.1.3         1972-80       8.0       4.6         1981-90       13.9       7.1         1991-2002       28.5       10.7         6.I Father's Occupational Prestige (Mean)       1972-80       44.2         1972-80       44.2       38.7         1981-90       45.0       40.2         1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)          1972-80           1972-80           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	1972-80	9.9	9.5	
6.H Mother's Education (% College Grad)         1972-80       8.0       4.6         1981-90       13.9       7.1         1991-2002       28.5       10.7         6.I Father's Occupational Prestige (Mean)       1972-80       44.2       38.7         1972-80       45.0       40.2       1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)       1972-80         1981-90       49.4       43.2         1972-80         1981-90         1981-90       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9       16.9	1981-90	11.4	10.4	
1972-80       8.0       4.6         1981-90       13.9       7.1         1991-2002       28.5       10.7         6.I Father's Occupational Prestige (Mean)       1972-80       44.2         1972-80       44.2       38.7         1981-90       45.0       40.2         1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)          1972-80           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	1991-2002	13.0	11.3	
1981-90       13.9       7.1         1991-2002       28.5       10.7         6.1 Father's Occupational Prestige (Mean)       1972-80       44.2       38.7         1981-90       45.0       40.2         1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)           1972-80           1981-90           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80       24.4         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	6.H Mother's Education	(% College Grad)		
1991-2002       28.5       10.7         6.1 Father's Occupational Prestige (Mean)       1972-80       44.2       38.7         1981-90       45.0       40.2         1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)           1972-80           1981-90           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	1972-80	8.0	4.6	
6.1 Father's Occupational Prestige (Mean)         1972-80       44.2       38.7         1981-90       45.0       40.2         1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)           1972-80           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	1981-90	13.9	7.1	
1972-80       44.2       38.7         1981-90       45.0       40.2         1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)           1972-80           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	1991-2002	28.5	10.7	
1981-90       45.0       40.2         1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)           1972-80           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	6.I Father's Occupationa	I Prestige (Mean)		
1991-2002       49.4       43.2         6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)           1972-80           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	1972-80	44.2	38.7	
6.J Mother's Occupational Prestige (Mean)         1972-80          1981-90          1991-2002       49.1         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)         1972-80       24.4         1972-80       30.1	1981-90	45.0	40.2	
1972-80           1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7 <b>6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen</b> (% Above Average)         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	1991-2002	49.4	43.2	
1981-90           1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80         1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	6.J Mother's Occupation	<b>al Prestige</b> (Mean)		
1991-2002       49.1       40.7         6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)       1972-80       24.4       14.0         1981-90       30.1       16.9	1972-80			
6.K Financial Standing at Age Sixteen (% Above Average)           1972-80         24.4         14.0           1981-90         30.1         16.9	1981-90			
1972-80     24.4     14.0       1981-90     30.1     16.9	1991-2002	49.1	40.7	
1981-90     30.1     16.9	6.K Financial Standing a	<b>t Age Sixteen</b> (% Above A	verage)	
	1972-80	24.4	14.0	
1991-2002 52.4 18.2	1981-90	30.1	16.9	
	1991-2002	52.4	18.2	

## Table 7 Religion by Ethnic/Racial Groups

7.A Frequency of Prayer	
Group	% Daily+
Black	76.4
Other	58.1
Native American	56.1
Asian	55.0
Irish	54.3
German	53.9
Hispanic	53.3
British	52.9
Polish	52.7
Italian	52.3
Other White	52.2
Eastern European	50.8
French	50.1
Scandinavian	48.0
Jewish	25.5
Average	55.3
5	55.3
7.B Attend Religious Ser	55.3 vices
7.B Attend Religious Ser	55.3
7.B Attend Religious Ser Group	55.3 vices
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian	55.3 vices % Weekly +
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black	55.3 <b>vices</b> % Weekly + 35.2
Average <b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British	55.3 <b>vices</b> % Weekly + 35.2 31.0
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British German	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish	55.3 <b>vices</b> % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British German Irish	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8 26.9
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British German Irish Eastern European French	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8 26.9 26.7
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British German Irish Eastern European French Hispanic	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8 26.9 26.7 26.6
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British German Irish Eastern European French Hispanic Other	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8 26.9 26.7 26.6 25.5
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British German Irish Eastern European French Hispanic Other Scandinavian	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8 26.9 26.7 26.6 25.5 23.9
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British German Irish Eastern European French Hispanic Other Scandinavian Other White	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8 26.9 26.7 26.6 25.5 23.9 23.9 23.9
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British German Irish Eastern European French Hispanic Other Scandinavian Other White Italian	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8 26.9 26.7 26.6 25.5 23.9 23.9 23.1
<b>7.B Attend Religious Ser</b> Group Asian Black Polish British German Irish Eastern European	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8 26.9 26.7 26.6 25.5 23.9 23.9 23.9 23.1 22.8
7.B Attend Religious Ser Group Asian Black Polish British German Irish Eastern European French Hispanic Other Scandinavian Other White Italian Native American	55.3 vices % Weekly + 35.2 31.0 30.4 29.0 28.8 26.9 26.7 26.6 25.5 23.9 23.9 23.9 23.1 22.8 19.6

#### 7.C Supreme Court Ruling Against School Prayers

Group	% Approve Ruling
Jewish	84.2
Scandinavian	49.2
Italian	46.7
Asian	44.1
Other	43.8
Irish	42.2
Polish	41.9
British	41.8
French	41.3
Hispanic German	41.2
Eastern European	38.8
Other White	37.1
Native American	30.2
Black	23.9
Average	39.0

#### 7.D Nature of World

Group	% Mostly Good—6&7
Other	39.2
Asian	35.8
Polish	33.7
French	33.4
Italian	31.9
British	31.5
Black	31.0
Scandinavian	30.7
Eastern European	30.3
Irish	30.1
Other White	29.7
German	29.5
Native American	26.8
Hispanic	25.5
Jewish	24.8
Average	30.3

#### 7.E Human Nature Group Other Jewish Irish French Eastern European Scandinavian Italian Other White German Asian British Polish Native American Hispanic

Black

Average

# 7.F Religious Strength

7.F Kenglous Strength	
Group	% Strong <sup>a</sup>
Black	48.5
Asian	42.7
German	38.9
Eastern European	38.4
British	37.9
Other	37.7
Jewish	37.6
Irish	37.0
French	36.5
Scandinavian	35.7
Italian	33.8
Polish	33.6
Other White	32.6
Hispanic	32.4
Native American	31.5
Average	37.4

% Mostly Good–1&2

54.6

47.0

42.4

41.1

39.5

38.2

37.6 37.1

37.0

36.9

36.9

34.6

33.3

31.6

29.1

36.6

a. Religious strength is asked only for those who report some religious preference.

#### 7.G God

Group	% Knows God Exists
Black	80.5
Hispanic	76.2
Asian	65.9
German	64.8
Native American	64.8
Other White	63.2
British	63.0
Scandinavian	61.2
Irish	60.4
Italian	60.0
Eastern European	58.4
French	58.1
Polish	55.2
Other	51.7
Jewish	27.0
Average	64.7

#### 7.I Bible % Exact Word of God Group Black 63.7 Native American 42.6 Hispanic 38.3 Other White 33.9 German 30.7 Asian 27.7 British 27.1 Irish 27.0 Other 26.1 Scandinavian 24.4 23.2 Eastern European French 21.5 Polish 20.7 Italian 18.5 Jewish 10.8

32.4

Average

#### 7.H Life after Death

Group	% Believes in
Native American	80.2
German	78.4
Other	77.2
French	76.0
Polish	76.0
British	75.2
Irish	74.9
Asian	73.5
Other White	72.6
Scandinavian	72.4
Black	70.1
Italian	70.1
Hispanic	68.2
Eastern European	66.5
Jewish	42.8
Average	73.1

#### Table 8 Religion by Religious Groups

#### 8.A Frequency of Prayers

Religion	% Daily+
Fundamentalist Protestant	69.6
Other Religions	62.5
Moderate Protestant	58.7
Liberal Protestant	54.1
Catholic	55.3
Jewish	25.5
None	18.8

#### 8.B Attend Religious Service

Religion	% Weekly +
Fundamentalist Protestant Catholic	36.3 30.5
Moderate Protestant	25.9
Other Religions	23.6
Liberal Protestant Jewish None	21.5 <b>7.4</b> 1.5

#### 8.C Supreme Court Ruling Against School Prayers

Policion	% Approve
Religion	Ruling
Jewish	84.2
None	64.2
Other Religions	46.9
Liberal Protestant	39.9
Catholic	39.8
Moderate Protestant	36.9
Fundamentalist Protestant	24.8

#### 8.D Nature of World % Mostly Religion Good—6&7 Liberal Protestant 38.3 Other Religions 33.8 Catholic 33.5 Moderate Protestant 32.4 Fundamentalist Protestant 26.3 Jewish 24.8 None 20.6 8.E Human Nature % Mostly Good—1&2 Religion Jewish 47.0 Liberal Protestant 44.0 Other Religions 41.1 Catholic 40.2 Moderate Protestant 37.2 Fundamentalist Protestant 30.8 30.1 None 8.F Religious Strength % Strong<sup>a</sup> Religion Other Religions 52.0 Fundamentalist Protestant 49.5 Jewish 37.6 Catholic 37.2 Liberal Protestant 34.6 42.2 Moderate Protestant \_\_\_\_a None

a. People with no religion were not asked about the strength of their religion.

#### 8.G God

Religion	% Knows God Exists
Keligion	GOU LAISIS
Fundamentalist Protestant	82.4
Moderate Protestant	67.4
Catholic	65.4
Liberal Protestant	58.8
Other Religions	56.2
Jewish	27.0
None	22.0
8.H Life after Death	
Religion	% Believes in
Fundamentalist Protestant	79.9
Moderate Protestant	78.1
Liberal Protestant	75.7
Other Religions	75.2
Catholic	74.2
None	49.3
Jewish	42.8
8.I Bible	
	% Exact
Religion	Word of God
Fundamentalist Protestant	56.5
Moderate Protestant	33.5
Other Religions	32.0
Liberal Protestant	22.3
Catholic	20.7
Jewish	10.8
None	9.6

# Table 9 Religion, 1972-2002

9.A Frequency of Prayer Years	s (% Daily+) Jews	Non-Jews	
1972-80			
1981-90	25.9	55.1	
1991-2002	25.5	55.9	
9.B Attend Religious Ser	rvices (% Weekly +)		
1972-80	7.0	30.7	
1981-90	12.0	30.9	
1991-2002	7.4	26.8	
9.C Supreme Court Rulin (% Approve Ruling)	ng Against School Prayers	5	
1972-80	66.9	32.9	
1981-90	76.5	39.0	
1991-2002	84.2	38.1	
9.D Nature of World (% Mostly Good—6&7)			
1972-80			
1981-90	27.3	29.4	
1991-2002	24.8	30.3	
9.E Human Nature (% Mostly Good—1&2)			
1972-80			
1981-90	53.8	42.6	
1991-2002	47.0	36.4	
9.F Religious Strength (% Strong) <sup>a</sup>			
1972-80	40.3	38.2	
1981-90	41.5	39.9	
1991-2002	37.6	37.4	

a. Includes people with no religion in base. Because all Jews by definition have a religion, all are asked this item. But some non-Jews have no religion and thus cannot be a "strong" member of their religion.

9.G God (% Knows God E	xists)	
Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80		
1981-90	26.3	64.1
1991-2002	27.0	65.4
9.H Life after Death (%	Believes In)	
1972-80	17.5	71.4
1981-90	31.3	73.6
1991-2002	42.8	73.7
9.1 Bible (% Exact Word o	f God)	
1972-80		
1981-90	4.5	35.8
1991-2002	10.8	32.9

# Table 10 Abortion Attitudes by Ethnic/Racial Groups

Group	% Allow
Jewish	94.6
Scandinavian	86.4
Eastern European	81.7
British	81.5
Italian	80.8
Polish	77.8
Other White	77.2
Irish	75.6
German	75.0
Asian	74.9
Native American	74.1
Hispanic	73.7
Other	73.4
French	71.7
Black	70.9
Average	76.8
10.B Abortion if Woman	Not Married
Group	% Allow

Jewish	83.2
Scandinavian	50.3
Italian	49.1
Other	48.2
Eastern European	48.1
British	46.8
Polish	45.6
Asian	42.1
Other White	40.2
Irish	41.1
German	39.7
French	39.1
Hispanic	34.7
Black	33.1
Native American	29.6
Average	41.4

#### 10.C Abortion if Raped

Group	% Allow	
Jewish	96.2	
British	83.2	
Scandinavian	83.0	
Italian	82.7	
Eastern European	80.8	
Polish	80.6	
Other White	78.9	
Irish	78.8	
French	78.3	
German	78.2	
Native American	75.7	
Black	74.7	
Other	74.1	
Hispanic	71.5	
Asian	66.8	
Average	78.6	

#### 10.D Abortion if Woman Wants No More Children

Group	% Allow
Jewish	82.2
Asian	51.3
Eastern European	49.8
Italian	48.4
Scandinavian	47.4
British	46.4
Other	43.4
Irish	41.7
Other White	40.4
Polish	39.9
Black	38.7
German	38.3
French	37.9
Hispanic	36.7
Native American	34.9
Average	42.2

Jewish	96.0
Scandinavian	93.2
Italian	90.0
British	89.4
Eastern European	88.0
Asian	87.3
Irish	86.8
Other White	86.4
German	85.8
Black	85.0
Native American	84.4
Other	84.3
Polish	84.1
French	82.0
Hispanic	82.0
10.F Abortion if Can't Affo	86.7 ord More Children % Allow
Average 10.F Abortion if Can't Affo Group	ord More Children
10.F Abortion if Can't Affo Group	ord More Children % Allow 81.1
<b>10.F Abortion if Can't Affo</b> Group Jewish Eastern European	ord More Children % Allow 81.1 50.8
<b>10.F Abortion if Can't Affo</b> Group Jewish Eastern European Scandinavian	ord More Children % Allow 81.1 50.8 49.5
10.F Abortion if Can't Affe Group Jewish Eastern European Scandinavian Other	<b>81.1</b> 50.8 49.5 48.3
10.F Abortion if Can't Affe Group Jewish Eastern European Scandinavian Other Italian	Bit         State           81.1         50.8           49.5         48.3           47.5         47.5
10.F Abortion if Can't Affo Group Jewish Eastern European Scandinavian Other Italian British	ord More Children           % Allow           81.1           50.8           49.5           48.3           47.5           46.5
10.F Abortion if Can't Affo Group Jewish Eastern European Scandinavian Other Italian British Asian	ord More Children % Allow 81.1 50.8 49.5 48.3 47.5 46.5 44.9
10.F Abortion if Can't Affe Group Jewish Eastern European Scandinavian Other Italian British Asian Polish	ord More Children % Allow 81.1 50.8 49.5 48.3 47.5 46.5 44.9 44.9
10.F Abortion if Can't Affe Group Jewish Eastern European Scandinavian Other Italian British Asian Polish Irish	State           bord More Children           % Allow           81.1           50.8           49.5           48.3           47.5           46.5           44.9           44.9           43.8
<b>10.F Abortion if Can't Affe</b> Group <b>Jewish</b> Eastern European Scandinavian Other Italian British Asian Polish Irish Other White	State           bord More Children           % Allow           81.1           50.8           49.5           48.3           47.5           46.5           44.9           43.8           42.6
<b>10.F Abortion if Can't Affo</b> Group <b>Jewish</b> Eastern European Scandinavian Other Italian British Asian Polish Irish Other White Black	String           bord More Children           % Allow           81.1           50.8           49.5           48.3           47.5           46.5           44.9           43.8           42.6           41.2
10.F Abortion if Can't Affo Group Jewish Eastern European Scandinavian Other Italian British Asian Polish Irish Other White Black French	Bit           % Allow           81.1           50.8           49.5           48.3           47.5           46.5           44.9           43.8           42.6           41.2           40.9
<b>10.F Abortion if Can't Affe</b> Group <b>Jewish</b> Eastern European Scandinavian Other Italian British Asian Polish Irish Other White	String           bord More Children           % Allow           81.1           50.8           49.5           48.3           47.5           46.5           44.9           43.8           42.6           41.2

#### 10.G Abortion for Any Reason

Group	% Allow	
Jewish	77.3	
Eastern European	50.2	
Scandinavian	46.8	
Italian	45.8	
Other	45.5	
British	43.8	
Irish	41.6	
Polish	39.9	
Asian	39.8	
Other White	39.7	
German	37.7	
Black	37.4	
French	37.0	
Hispanic	35.4	
Native American	30.0	
Average	40.7	

#### Table 11 Abortion Attitudes by Religious Groups

#### 11.A Abortion if Strong Chance of Serious Birth Defects

Religion	% Allow	
Jewish	94.6	
Liberal Protestant	88.3	
None	88.2	
Other Religions	79.9	
Moderate Protestant	79.5	
Catholic	73.6	
Fundamentalist Protestant	67.5	

#### 11.B Abortion if Woman Not Married

Religion	% Allow	
Jewish	83.2	
None	60.0	
Liberal Protestant	53.0	
Other Religions	52.0	
Moderate Protestant	43.0	
Catholic	37.6	
Fundamentalist Protestant	27.5	

#### 11.C Abortion if Raped

Religion	% Allow	
Jewish	96.2	
None	89.8	
Liberal Protestant	88.5	
Other Religions	83.6	
Moderate Protestant	81.7	
Catholic	75.7	
Fundamentalist Protestant	69.5	

#### 11.D Abortion if Woman Wants No More Children

Religion % Allow

Jewish	82.2
None	63.0
Other Religions	53.4
Liberal Protestant	51.0
Moderate Protestant	43.7
Catholic	37.9
Fundamentalist Protestant	28.9

#### 11.E Abortion if Woman's Health Seriously Endangered

Religion	% Allow	
Jewish	96.0	
Liberal Protestant	94.0	
None	92.6	
Other Religions	89.1	
Moderate Protestant	88.1	
Catholic	84.0	
Fundamentalist Protestant	81.9	

#### 11.F Abortion if Can't Afford More Children

Religion	% Allow
Jewish	81.1
None	63.4
Other Religions	53.4
Liberal Protestant	53.3
Moderate Protestant	44.6
Catholic	39.6
Fundamentalist Protestant	30.8

#### 11.G Abortion for Any Reason

Religion	% Allow
Jewish	77.3
None	60.0
Other Religions	52.2
Liberal Protestant	48.4
Moderate Protestant	43.1
Catholic	37.2
Fundamentalist Protestant	27.9

#### Table 12 Abortion, 1972-2002

# 12.A Abortion if Strong Chance of Serious Birth Defects

(% Allow) Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	96.0	80.0
1981-90	94.0	77.3
1991-2002	94.6	76.5

#### 12.B Abortion if Woman Not Married (% Allow)

1972-80	85.0	44.1
1981-90	85.3	40.0
1991-2002	83.2	40.6

#### 12.C Abortion if Raped (% Allow)

1972-80	97.3	79.6
1981-90	95.0	78.8
1991-2002	96.2	78.3

#### 12.D Abortion if Woman Wants No More Children (% Allow)

1972-80	82.3	42.1
1981-90	82.2	40.0
1991-2002	82.2	41.4

#### 12.E Abortion if Woman's Health Seriously Endangered (% Allow)

1972-80	97.0	88.2
1981-90	97.4	87.6
1991-2002	96.0	86.5

#### 12.F Abortion if Can't Afford More Children (% Allow)

Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	84.8	48.7
1981-90	84.5	42.9
1991-2002	81.1	42.8
12.G Abortion for Any R	eason (% Allow)	
1972-80	71.9	34.8
1981-90	76.5	35.8
1991-2002	77.3	40.0

#### Table 13 Suicide and Euthanasia by Ethnic/Racial Groups

#### 13.A Suicide if Person Has Incurable Disease

	% Person	
Group	Has Right to	
Jewish	84.1	
Eastern European	68.3	
Polish	66.3	
Scandinavian	66.3	
Italian	63.9	
British	63.2	
German	61.7	
French	61.4	
Irish	61.0	
Other White	59.7	
Other	55.0	
Native American	53.6	
Hispanic	51.3	
Asian	49.9	
Black	41.1	
Average	58.5	

#### 13.B Suicide if Person Is Bankrupt

	% Person	
Group	Has Right to	
Jewish	22.3	
Eastern European	12.3	
Other	11.7	
British	10.6	
Irish	10.2	
Scandinavian	10.1	
Italian	8.8	
Other White	8.5	
German	7.9	
Polish	6.9	
Native American	6.8	
Asian	6.3	
Hispanic	6.3	
Black	5.4	
French	5.4	
Average	8.5	

# 13.C Suicide if Person Dishonors Family

	% Person
Group	Has Right to
Jewish	22.7
Other	11.1
Eastern European	10.8
British	10.6
Scandinavian	9.5
Irish	9.4
Italian	9.4
Native American	9.3
Other White	8.8
Asian	8.3
German	7.5
Polish	6.6
Black	5.3
Hispanic	5.2
French	4.8
Average	8.4

#### 13.E Euthanasia for Incurable Patients % For Allowing Group Jewish 85.7 Eastern European 76.4 Other 75.9 Italian 72.2 Polish 71.7 British 71.1 French 70.9 Scandinavian 70.9 70.4 Irish German 69.4 Other White 68.0 Native American 66.6 Asian 63.0 Hispanic 62.6 Black 48.0 Average 66.9

#### 13.D Suicide if Person Is Tired of Living

Group	% Person Has Right to
Jewish	33.4
Eastern European	19.3
British	18.1
Scandinavian	18.1
Irish	17.9
Other	16.6
Other White	15.8
German	15.6
Italian	14.9
Native American	13.1
Asian	12.8
Hispanic	12.7
Polish	12.1
Black	11.6
French	9.6
Average	15.6

#### Table 14 Suicide and Euthanasia by Religious Groups

#### 14.A Suicide if Person Has Incurable Disease

	% Person
Religion	Has Right to
Jewish	84.1
None	80.5
Liberal Protestant	67.9
Moderate Protestant	59.1
Catholic	58.4
Other Religions	57.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	44.1

#### 14.B Suicide if Person Is Bankrupt

Dellater	% Person
Religion	Has Right to
Jewish	22.3
None	20.3
Liberal Protestant	10.1
Other Religions	9.7
Moderate Protestant	7.3
Catholic	6.1
Fundamentalist Protestant	4.7

#### 14.C Suicide if Person Dishonors Family

Religion	% Person Has Right to	
Jewish	22.7	
None	19.9	
Other Religions	12.0	
Liberal Protestant	9.5	
Moderate Protestant	6.7	
Catholic	5.8	
Fundamentalist Protestant	4.9	

#### 14.D Suicide if Person Is Tired of Living

	% Person	
Religion	Has Right to	
Jewish	33.4	
None	32.7	
Liberal Protestant	18.8	
Other Religions	18.1	
Moderate Protestant	13.2	
Catholic	12.6	
Fundamentalist Protestant	9.4	

#### 14.E Euthanasia for Incurable Patients

Religion	% For Allowing
Jewish	85.7
None	84.4
Liberal Protestant	76.2
Catholic	67.6
Other Religions	66.9
Moderate Protestant	66.9
Fundamentalist Protestant	54.2

#### Table 15 Suicide and Euthanasia, 1972-2002

Years	Jews	Non-Jews	
1972-80	73.4	37.1	
1981-90	78.0	47.7	
1991-2002	84.1	58.0	
15.B Suicide if Person Is Bankrupt (% Person Has Right to)			
1972-80	20.8	5.1	
1981-90	19.4	6.4	
1991-2002	22.3	8.2	
15.C Suicide if Person D	ishonors Family (% Person	Has Right to)	
1972-80	20.8	5.9	
1981-90	19.4	6.6	
1991-2002	22.7	8.1	
15.D Suicide if Person Is Tired of Living (% Person Has Right to)			
1972-80	30.8	11.5	
1981-90	26.5	12.8	
1991-2002	33.4	15.2	
15.E Euthanasia for Incurable Patients (% For Allowing)			
1972-80	73.3	57.8	
1981-90	79.1	64.3	

## Table 16 Sexual Morality by Ethnic/Racial Groups

#### 16.A Premarital Sex

	% Always	
Group	Wrong	
	5	
Jewish	4.0	
Italian	12.0	
Eastern European	18.5	
French	20.4	
Polish	20.7	
Hispanic	21.1	
Irish	25.0	
Scandinavian	25.1	
Other White	25.7	
British	27.0	
German	27.9	
Native American	28.9	
Other	30.3	
Asian	32.8	
Black	33.9	
Average	25.7	
16.B Extramarital Sex		
TO.D Extramantal Jex	% Always	
Group	Wrong	
Jewish	51.9	
Other	72.1	
Asian	73.3	
Italian	73.4	
Scandinavian	75.0	
Polish	75.9	
Black	76.4	
French	76.9	
Eastern European	77.2	
British	77.8	
	,,,,,,	
Irish	78.5	
Irish Hispanic		
	78.5	
Hispanic	78.5 79.4	
Hispanic Other White	78.5 79.4 80.6	
Hispanic Other White German	78.5 79.4 80.6 81.7	

#### 16.C Homosexual Sex

IO.C HUMUSERUUI JER	
Group	% Always Wrong
Gloup	wrong
Jewish	18.3
Italian	44.5
Polish	48.2
Eastern European	49.8
Scandinavian	51.4
Hispanic	55.5
French	55.6
Irish	55.9
Other	56.6
British	57.3
Asian	60.1
Other White	61.3
German	62.7
Native American	66.6
Black	71.1
Average	59.1

#### 16.D Teenage Sex

Group	% Always Wrong
Jewish	52.0
Eastern European	65.2
, Hispanic	65.5
Italian	65.7
French	67.3
Irish	68.0
Scandinavian	68.1
Asian	69.4
Other White	70.4
Other	70.5
German	70.8
Native American	71.6
Black	72.6
British	72.7
Polish	73.3
Average	69.7

Group	% Agree
Jewish	76.0
Native American	62.8
Hispanic	62.3
Italian	62.0
Irish	59.0
French	58.6
Black	58.1
Eastern European	57.1
Other White	56.0
Polish	55.8
Scandinavian	54.9
Asian	54.7
German	54.6
Other	54.5
British	53.0
Average	57.0
16.F Pornography	
<b>16.F Pornography</b> Group	% Illegal for All
Group	for All
Group Jewish	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8
Group Jewish Italian	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3
Group Jewish Italian Black	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian Eastern European Other Hispanic	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9 35.5 35.7
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian Eastern European Other	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9 35.5
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian Eastern European Other Hispanic Polish Irish	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9 35.5 35.7 35.8 37.3
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian Eastern European Other Hispanic Polish Irish Scandinavian	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9 35.5 35.7 35.8 37.3 38.9
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian Eastern European Other Hispanic Polish Irish Scandinavian Other White	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9 35.5 35.7 35.8 37.3 38.9 39.2
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian Eastern European Other Hispanic Polish Irish Scandinavian Other White Native American	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9 35.5 35.7 35.8 37.3 38.9 39.2 39.3
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian Eastern European Other Hispanic Polish Irish Scandinavian Other White Native American French	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9 35.5 35.7 35.8 37.3 38.9 39.2 39.3 40.3
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian Eastern European Other Hispanic Polish Irish Scandinavian Other White Native American	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9 35.5 35.7 35.8 37.3 38.9 39.2 39.3 40.3 40.7
Group Jewish Italian Black Asian Eastern European Other Hispanic Polish Irish Scandinavian Other White Native American French	for All <b>16.5</b> 28.4 30.8 31.3 32.9 35.5 35.7 35.8 37.3 38.9 39.2 39.3 40.3

#### 16.G X-Rated Movie

TO.G A-Rated Movie	
	% Saw in
Group	Last Year
Other	41.7
Asian	33.9
Hispanic	30.9
French	29.9
Black	29.6
Italian	26.2
Native American	25.3
Other White	24.0
German	23.7
Eastern European	23.1
Jewish	22.1
Scandinavian	20.9
Irish	20.1
Polish	19.0
British	18.3
Average	24.3

# Table 17 Sexual Morality by Religious Groups

#### 17.A Premarital Sex

17.A Premarital Sex		
	% Always	
Group	Wrong	
Jewish	4.0	
None	6.9	
Catholic	16.9	
Liberal Protestant	20.4	
Other Religions	25.7	
Moderate Protestant	27.2	
Fundamentalist Protestant	43.7	
17.B Extramarital Sex		
	% Always	
Group	Wrong	
Jewish	51.9	
None	59.4	
Other Religions	74.0	
Catholic	78.7	
Liberal Protestant	79.6	
Moderate Protestant	80.1	
Fundamentalist Protestant	85.6	
17.C Homosexual Sex		
	% Always	
Group	Wrong	
Jewish	18.3	
None	31.6	
Other Religions	50.6	
Cathalia	FD 1	

Catholic	52.1
Liberal Protestant	56.9
Moderate Protestant	63.3
Fundamentalist Protestant	78.5

#### 17.D Teenage Sex

The reenage bea	0/ 1/2000
	% Always
Group	Wrong
N	42.2
None	43.3
Jewish	52.0
Other Religions	66.6
Catholic	67.4
Liberal Protestant	70.4
Moderate Protestant	74.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	81.3

#### 17.E Birth Control for Teenagers

Group	% Agree
Jewish	76.0
None	74.8
Other Religions	59.3
Liberal Protestant	58.5
Catholic	58.4
Moderate Protestant	54.3
Fundamentalist Protestant	48.1

#### 17.F Pornography

Group	% Illegal for All
None	17.6
Jewish	16.5
Catholic	32.2
Other Religions	32.5
Liberal Protestant	39.8
Moderate Protestant	40.3
Fundamentalist Protestant	47.7

#### 16.G X-Rated Movie % Saw in Group Last Year 36.5 None Other Religions Catholic 30.8 26.1 Jewish 22.1 Fundamentalist Protestant 21.2 Moderate Protestant 20.8 Liberal Protestant 19.5

#### Table 18 Sexual Morality, 1972-2002

#### **18.A Premarital Sex** (% Always Wrong)

Years	Jews	Non-Jews				
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	13.3 11.5 4.0	31.4 27.1 26.2				
18.B Extramarital Sex (% Always Wrong)						
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	48.2 50.4 51.9	71.1 75.3 78.7				
18.C Homosexual Sex (% Always	18.C Homosexual Sex (% Always Wrong)					
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	32.2 32.8 18.3	69.8 73.9 59.9				
18.D Teenage Sex (% Always Wre	ong)					
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	57.2 52.0	67.7 70.2				
18.E Birth Control for Teenage	18.E Birth Control for Teenagers (% Agree)					
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	73.4 76.0	 56.1 56.6				
18.F Pornography (% Illegal for A	All)					
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	24.4 18.5 16.5	41.0 41.4 37.7				
18.G X-Rated Movie (% Saw in Last Year)						
1972-80 1981-90 1991-2002	33.7 35.6 22.1	18.8 24.2 24.4				

# Table 19

Gender Roles and Gender Equality by Ethnic/Racial Groups

#### 19.A Vote for a Woman President

Group	% Would Vote For	
French	94.7	
Jewish	93.5	
Black	91.1	
Italian	91.1	
British	90.4	
Eastern European	90.4	
Irish	90.1	
Scandinavian	89.8	
German	89.4	
Hispanic	89.1	
Other White	88.5	
Asian	88.2	
Polish	87.9	
Native American	86.3	
Other	78.4	
Average	89.7	

# **19.B Women Not Emotionally as Suited for Politics** Group % Disagree

Group	% Disagree	
Jewish	83.2	
Italian	77.4	
French	75.6	
Irish	75.0	
German	74.6	
Polish	74.6	
Scandinavian	73.2	
Black	73.1	
Other White	72.8	
Eastern European	72.6	
British	72.1	
Hispanic	71.3	
Native American	70.3	
Other	67.2	
Asian	49.0	
Average	73.0	

#### **19.C Wife Working if Husband Can Support Them** Group % Approve

Group	% Approve
Jewish	90.2
Irish	86.4
Scandinavian	85.9
Asian	85.3
British	83.2
Italian	82.7
Polish	81.9
French	81.6
German	81.1
Eastern European	80.7
Other White	79.4
Native American	77.6
Hispanic	75.4
Black	73.9
Other	65.8
Average	80.6

## 19.D Women Should Take Care of Home, Not Run Country

% Disagree
92.1
87.0
86.7
85.2
84.8
84.7
83.8
83.5
83.0
79.7
79.2
79.1
77.5
73.3
68.5
82.1

Group	% Disagree
Black	63.3
Jewish	61.3
Polish	59.5
Native American	57.4
Other	56.7
Irish	56.3
Italian	55.5
Eastern European	55.0
German	53.0
Hispanic	52.6
Other White	52.5
French	50.8
Scandinavian	50.7
British	48.1
Asian	37.3
Average	54.0

<b>19.F Wife Should First Help Husband's Career</b> Group % Disagree		
	5	-
Jewish	88.1	
Native American	80.9	
Irish	80.6	
French	80.5	
Italian	80.4	
German	77.7	
Other White	76.4	
Scandinavian	76.1	
Black	74.7	
Eastern European	74.5	
British	73.8	
Polish	72.8	
Hispanic	70.9	
Other	63.8	
Asian	57.3	

76.2

Average

## 19.G Family Better if Man Works, Woman Tends Home

Group	% Disagree
French	80.5
Jewish	73.5
Irish	66.0
Italian	65.6
French	65.5
Native American	63.9
Polish	63.0
Black	62.9
German	62.5
Scandinavian	62.3
Other White	60.3
Eastern European	59.7
Hispanic	56.8
British	56.6
Other	55.5
Asian	53.7
Average	61.5

#### **19.H Mother Working Does Not Hurt Children** Group % Agree

Group	% Agree
Jewish	77.9
Black	71.4
Irish	69.1
Polish	68.7
Scandinavian	67.4
Italian	65.3
German	65.0
Other White	63.8
Native American	63.7
Hispanic	63.5
French	63.0
Asian	62.5
Eastern European	61.8
British	61.7
Other	59.3
Average	65.6

## Table 20 Gender Roles and Gender Equality by Religious Groups

## 20.A Vote for a Woman President

	% Would	
Religion	Vote For	
None	94.1	
Jewish	93.5	
Liberal Protestant	92.1	
Catholic	91.8	
Moderate Protestant	90.4	
Other Religions	89.8	
Fundamentalist Protestant	85.4	
20.B Women Not Emotionally	/ as Suited for Politics	
20.B Women Not Emotionally Religion	<b>/ as Suited for Politics</b> % Disagree	
Religion	% Disagree	
Religion Jewish	% Disagree <b>83.2</b>	
Religion Jewish None	% Disagree 83.2 78.7	
Religion Jewish None Catholic	% Disagree 83.2 78.7 75.4	
Religion Jewish None Catholic Liberal Protestant	% Disagree 83.2 78.7 75.4 75.3	
Religion Jewish None Catholic Liberal Protestant Moderate Protestant	% Disagree 83.2 78.7 75.4 75.3 75.0	

## 20.C Wife Working if Husband Can Support Them

Religion	% Approve	
Jewish	90.2	
None	85.9	
Moderate Protestant	82.6	
Other Religions	82.0	
Catholic	80.7	
Liberal Protestant	80.7	
Fundamentalist Protestant	77.2	

#### 20.D Women Should Take Care of Home, Not Run Country Religion % Disagree

Religion	% Disagree
Jewish	92.1
None	88.9
Catholic	85.0
Liberal Protestant	84.4
Moderate Protestant	81.9
Other Religions	78.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	76.0

#### 20.E Preschool Children Suffer if Mother Works

% Disagree
61.8
61.3
55.6
53.4
53.1
50.7
49.0

## 20.F Wife Should First Help Husband's Career

Religion	% Disagree
Jewish	88.1
None	87.0
Catholic	78.3
Liberal Protestant	76.7
Moderate Protestant	74.9
Other Religions	73.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	70.5

## 20.G Family Better if Man Works, Woman Tends Home

Religion	% Disagree
None	76.3
Jewish	73.5
Catholic	64.2
Liberal Protestant	63.6
Moderate Protestant	61.9
Other Religions	60.1
Fundamentalist Protestant	52.1

# 20.H Mother Working Does Not Hurt Children Religion % Agree Jewish 77.9

Jewish	//.9
None	72.1
Liberal Protestant	67.8
Catholic	67.7
Moderate Protestant	63.6
Other Religions	64.2
Fundamentalist Protestant	60.7

## Table 21 Gender Roles and Gender Equality, 1972-2002

21.A Vote for a Woman P	President (% Would Vote For	r)
Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	92.4	76.5
1981-90	89.6	83.7
1991-2002	93.5	89.7
21.B Women Not Emotio	nally as Suited for Politic	<b>s</b> (% Disagree)
1972-80	69.1	49.5
1981-90	81.7	61.7
1991-2002	83.2	72.8
21.C Wife Working if Hus	band Can Support Them	(% Approve)
1972-80	79.7	68.4
1981-90	90.6	78.3
1991-2002	90.2	80.4
21.D Women Should Take (% Disagree)	e Care of Home, Not Run	Country
1972-80	88.4	62.4
1981-90	87.2	74.3
1991-2002	92.1	81.8

## 21.E Preschool Children Suffer if Mother Works (% Disagree)

1972-80	53.9	30.8
1981-90	58.4	48.2
1991-2002	61.3	53.8

21.F Wife Should First Help H	Husband's Career (% Di	sagree)
Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	61.6	41.1
1981-90	69.6	65.1

88.1

76.0

## 21.G Family Better if Man Works, Woman Tends Home

(% Disagree)

1991-2002

1972-80	60.0	33.1
1981-90	67.1	54.6
1991-2002	73.5	61.3

#### 21.H Mother Working Does Not Hurt Children (% Agree)

1972-80	69.2	47.8
1981-90	65.5	62.0
1991-2002	77.9	65.3

## Table 22 Child Values by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 22.A Obedience

Group	% First Choice
Black	29.0
Other White	20.1
Other	18.7
Hispanic	18.0
Asian	17.6
French	17.3
German	17.3
British	17.0
Scandinavian	15.8
Native American	15.6
Irish	15.4
Eastern European	15.1
Italian	14.4
Polish	12.8
Jewish	5.8
Average	18.6

## 22.B Being Well-liked/Popular

Group	% First- Fourth Choice
Jewish	42.6
Asian	41.6
Other	40.0
Eastern European	28.0
Hispanic	27.0
Polish	26.7
Other White	25.2
Italian	24.4
British	23.6
German	21.9
Irish	21.9
Black	20.9
Scandinavian	20.3
Native American	19.6
French	18.5
Average	24.0

Group	% First Choice
ewish	70.9
candinavian	60.7
olish	56.6
rish	56.4
astern European	55.4
British	54.9
talian	53.7
German	53.0
rench	50.0
Other White	49.7
lative American	47.2
Black	40.6
Other	38.6
lispanic	37.4
Asian	24.3
Average	50.3
2.D Work Hard	
Group	% First Choice
sian	37.4
Other	26.9
lispanic	25.0
talian	20.7
Black	18.7
lative American	17.8
rench	17.3
Other White	16.8
	16.6
German	10.0
German British	14.6
British	14.6
rish	14.6 13.8
pritish rish Yolish	14.6 13.8 13.8
british ritish Polish iastern European	14.6 13.8 13.8 13.5

## 22.E Help Others

Group	% First Choice
Asian	18.8
Hispanic	18.3
Native American	18.0
Polish	16.3
Other	15.9
French	15.3
Eastern European	14.4
lrish	14.1
Scandinavian	14.3
British	13.1
Other White	12.7
German	12.6
Black	11.0
Italian	10.1
Jewish	9.0
Average	13.4

## Table 23 Child Values by Religious Groups

# 23.A Obedience

Religion	% First Choice	
Fundamentalist Protestant	28.8	
Moderate Protestant	17.8	
Catholic	14.9	
Other Religions	14.4	
Liberal Protestant	13.3	
None	9.4	
Jewish	5.8	

## 23.B Being Well-liked/Popular

Lord Dening Men Intean opular		
	% First-	
Religion	Fourth Choice	
Jewish	42.6	
Other Religions	36.1	
None	34.3	
Catholic	23.6	
Liberal Protestant	23.5	
Moderate Protestant	22.8	
Fundamentalist Protestant	18.5	

## 23.C Think for Oneself

Religion	% First Choice	
Jewish	70.9	
Liberal Protestant	60.7	
None	60.3	
Moderate Protestant	53.5	
Catholic	49.5	
Other Religions	49.0	
Fundamentalist Protestant	40.4	

## 23.D Work Hard

Religion	% First Choice
Catholic	20.7
Other Religions	20.1
None	16.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	15.9
Moderate Protestant	15.6
Liberal Protestant	14.4
Jewish	13.0

## 23.E Help Others

Religion	% First Choice	
Other Religions	15.3	
Fundamentalist Protestant	14.4	
Catholic	14.0	
None	13.0	
Moderate Protestant	12.6	
Liberal Protestant	10.9	
Jewish	9.0	

## Table 24 Child Values, 1972-2002

<b>24.A Obedience</b> (% First Cho Years	ice) Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80		
1981-90	8.1	20.7
1991-2002	5.8	18.8
24.B Being Well-liked/Popul	ar (% First Choice)	
1972-80		
1981-90	0.0	0.8
1991-2002	1.3	0.6
24.C Think for Oneself (% First Choice)		
1972-80		
1981-90	76.8	51.9
1991-2002	70.9	49.8
24.D Work Hard (% First Choice)		
1972-80		
1981-90	7.5	13.6
1991-2002	13.0	17.3
24.E Help Others (% First Choice)		
1972-80		
1981-90	7.6	13.1
1991-2002	9.0	13.5

## Table 25 Misanthropy by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 25.A Trustworthy

	% Most	
Group	People Are	
Scandinavian	47.4	
Jewish	47.3	
British	46.5	
German	41.6	
Irish	41.6	
Eastern European	40.1	
Polish	38.7	
Italian	37.1	
French	36.8	
Other White	34.1	
Asian	30.8	
Native American	29.8	
Other	23.4	
Hispanic	22.2	
Black	15.5	
Average	35.5	

#### 25.C Fair % Most People Are Group Scandinavian 70.0 British 63.3 Eastern European 61.0 German 59.6 Irish 58.9 Polish 58.9 Jewish 58.2 Asian 52.3 Italian 52.2 Other White 51.6 French 51.2 Native American 42.6 Hispanic 39.9

36.2

32.0

52.7

Other

Black

Average

## 25.B Helpful

	% Most
Group	People Are
Scandinavian	60.5
British	56.2
Irish	52.7
German	51.3
French	50.8
Jewish	50.0
Other White	46.6
Polish	46.1
Asian	45.7
Italian	45.7
Eastern European	45.6
Native American	38.6
Hispanic	34.2
Black	33.6
Other	25.1
Average	47.0

## Table 26 Misanthropy by Religious Groups

## 26.A Trustworthy

20.A mustworthy		
	% Most	
Religion	People Are	
Jewish	47.3	
Jewish	47.5	
Liberal Protestant	45.7	
Moderate Protestant	40.3	
Other Religions	35.5	
Catholic	35.1	
None	34.4	
Fundamentalist Protestant	29.1	
26.B Helpful		
	% Most	

Religion	% Most People Are
Liberal Protestant	59.4
Moderate Protestant	50.6
Jewish	50.0
Catholic	47.9
Fundamentalist Protestant	42.7
Other Religions	42.5
None	40.5

## 26.C Fair

Religion	% Most People Are	
Liberal Protestant	64.3	
Moderate Protestant	58.6	
Jewish	58.2	
Catholic	54.3	
None	48.5	
Other Religions	48.4	
Fundamentalist Protestant	46.4	

## Table 27 Misanthropy, 1972-2002

27.A Trustworthy (% Most Years	t People Are) Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	47.2	43.4
1981-90	50.4	41.3
1991-2002	47.3	35.3
27.B Helpful (% Most People Are)		
1972-80	45.5	50.0
1981-90	57.3	52.5
1991-2002	50.0	47.0
27.C Fair (% Most People Are)		
1972-80	68.0	60.5
1981-90	64.6	60.3
1991-2002	58.2	52.7

## Table 28 Socializing by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 28.A Spend an Evening with Relatives

	% Several
Group	Times a Week+
Hispanic	49.9
Native American	45.2
Black	43.8
Italian	38.1
French	37.9
Other White	37.5
Asian	37.2
Other	36.5
German	32.1
Polish	32.0
Irish	31.1
British	29.9
Eastern European	29.4
Scandinavian	27.1
Jewish	26.0
Average	36.0

## 28.B Spend an Evening with a Neighbor

Group	% Several Times a Week+
Scandinavian	27.7
Other	26.9
Black	25.9
French	24.8
Native American	22.9
Asian	21.0
Irish	21.0
Polish	20.7
Other White	20.4
Hispanic	20.1
Italian	19.9
Eastern European	19.7
German	19.2
British	18.7
Jewish	17.1
Average	21.2

## 28.C Spend an Evening with Friends

	% Several
Group	Times a Week+
Other	36.5
Hispanic	27.9
Black	24.7
French	24.4
Other White	24.2
German	23.7
Jewish	23.6
Irish	23.2
Eastern European	22.9
Asian	22.7
Italian	22.7
Polish	21.4
Native American	21.1
Scandinavian	20.3
British	19.4
Average	23.4

# 28.D Spend an Evening at a Bar

Group	% Once a Year+
Scandinavian	62.5
Italian	59.2
Polish	58.3
Irish	58.1
French	57.7
Eastern European	55.5
Jewish	55.4
German	55.0
Hispanic	49.9
British	49.6
Other White	48.4
Native American	44.0
Other	44.0
Black	38.9
Asian	30.8
Average	50.5

## Table 29 Socializing by Religious Groups

#### 29.A Spend an Evening with Relatives

Religion	% Several Times a Week+
Other Religions	40.9
Fundamentalist Protestant	40.1
Catholic	37.9
Moderate Protestant	33.0
Liberal Protestant	32.5
None	29.6
Jewish	<b>26.0</b>

## 29.B Spend an Evening with a Neighbor

	% Several	
Religion	Times a Week+	
Other Religions	24.7	
None	23.5	
Fundamentalist Protestant	21.3	
Liberal Protestant	21.1	
Catholic	20.3	
Moderate Protestant	20.1	
Jewish	17.1	

## 29.C Spend an Evening with Friends

Religion	% Several Times a Week+	_
Other Religions	28.8	
None	28.4	
Jewish	23.6	
Catholic	23.3	
Fundamentalist Protestant	22.6	
Moderate Protestant	22.5	
Liberal Protestant	20.0	

#### 29.D Spend an Evening at a Bar Religion % Once a Year+

Religion	% Once a rear+
None	65.2
Catholic	57.6
Jewish	55.4
Other Religions	52.3
Liberal Protestant	51.9
Moderate Protestant	51.0
Fundamentalist Protestant	37.3

## Table 30 Socializing, 1972-2002

30.A Spend an Evening with Rel	atives (% Several	Times a Week+)
Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	30.4	37.8
1981-90	28.8	35.6
1991-2002	26.0	36.4
<b>30.B Spend an Evening with a N</b> (% Several Times a Week+)	eighbor	
1972-80	34.7	27.7
1981-90	22.3	24.3
1991-2002	17.1	21.3
30.C Spend an Evening with Frie	ends (% Several Tir	nes a Week+)
1972-80	30.9	21.2
1981-90	19.3	21.4
1991-2002	23.6	23.4
30.D Spend an Evening at a Bar	(% Once a Year+)	
1972-80	40.9	47.6
1981-90	36.4	48.7
1991-2002	55.4	50.4

## Table 31 Politics and Voting by Ethnic/Racial Groups

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## 31.A1 1992 Presidential Election

Group	% Reported Voting
Jewish	84.7
Scandinavian	80.0
British	76.5
Polish	75.3
Irish	73.0
Eastern European	69.3
German	68.9
French	67.1
Italian	64.9
Black	63.1
Other White	62.2
Native American	56.5
Hispanic	42.1
Asian	36.3
Other	33.1
Average	65.9

#### **31.A2 1996 Presidential Election** Group % Reported Voting

Group	% Reported Voting
Scandinavian	76.5
British	73.9
Jewish	73.5
Eastern European	69.6
Irish	67.5
German	67.3
Italian	65.6
French	64.6
Polish	64.5
Black	59.6
Other White	58.5
Native American	54.6
Hispanic	36.5
Other	32.7
Asian	32.0
Average	61.9

#### 31.A3 2000 Presidential Election

Group	% Reported Voting	
Jewish	79.5	
Scandinavian	78.1	
British	74.4	
Eastern European	73.5	
Irish	71.2	
German	69.1	
Polish	67.2	
Italian	62.7	
Other White	62.4	
French	60.5	
Black	57.9	
Native American	48.0	
Asian	45.2	
Other	44.1	
Hispanic	44.0	
Average	63.7	

#### 31.B1 Presidential Vote, 1992

Group	% Democratic	
Black	90.8	
Jewish	76.6	
Other	69.4	
Hispanic	61.9	
Asian	47.0	
Eastern European	46.9	
Scandinavian	42.6	
Native American	41.8	
Irish	41.4	
Polish	40.7	
Italian	40.2	
French	38.2	
Other White	37.2	
British	34.6	
German	34.6	
Average	46.0	

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Group	% Democratic
Black	93.2
Asian	77.5
Hispanic	72.0
Jewish	71.0
Other	70.3
Eastern European	54.1
Italian	54.1
Polish	52.1
French	49.1
Irish	47.9
Scandinavian	47.5
Other White	47.0
Native American	45.5
British	44.8
German	41.2
Average	54.4
31.C Party Identification	
Group	% Democratic

Group	% Democratic
Black	64.5
Jewish	51.7
Hispanic	43.4
Polish	38.3
Other	36.4
Eastern European	33.4
Italian	32.0
Irish	31.7
French	30.3
Asian	28.3
Native American	28.1
British	26.2
Other White	26.1
Scandinavian	25.8
German	22.8
Average	33.3

#### 31.D Political Ideology Group % Liberal Jewish 47.8 Black 32.6 Asian 31.7 Hispanic 30.2 Other 29.4 Polish 28.7 28.6 Irish Scandinavian 27.8 French 25.1 Eastern European 24.7 British 24.2 24.0 Italian Native American 23.6 Other White 23.0 German 22.1 26.5 Average

## Table 32 Politics and Voting by Religious Groups

## 32.A1 1992 Presidential Election

Religion	% Reported Voting	
Jewish	84.7	
Liberal Protestant	78.9	
Moderate Protestant	71.6	
Catholic	65.0	
Fundamentalist Protestant	63.9	
None	54.0	
Other Religions	49.7	

#### 32.A2 1996 Presidential Election

Religion	% Reported Voting
Liberal Protestant	77.8
Jewish	73.5
Moderate Protestant	69.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	61.2
Catholic	59.5
Other Religions	51.8
None	49.8

## 32.A3 2000 Presidential Election

Religion	% Reported Voting
Jewish	79.5
Liberal Protestant	77.0
Moderate Protestant	68.1
Catholic	64.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	62.1
None	52.7
Other Religions	51.8

## 32.B1 Presidential Vote, 1992

Religion	% Democratic
Jewish	76.6
Other Religions	55.1
None	54.3
Catholic	45.4
Moderate Protestant	45.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	43.8
Liberal Protestant	40.6

### 32B2. Presidential Vote, 1996

Religion	% Democratic
Jewish	71.0
None	64.8
Other Religions	59.6
Catholic	56.6
Fundamentalist Protestant	53.1
Moderate Protestant	48.8
Liberal Protestant	46.6

## 32.C Party Identification

Religion	% Democratic
Jewish	51.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	35.6
Catholic	35.4
Moderate Protestant	31.3
Liberal Protestant	30.2
Other Religions	29.8
None	28.7

## 32.D Political Ideology

Religion	% Liberal	
Jewish	47.8	
None	43.5	
Other Religions	35.0	
Catholic	26.0	
Liberal Protestant	25.0	
Moderate Protestant	24.9	
Fundamentalist Protestant	19.2	

## Table 33 Politics and Voting, 1972-2002

<b>33.A Presidential Election</b> ( Years	Jews	Non-Jew
Election of		
1968	78.3	63.6
1972	85.8	64.6
1976	77.4	61.7
1980	85.0	64.8
1984	82.9	65.1
1988	82.3	63.6
1992	84.7	65.5
1996	73.5	61.7
2000	79.5	63.5
33.B Presidential Candidate	e (% Voting Democratic)	
Election of		
1968 (Humphrey)	79.0	39.9
1972 (McGovern)	63.5	36.6
1976 (Carter)	69.0	54.6
1980 (Carter)	46.9	46.1
1984 (Mondale)	57.3	35.9
1988 (Dukakis)	70.2	36.5
1992 (Clinton)	76.6	45.2
1996 (Clinton)	71.0	54.0
2000 (Gore)	67.2	42.8
33.C Party Identification (%	Democratic)	
1972-80	57.8	41.8
1981-90	53.9	37.7
1991-2002	51.7	33.2
33.D Political Ideology (% L	iberal)	
1972-80	47.8	28.0
1981-90	42.5	25.7
1991-2002	47.8	26.0

## Table 34 Confidence in Institutions by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 34.A Confidence in Financial Institutions

Group	% Great Deal
Asian	28.0
Other	27.1
British	23.5
Other White	23.0
Black	22.9
German	22.6
Italian	21.7
Hispanic	21.0
Irish	20.8
Native American	20.8
Polish	19.0
Scandinavian	19.0
Jewish	18.6
French	17.8
Eastern European	17.4
Average	22.1

#### 34.B Confidence in Major Companies

Group	% Great Deal
Asian	37.1
British	29.1
Scandinavian	29.0
Native American	28.2
German	27.5
Jewish	26.1
French	24.4
Irish	23.8
Other White	23.3
Italian	23.0
Eastern European	22.6
Hispanic	21.3
Other	18.7
Polish	18.6
Black	16.4
Average	24.4

#### 34.C Confidence in Organized Labor Group % Great Deal Hispanic 15.5 Black 14.8 Italian 13.3 Eastern European 12.2 Asian 11.8 Native American 10.9 Other 10.9 10.9 Polish Other White 10.8 Irish 10.7 German 9.9 French 9.5 British 8.8 Scandinavian 8.2

## 24 D. Confidence in Ownerized Policien

4.7

11.1

Jewish

Average

Group	% Great Deal	
Black	29.8	
Polish	27.0	
British	26.6	
German	26.5	
Scandinavian	26.1	
French	25.9	
Italian	25.3	
Irish	24.9	
Hispanic	24.3	
Other White	22.8	
Other	22.6	
Asian	21.9	
Eastern European	21.5	
Native American	19.0	
Jewish	12.1	
Average	25.1	

#### 34.E Confidence in Education

Group	% Great Deal
Other	37.5
Black	37.0
Asian	36.5
Hispanic	31.8
Eastern European	28.7
Native American	25.8
Irish	24.0
German	23.3
British	23.2
Other White	23.1
Jewish	22.5
French	22.3
Polish	21.0
Scandinavian	20.3
Italian	20.2
Average	25.8

#### 34.F Confidence in Executive Branch

Group	% Great Deal
Other	23.8
Jewish	21.4
Eastern European	20.9
Asian	20.6
Polish	19.7
Hispanic	19.2
Black	16.0
British	14.6
Irish	14.3
Other White	13.7
Italian	13.3
French	12.2
Scandinavian	12.2
German	11.6
Native American	11.3
Average	14.6

# 34.G Confidence in the Congress Group % Great Deal

Asian	18.3
Hispanic	18.3
Other	16.7
Black	13.4
Eastern European	12.9
Italian	12.8
Jewish	11.0
Other White	9.8
Irish	9.4
French	9.3
Scandinavian	8.4
German	7.9
Polish	7.7
British	7.6
Native American	6.9
Average	10.4

#### 34.H Confidence in the Supreme Court

Group	% Great Deal
Jewish	40.2
Asian	37.5
Hispanic	37.4
British	36.4
Other	35.6
Polish	34.8
Scandinavian	34.3
Irish	33.4
Italian	33.2
Eastern European	33.1
German	30.8
Other White	30.1
French	29.2
Native American	26.4
Black	24.8
Average	31.8

## 34.I Confidence in Television

Group	% Great Deal
Asian	17.8
Hispanic	15.9
Black	15.0
French	11.7
Other White	11.4
Italian	10.9
Native American	10.9
Eastern European	10.4
Other	10.3
Irish	9.1
Scandinavian	8.8
Jewish	8.6
German	8.2
British	7.0
Polish	6.7
Average	10.6

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#### 34.J Confidence in the Press

Group	% Great Deal
Hispanic	17.7
Asian	17.1
Other	14.1
Black	12.2
Eastern European	12.2
Other White	10.5
French	10.2
Scandinavian	10.0
Jewish	9.9
Polish	9.6
British	9.5
Italian	9.3
German	9.0
Native American	8.8
Irish	8.5
Average	10.6

Group	% Great Deal
Asian	50.4
Eastern European	46.6
French	46.1
German	45.2
Hispanic	45.1
Scandinavian	44.9
Italian	44.5
Other White	43.4
Native American	43.3
Other	43.2
Black	42.9
Irish	42.4
British	41.9
Jewish	40.5
Polish	38.3
Average	43.7

#### 34.L Confidence in Scientific Community

Group	% Great Deal
Asian	53.5
Jewish	50.1
Other	46.9
Irish	45.9
Polish	45.8
French	45.0
Italian	44.8
British	44.2
Scandinavian	43.1
Eastern European	41.5
German	40.2
Hispanic	39.9
Other White	37.2
Native American	33.2
Black	24.2
Average	39.5

## 34.M Confidence in the Military

Group	% Great Deal
Other	49.1
Irish	46.9
French	46.3
Hispanic	44.5
Asian	44.4
Other White	44.3
British	43.9
Eastern European	43.0
Scandinavian	42.2
German	41.5
Native American	41.4
Polish	41.4
Italian	37.8
Black	34.2
Jewish	29.9
Average	42.0

## Table 35 Confidence in Institutions by Religious Groups

## 35.A Confidence in Financial Institutions

Reli	gion	% Great Deal	
Libe	eral Protestant	24.2	
Мо	derate Protestant	23.3	
Fun	damentalist Protestant	22.0	
Nor	ne	21.9	
Cat	holic	21.1	
Oth	er Religions	20.5	
Jew	vish	18.6	

#### **35.B Confidence in Major Companies** Religion % Great Deal

Religion	70 Great Dear
Likewal Dratastant	20 C
Liberal Protestant	28.6
Jewish	26.1
Other Religions	25.9
Moderate Protestant	25.1
Catholic	24.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	23.1
None	21.3

## 35.C Confidence in Organized Labor

Religion	% Great Deal	
Catholic	13.1	
None	12.4	
Moderate Protestant	11.5	
Other Religions	11.2	
Fundamentalist Protestant	10.6	
Liberal Protestant	7.8	
Jewish	4.7	

## 35.D Confidence in Organized Religion

Religion	% Great Deal
Fundamentalist Protestant	29.3
Liberal Protestant	28.5
Catholic	27.7
Moderate Protestant	25.2
Other Religions	20.6
Jewish	12.1
None	7.5

## 35.E Confidence in Education

eligion % Great Dea	
Fundamentalist Protestant	27.9
Other Religions	27.5
Liberal Protestant	26.2
Catholic	26.1
Moderate Protestant	22.7
Jewish	22.5
None	21.8

#### 35.F Confidence in Executive Branch

Religion	% Great Deal
Jewish	21.4
Catholic	16.8
Other Religions	14.5
Liberal Protestant	14.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	13.8
Moderate Protestant	12.9
None	12.5

## 35.G Confidence in the Congress

Religion	% Great Deal
Other Religions	12.4
Catholic	12.4
Jewish	11.0
Liberal Protestant	9.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	9.7
Moderate Protestant	9.1
None	8.5

## 35.H Confidence in the Supreme Court

Religion % Great Deal		
Jewish	40.2	
Liberal Protestant	36.7	
Other Religions	36.7	
Catholic	34.6	
Moderate Protestant	33.3	
None	30.3	
Fundamentalist Protestant	26.3	
35.I Confidence in Television	I	
Religion	% Great Deal	
	% Great Deal	
None	12.8	
	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	
None	12.8	
None Catholic	12.8 11.8	

#### 35.J Confidence in the Press

Other Religions

Jewish

Religion	% Great Deal	
Catholic	12.6	
None	12.4	
Other Religions	11.4	
Jewish	9.9	
Moderate Protestant	9.9	
Liberal Protestant	9.5	
Fundamentalist Protestant	9.1	

8.9

8.6

## 35.K Confidence in Medicine

Religion	% Great Deal	
Catholic	46.0	
Moderate Protestant	44.8	
Fundamentalist Protestant	42.9	
Liberal Protestant	42.8	
Other Religions	42.8	
None	41.1	
Jewish	40.5	

## 35.L Confidence in Scientific Community

Religion	% Great Deal
Jewish	50.1
None	45.4
Other Religions	45.0
Catholic	44.1
Liberal Protestant	42.0
Moderate Protestant	40.2
Fundamentalist Protestant	30.7

## 35.M Confidence in the Military

Religion	% Great Deal	
Catholic	44.2	
Fundamentalist Protestant	43.6	
Liberal Protestant	43.4	
Moderate Protestant	43.0	
Other Religions	37.4	
None	34.4	
Jewish	29.9	

## Table 36 Rankings of Confidence in Institutions for Jews and Non-Jews,1991-2002

Institutions	Jews % with Great Deal of Confidence	Institutions	Non-Jews % with Great Deal of Confidence
Science	50.1	Medicine	43.7
Medicine	40.5	Military	42.3
Supreme Court	40.2	Science	39.4
Military	29.9	Supreme Court	31.6
Major Companies	26.1	Education	25.9
Education	22.5	Religion	25.4
Executive Branch	21.4	Major Companies	24.3
Financial Insts.	18.6	Financial Insts.	22.2
Religion	12.1	Executive Branch	14.5
Congress	11.0	Labor Unions	11.2
Press	9.9	Television	10.6
Television	8.6	Press	10.6
Labor Unions	4.7	Congress	10.3

## Table 37 Confidence in Institutions, 1972-2002

<b>37.A Confidence in Financial Inst</b> Years	itutions (% Grea Jews	at Deal) Non-Jews
1972-80	28.4	35.4
1981-90	23.1	24.1
1991-2002	18.6	22.2
37.B Confidence in Major Compa	nies (% Great De	eal)
1972-80	24.0	25.2
1981-90	28.6	25.9
1991-2002	26.1	24.3
37.C Confidence in Organized La	<b>bor</b> (% Great Dea	al)
1972-80	9.4	13.9
1981-90	6.5	10.1
1991-2002	4.7	11.2
37.D Confidence in Organized Re	ligion (% Great	Deal)
1972-80	20.0	34.4
1981-90	18.9	27.0
1991-2002	12.1	25.4
37.E Confidence in Education (%	Great Deal)	
1972-80	21.4	36.5
1981-90	21.0	30.4
1991-2002	22.5	25.9
37.F Confidence in Executive Bra	<b>nch</b> (% Great De	al)
1972-80	10.8	17.4
1981-90	13.0	18.9
1991-2002	21.4	14.5

37.G Confidence in the Congr Years	r <b>ess</b> (% Great Deal) Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	10.9	15.5
1981-90	17.7	14.5
1991-2002	11.0	10.3
37.H Confidence in the Supre	<b>me Court</b> (% Great D	eal)
1972-80	38.6	30.9
1981-90	43.9	32.4
1991-2002	40.2	31.6
37.I Confidence in Television	(% Great Deal)	
1972-80	20.1	17.7
1981-90	12.6	13.3
1991-2002	8.6	10.7
37.J Confidence in the Press (	% Great Deal)	
1972-80	28.1	23.7
1981-90	19.6	17.0
1991-2002	9.9	10.6
37.K Confidence in Medicine	(% Great Deal)	
1972-80	43.6	53.3
1981-90	46.9	49.3
1991-2002	40.5	43.7
37.L Confidence in Scientific	Community (% Great	Deal)
1972-80	53.6	39.7
1981-90	56.5	40.8
1991-2002	50.1	39.4
37.M Confidence in the Milita	<b>ary</b> (% Great Deal)	
1972-80	16.5	34.7
1981-90	17.4	33.0
1991-2002	29.9	42.3

## Table 38 Government Spending Priorities and Taxes by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 38.A Spending on Space

Group	% Too Little
Jewish	15.0
Italian	12.8
Scandinavian	12.8
British	12.6
Native American	12.4
Irish	11.9
Polish	11.7
Other	11.4
German	11.3
Other White	11.3
French	11.2
Eastern European	11.1
Hispanic	10.1
Asian	9.8
Black	6.0
Average	11.0

## 38.B Spending on the Environment

Group	% Too Little
Jewish	70.6
Polish	66.2
Native American	66.1
Italian	65.7
Black	65.4
Irish	64.7
French	63.5
Hispanic	61.6
British	60.6
Eastern European	59.7
German	58.8
Other	58.7
Scandinavian	58.2
Other White	57.7
Asian	52.3
Average	61.3

Group	% Too Little
Black	80.3
Jewish	75.8
Other	72.9
Native American	71.4
Irish	71.1
Italian	69.6
Polish	69.6
Eastern European	68.9
French	67.1
Hispanic	66.1
Scandinavian	65.5
Other White	65.3
German	64.2
British	63.3
Asian	53.1
Average	68.0
	00.0
5	
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvi</b> Group	ng Problems of Big
38.D Spending on "Solvi	ng Problems of Big
38.D Spending on "Solvin Group	ng Problems of Bi % Too Little
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black J <b>ewish</b>	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> Italian	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4 57.5
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> Italian Hispanic	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4 57.5 53.4
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> Italian Hispanic Polish	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4 57.5 53.4 51.2
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> Italian Hispanic Polish Irish	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4 57.5 53.4 51.2 49.8 49.7 47.3
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> Italian Hispanic Polish Irish Other Native American Asian	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4 57.5 53.4 51.2 49.8 49.7 47.3 47.2
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> Italian Hispanic Polish Irish Other Native American Asian Eastern European	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4 57.5 53.4 51.2 49.8 49.7 47.3 47.2 46.5
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> Italian Hispanic Polish Irish Other Native American Asian Eastern European British	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4 57.5 53.4 51.2 49.8 49.7 47.3 47.2 46.5 44.1
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> Italian Hispanic Polish Irish Other Native American Asian Eastern European British French	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4 57.5 53.4 51.2 49.8 49.7 47.3 47.2 46.5 44.1 43.6
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> Italian Hispanic Polish Irish Other Native American Asian Eastern European British French Other White	ng Problems of Big % Too Little 65.2 62.4 57.5 53.4 51.2 49.8 49.7 47.3 47.2 46.5 44.1 43.6 43.3
<b>38.D Spending on "Solvin</b> Group Black <b>Jewish</b> talian Hispanic Polish rish Dther Native American Asian Eastern European British French	ng Problems of Bi % Too Littl 65.2 62.4 57.5 53.4 51.2 49.8 49.7 47.3 47.2 46.5 44.1 43.6

Average

49.0

## 38.E Spending on Lowering Crime Rate

Group	% Too Little
Black	74.7
Polish	70.6
Hispanic	68.8
French	68.1
Irish	66.2
Other White	64.6
Italian	64.4
Eastern European	64.2
Native American	64.1
Other	62.8
German	62.3
Asian	59.6
British	59.4
Jewish	58.1
Scandinavian	57.4
Average	65.0

#### 38.F Spending on "Dealing with Drug Addiction"

Group	% Too Little
Black	72.1
Hispanic	62.2
Polish	60.9
German	58.2
Irish	58.0
Italian	57.1
French	56.8
Scandinavian	56.6
Jewish	56.3
Other White	56.2
Native American	54.7
Other	53.5
Asian	53.1
British	53.1
Eastern European	52.0
Average	58.6

38.G Spending on Educa Group	% Too Little
Jewish	82.0
Black	81.1
Native American	74.8
Polish	74.0
Irish	73.6
Italian	72.8
Hispanic	72.0
French	71.5
Other White	71.3
Other	69.7
Eastern European	69.6
British	68.7
German	68.5
Scandinavian	68.5
Asian	59.6
Average	72.1

## 38.H Spending on "Improving the Conditions of Blacks"

Group	% Too Little
Black	76.0
Jewish	40.0
Other	38.7
Hispanic	34.2
Polish	30.6
Eastern European	30.3
Italian	29.3
Asian	28.6
Irish	27.2
Native American	27.1
German	25.3
British	24.4
Other White	23.5
French	21.9
Scandinavian	21.4
Average	32.8

## 38.I Spending on the Military

Group	% Too Little
British	23.1
Native American	22.9
Other White	22.0
Irish	21.9
German	21.2
French	20.1
Other	20.3
Italian	20.0
Scandinavian	19.3
Polish	17.4
Eastern European	16.8
Black	15.9
Hispanic	15.9
Jewish	11.4
Asian	8.4
Average	19.9

#### 38.J Spending on Foreign Aid

Group	% Too Little
Other	11.7
Hispanic	11.2
Asian	10.8
Black	8.9
Jewish	8.3
Irish	6.1
Scandinavian	5.8
Polish	5.5
British	5.1
Italian	4.5
French	4.3
Other White	4.0
German	3.7
Eastern European	3.5
Native American	3.3
Average	5.7

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Group	% Too Little
Black	33.9
Jewish	25.5
Other	23.5
Hispanic	21.5
Polish	19.0
Eastern European	16.2
Native American	16.1
Scandinavian	16.0
Asian	13.7
Other White	13.7
Italian	13.6
Irish	13.5
German	13.2
French	12.0
British	11.9
Average	17.0

#### 38.L Spending on Social Security

Group	% Too Little	
Black	69.5	
Native American	64.3	
French	58.2	
Italian	54.6	
Polish	54.0	
Other	53.2	
Hispanic	52.2	
Other White	52.0	
Irish	51.3	
Eastern European	51.1	
German	47.8	
British	44.2	
Jewish	41.8	
Scandinavian	39.9	
Asian	38.4	
Average	52.4	

## 38.M Spending on Highways and Bridges

Group	% Too Little
French	42.4
British	40.6
Polish	39.5
Eastern European	39.0
Native American	38.8
Jewish	38.6
Irish	37.2
Other White	37.0
German	36.9
Italian	35.0
Black	34.8
Scandinavian	32.3
Other	29.7
Hispanic	25.6
Asian	22.2
Average	36.2

#### 38.N Spending on Parks and Recreation

Group	% Too Little
Black	46.7
Hispanic	39.4
Other	35.7
Italian	35.3
Jewish	34.3
Native American	34.0
Polish	32.6
Irish	30.5
Other White	29.6
British	29.5
French	29.5
German	29.0
Asian	28.0
Scandinavian	27.6
Eastern European	26.8
Average	32.8

## 38.0 Spending on Mass Transportation

Group	% Too Little
Jewish	45.9
Eastern European	43.9
Asian	40.4
British	38.0
Scandinavian	37.5
Italian	35.7
Black	34.0
Polish	32.9
Irish	32.8
Hispanic	32.3
German	31.6
Other White	30.4
French	30.2
Other	30.0
Native American	26.6
Average	33.6

## 38.P Spending on Assistance to the Poor

bon spending on rissise	
Group	% Too Little
Black	84.1
Other	70.3
Hispanic	68.2
Native American	65.4
Irish	61.8
Polish	61.7
Scandinavian	58.4
Other White	58.1
Italian	57.0
Asian	56.4
French	56.2
Eastern European	54.6
Jewish	54.2
German	51.8
British	51.6
Average	60.6

## 38.Q Spending on Law Enforcement

Group	% Too Little
Other	64.3
Black	60.8
Irish	59.4
Italian	58.5
Polish	57.9
Native American	57.2
German	55.1
British	54.8
Other White	54.6
Jewish	52.5
Hispanic	52.1
French	51.1
Eastern European	49.1
Scandinavian	46.8
Asian	33.9
Average	55.2

#### 38.R Spending on Assistance to Blacks

Group	% Too Little
Black	69.6
Hispanic	33.3
Other	32.0
Jewish	30.5
Italian	22.2
Asian	21.4
Polish	21.4
French	20.1
Irish	19.7
Eastern European	18.8
British	17.9
Native American	17.3
Other White	15.8
German	15.2
Scandinavian	13.7
Average	25.3

Group	% Too Little
Black	37.8
Jewish	35.0
Hispanic	30.9
Other	30.6
Asian	22.5
Polish	21.8
Italian	21.4
Irish	19.8
Eastern European	18.8
British	15.9
Native American	15.8
German	15.4
Other White	15.4
Scandinavian	14.8
French	13.0
Average	20.7
-	

#### 38.T Spending on Drug Rehabilitation

Group	% Too Little
Black	70.1
Hispanic	62.1
Native American	53.5
Asian	52.9
Italian	51.6
British	50.7
Jewish	49.9
Eastern European	49.8
Scandinavian	49.8
Irish	49.7
Other White	49.3
German	48.0
French	47.0
Polish	46.9
Other	43.6
Average	52.9

#### 38.U Own Federal Income Tax

Group	% Too High
Polish	75.6
Black	71.9
Jewish	70.2
Italian	69.4
Other	68.7
Native American	66.7
French	64.2
Other White	64.1
Eastern European	63.6
German	63.1
Hispanic	62.4
British	62.0
Irish	61.7
Asian	56.1
Scandinavian	54.2
Average	64.5

# Table 39Government Spending Priorities and Taxesby Religious Groups

## **39.A Spending on Space**

Religion	% Too Little	
None	18.1	
Jewish	15.0	
Other Religions	12.9	
Liberal Protestant	11.3	
Catholic	11.1	
Moderate Protestant	9.9	
Fundamentalist Protestant	7.6	

## 39.B Spending on the Environment

Religion	% Too Little	
None	70.9	
Jewish	70.6	
Other Religions	68.6	
Catholic	62.2	
Liberal Protestant	60.8	
Moderate Protestant	59.3	
Fundamentalist Protestant	56.2	

## 39.C Spending on Health Care

Religion	% Too Little	
Jewish	75.8	
None	69.5	
Other Religions	68.5	
Catholic	68.1	
Fundamentalist Protestant	68.1	
Liberal Protestant	66.7	
Moderate Protestant	66.7	

## 39.D Spending on "Solving Problems of Big Cities"

Religion % Too Little

Jewish	62.4
Other Religions	55.5
Catholic	50.9
Moderate Protestant	50.2
None	48.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	47.6
Liberal Protestant	44.0

## 39.E Spending on Lowering Crime Rate

Religion	% Too Little
Fundamentalist Protestant	67.9
Catholic	67.6
Liberal Protestant	65.6
Moderate Protestant	64.6
Other Religions	60.8
Jewish	58.1
None	55.1

## 39.F Spending on "Dealing with Drug Addiction"

Religion	% Too Little
Fundamentalist Protestant Catholic Liberal Protestant Moderate Protestant Jewish None	63.2 58.8 58.0 57.8 <b>56.3</b> 52.1
Other Religions	51.1

## 39.G Spending on Education

Religion	% Too Little
Jewish	82.0
Other Religions	77.9
None	76.0
Fundamentalist Protestant	71.3
Catholic	71.1
Liberal Protestant	70.9
Moderate Protestant	70.5

Religion	% Too Little	
Jewish	40.0	
None	36.6	
Fundamentalist Protestant	35.9	
Moderate Protestant	31.9	
Catholic	30.5	
Other Religions	30.1	
Liberal Protestant	27.5	
39.I Spending on the Milita	ry	
Religion	% Too Little	
Fundamentalist Protestant	23.7	
Liberal Protestant	21.2	
Moderate Protestant	20.2	
Catholic	18.9	
None	14.5	
Other Religions	12.6	
Jewish	11.4	
39.J Spending on Foreign A	id	
Religion	% Too Little	
Jewish	8.3	
None	7.8	
Other Religions	7.5	
Catholic	6.0	
Fundamentalist Protestant	5.3	
Moderate Protestant	4.6	
Liberal Protestant	4.0	
39.K Spending on Welfare		
Religion	% Too Little	
Jewish	25.5	
Fundamentalist Protestant	18.0	
None	17.9	
Moderate Protestant	17.2	
Catholic	16.7	
Other Religions	15.8	
Liberal Protestant	13.2	

## **39.L Spending on Social Security**

Religion	% Too Little
Fundamentalist Dustantant	
Fundamentalist Protestant	58.6
Catholic	53.6
None	49.9
Moderate Protestant	48.8
Other Religions	48.3
Liberal Protestant	44.5
Jewish	41.8

## 39.M Spending on Highways and Bridges

Religion	% Too Little
Liberal Protestant	39.5
Jewish	38.6
Moderate Protestant	37.0
Fundamentalist Protestant	37.0
None	35.0
Catholic	34.5
Other Religions	30.8

#### 39.N Spending on Parks and Recreation

Religion	% Too Little
None	40.4
Jewish	34.3
Other Religions	34.2
Fundamentalist Protestant	33.1
Catholic	31.9
Moderate Protestant	30.6
Liberal Protestant	28.9

#### 39.0 Spending on Mass Transportation

Religion	% Too Little
Jewish	45.9
Other Religions	41.2
None	40.8
Liberal Protestant	37.2
Moderate Protestant	34.3
Catholic	32.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	27.4

## 39.P Spending on Assistance to the Poor

Religion	% Too Little
Other Religions	65.2
None	63.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	63.3
Moderate Protestant	60.8
Catholic	59.8
Jewish	54.2
Liberal Protestant	53.4

#### 39.Q Spending on Law Enforcement

Religion	% Too Little	
Fundamentalist Protestant	60.0	
Liberal Protestant	57.0	
Catholic	55.3	
Moderate Protestant	55.0	
Jewish	52.5	
Other Religions	51.6	
None	43.5	

## 39.R Spending on Assistance to Blacks

Religion	% Too Little
Jewish	30.5
Other Religions	30.1
None	28.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	27.3
Catholic	23.7
Moderate Protestant	22.9
Liberal Protestant	20.3

## 39.S Spending on Assistance to Big Cities

Religion	% Too Little
Jewish	35.0
Other Religions	26.6
None	24.8
Catholic	21.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	18.3
Liberal Protestant	18.2
Moderate Protestant	17.7

## 39.T Spending on Drug Rehabilitation

Religion	% Too Little
Other Religions	56.6
None	55.3
Fundamentalist Protestant	53.6
Moderate Protestant	52.8
Catholic	51.7
Liberal Protestant	51.6
Jewish	49.9

## 39.U Own Federal Income Tax

Religion	% Too High
Jewish	70.2
Fundamentalist Protestant	66.5
Catholic	65.3
Other Religions	64.3
Liberal Protestant	62.1
Moderate Protestant	61.9
None	61.7

## Table 40 Ranking of Spending Priorities for Jews and Non-Jews, 1991-2002

Spending Priority	Jews % Say Spending Too Little	Spending Priority	Non-Jews % Say Spending Too Little
Education	82.0	Education	71.9
Health	75.8	Health	67.9
Environment	70.6	Lowering Crime Rate	0710
Probs. Big Cities	62.4	Environment	61.1
Lowering Crime Rate	58.1	Assist Poor	60.8
Drug Addiction	56.3	Drug Addiction	58.7
Assist Poor	54.2	Law Enforcement	55.3
Law Enforcement	52.5	Drug Rehab.	53.0
Drug Rehab.	49.9	Social Security	52.6
Mass Transportation	45.9	Probs. Big Cities	48.7
Social Security	41.8	Highway/Bridges	36.1
Improving Blacks	40.0	Mass Transportation	33.3
Highways/Bridges	38.6	Parks/Recreation	32.7
Assist Big Cities	35.0	Improving Blacks	32.6
Parks/Recreation	34.3	Assist Blacks	25.2
Assist Blacks	30.5	Assist Big Cities	20.3
Welfare	25.5	Military	20.1
Space Exploration	15.0	Welfare	16.8
Military	11.4	Space Exploration	10.8
,	8.3		5.7
Foreign Aid	0.0	Foreign Aid	5.7

## Table 41 Governmental Spending Priorities and Taxes, 1972-2002

<b>41.A Spending on Space</b> (% Too L Years	ittle) Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	13.0	10.1
1981-90	15.9	13.4
1991-2002	15.0	10.9
41.B Spending on the Environme	<b>nt</b> (% Too Little)	
1972-80	67.3	54.2
1981-90	70.6	61.3
1991-2002	70.6	61.1
41.C Spending on Health Care (%	o Too Little)	
1972-80	76.5	59.2
1981-90	73.7	61.7
1991-2002	75.8	67.9
41.D Spending on "Solving Prob	ems of Big Citi	es" (% Too Little)
1972-80	69.4	43.9
1981-90	63.8	43.0
1991-2002	62.4	48.7
41.E Spending on Lowering Crime Rate (% Too Little)		
1972-80	72.9	66.2
1981-90	75.0	68.2
1991-2002	58.1	65.2
41.F Spending on "Dealing with Drug Addiction" (% Too Little)		
1972-80	60.5	58.8
1981-90	61.2	61.7
1991-2002	56.3	58.7

Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	64.7	50.3
1981-90	77.4	64.0
1991-2002	82.0	71.9
<b>41.H Spending on "Imp</b> (% Too Little)	roving the Conditions of	Blacks″
1972-80	30.7	27.6
1981-90	40.9	31.7
1991-2002	40.0	32.6
41.I Spending on the Mi	ilitary (% Too Little)	
1972-80	13.4	25.7
1981-90	14.6	18.3
1991-2002	11.4	20.1
41.J Spending on Foreig	n Aid (% Too Little)	
1972-80	3.6	4.1
1981-90	5.9	5.4
1991-2002	8.3	5.7
41.K Spending on Welfa	re (% Too Little)	
1972-80	17.6	16.9
1981-90	22.7	21.3
1991-2002	25.5	16.8
41.L Spending on Social	Security (% Too Little)	
1972-80		
1981-90	45.1	53.3
1991-2002	41.8	52.6
41.M Spending on High	ways and Bridges (% Too	Little)
1972-80		
1981-90	38.9	39.2
1991-2002	38.6	36.1

<b>41.N Spending on Parks</b> Years	and Recreation (% Too Little Jews	e) Non-Jews	
1972-80			
1981-90	31.9	30.6	
1991-2002	34.3	32.7	
41.0 Spending on Mass	Transportation (% Too Little)	)	
1972-80			
1981-90	52.4	29.3	
1991-2002	45.9	33.3	
41.P Spending on Assista	ance to the Poor (% Too Litt	le)	
1972-80			
1981-90	57.7	65.6	
1991-2002	54.2	60.8	
41.Q Spending on Law Enforcement (% Too Little)			
1972-80			
1981-90	57.5	54.8	
1991-2002	52.5	55.3	
41.R Spending on Assist	ance to Blacks (% Too Little)		
1972-80			
1981-90	40.0	25.6	
1991-2002	30.5	25.2	
41.S Spending on Assista	ance to Big Cities (% Too Lit	ttle)	
1972-80			
1981-90	39.4	18.4	
1991-2002	35.0	20.3	

41.T Spending on Drug Rehabilitation (% Too Little)		
Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80		
1981-90	64.9	56.6
1991-2002	49.9	53.0
41.U Own Federal Income Tax	<b>‹</b> (% Too High)	
1972-80	73.1	67.6
1981-90	70.9	63.3
1991-2002	70.2	64.4

## Table 42 Social Welfare Policies by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 42.A Government Reduction of Income Differences

Group	% Favoring
Other	58.2
Black	55.9
Asian	48.4
French	48.2
Native American	48.0
Hispanic	47.0
Eastern European	44.6
Other White	43.5
Irish	43.3
Polish	43.3
Italian	38.5
German	38.2
Jewish	38.2
British	37.2
Scandinavian	33.5
Average	43.5

## 42.B Government Improve Living Standards

Group	% Favoring	
Black	45.3	
Hispanic	34.5	
Polish	32.3	
Asian	30.4	
French	27.4	
Native American	27.3	
Other White	24.9	
Jewish	24.8	
Other	24.0	
Irish	22.9	
Italian	22.6	
German	21.9	
Eastern European	21.0	
British	19.4	
Scandinavian	17.1	
Average	26.5	

Group	% Favoring
Black	63.8
Jewish	56.9
Polish	53.9
Hispanic	53.3
Asian	52.9
Other	52.5
Eastern European	51.7
Native American	51.6
Italian	50.8
French	49.6
Irish	49.0
Other White	45.5
Scandinavian	44.5
British	43.5
German	42.2
Average	49.1
5	

#### 42.D Government Should Do More

Group	% Favoring
Black	40.8
Asian	38.4
Hispanic	36.6
Jewish	27.5
Native American	27.3
Other	26.5
Eastern European	26.0
Italian	24.6
Irish	23.0
Other White	22.2
French	21.8
Polish	21.0
Scandinavian	18.8
German	18.1
British	17.3
Average	24.8

## Table 43 Social Welfare Policies by Religious Groups

## 43.A Government Reduction of Income Differences

Religion	% Favoring
None	47.8
Other Religions	47.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	44.2
Catholic	43.0
Moderate Protestant	41.9
Liberal Protestant	39.3
Jewish	38.2

#### **43.B Government Improve Living Standards** Religion % Favoring

Religion	% Favoring
None	32.4
Other Religions	31.0
Catholic	27.1
Fundamentalist Protestant	26.7
Jewish	24.8
Moderate Protestant	24.6
Liberal Protestant	20.3

#### 43.C Government Assist with Health Care

Religion	% Favoring	
Jewish	56.9	
Other Religions	56.3	
None	53.9	
Catholic	51.4	
Moderate Protestant	46.3	
Fundamentalist Protestant	46.8	
Liberal Protestant	44.9	

### 43.D Government Should Do More

Religion	% Favoring
Jewish	27.5
Other Religions	27.2
Fundamentalist Protestant	26.7
Catholic	26.4
None	26.0
Moderate Protestant	23.2
Liberal Protestant	17.1

## Table 44 Social Welfare Policies, 1972-2002

44.A Government Reduction of Income Differences (% Favoring)		
Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	35.1	44.1
1981-90	32.2	47.7
1991-2002	38.2	43.6
44.B Government Improv	re Living Standards (% Fa	avoring)
1972-80		39.4
1981-90	29.0	30.3
1991-2002	24.8	26.6
44.C Government Assist	with Health Care (% Favo	ring)
1972-80		48.3
1981-90	59.4	47.5
1991-2002	56.9	48.9
44.D Government Should	Do More (% Favoring)	
1972-80		37.1
1981-90	31.8	26.3

## Table 45 Intergroup Relations by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 45.A Government Special Help for Blacks

Group	% For	
Black	47.2	
Other	28.4	
Asian	19.9	
Hispanic	18.6	
Jewish	18.6	
Polish	15.9	
Irish	13.0	
Eastern European	12.8	
French	12.7	
British	12.0	
Italian	12.0	
Scandinavian	11.7	
Native American	11.4	
Other White	11.3	
German	10.7	
Average	17.0	

# **45.B1 Black-White Differences Due to Discrimination**

Group	% Yes
Black	64.8
Other	57.3
Hispanic	44.3
Asian	40.9
Jewish	40.6
Irish	36.2
Scandinavian	34.7
Native American	31.9
British	31.7
Eastern European	31.1
German	31.1
Other White	30.4
Polish	30.2
Italian	29.7
French	29.2
Average	37.3

#### 45.C1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Ability of Blacks

Group	% Yes	
Asian	18.2	
Eastern European	14.8	
Other	14.1	
Italian	13.6	
Polish	13.0	
Hispanic	12.6	
Native American	11.8	
Other White	11.4	
Black	11.1	
German	10.9	
Irish	10.5	
French	10.2	
British	9.9	
Scandinavian	8.7	
Jewish	7.3	
Average	11.2	

#### 45.D1 Black-White Differences Due to Less Black Education

Group	% Yes
Jewish	62.9
Black	56.2
Other	53.0
Irish	49.5
Eastern European	49.2
Scandinavian	48.5
British	47.4
Italian	44.8
French	44.5
Asian	44.3
German	43.5
Polish	42.7
Hispanic	41.9
Other White	38.9
Native American	37.3
Average	45.8

#### 45.E1 Black-White Differences Due to Less Black Motivation Group % Yes Asian 58.6 Polish 55.4 Native American 55.0 Other White 51.2 Hispanic 50.8 Eastern European 50.7 German 50.5 French 48.7 British 46.9 Italian 46.8 Irish 45.1 Other 43.3 Scandinavian 41.4 Black 38.0 Jewish 32.2 Average 47.6 45.F1 Laws against Black-White Intermarriage

Group	% Opposed to	
Jewish	97.3	
Black	93.5	
Asian	91.8	
Other	91.8	
Hispanic	91.7	
Polish	89.3	
Scandinavian	88.8	
Eastern European	88.4	
Italian	87.4	
French	86.5	
Irish	85.3	
British	84.8	
German	83.4	
Other White	80.4	
Native American	79.7	
Average	86.0	

# **45.G1 Whites Can Segregate Their Neighborhoods**

Group	% Disagree
Black	89.5
Jewish	88.2
Hispanic	88.0
French	85.7
Irish	85.1
Scandinavian	84.3
Eastern European	83.9
German	83.9
Italian	83.5
Native American	83.1
Polish	82.8
British	82.0
Other White	79.7
Asian	77.5
Other	75.5
Average	83.8

#### 45.H1 Blacks Shouldn't Push for Rights

Group	% Disagree
Jewish	77.7
Other	66.4
Black	62.3
Eastern European	60.3
Scandinavian	58.6
Hispanic	58.0
German	57.1
Irish	56.7
British	55.5
Polish	53.8
Italian	53.3
French	52.2
Other White	51.9
Native American	49.5
Asian	48.0
Average	56.2

45.11 Has "Opposite Race' Group	% Yes
Black	78.7
Jewish	75.8
Other	74.2
Hispanic	70.8
Asian	69.6
Native American	63.6
Italian	61.2
Polish	60.7
Eastern European	60.5
Irish	60.4
Other White	57.9
French	55.6
German	55.4
British	55.2
Scandinavian	48.1
Average	61.6

#### 45.J School Busing to Desegregate

Group	% Favoring
Black	58.1
Hispanic	47.2
Scandinavian	34.4
Eastern European	33.5
Native American	33.4
Asian	32.5
Jewish	31.8
French	30.0
Irish	29.1
Italian	28.9
Other White	28.9
Other	28.5
British	25.1
Polish	23.9
German	23.6
Average	32.6

#### 45.K1 Vote for a Black for President

Group	% Would
Black	97.7
Other	96.9
Jewish	95.6
Scandinavian	93.2
Eastern European	91.4
French	90.8
Irish	89.4
Hispanic	89.3
British	87.2
Italian	87.0
German	86.0
Asian	83.3
Native American	83.2
Polish	81.9
Other White	81.4
Average	87.8

#### 45.L1 Open Housing Law

Group	% Vote for
Other	78.9
Hispanic	78.4
Black	77.1
Asian	74.1
Jewish	70.5
Scandinavian	68.4
Irish	68.2
Native American	65.1
Eastern European	62.3
French	61.5
Polish	60.2
British	59.3
German	59.3
Other White	57.6
Italian	58.9
Average	64.

## 45.M Preferences in Hiring Blacks

Group	% Supporting
Black	43.8
Other	28.2
Hispanic	19.1
Native American	17.7
Asian	17.6
Jewish	15.3
Eastern European	13.9
Other White	12.0
Polish	11.6
Scandinavian	10.7
German	9.9
Italian	9.3
Irish	8.9
British	8.2
French	7.8
Average	15.9

# 45.N Blacks Should Overcome Prejudice without Special Favors

Group	% Disagree
Black	34.5
Jewish	22.2
Other	19.0
British	13.5
Eastern European	13.4
Polish	13.3
Hispanic	12.3
French	12.1
Scandinavian	11.9
Native American	11.8
Other White	10.2
Irish	9.8
German	9.7
Italian	9.3
Asian	7.6
Average	14.5

#### Table 46 Intergroup Relations by Religious Groups

#### 46.A Government Special Help for Blacks

Religion	% For
None Other Religions	22.4 21.3
Jewish	18.6
Fundamentalist Protestant	18.4
Moderate Protestant	16.3
Catholic	14.4
Liberal Protestant	13.9

#### 46.B1 Black-White Differences Due to Discrimination

Religion	% Yes
Other Religions None	42.9 41.3
Jewish	40.6
Moderate Protestant	38.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	37.8
Catholic	35.2
Liberal Protestant	33.8

## 46.C1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Ability of Blacks

Religion	% Yes	
Catholic	12.9	
Fundamentalist Protestant	12.2	
Liberal Protestant	11.7	
Moderate Protestant	10.6	
Other Religions	8.3	
None	7.5	
Jewish	7.3	

#### 46.D1 Black-White Differences Due to Less Black Education Religion % Yes Jewish 62.9 None 51.1 Moderate Protestant 49.7 Liberal Protestant 49.2 Other Religions 47.3 Catholic 45.6 Fundamentalist Protestant 40.2 46.E1 Black-White Differences Due to Less Black Motivation Religion % Yes Fundamentalist Protestant 52.2 Catholic 49.4 Liberal Protestant 48.8 Moderate Protestant 45.2 Other Religions 43.3 None 37.6 Jewish 32.2 46.F1 Laws against Black-White Intermarriage Religion % Opposed to

5	11	
Jewish	97.3	
Other Religions	93.3	
None	91.3	
Catholic	89.1	
Moderate Protestant	86.1	
Liberal Protestant	84.8	
Fundamentalist Protestant	79.9	

#### **46.G1 Whites Can Segregate Their Neighborhoods** Religion % Disagree

Religion	70 Disagree
None	89.6
Other Religions	88.9
Jewish	88.2
Catholic	85.5
Moderate Protestant	84.7
Liberal Protestant	82.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	80.2

#### 46.H1 Blacks Shouldn't Push for Rights

Religion	% Disagree	
Jewish	77.7	
None	62.4	
Other Religions	61.6	
Liberal Protestant	57.0	
Catholic	55.9	
Moderate Protestant	55.9	
Fundamentalist Protestant	51.3	

#### 46.11 Has "Opposite Race" Black/White Neighbor

Religion	% Yes	
Jewish	75.8	
Other Religions	69.1	
None	65.2	
Fundamentalist Protestant	62.2	
Catholic	61.7	
Moderate Protestant	57.4	
Liberal Protestant	55.4	

#### 46.J School Busing to Desegregate

Religion	% Favoring	
Other Religions	42.9	
Catholic	34.6	
Fundamentalist Protestant	32.8	
Moderate Protestant	32.0	
Jewish	31.8	
None	31.2	
Liberal Protestant	28.9	

#### 46K1. Vote for a Black for President

Religion	% Would	
Jewish	95.6	
Other Religions	94.2	
Moderate Protestant	92.0	
None	89.3	
Catholic	88.9	
Liberal Protestant	87.5	
Fundamentalist Protestant	84.0	

Religion	% Vote for	
None	70.9	
Other Religions	70.6	
Jewish	70.5	
Catholic	67.9	
Moderate Protestant	64.4	
Liberal Protestant	60.4	
Fundamentalist Protestant	60.3	
46.M Preferences in Hiring	Blacks	
Religion	% Supporting	
Other Religions	21.2	
None	18.6	
Fundamentalist Protestant	18.1	
Jewish	15.3	

Jewijii	13.5
Moderate Protestant	14.8
Catholic	13.6
Liberal Protestant	12.4

## 46.N Blacks Should Overcome Prejudice without Special Favors

#### Table 47 Intergroup Relations, 1972-2002

#### 47.A Government Special Help for Black (% For)

Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	40.8	24.5
1981-90	25.2	18.4
1991-2002	18.6	17.0
17 B1 Black-White Differences Due to Discrimination (% Ves)*		

#### 47.B1 Black-White Differences Due to Discrimination (% Yes)\*

1972-80	52.3	39.2
1981-90	46.2	42.0
1991-2002	40.6	37.2

# 47.B2 Black-White Differences Due to Discrimination, Blacks Excluded in All Years (% Yes)\*

1972-80	52.3	39.2
1981-90	45.1	38.2
1991-2002	39.5	33.0

# 47.C1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Ability of Blacks (% $\gamma es)^{\star}$

1972-80	6.2	25.2
1981-90	14.4	18.5
1991-2002	7.3	11.4

#### 47.C2 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Ability of Blacks, Blacks Excluded in All Years (% Yes)

1972-80	6.2	25.2
1981-90	14.7	18.9
1991-2002	7.4	11.4

\*For those variables marked with an asterisk (\*), the items were asked only of non-Blacks in 1972-77. These items were asked of all respondents after 1977. Thus, the Jewish/non-Jewish comparisons for these variables in the 1972-80 period are not strictly comparable to those on other variables. Also, the over-time comparisons for these variables are not comparable, since Blacks are excluded from some of the early years and included in the later two time periods.

# 47.D1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Black Education

Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	56.9	49.2
1981-90 1991-2002	62.5 62.9	52.1 45.5

# 47.D2 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Black Education, Blacks Excluded in All Years (% Yes)\*

1972-80	56.9	49.2
1981-90	63.0	50.2
1991-2002	63.6	43.9

# 47.E1 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Black Motivation (% $\gamma e_s)^\star$

1972-80	44.6	61.6
1981-90	50.6	56.8
1991-2002	32.2	48.0

# 47.E2 Black-White Differences Due to Lesser Black Motivation, Blacks Excluded in All Years (% Yes)\*

4070.00		64.6
1972-80	44.6	61.6
1981-90	50.4	59.6
1991-2002	32.4	49.6

#### 47.F1 Laws against Black-White Intermarriage (% Opposed to)\*

1972-80	84.9	64.7
1981-90	89.6	73.9
1991-2002	97.3	85.8

#### 47.F2 Laws against Black-White Intermarriage, Blacks Excluded in All Years (% Opposed to)\*

1972-80	84.9	64.5
1981-90	89.4	71.8
1991-2002	97.8	84.6

#### 47.G1 Whites Can Segregate Their Neighborhoods

(% Opposed to) Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	70.6	60.0
1981-90	83.3	74.6
1991-2002	88.2	83.8

# 47.G2 Whites Can Segregate Their Neighborhoods, Blacks Excluded from All Years (% Disagree)\*

1972-80	70.6	59.3
1981-90	84.0	73.2
1991-2002	88.6	82.8

#### 47.H1 Blacks Shouldn't Push for Rights (% Disagree)\*

1972-80	47.8	26.8
1981-90	62.3	41.0
1991-2002	77.7	55.9

# 47.H2 Blacks Shouldn't Push for Rights, Blacks Excluded from All Years (% Disagree)\*

1972-80	47.8	26.5
1981-90	63.5	38.3
1991-2002	77.7	54.9

#### 47.I1 Has "Opposite Race" Black/White Neighbor (% Yes)\*

1972-80	50.1	39.1
1981-90	68.7	48.9
1991-2002	75.8	61.3

# 47.12 Has "Opposite Race" Black/White Neighbor, Blacks Excluded in All Years (% Yes)\*

1972-80	50.1	38.7
1981-90	68.3	45.5
1991-2002	75.7	58.6

#### 47.J School Busing to Desegregate (% Favoring)

Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	15.7	18.4
1981-90	27.8	26.2
1991-2002	31.8	32.7

#### 47.K1 Vote for a Black for President (% Would)\*

1972-80	85.1	77.1
1981-90	82.6	82.5
1991-2002	95.6	87.6

# 47.K2 Vote for a Black for President, Blacks Excluded in All Years (% Would)\*

1972-80	85.1	76.3
1981-90	82.4	80.9
1991-2002	95.5	86.2

#### 47.L1 Open Housing Law (% Vote for)\*

1972-80	52.1	37.1
1981-90	56.0	53.4
1991-2002	70.5	64.0

#### 47.L2 Open Housing Law, Blacks Excluded in All Years

(% Vote for)\*

1972-80	52.1	35.5
1981-90	55.5	50.3
1991-2002	71.3	62.2

Strictly comparable time series are possible if Blacks are excluded from all years. These are presented after the full-presentations in the items with a 2 in their headings (e.g., 47B2).

# Table 48 Support for Civil Liberties by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 48.A Public Speech by Anti-Religionist

Group	% Allowing
Jewish	86.1
Scandinavian	82.3
British	79.9
Irish	78.7
Polish	78.7
Eastern European	78.5
Italian	76.4
German	75.4
French	74.7
Other White	73.0
Native American	71.6
Other	67.5
Asian	66.8
Hispanic	66.1
Black	63.9
Average	74.0

## 48.B Anti-Religionist College Teacher

Group	% Not Fire/ Allow to Teach
Scandinavian	67.3
Other	62.2
Eastern European	61.9
Jewish	61.3
British	58.9
Italian	58.6
German	58.3
French	57.5
Irish	56.6
Other White	54.4
Polish	54.1
Asian	53.9
Hispanic	51.9
Native American	48.6
Black	45.8
Average	55.3

_	% Not
Group	Remove
Jewish	87.7
Scandinavian	79.9
Polish	77.4
Eastern European	76.4
Italian	75.7
British	74.0
Irish	73.1
French	71.5
German	70.3
Other White	68.4
Other	66.1
Asian	64.9
Hispanic	60.9
Native American	60.4
Black	57.1
black	5711
Average	69.2
48.D Public Speech by F	Racist
48.D Public Speech by F	
Average <b>48.D Public Speech by F</b> Group Scandinavian	Racist
48.D Public Speech by F Group	Racist % Allowing
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish	Racist % Allowing 70.2
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British Irish	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British Irish Polish	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6 66.3
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British Irish Polish French	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6 66.3 65.3
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British Irish Polish French Italian	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6 66.3 65.3 65.3 63.7
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British Irish Polish French Italian German	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6 66.3 65.3 65.3 63.7 62.7
48.D Public Speech by F Group	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6 66.3 65.3 65.3 63.7 62.7 62.2
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British Irish Polish French Italian German Other White	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6 66.3 65.3 63.7 62.7 62.2 61.1
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British Irish Polish French Italian German Other White Asian	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6 66.3 65.3 63.7 62.7 62.7 62.2 61.1 59.6
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British Irish Polish French Italian German Other White Asian Other	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6 66.3 65.3 63.7 62.7 62.2 61.1 59.6 59.3
48.D Public Speech by F Group Scandinavian Jewish Eastern European British Irish Polish French Italian German Other White Asian Other Native American	Racist % Allowing 70.2 68.8 68.0 67.6 66.3 65.3 63.7 62.7 62.2 61.1 59.6 59.3 58.2

# 48.E Racist College Teacher

	% Not Fire/
Group	Allow to Teach
Eastern European	53.0
Eastern European	
Scandinavian	52.2
Italian	50.5
Irish	49.0
British	48.5
German	48.4
Asian	48.1
Jewish	48.0
Polish	46.0
Other White	45.6
French	45.5
Other	44.9
Hispanic	39.9
Native American	37.8
Black	33.6
Average	45.3

\_\_\_\_\_

## 48.F Racist's Book in Library

Group	% Not Remove
Jewish	76.4
Polish	75.2
Eastern European	71.3
Scandinavian	70.7
British	70.6
Irish	69.7
Italian	68.8
German	66.9
French	65.6
Other White	64.4
Asian	60.0
Native American	58.3
Other	57.2
Hispanic	54.2
Black	50.2
Average	64.4

# 48.G Public Speech by Communist

Group	% Allowing
Jewish	85.0
Eastern European	80.2
Scandinavian	78.4
British	74.2
Polish	72.8
Irish	72.5
French	72.0
Italian	68.9
German	68.5
Other White	65.1
Other	62.0
Asian	58.2
Hispanic	57.0
Black	54.9
Native American	54.6
Average	66.9

#### 48.H Communist College Teacher

Group	% Not Fire/ Allow to Teach
Jewish	70.5
Other	63.5
Polish	62.3
Scandinavian	62.2
Eastern European	62.0
British	60.4
Irish	59.6
Italian	59.6
French	58.1
German	57.6
Asian	56.4
Other White	55.5
Hispanic	53.4
Native American	49.8
Black	48.9
Average	56.8

#### 48.I Communist's Book in Library

48.1 Communist's Book in Library		
	% Not	
Group	Remove	
Jewish	85.0	
Scandinavian	76.8	
Eastern European	75.7	
Polish	74.9	
British	74.2	
Irish	72.1	
Italian	71.6	
German	68.5	
French	67.9	
Asian	65.7	
Other White	65.7	
Hispanic	58.3	
Native American	58.2	
Other	58.0	
Black	51.3	
Average	66.7	

#### 48.J Public Speech by Militarist

Group	% Allowing
Jewish	75.9
Scandinavian	74.3
British	71.4
Eastern European	71.3
Irish	70.6
Polish	69.9
French	67.0
Italian	66.5
German	65.3
Native American	64.6
Other White	64.0
Other	58.0
Asian	57.7
Hispanic	56.6
Black	52.8
Average	64.8

# 48.K Militarist College Teacher Group Jewish Eastern European

Jewish	58.9
Eastern European	55.5
Scandinavian	54.0
Polish	53.8
Italian	53.5
Irish	52.5
British	51.9
Other	51.8
French	51.5
German	49.9
Asian	48.2
Other White	47.7
Hispanic	44.4
Native American	44.2
Black	38.5
Average	48.7

% Not Fire/ Allow to Teach

#### 48.L Militarist's Book in Library

Group	% Allowing
Jewish	82.0
Scandinavian	77.6
Polish	72.8
British	71.3
Irish	71.1
Eastern European	70.9
Italian	69.6
German	67.7
Other White	65.1
French	64.8
Other	62.0
Native American	61.3
Asian	58.4
Hispanic	58.2
Black	54.3
Average	66.0

# 48.M Public Speech by Homosexual

Group	% Allowing
Jewish	93.2
Scandinavian	89.7
Polish	87.1
Italian	86.7
Eastern European	85.9
French	85.9
Irish	85.3
British	82.2
German	81.1
Hispanic	79.6
Black	75.7
Other White	75.7
Native American	74.7
Asian	73.9
Other	69.4
Average	80.4

#### 48.N Homosexual College Teacher

40.14 Holilosexual concyc h	% Not Fire/	
Group	Allow to Teach	
Jewish	93.7	
Polish	85.5	
Italian	85.2	
Scandinavian	81.5	
French	80.5	
Eastern European	80.0	
Irish	78.7	
Hispanic	77.5	
Asian	76.1	
German	75.6	
Black	75.2	
British	74.1	
Other White	71.2	
Native American	68.1	
Other	65.0	
Average	75.6	

	% Not
Group	Remove
Jewish	88.2
Scandinavian	81.4
Polish	79.0
Italian	78.1
Irish	73.8
French	73.5
Eastern European	73.2
British	72.5
German	70.3
Hispanic	67.3
Other	66.7
Other White	66.5
Asian	66.1
Native American	63.5
Black	61.7
Average	69.5

#### Table 49 Support for Civil Liberties by Religious Groups

#### 49.A Public Speech by Anti-Religionist

% Allowing
87.6
86.1
78.0
78.0
74.7
73.5
65.1

#### 49.B Anti-Religionist College Teacher

	% Not Fire/
Religion	Allow to Teach
None	73.3
Jewish	61.3
Other Religions	61.3
Catholic	57.2
Liberal Protestant	56.1
Moderate Protestant	55.2
Fundamentalist Protestant	45.4

#### 49.C Anti-Religionist Book in Library

	% Not
Religion	Remove
Jewish	87.7
None	84.4
Other Religions	73.5
Catholic	72.4
Liberal Protestant	71.9
Moderate Protestant	68.0
Fundamentalist Protestant	58.0

#### 49.D Public Speech by Racist Religion % Allowing None 74.4 Jewish 68.8 Liberal Protestant 65.6 Moderate Protestant 62.2 Catholic 61.6 Other Religions 60.4 Fundamentalist Protestant 54.2 49.E Racist College Teacher % Not Fire/ Allow to Teach Religion None 55.9 Jewish 48.0 Catholic 47.8 Other Religions 47.0 Liberal Protestant 46.2 Moderate Protestant 43.8 38.9 Fundamentalist Protestant 49.F Racist's Book in Library % Not Religion Remove

None	77.4
Jewish	76.4
Liberal Protestant	68.6
Catholic	67.0
Other Religions	65.0
Moderate Protestant	62.1
Fundamentalist Protestant	55.2

## 49.G Public Speech by Communist

Religion	% Allowing	
None	82.6	
Jewish	85.0	
Other Religions	73.1	
Liberal Protestant	69.3	
Catholic	67.9	
Moderate Protestant	67.4	
Fundamentalist Protestant	56.5	

#### 49.H Communist College Teacher

	% Not Fire/ Allow to Teach	
Religion		
Jewish	70.5	
None	69.6	
Other Religions	64.9	
Catholic	59.0	
Liberal Protestant	57.7	
Moderate Protestant	55.1	
Fundamentalist Protestant	48.3	

#### 49.I Communist's Book in Library

	% Not
Religion	Remove
None	82.2
Jewish	85.0
Other Religions	73.9
Catholic	69.5
Liberal Protestant	69.3
Moderate Protestant	66.2
Fundamentalist Protestant	55.5

#### 49.J Public Speech by Militarist

Religion % Allowing	
None	78.7
Jewish	75.9
Liberal Protestant	66.5
Other Religions	67.9
Catholic	66.9
Moderate Protestant	65.6
Fundamentalist Protestant	55.3

#### 49.K Militarist College Teacher

	% Not Fire/	
Religion	Allow to Teach	
None	63.1	
Jewish	58.9	
Other Religions	52.3	
Catholic	51.3	
Liberal Protestant	49.7	
Moderate Protestant	47.5	
Fundamentalist Protestant 49.L Militarist's Book in Libr	39.8 <b>'ary</b>	
Fundamentalist Protestant		
Fundamentalist Protestant 49.L Militarist's Book in Lib	rary	
Fundamentalist Protestant <b>49.L Militarist's Book in Lib</b> Religion	rary % Allowing	
Fundamentalist Protestant 49.L Militarist's Book in Lib Religion Jewish	rary % Allowing 82.0	
Fundamentalist Protestant <b>49.L Militarist's Book in Lib</b> Religion Jewish None	rary % Allowing 82.0 80.2	
Fundamentalist Protestant <b>49.L Militarist's Book in Lib</b> Religion Jewish None Other Religions	rary % Allowing 82.0 80.2 70.0	
Fundamentalist Protestant <b>49.L Militarist's Book in Lib</b> Religion Jewish None Other Religions Liberal Protestant	<b>82.0</b> 80.2 70.0 69.0	

# **49.M Public Speech by Homosexual**

Religion	% Allowing	
Jewish	93.2	
None	89.0	
Catholic	85.0	
Liberal Protestant	83.3	
Moderate Protestant	82.2	
Other Religions	78.9	
Fundamentalist Protestant	70.6	

#### 49.N Homosexual College Teacher

	% Not Fire/	
Religion	Allow to Teach	
Jewish	93.7	
None	86.0	
Catholic	82.1	
Other Religions	78.2	
Liberal Protestant	77.0	
Moderate Protestant	74.5	
Fundamentalist Protestant	64.2	

## 49.0 Homosexual's Book in Library

	% Not	
Religion	Remove	
Jewish	88.2	
None	82.9	
Catholic	76.1	
Other Religions	75.4	
Liberal Protestant	73.3	
Moderate Protestant	69.8	
Fundamentalist Protestant	56.3	

### Table 50 Support for Civil Liberties, 1972-2002

50.A Public Speech by An Years	<b>nti-Religionist</b> (% Allowing Jews	j) Non-Jews
1972-80	82.9	64.4
1981-90	79.6	68.5
1991-2002	86.1	73.7
50.B Anti-Religionist Col	l <b>ege Teacher</b> (% Not Fire/A	llow to Teach)
1972-80	67.9	41.3
1981-90	56.7	47.1
1991-2002	61.3	55.3
50.C Anti-Religionist Boo	<b>k in Library</b> (% Not Remov	ve)
1972-80	85.5	60.0
1981-90	86.1	64.1
1991-2002	87.7	68.8
50.D Public Speech by Ra	acist (% Allowing)	
1972-80	67.1	60.7
1981-90	67.9	59.3
1991-2002	68.8	61.5
50.E Racist College Teach	<b>ner</b> (% Not Fire/Allow to Tea	ıch)
1972-80	50.3	41.0
1981-90	43.6	42.5
1991-2002	48.0	45.3
50.F Racist's Book in Library (% Not Remove)		
1972-80	73.6	61.5
1981-90	82.5	62.0
1991-2002	76.4	64.2

50.G Public Speech by Q Years	Communist (% Allowing) Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	81.0	55.7
1981-90	87.1	59.6
1991-2002	85.0	66.5
50.H Communist Colleg	<b>e Teacher</b> (% Not Fire/Allow	to Teach)
1972-80	58.2	38.8
1981-90	65.3	46.8
1991-2002	70.5	56.6
50.I Communist's Book	in Library (% Not Remove)	
1972-80	82.0	56.1
1981-90	82.8	59.8
1991-2002	85.0	66.4
50.J Public Speech by N	filitarist (% Allowing)	
1972-80	71.1	53.8
1981-90	68.6	56.3
1991-2002	75.9	64.6
50.K Militarist College	<b>Feacher</b> (% Not Fire/Allow to	o Teach)
1972-80	52.7	36.7
1981-90	47.4	40.3
1991-2002	58.9	48.5
50.L Militarist's Book in	Library (% Allowing)	
1972-80	77.4	55.7
1981-90	74.8	58.2
1991-2002	82.0	65.7

50.M Public Speech by	Homosexual (% Allowing)	
Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	84.1	62.7
1981-90	92.1	69.1
1991-2002	93.2	80.2
50.N Homosexual Colle	ge Teacher (% Not Fire/Allo	w to Teach)
1972-80	83.7	52.8
1981-90	88.8	60.4
1991-2002	93.7	75.2
50.0 Homosexual's Boo	<b>k in Library</b> (% Not Remov	e)
1972-80	79.5	55.4
1981-90	83.2	59.3
1991-2002	88.2	69.5

# Table 51 Crime and Firearms by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 51.A Capital Punishment

Group	% Favor
Black	47.9
Hispanic	63.3
Jewish	64.1
Other	64.6
Asian	65.4
Polish	71.2
Irish	71.8
Scandinavian	71.8
Italian	73.4
Other White	73.8
Eastern European	74.1
French	75.8
British	76.1
German	77.1
Native American	77.5
Average	70.2

#### 51.B Courts

	% Not
Group	Harsh Enough
Asian	65.4
Other	67.0
Jewish	70.6
Black	72.2
Hispanic	75.1
Scandinavian	75.9
Polish	77.6
British	77.9
Other White	77.9
French	78.0
Irish	78.4
Italian	78.9
German	79.3
Eastern European	79.4
Native American	80.7
Average	76.9

## 51.C Fear to Walk Alone at Night

Group	% Yes	
Scandinavian	28.6	
French	31.8	
German	34.4	
Other	35.1	
Italian	36.3	
Other White	38.5	
British	38.7	
Irish	39.7	
Native American	40.8	
Polish	41.9	
Eastern European	43.2	
Asian	45.0	
Hispanic	45.9	
Black	49.6	
Jewish	51.6	
A		
-	39.9	
Average <b>51.D Gun in Household</b> Group	39.9 % Yes	
51.D Gun in Household		
51.D Gun in Household Group	% Yes	
51.D Gun in Household Group	% Yes 12.9	
51.D Gun in Household Group Asian Jewish	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b>	
51.D Gun in Household Group Asian Jewish Other	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0	
<b>51.D Gun in Household</b> Group Asian <b>Jewish</b> Other Hispanic	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5	
51.D Gun in Household Group Asian Jewish Other Hispanic Black	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5 25.3	
51.D Gun in Household Group Asian Jewish Other Hispanic Black Italian	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5 25.3 31.3	
51.D Gun in Household Group Asian Jewish Other Hispanic Black Italian Polish	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5 25.3 31.3 37.4	
<b>51.D Gun in Household</b> Group Asian <b>Jewish</b> Other Hispanic Black Italian Polish Eastern European	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5 25.3 31.3 37.4 40.1	
<b>51.D Gun in Household</b> Group Asian <b>Jewish</b> Other Hispanic Black Italian Polish Eastern European Irish	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5 25.3 31.3 37.4 40.1 42.3	
<b>51.D Gun in Household</b> Group Asian <b>Jewish</b> Other Hispanic Black Italian Polish Eastern European Irish Scandinavian	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5 25.3 31.3 37.4 40.1 42.3 46.1	
51.D Gun in Household Group Asian Jewish Other Hispanic Black Italian Polish Eastern European Irish Scandinavian Other White	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5 25.3 31.3 37.4 40.1 42.3 46.1 47.2	
51.D Gun in Household Group Asian Jewish Other Hispanic Black Italian Polish Eastern European Irish Scandinavian Other White German	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5 25.3 31.3 37.4 40.1 42.3 46.1 47.2 49.2	
51.D Gun in Household Group Asian Jewish Other Hispanic Black Italian Polish Eastern European Irish Scandinavian Other White German French	% Yes 12.9 <b>13.2</b> 17.0 17.5 25.3 31.3 37.4 40.1 42.3 46.1 47.2 49.2 49.7	

## 51.E Personally Own Gun

Group	% Yes
Asian	7.3
Hispanic	8.4
Jewish	9.5
Other	11.6
Black	17.0
Italian	18.3
Polish	22.6
Eastern European	25.2
Irish	27.2
Scandinavian	29.0
Other White	30.4
Native American	32.2
British	32.5
French	32.6
German	32.9
Average	25.9

#### 51.F Police Permit before Gun Purchase

Group	% Favor
Jewish	92.2
Other	91.8
Asian	90.8
Italian	87.6
Hispanic	85.7
Black	84.3
Polish	84.2
Irish	82.2
Eastern European	81.3
French	78.5
German	76.7
Other White	76.6
Scandinavian	76.5
British	75.8
Native American	75.3
Average	80.0

#### 51.G Police Ever Strike Citizen

Group	% Approve
Black	46.4
Other	46.4
Asian	48.5
Hispanic	48.5
Eastern European	65.1
Jewish	69.0
Other White	69.7
French	70.6
Polish	72.9
Italian	73.5
Irish	73.9
German	75.3
Native American	76.6
British	77.6
Scandinavian	78.7
Average	68.0

# 51.H Police Strike Escapee

ST. IT POLICE SUIKE ESCAPEE	
Group	% Approve
Black	50.7
Other	54.2
Hispanic	57.9
Asian	59.4
Eastern European	69.2
Other White	70.6
French	72.4
Native American	72.7
Polish	72.9
Scandinavian	73.6
Italian	74.7
German	75.2
Irish	76.9
Jewish	77.4
British	78.0
Average	69.9

# 51.I Police Strike Person Hitting Police

Group	% Approve
Asian	79.9
Black	84.7
Hispanic	87.4
Other	87.7
Eastern European	90.0
Other White	91.0
Polish	91.0
Native American	91.8
French	92.4
German	93.3
Irish	93.7
Jewish	94.0
British	94.3
Italian	94.5
Scandinavian	95.1
Average	91.2

#### 51.J Police Strike Murder Suspect

Group	% Approve
Polish	2.7
Scandinavian	4.5
French	4.7
British	5.1
Other White	5.5
Native American	5.6
Irish	5.7
Eastern European	5.8
German	6.0
Italian	6.1
Jewish	6.3
Black	7.4
Hispanic	8.3
Other	15.4
Asian	18.2
Average	6.2

Group	% Approve
Hispanic	3.9
Black	4.8
Native American	5.1
Jewish	6.0
French	6.2
Irish	6.2
Polish	6.2
Italian	6.6
Scandinavian	7.9
German	8.0
Other White	8.1
British	8.3
Asian	9.4
Eastern European	10.0
Other	16.0
Average	7.1
51.L Wiretapping	
Group	% Approve
British	28.5
British German	28.5 27.6
German	27.6
German Italian	27.6 26.6
German Italian Other	27.6 26.6 26.6
German Italian Other Scandinavian	27.6 26.6 26.2 23.6 <b>22.5</b>
German Italian Other Scandinavian Other White	27.6 26.6 26.6 26.2 23.6
German Italian Other Scandinavian Other White Jewish	27.6 26.6 26.2 23.6 <b>22.5</b>
German Italian Other Scandinavian Other White Jewish Irish French Polish	27.6 26.6 26.2 23.6 <b>22.5</b> 21.2 20.0 19.6
German Italian Other Scandinavian Other White Jewish Irish French	27.6 26.6 26.2 23.6 <b>22.5</b> 21.2 20.0
German Italian Other Scandinavian Other White Jewish Irish French Polish Asian Hispanic	27.6 26.6 26.2 23.6 <b>22.5</b> 21.2 20.0 19.6 18.4 16.8
German Italian Other Scandinavian Other White Jewish Irish French Polish Asian	27.6 26.6 26.2 23.6 <b>22.5</b> 21.2 20.0 19.6 18.4 16.8 15.8
German Italian Other Scandinavian Other White Jewish Irish French Polish Asian Hispanic	27.6 26.6 26.2 23.6 <b>22.5</b> 21.2 20.0 19.6 18.4 16.8

22.4

Average

### Table 52 Crime and Firearms by Religious Groups

#### 52.A Capital Punishment

% Favor
63.3
64.1
66.1
70.6
71.0
72.0
72.6

#### 52.B Courts

	% Not	
Religion	Harsh Enough	
Other Religions	66.0	
None	66.7	
Jewish	70.6	
Liberal Protestant	77.7	
Catholic	78.1	
Moderate Protestant	78.7	
Fundamentalist Protestant	80.6	

# 52.C Fear to Walk Alone at Night

Religion	% Yes
None	34.0
Moderate Protestant	38.4
Catholic	38.8
Liberal Protestant	39.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	42.4
Other Religions	43.7
Jewish	51.6

52.D Gun in Household Religion	% Yes	
Jewish	13.2	
Other Religions	25.7	
Catholic	32.8	
None	33.5	
Moderate Protestant	44.8	
Liberal Protestant	46.8	
Fundamentalist Protestant	48.5	
52.E Personally Own Gun		
Religion	% Yes	
Jewish	9.5	
Other Religions	17.8	
Catholic	19.9	
None	23.2	
Moderate Protestant	28.7	
Liberal Protestant	29.9	
Fundamentalist Protestant	31.5	
52.F Police Permit before Gun Purchase		
Religion	% Favor	
Jewish	92.2	
Catholic	84.3	
Other Religions	81.6	
None	81.1	
Liberal Protestant	80.1	
Moderate Protestant	78.4	
Fundamentalist Protestant	76.9	
52.G Police Ever Strike Citizen		
Group	% Approve	
Other Religions	63.6	_
Catholic	63.9	
Fundamentalist Protestant	67.1	
Jewish	69.0	
Moderate Protestant	70.8	
Maria a	74.0	

71.8

73.9

None

Liberal Protestant

# 52.H Police Strike Escapee

Group	% Approve	
None	65.4	
Other Religions	66.7	
Moderate Protestant	68.7	
Catholic	68.9	
Fundamentalist Protestant	70.6	
Liberal Protestant	75.3	
Jewish	77.4	

#### 52.I Police Strike Person Hitting Police

Group	% Approve	
Other Religions	87.9	
None	90.5	
Moderate Protestant	90.7	
Catholic	91.4	
Fundamentalist Protestant	91.5	
Liberal Protestant	93.2	
Jewish	94.0	

## 52.J Police Strike Murder Suspect

Group	% Approve	
None	4.8	
Moderate Protestant	5.0	
Liberal Protestant	5.7	
Jewish	6.3	
Fundamentalist Protestant	6.5	
Catholic	7.0	
Other Religions	7.4	

#### 52.K Police Strike Person Verbally Abusing Police

Group	% Approve
Other Religions	5.1
None	5.3
Jewish	6.0
Moderate Protestant	6.7
Catholic	7.1
Liberal Protestant	7.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	8.1

52.L Wiretapping		
Religion	% Approving	
Other Religions	20.3	
None	20.3	
Fundamentalist Protestant	20.7	
Moderate Protestant	21.4	
Jewish	22.5	
Catholic	22.8	
Liberal Protestant	28.4	

#### Table 53 Crime and Firearms, 1972-2002

#### 53.A Capital Punishment (% Favor) Years Jews Non-Jews 64.2 1972-80 65.5 1981-90 73.0 72.4 1991-2002 64.1 70.3 53.B Courts (% Not Harsh Enough) 1972-80 74.9 79.0 1981-90 86.0 83.4 70.6 1991-2002 77.0 53.C Fear to Walk Alone at Night (% Yes) 1972-80 49.1 41.9 1981-90 57.5 39.2 51.6 39.7 1991-2002 53.D Gun in Household (% Yes) 1972-80 14.2 51.2 1981-90 13.4 48.3 1991-2002 13.2 40.9 53.E Personally Own Gun (% Yes) \* 1972-80 29.6 7.5 1981-90 28.4 9.5 26.2 1991-2002 53.F Police Permit before Gun Purchase (% Favor) 1972-80 94.9 71.4 72.7 1981-90 93.5

\*Too few cases to report

1991-2002

53.G Police Ever Strike Citizen (% Approve)		
Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	75.9	74.2
1981-90	77.8	72.5
1991-2002	69.0	68.0
53.H Police Strike Escapee (% Ap	prove)	
1972-80	79.6	79.5
1981-90	76.0	75.0
1991-2002	77.4	69.8
53.I Police Strike Person Hitting	Police (% Approv	e)
1972-80	94.5	95.1
1981-90	93.1	92.6
1991-2002	94.0	91.3
53.J Police Strike Murder Suspec	<b>t</b> (% Approve)	
1972-80	6.7	7.6
1981-90	6.3	9.2
1991-2002	6.3	6.2
53.K Police Strike Person Verbally Abusing Police (% Approve)		
1972-80	12.9	17.9
1981-90	5.7	12.6
1991-2002	6.0	7.1
53.L Wiretapping (% Approve)		
1972-80	13.5	17.6
1981-90	17.2	21.6
1991-2002	22.5	22.3

92.2

79.8

# Table 54 Psychological Well-being and Health by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 54.A Overall Happiness

Group	% Very Happy
British	36.4
Polish	36.0
Other	35.6
Jewish	35.4
French	35.1
German	34.4
Native American	34.1
Other White	33.8
Irish	33.7
Scandinavian	33.4
Italian	32.6
Eastern European	31.5
Asian	31.4
Hispanic	28.4
Black	23.5
Average	32.6

#### 54.B Marital Happiness

Group	% Very Happy
British	67.5
Jewish	67.1
Italian	66.2
French	64.9
Asian	64.5
Irish	63.3
Other	63.1
German	62.9
Native American	62.1
Other White	61.5
Polish	60.3
Scandinavian	60.3
Eastern European	60.2
Hispanic	58.4
Black	46.9
Average	61.8

Group	% Satisfied
Jewish	38.8
British	35.5
Eastern European	33.9
German	33.7
Scandinavian	32.5
Italian	32.0
Irish	31.0
Other White	29.9
French	27.2
Polish	26.2
Asian	26.0
Native American	19.8
Hispanic	19.7
Black	18.9
Other	17.8
Average	29.1
54.D Job Satisfaction	
Group	% Very Satisfied
Irish	51.5
Jewish	50.4
Jewish	50.4
<b>Jewish</b> French	<b>50.4</b> 48.8
<b>Jewish</b> French Italian	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3
<b>Jewish</b> French Italian German	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3 48.0
<b>Jewish</b> French Italian German Other White	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3 48.0 48.0
<b>Jewish</b> French Italian German Other White Native American	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3 48.0 48.0 47.7 47.5 47.5
Jewish French Italian German Other White Native American British Scandinavian Polish	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3 48.0 48.0 47.7 47.5 47.5 46.3
Jewish French Italian German Other White Native American British Scandinavian Polish Eastern European	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3 48.0 48.0 47.7 47.5 47.5 46.3 44.8
Jewish French Italian German Other White Native American British Scandinavian Polish Eastern European Hispanic	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3 48.0 48.0 47.7 47.5 47.5 46.3 44.8 43.1
Jewish French Italian German Other White Native American British Scandinavian Polish Eastern European Hispanic Black	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3 48.0 48.0 47.7 47.5 47.5 46.3 44.8 43.1 36.1
Jewish French Italian German Other White Native American British Scandinavian Polish Eastern European Hispanic Black Asian	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3 48.0 47.7 47.5 47.5 46.3 44.8 43.1 36.1 34.7
Jewish French Italian German Other White Native American British Scandinavian Polish Eastern European Hispanic Black	<b>50.4</b> 48.8 48.3 48.0 48.0 47.7 47.5 47.5 46.3 44.8 43.1 36.1

#### 54.E Health

Group	% Excellent
Jewish	43.2
Other	37.6
Scandinavian	37.5
German	35.1
Irish	32.9
British	32.8
Italian	32.8
French	32.1
Other White	31.8
Asian	30.9
Polish	30.8
Hispanic	29.8
Eastern European	29.2
Black	25.5
Native American	24.0
Average	31.7

## 54.F Life

Group	% Is Exciting
Other	61.3
Jewish	56.3
Polish	55.1
British	51.9
Eastern European	50.7
Irish	50.3
Scandinavian	50.0
German	47.3
Asian	47.1
French	46.4
Italian	46.2
Hispanic	45.8
Other White	45.4
Native American	44.2
Black	41.9
Average	47.4

# Table 55 Psychological Well-being and Health by Religious Groups

## 55.A Overall Happiness

Religion	% Very Happy	
Liberal Protestant	36.0	
Jewish	35.4	
Other Religions	35.3	
Fundamentalist Protestant	33.4	
Moderate Protestant	33.1	
Catholic	32.0	
None	24.4	
55.B Marital Happiness		
Religion	% Very Happy	
Jewish	67.1	
Liberal Protestant	65.7	
Fundamentalist Protestant	62.6	
Other Religions	62.5	
Moderate Protestant	60.7	
Catholic	60.4	
None	56.4	
55.C Financial Satisfaction		
Religion	% Satisfied	
Jewish	38.8	
Liberal Protestant	37.6	

Jewish	38.8
Liberal Protestant	37.6
Moderate Protestant	32.5
Fundamentalist Protestant	27.5
Catholic	26.6
None	25.8
Other Religions	22.6

#### 55.D Job Satisfaction

55.D Job Satisfaction	
Religion	% Very Satisfied
Jewish	50.4
Liberal Protestant	49.6
Catholic	46.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	46.1
Moderate Protestant	45.6
Other Religions	42.9
None	40.5
55.E Health	
Religion	% Excellent
Jewish	43.2
Liberal Protestant	35.1
None	33.7
Catholic	32.7
Other Religions	32.5
Moderate Protestant	31.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	27.9
55.F Life	
Religion	% Is Exciting
Other Religions	57.4
Jewish	56.3
Liberal Protestant	49.2
Catholic	47.7
Moderate Protestant	47.4
None	46.5
None	

# Table 56 Psychological Well-being and Health, 1972-2002

<b>56.A Overall Happiness</b> ( Years	% Very Happy) Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	34.8	34.9
1981-90	32.9	33.9
1991-2002	35.4	32.5
56.B Marital Happiness (	% Very Happy)	
1972-80	72.9	66.6
1981-90	61.9	62.8
1991-2002	67.1	61.7
56.C Financial Satisfaction	on (% Satisfied)	
1972-80	33.4	31.8
1981-90	44.1	29.4
1991-2002	38.8	28.9
56.D Job Satisfaction (%	Very Satisfied)	
1972-80	45.3	49.4
1981-90	52.4	46.7
1991-2002	50.4	45.7
56.E Health (% Excellent)		
1972-80	37.1	32.1
1981-90	36.6	32.8
1991-2002	43.2	31.5
56.F Life (% Is Exciting)		
1972-80	46.2	44.9
1981-90	55.4	45.8
1991-2002	56.3	47.2

#### Table 57 Financial and Job Changes and Expectations by Ethnic/Racial Groups

# 57.A Own Standard of Living Compared to Parent's

Group	% Better
Asian	74.8
Hispanic	70.5
Black	68.5
Eastern European	68.1
Italian	68.1
Irish	66.5
British	66.2
Jewish	65.9
German	65.7
Native American	65.1
Polish	64.8
Other	64.2
Other White	62.7
French	60.7
Scandinavian	58.6
Average	65.8

#### 57.B Expected Standard of Living of Children

% Better than Own
72.9
69.3
68.5
66.5
65.0
59.9
54.3
53.7
51.1
50.9
49.8
48.4
48.3
48.0
47.5
54.6

#### **57.C Financial Situation in Recent Years** % Getting Group Better Irish 44.5 44.4 Hispanic German 44.2 Polish 43.3 British 41.9 Italian 41.6 Scandinavian 41.2 Jewish 41.1 Asian 39.7 French 39.4 Native American 39.2 Other White 39.2 38.3 Other Black 35.5 Eastern European 35.3 40.9 Average 57.D Losing Job in Next Twelve Months % Not at All Likely Group Polish 76.1 Jewish 72.9 68.0 Italian Other White 67.1 German 65.7 British 64.6 Scandinavian 64.1 Asian 63.3 62.7 French 62.6 Native American 62.2 Eastern European Irish 62.1 Hispanic 60.4

58.4 55.4

64.3

Black

Other

Average

## 57.E Finding as Good a Job, if Lost Job

Group	% Very Easy
Italian	35.8
Polish	34.6
Other	33.9
Scandinavian	33.0
Eastern European	30.6
Other White	29.4
Native American	29.2
Hispanic	28.6
German	28.2
Black	27.8
Irish	27.2
Jewish	26.7
French	24.7
Asian	24.3
British	23.9
Average	28.3

# Group% From<br/>Hard WorkNative American72.6

57.G How People Get Ahead

Group	
Native American	72.6
German	72.3
Other	71.8
Irish	69.4
British	69.3
Other White	68.0
French	66.8
Hispanic	66.5
Asian	66.2
Black	65.1
Italian	64.8
Eastern European	62.8
Scandinavian	61.8
Jewish	58.0
Polish	57.3
Average	67.7

# 57.F Continued to Work if Able to Live Comfortably without Work

Group	% Work
Other	82.0
Polish	76.5
Asian	75.6
Jewish	72.5
Native American	72.1
Hispanic	71.2
Scandinavian	69.7
German	69.2
Irish	68.4
French	67.8
Black	67.3
Other White	66.9
Eastern European	64.3
British	64.1
Italian	63.0
Average	68.1

#### Table 58 Financial and Job Changes and Expectations by Religious Groups

#### 58.A Own Standard of Living Compared to Parent's

% Better
67.9
67.3
66.7
65.9
64.7
60.6
59.3

#### 58.B Expected Standard of Living of Children

	% Better
Religion	than Own
Other Religions	58.9
Fundamentalist Protestant	56.5
Catholic	56.3
None	52.2
Moderate Protestant	51.2
Liberal Protestant	51.0
Jewish	47.5

#### 58.C Financial Situation in Recent Years

Religion	% Getting Better
Other Religions	43.1
None	41.7
Moderate Protestant	41.6
Catholic	41.4
Jewish	<b>41.1</b>
Liberal Protestant	40.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	39.3

#### 58.D Losing Job in Next Twelve Months

Religion	% Not at All Likely	
Jewish	72.9	
Moderate Protestant	67.6	
Liberal Protestant	65.7	
Catholic	64.1	
Other Religions	63.0	
Fundamentalist Protestant	62.9	
None	61.6	

#### 58.E Finding as Good a Job, if Lost Job

Religion	% Very Easy	
None	30.9	
Catholic	29.6	
Other Religions	28.1	
Liberal Protestant	27.2	
Fundamentalist Protestant	26.9	
Moderate Protestant	26.9	
Jewish	26.7	

# 58.F Continued to Work if Able to Live Comfortably without Work

Religion	% Work
Other Religions	73.3
Jewish	72.5
None	70.1
Catholic	67.8
Fundamentalist Protestant	67.6
Moderate Protestant	67.2
Liberal Protestant	66.3

## 58.G How People Get Ahead

	% From	
Religion	Hard Work	
Fundamentalist Protestant	72.4	
Moderate Protestant	68.5	
Liberal Protestant	67.6	
Catholic	66.8	
None	61.5	
Other Religions	59.8	
Jewish	58.0	

#### Table 59 Financial and Job Changes and Expectations, 1972-2002

59.A Own Standard of Living Years	g Compared to Parent Jews	<b>'s</b> (% Better) Non-Jews
1972-80		
1981-90		
1991-2002	65.9	65.8
59.B Expected Standard of L	<b>iving of Children</b> (% E	Better than Own)
1972-80		
1981-90		
1991-2002	47.5	54.7
59.C Financial Situation in R	ecent Years (% Getting	g Better)
1972-80	44.6	39.1
1981-90	48.8	38.9
1991-2002	41.1	40.9
59.D Losing Job in Next Twe	lve Months (% Not at a	All Likely)
1972-80	80.1	68.2
1981-90	79.9	65.0
1991-2002	72.9	64.1
59.E Finding as Good a Job, if Lost Job (% Very Easy)		
1972-80	30.6	26.6
1981-90	32.4	26.2
1991-2002	26.7	28.3

# 59.F Continued to Work if Able to Live Comfortably without Work (% $\mathsf{Work})$

Years	Jews	Non-Jews
1972-80	65.6	70.1
1981-90	80.6	72.7
1991-2002	72.5	68.0

#### 59.G How People Get Ahead (% From Hard Work)

1972-80	41.4	62.8
1981-90	55.4	66.2
1991-2002	58.0	67.9

#### Table 60 Miscellaneous by Ethnic/Racial Groups

## 60.A Spanking Children

oon oppanning ennaren		
Group	% Agree With	
Jewish	49.4	
Italian	64.6	
Asian	66.0	
Eastern European	67.0	
Hispanic	68.9	
Scandinavian	69.3	
Irish	69.6	
Polish	70.1	
French	72.0	
British	73.2	
Other White	74.2	
German	74.4	
Other	78.9	
Native American	79.6	
Black	83.5	
Average	73.2	
60.B Divorce Law	% For Easier Laws	
Black	46.3	
Hispanic	33.7	
Native American	30.3	
Jewish	28.8	
Asian		
Other	27.1	
F 1	27.1 25.9	
French		
French Irish	25.9	
Irish Other White	25.9 22.5 22.5 22.3	
Irish Other White Italian	25.9 22.5 22.5 22.3 21.2	
Irish Other White Italian	25.9 22.5 22.5 22.3 21.2 20.1	
Irish Other White Italian Eastern European Polish	25.9 22.5 22.5 22.3 21.2 20.1 20.0	
Irish Other White Italian Eastern European Polish Scandinavian	25.9 22.5 22.3 21.2 20.1 20.0 19.4	
Irish Other White Italian Eastern European Polish Scandinavian German	25.9 22.5 22.3 21.2 20.1 20.0 19.4 18.0	
Irish Other White Italian Eastern European Polish Scandinavian	25.9 22.5 22.3 21.2 20.1 20.0 19.4	
Irish Other White Italian Eastern European Polish Scandinavian German	25.9 22.5 22.3 21.2 20.1 20.0 19.4 18.0	

#### 60.C World War within Ten Years

Group	% Expecting
Black	55.9
Native American	53.1
Hispanic	51.7
French	49.2
Other	45.6
Polish	45.5
Other White	43.5
German	42.0
Eastern European	41.9
Irish	40.2
British	39.5
Italian	35.6
Scandinavian	34.1
Asian	29.1
Jewish	23.2
Average	43.7

#### 60.D Legalizing Marijuana

Group	% In Favor	
Jewish	41.3	
Native American	30.0	
Other	29.7	
Italian	29.6	
Polish	29.6	
Irish	28.5	
French	27.7	
German	27.6	
Eastern European	27.2	
Other White	24.6	
British	23.5	
Hispanic	22.6	
Black	22.3	
Scandinavian	21.4	
Asian	16.5	
Average	25.7	

Group	% Daily
Jewish	57.1
British	54.1
Italian	51.0
Eastern European	50.4
German	48.2
Scandinavian	48.0
French	47.9
Irish	46.2
Other White	42.1
Polish	38.2
Other	36.8
Native American	36.2
Black	35.4
Asian	34.8
Hispanic	32.8
Average	44.3

## 60.F TV Watching

	Mean Hours
Group	per Day
Black	3.8
Native American	3.0
Hispanic	2.9
Irish	2.8
Other White	2.8
German	2.7
Italian	2.7
Polish	2.7
British	2.7
Other	2.6
French	2.6
Scandinavian	2.5
Eastern European	2.5
Jewish	2.5
Asian	2.3
Average	2.9

# Table 61 Miscellaneous by Religious Groups

#### 61.A Spanking Children

Religion	% Agree with	
Jewish	49.4	
None	65.5	
Catholic	65.9	
Other Religions	69.5	
Liberal Protestant	72.2	
Moderate Protestant	74.7	
Fundamentalist Protestant	84.3	

#### 61.B Divorce Law

	% For
Religion	Easier Laws
None	34.8
Jewish	28.8
Other Religions	27.7
Fundamentalist Protestant	24.6
Catholic	24.5
Liberal Protestant	21.4
Moderate Protestant	21.1

# 61.C World War within Ten Years

Religion % Expecti			
Fundamentalist Protestant Moderate Protestant Other Religions Catholic None Liberal Protestant	52.1 45.0 41.2 41.2 39.8 35.7		
Jewish	23.2		

Religion	% In Favor	
None	47.7	
Jewish	41.3	
Other Religions	35.0	
Catholic	24.7	
Liberal Protestant	23.9	
Moderate Protestant	23.1	
Fundamentalist Protestant	17.8	
61.E Newspaper Reading		
Religion	% Daily	
Jewish	57.1	
Liberal Protestant	57.9	
Catholic	48.4	
Moderate Protestant	46.4	
Fundamentalist Protestant	38.8	
None	36.0	
Other Religions	30.4	
61.F TV Watching		
-	Mean Hours	
Religion	per Day	
Fundamentalist Protestant	3.0	
Catholic	2.9	

2.9 2.9

2.8

2.5

2.5

Moderate Protestant

Liberal Protestant

Other Religions

None

Jewish

#### Table 62 Miscellaneous, 1972-2002

# 62.A Spanking Children (% Agree with)

		Non-Jews
1972-80		
1981-90	58.5	79.9
1991-2002	49.4	73.6
62.B Divorce Law (% For Easier	Laws)	
1972-80	40.4	28.1
1981-90	31.1	23.9
1991-2002	28.8	25.0
62.C World War within Ten Yea	ars (% Expecting)	
1972-80	*	44.0
1981-90	15.7	38.2
1991-2002	23.2	44.1
62.D Legalizing Marijuana (%	In Favor)	
1972-80	43.2	24.0
1981-90	37.8	17.5
1991-2002	41.3	25.3
62.E Newspaper Reading (% [	Daily)	
1972-80	74.1	64.1
1981-90	71.7	52.9
1991-2002	57.1	44.1
62.F TV Watching (Mean Hours	per Day)	
1972-80	2.5	2.9
1981-90	2.3	3.0
1991-2002	2.5	2.9

\* Too few cases to report

#### Table 63 Differences of Ethnic/Racial and Religious Groups from the Overall National Average on Nondemographics

Ethnic/Racial Groups	Average Absolute Percentage Point Difference from the Overall Average
Jewish Black Other Asian Hispanic Scandinavian Native American British Polish Eastern European Italian French German Irish Other Whites	11.4         10.1         7.2         6.9         5.8         5.1         4.4         4.0         3.8         3.6         3.5         3.1         2.9         2.6         2.1
Religious Groups	Average Absolute Percentage Point Difference from the Overall Average
Jewish None Fundamentalist Protestant Other Liberal Protestant Catholic Moderate Protestant	<b>11.4</b> 8.8 5.2 4.5 3.7 2.0 1.7

#### Table 64 Average Difference from Jews of Other Ethnic/Racial and Religious Groups on Nondemographics

Ethnic/Racial Groups	Average Difference Percentage Points
Eastern European	9.8
Italian	9.8
Scandinavian	10.2
Irish	10.3
Polish	10.5
British	11.1
French	12.0
German	12.2
Other White	12.8
Other	13.5
Hispanic	13.9
Asian	14.4
Native American	14.5
Black	17.0
	Average Difference
Religious Groups	Percentage Points
None	7.1
Other	10.0
Liberal Protestant	10.2
Catholic	11.0
Moderate Protestant	11.5
Fundamentalist Protestant	16.1

#### Table 65 Jewish Distinctiveness by Topic Area

Торіс	Difference from Overall Mean		Average Percent of tems at Extremes <sup>a</sup>
Abortion Rights	28.7	Abortion Righ	its 100.0
Religion	22.2	Suicide	100.0
Sexual Morality	21.2	Child Values	90.0
Politics	19.0	Sexual Morali	ty 71.4
Suicide	18.1	Gender Roles	68.8
Misc.	13.4	Politics	64.3
Civil Liberties	13.0	Civil Liberties	60.0
Child Values	12.1	Misc.	58.3
Gender Roles	9.6	Religion	55.6
Intergroup Rel.	8.3	Intergroup Re	l. 50.0
Crime	7.7	Socializing	50.0
Well-being	7.1	Well-being	50.0
Spending/Taxes	6.9	Confidence	46.1
Misanthropy	6.8	Social Welfare	e 37.5
Confidence	5.1	Finances/Jobs	35.7
Socializing	4.8	Spending/Taxe	es 33.4
Finances/Jobs	4.5	Crime	29.2
Social Welfare	4.4	Misanthropy	16.7

a. This takes the percentage of items on which Jews are at the highest or lowest extreme among the fifteen ethnic groups and the seven religious groups and averages them.

# Table 66Changes in Average Difference between Jews and Non-Jews by Topic, 1972-2002a

Торіс	Average Difference 1972-80	Average Difference 1991-2002	1991-2002/ 1972-80
Gender Roles (8)	20.6	9.8	0.478
Finances/Jobs (5)	9.5	5.0	0.529
Socializing (4)	7.7	5.0	0.643
Civil Liberties (15)	20.0	13.2	0.661
Confidence (13)	8.4	5.7	0.674
Intergroup Rel. (12)	13.8	10.6	0.768
Spend/Tax/Soc. Wel. (12)	8.7	7.2	0.829
Misc. (4)	11.1	9.2	0.830
Religion (4)	28.4	24.2	0.850
Crime (11)	7.9	7.0	0.894
Suicide (5)	20.3	18.4	0.807
Sexual Morality (5)	22.0	22.8	1.036
Abortion Rights (7)	28.1	29.2	1.039
Politics (2)	17.9	20.2	1.126
Misanthropy (3)	5.3	6.8	1.297
Well-being (6)	3.1	7.3	2.375
Overall (117)	14.1	11.5	0.812

a. There were 117 items with trends for the entire period. They appear in sixteen topics in this table because there were no items in child values with trends for the whole period and only one trend for social welfare policy. That single social welfare item is included with the spending/taxes items.

#### Table 67 Jewish Subgroup Differences by Topics

Topics	% of Items with Statistically Significant Differences at .05
Religion	59.3
Politics	47.6
Child Values	26.7
Miscellaneous	22.2
Well-being	22.2
Confidence in Institutions	20.5
Civil Liberties	20.0
Socializing	16.7
Social Welfare	16.7
Sexual Morality	14.3
Suicide	13.3
Spending/Taxes	11.1
Intergroup Relations	9.5
Crime	8.3
Abortion Rights	5.3
Gender Roles	4.2
Finance/Jobs	0.0
Misanthropy	0.0

#### Table 68 Differences among Jews on Nondemographics by Topics

#### 68.A Religion

Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Bible Inerrancy Praying Attend Services School Prayers World Evil/Good Humans Good/Bad Relig. Strength God Afterlife	No=None, Ref <sup>***</sup> Low=None <sup>***</sup> For=NS Good=NS Good=NC <sup>***</sup> Low=None <sup>**</sup> No=NS No=NS	* No=Low*** Low=Low*** a For=NS Good=NS Good=NS Low=Low*** No=Low** No=Mod**	No=None <sup>***</sup> Low=None <sup>***</sup> For=Other <sup>***</sup> Good=not None <sup>**</sup> Good=NS b No=None <sup>***</sup> No=None <sup>*</sup>

#### 68.B Abortion Rights

Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Defect in Fetus	Allow=NS	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
Not Married	Allow=Ref <sup>**</sup>	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
Raped	Allow=NS	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
No More Children	Allow=Ref <sup>**</sup>	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
Mother's Health	Allow=NS	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
Can't Afford	Allow=Ref <sup>**</sup>	Allow=Mod*	Allow=NS
Any Reason	Allow=Ref <sup>**</sup>	Allow=NS	Allow=NS

a. Since attendance is used to distinguish Jews, it would be redundant to report it here.

b. Religious strength is asked in terms of current affiliation and is not asked of those with no current affiliation.

For Denominations: Con=Conservative; None=no denomination chosen; Ortho=Orthodox; Ref=Reform; NC=no clear pattern For Attendance: Low=less than yearly; Mod=moderate (less than monthly); High=monthly+; NC=no clear pattern For Current/Past: Jew=current Jew; None=raised Jewish, now none; Other=raised Jewish, now other; NC=no clear pattern NS=not statistically significant at the 0.1 level \*=statistically significant at 0.1 level \*\*=statistically significant at .05 level \*\*\*=statistical significant at .001 level

Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Incurable Disease	Allow=NS	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
Bankrupt	Allow=NS	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
Dishonored Family	Allow=None*	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
Tired of Living	Allow=None**	Allow=Low**	Allow=NS
Euthanasia	Allow=NS	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
68.D Sexual Moral	ity		
Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Premarital Sex	Yes=NS	Yes=Low**	Yes=NS
Extramarital Sex	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Homosexual Sex	Yes=None <sup>***</sup>	Yes=NS	Yes=None**
Teenage Sex	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=None**
Teen Contraceptive	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Porn Allowed	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
X-rated Movie	Saw=NS	Saw=NS	Saw=NS
68.E Intergroup Re	lations		
Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Special Help Blks.	For=NS	For=NS	For=NS
Race Dif. Discrim.	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Race Dif. Inborn	Yes=NS	Yes=Mod*	Yes=NS
Race Dif. School	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Race Dif. Motivtn.	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Intermarriage	Legal=None,Ref <sup>**</sup>	Legal=NS	Legal=None <sup>***</sup>
Segregate Neigh.	Allow=NS	Allow=NS	Allow=NS
Black Push Rights	For=None,Ref <sup>***</sup>	For=NS	For=NS
Oth. Race Neighbor	Has=NS	Has=NS	Has=NS
Busing	For=None*	For=Low**	For=NS
Blk. President	For=NS	For=NS	For=NS
Open Housing Law	For=NS	For=NS	For=NS
A (()	F NG		F 110

For=NS

For=NS

For=NS

For=None\*

Affirm. Action

Spec. Favors Blks.

For=NS

For=NS

## 68.F Well-being

	D:	A., 1	C 1/D
Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
General Happiness Marital Happiness Finan. Satisfied	Very=NS Very=None,Ref <sup>***</sup> Yes=NS	Very=High <sup>**</sup> Very=Mod <sup>**</sup> Yes=NS	Very=NS Very=NS Yes=NS
Job Satisfied	Yes=NS	Yes=High <sup>**</sup>	Yes=NS
Health	Excel=NC*	Excel=NS	Excel=NS
Life Exciting	Yes=NS	Yes=NC*	Yes=NS
68.G Finances/Jobs	5		
Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Parents < Self	Self=NS	Self=NS	Self=NS
Kids > Self	Kids=NS	Kids=NS	Kids=NS
Lose Job	No=NS	No=NS	No=NS
Find Like Job	Can=NS	Can=NS	Can=NS
Work if Rich	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Ahead by Hard Work	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Finances Better	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
68.H Gender Roles	5		
Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Woman President	For=NS	For=NS	For=None*
Women Suited Pols.	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Women Work	For=Ref <sup>**</sup>	For=NS	For=NS
Nomen Home, Pols.	No=NS	No=NS	No=NS
Preschlers. Suffer	No=NS	No=NS	No=NS
Help Husband Frst.	No=NS	No=NS	No=NS
Men Work	No=NS	No=NS	No=NS
Norking Mother	OK=NS	OK=NS	OK=NS
68.I Child Values			
Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Obeying	Top=Ortho,Con***	Top=High**	Top=Other*
Popularity	Top=NS	Top=NS	Top=NS
Think for Self	Top=None <sup>**</sup>	Top=NS	Top=None <sup>***</sup>
Work Hard	Top=NS	Top=Mod*	Top=NS
Help Others	Top=NS	Top=NS	Top=NS
the stress			

<b>68.J Misanthropy</b> Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Trust	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Helpful	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Fair	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
<b>68.K Socializing</b> Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
	Denominations	rittendance	current/rust
With Friends	Often=NS	Often=NS	Often=NS
With Neighbors	Often=NS	Often=NS	Often=NS
With Relatives	Often=NS	Often=NC**	Often=NS
At Bars	Not Never=NS	Not Never=Mod**	Not Never=NS
68.L Politics			
Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Voted in 1992	Yes=Ref <sup>***</sup>	Yes=Mod <sup>**</sup>	Yes=NS
Voted in 1992	Yes=Ref <sup>**</sup>	Yes=Mod <sup>**</sup>	Yes=NS
Voted in 2000	Yes=Ref <sup>**</sup>	Yes=Mod*	Yes=NS
Voted Dem. in 1992	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Voted Dem. in 1992 Voted Dem. in 1996	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=None,Other**
Pol. Ideology	Liberal=None**	Liberal=Low**	Liberal=None**
Party ID	Dem=Con*	Dem=NS	Dem=Jew**
68.M Confidence in			
Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Banks/Financial	GrtDeal=Not None***	GrtDeal=High*	GrtDeal=NS
Major Companies	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=Low**	GrtDeal=NS
Organized Religion	GrtDeal=Ortho**	GrtDeal=High***	GrtDeal=Jew***
Education	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS
Fed. Exec. Branch	GrtDeal=NC <sup>**</sup>	GrtDeal=High**	GrtDeal=NS
Organized Labor	GrtDeal=None <sup>**</sup>	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS
Press	GrtDeal=None GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS
Medicine			
	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS
TV	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS
Supreme Court	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS
Science	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS
Congress Military	GrtDeal=NS GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS GrtDeal=NS	GrtDeal=NS GrtDeal=NS

#### 68.N Spending/Taxes

Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
Topics Space Environment Health Solve Big City Crime Rate Less Drug Addict. Education Improvement Blks. National Defense Foreign Aid Welfare Social Security Roads/Bridges Parks Mass Transit Assist Poor Law Enforcement Assist Blacks Assist Big Cities Drug Rehab	Denominations More=NS More=NS More=Con* More=Con* More=NS	Attendance More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS	Current/Past More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS More=NS
Own Income Taxes	Too High=NS	Too High=NS	Too High=NS

#### 68.0 Social Welfare

Topics	Denominations	Attendance	Current/Past
	Ver NC		V N **
Equalize Wealth	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=None <sup>**</sup>
Govt. Help Poor	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=NS
Govt. Help Sick	Yes=NS	Yes=NS	Yes=None <sup>**</sup>
Govt. Do More	Yes=None*	Yes=NS	Yes=NS

#### 68.P Crime Topics Denominations Attendance Current/Past Death Penalty No=NS No=NS No=NS **Tougher Courts** No=NS No=Low\* No=NS Fear Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=Ref, Missing\* Gun in House Yes=NS Yes=NS Personal Gun Yes=Ref, Missing Yes=NS Yes=Ns Police Hit, Ever Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=Ref, Ortho\*\* Pol. Hit, Escapee Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=Jew\*\* Pol. Hit, Attack Yes=NS Yes=NS Pol. Hit, Murderer Yes=No Yes=NS Yes=NS Pol. Hit, Abuse Yes=NS Yes=Mod\* Yes=NS Wiretap Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=NS **68.Q Civil Liberties** Topics Denominations Attendance Current/Past Yes=None\*\* Anti-Relig. Speak Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=None<sup>\*\*</sup> Yes=None<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Anti-Relig. Teach Yes=NS Yes=NS Anti-Relig. Book Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=None\* Racist Speak Yes=NS Yes=None\* Racist Teach Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=None\* Racist Book Yes=NS Communist Speak Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=None' Communist Teach Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=None\*\* Communist Book Yes=NS Yes=NS Militarist Speak Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=NS Militarist Teach Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=None,Ref<sup>\*\*</sup> Militarist Book Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=Low\*\* Yes=None\*\* Yes=not Ortho\*\* Homosexual Speak Homosexual Teach Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=NS Yes=None\*\* Homosexual Book Yes=NS Yes=NS 68.R Miscellaneous Topics Denominations Attendance Current/Past Spanking Children Approve=NS Approve=NS Approve=NS Divorce Laws Easier=NS Easier=NS Easier=NS World War Expected Yes=NS Yes=None\* Yes=NS Yes=None\*\*\* Legalize Marijuana Yes=NS Yes=Low\*

Often=NS

High=NS

Newspaper Reading

TV Hours

Often=Mod\*\*

High=High\*

Often=Jew\*\*

High=NC\*\*

#### Table 69 Relationship of Education and Income to Selected Measures among Jews, 1988-2002

	(regression coefficient/probability level) Independent Variables <sup>a</sup>	
Dependent Variables	Years of Schooling	Household Income
Abortion scale <sup>b</sup> Political ideology Civil liberties scale <sup>c</sup> Equalize wealth Homosexual behavior Govt. help sick Spending on welfare Party identification	209/.006 196/.001 250/.001 065/.380 174/.019 163/.031 080/.323 070/.228	009/.906 .166/.006 005/.949 .147/.052 043/.567 .110/.155 .049/.554 .020/.741

Note: Items are coded so a negative relationship indicates that years of schooling or household education is associated with the liberal positions (i.e., pro-choice, self-identification as liberal, for free speech, etc., for equalizing wealth, accepting of homosexuality, for more government health care, for more welfare spending, and Democratic Party identification).

a. Multiple regression analysis was conducted with additional controls for age, sex, region (Northeast vs. other), and urbanicity.

b. A scale was made from the seven abortion items.

c. A scale was made from the fifteen civil liberties items.

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# Appendixes

#### Appendix 1: The National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey

The National Data Program for the Social Sciences has been monitoring trends in American society since 1972. It is the largest and longest-running research effort supported by the Sociology Program of the National Science Foundation. Since 1972 the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago has conducted the General Social Survey (GSS) twenty-four times to examine how American society works and what social changes are occurring. The GSSs are full-probability samples of adults (eighteen+) living in households in the United States. Interviews are conducted in person. The annual response rates have ranged from 70.0 percent to 82.4 percent. Across the surveys from 1972 to 2002, 43,698 people have been interviewed. For more details on sampling, survey design, question wordings, and other information, see James A. Davis, Tom W. Smith, and Peter V. Marsden, *General Social Surveys: 1972-2002: Cumulative Codebook* (Chicago: NORC, 2003). Also, consult the following Web site: www.icpsr.umich.edu/gss.

The GSSs are directed by James A. Davis (NORC, University of Chicago), Tom W. Smith (NORC, University of Chicago), and Peter V. Marsden (Harvard University).

#### Appendix 2: Ethnic Classification

Because the GSSs are replicating cross-sectional surveys, it is possible to aggregate subgroups by pooling across years. This is the strategy used in this analysis. For the trend analysis of how Jews and non-Jews have compared across time, surveys were grouped together as listed below:

Sample Size			
Years	Jews	Non-Jews	
1972-80	272	11,816	
1981-90	266	13,126	
1991-2002	333	17,015	
All Years	871	41,957	

To compare Jews with other ethnic groups, the 1991-2002 GSSs were combined into the following categories:

Ethnicity	Sample Size
German (includes Austrian, Dutch)	2,662
British (English, Welsh, Scottish)	2,254
Black	2,228
Irish	1,631
Hispanic (Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, etc.)	1,033
Italian	779
Native American (American Indian)	601
Scandinavian (Danish, Swedish, Norse, Finnish)	566
French	516
Eastern European (except Polish)	430
Asian	395
Polish	351
Jewish	333
Other White (Other Countries/DK Country)	3,513
Other (Non-White and Non-Black; Other/DK Country)	140
All	17,433

This ethnic typology combines elements of national origins, religion, and race into fifteen groups. Classification as German, British, Irish, Hispanic, Italian, Scandinavian, Native American, French, Eastern European, Polish, and Asian is based on the national origin item. ("From what country or part of the world did your ancestors come?") Classification as Jewish is based on current religion. ("What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?") Classification as Black, Other White, and Other is based in whole or in part on the race item. ("What race do you consider yourself?") Other Whites are those a) giving their race as White, b) not Jewish, and c) either mentioning a national origin not covered above or not selecting any national origin. Others are a) Other on race (non-White and non-Black), b) not Jewish, and c) either mentioning a national origin not covered above or not selecting any national origin.

In both of the above listings these are the maximum number of each group that the analysis is based on. Due to missing values or questions not being asked in a particular GSS, the number of respondents in many comparisons will be somewhat smaller.

If Jewish was eliminated as an ethnic category and Jews were assigned to other ethnic/racial groups, 95.7 percent would be non-Hispanic White (38.5 percent Eastern European, mostly Russian; 31.6 percent Other White; 9.9 percent Polish; 8.8 percent German; and 6.9 percent in the other European groups delineated above) and 4.3 percent other races and ethnicities (2.2 percent Black, 1.2 percent Hispanic, 0.9 percent Asian).

For alternative definitions and how their use affects the size of the Jewish population, see Appendices 4 and 5.

#### Appendix 3: Religious Classification

Religions are divided into seven categories based on current religious preference ("What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?"): 1) Jewish, 2) Catholic, 3) those with no religious preference (i.e., "Nones" on current religion), 4) Protestants belonging to a fundamentalist denomination (e.g., Assemblies of God, Pentecostal, Southern Baptist), 5) Protestants belonging to a moderate denomination (e.g., American Baptist Churches, Evangelical Lutheran Church, Reformed), 6) Protestants belonging to a liberal denomination (e.g., Episcopal, United Church of Christ, Unitarian), and 7) all others (i.e., Other Religions). Protestant denominations are divided on a fundamentalist/liberal theological dimension as explained in Tom W. Smith, "Classifying Protestant Denominations," *Review of Religious Research* 31 (March 1990): 225-45. In 1991-2002 there were the following number of cases:

Jews	333
Catholics	4,430
Nones	3,799
Fundamentalist Protestants	5,248
Moderate Protestants	2,071
Liberal Protestants	2,296
Other Religions	807
Total	17,195

Due to missing values and questions not being asked in a particular GSS, the number in many comparisons will be somewhat smaller.

#### Appendix 4: Classification of Jews

Jews were divided in three different ways to examine subgroup differences. The first classification considered current and previous religious identification. It consisted of a) those currently giving their religion as Jewish (the same definition of Jewish as used in the over-time and ethnic and religious group analyses), b) those raised as Jewish, but with no current religious preference, and c) those raised as Jewish, but with some other current religious preference (Catholic, Protestant, or some other religion). In the 1988-2002 GSSs there were 412 current Jews, 42 Jewish/None, and 29 Jewish/Other.

The second classification used an item first added in 1988 that asks current Jews, "Do you consider yourself Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, or none of these?" There were 20 Orthodox, 116 Conservative, 174 Reform, 85 None of these, 1 Don't Know, and 17 No Answer/Missing.<sup>1</sup> On denominational differences among Jews, see Lazerwitz, 1998; Mayer, Kosmin, and Keysar, 2002; and United Jewish Communities, 2004a, b, c.

The third classification looked at current Jews by frequency of attending religious services. The three levels were: High (monthly or more often), Moderate (less than monthly, but at least once or twice a year), and Low (less than once a year or never). In 1988-2002 there were 99 High, 212 Moderate, and 99 Low cases.

<sup>1.</sup> The GSS appears to get more Reform Jews than the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) 2000-01 found (United Jewish Communities, 2003a, b, c). The GSS has 44 percent Reform, 29 percent Conservative, 5 percent Orthodox, and 20 percent none of these. The NJPS reports 35 percent Reform, 26 percent Conservative, 10 percent Orthodox, 20 percent "just Jewish," and 9 percent other. However, most of the differences probably reflect the different way the items were asked and coded rather than real differences in the distribution of Jewish denominations across the surveys.

#### Appendix 5: Estimates of Jewish Proportion of American Population

Using current religious preference/affiliation as the criteria, Jews are about 1.5-2.0 percent of the adult population (Table A5.1). Using broader definitions of who is Jew-ish pushes estimates of the Jewish share of the adult population to 1.7-2.5 percent (Table A5.2). Figures for the total population (adults + children) in turn slightly reduce the estimates.

#### Table A5.1 Estimates of Number of Jews in the United States: Adults

Orgs.	Dates	Mode	Sample Size	Estimate	es
			MVs I	ncluded MVs	Excluded
Gallup	1997-2001	Т	13,714		1.8%
Gallup	2001-02	Т	25,102		1.9%
ANES/ISR	1998-2000	T/P	3,049-3,088	2.0%	2.0%
GSS	1998-2002	Р	8,353-8,414	1.8%	1.8%
ARIS	2001	Т	47,525-50,238 <sup>a</sup>	1.3-1.4%	1.4%
NJPS	2000-01	Т	170,922-174,660 <sup>b</sup>	1.6%	1.6%

T=telephone

P=in person/face-to-face

a. ARIS reports 1.3 percent in Exhibit 1, but using numbers also reported in Exhibit 1, a level of 1.4 percent is obtained. The number of cases with missing data excluded is estimated based on percentages reported in Exhibit 1.

b. The number of cases with missing data excluded is estimated based on reported 2.1 percent missing.

#### Wordings:

Gallup:

What is your religious preference—is it Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or an Orthodox religion such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?

ANES/ISR (American National Election Studies/Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan):

If attends religious services: Do you mostly attend a place of worship that is Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or what?

If doesn't attend religious services: Regardless of whether you now attend religious services, do you ever think of yourself as part of a particular church or denomination? If yes: Do you consider yourself Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or what?

GSS (General Social Survey, NORC, University of Chicago):

What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?

ARIS (American Religious Identification Survey, City University of New York): What is your religion, if any?

NJPS (National Jewish Population Survey, United Jewish Communities): What is (your)(NAMES's) religion, if any?

## Table A5.2

Estimates of Number of Jews in the United States for Adults and Total Population using Various Definitions

		Total
Survey	Adults	Population <sup>a</sup>
GSS:		
Religious Preference	1.8	1.7
Rel. Pref. + Religious Upbringing	2.1	1.9
Current or Raised Jewish	2.2	2.0
ARIS/AJIS: <sup>b</sup>		
Religious Preference	1.3-1.4	
Rel. Pref. + Parentage	2.4	
Rel. Pref. + Par. + Upbringing +		
Considers Self Jewish	2.6	
Core Jewish Population	1.9	1.9 <sup>c</sup>
NJPS:		
Religious Preference	1.5	1.5
Rel. Pref. + Jewish Background,		
no current religion	1.7	1.6
Rel. Pref., Jewish Background,		
not now Christian or Muslim	2.1	1.9
Rel. Pref. + Jewish Background	2.5	2.2

a. Total population estimate for the GSS assumes that all members of a household (adults and children) are the same religion as the randomly selected adult respondent.

b. While the ARIS and AJIS (American Jewish Identification Survey) are essentially the same survey, estimates from separate reports differ for reasons that are not clear. Two figures under adults are based respectively on number of cases divided by total number of respondents and estimated total number of adults that this represents divided by total number of adults according to the Census. c. Includes adjustment for institutionalized population and omission of Alaska and Hawaii.

#### GSS:

Religious Preferences = Jewish on following question: "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?"

Religious Preference + Religious Upbringing = Jewish on religious preference item above + "no religion" on religious preference item and Jewish on item: "In what religion were you raised?"

Current or Raised Jewish = Jewish on either current religious preference or religion raised in. ARIS/AJIS:

Religious Preference = Jewish on the following question: "What is your religion, if any?"

Religious Preference + Parentage = Jewish on religious preference item above + had Jewish parent ("Do you or does anyone else in your household have a Jewish mother or a Jewish father?" If "Yes" or "Partly/half Jewish," then: "Is it you, yourself, someone else in your household, or both you and someone else in the household that has a Jewish mother or father?")

Religious Preference + Parentage + Upbringing + Considers Self Jewish = Jewish on religious preference or parentage or upbringing ("Were you, or anyone in your household raised as Jewish?" If

"Yes" or "Partly/half Jewish": "Is it you, yourself, or someone else in your household, or both you and someone else in your household that was raised Jewish?") or other self-identification: ("Do you, or anyone else in your household consider himself/herself to be Jewish?" If "Yes": "Is it just you yourself, someone else in your household, or both you and someone else in your household that considers himself/herself to be Jewish?")

Core Jewish Population = Religious preference is Jewish or has Jewish parent and no current religious preference or the minor, coresiding child of such a person.

NJPS:

Religious Preference = Adults: "What is your (relationship's) religion, if any?" Children: "In what religion is your (relationship) being raised?"

Rel. Pref. + Jewish Background, no current religion = In addition to those with Jewish religious preference, includes the following:

Adults: "What is your (relation's) religion, if any?" None, No Religion, Secular, Atheist, Agnostic, Don't Know, Refused and Jewish to at least one of the following: "Was your (relationship's) mother born Jewish? Was your (relationship's) father born Jewish? Were you (was your [relationship]) raised Jewish?"

Children: "In what religion is your (relationship) being raised?" None, No Religion, Secular, Atheist, Agnostic, Don't Know, Refused and Jewish to at least one of the following: "Is your (relationship) being raised Jewish? Is your (relationship) considered Jewish for any reason?"

Rel. Pref., Jewish Background, not now Christian or Muslim = to those with Jewish background, but no current religion, adds in those with any non-Christian and non-Muslim religion and some Jewish background.

Rel. Pref. + Jewish Background = adds in those now Christian or Muslim with some Jewish background (i.e., mother or father born Jewish or person raised as Jewish).

# OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY TOM W. SMITH FOR THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

- Jewish Attitudes toward Blacks and Race Relations. Jewish Sociology Papers. New York: American Jewish Committee, 1990.
- What Do Americans Think About Jews? Working Papers on Contemporary Anti-Semitism. New York: American Jewish Committee, 1991.
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